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L161— O-1096 

THE  LAW  OF  LOVE 

AND  LOYE  AS  A  LAW; 

OB, 

CHRISTIAN  ETHICS. 
Uttim  €tiition* 
THEORY  OF  MORALS  RESTATED. 

FOB  USE  WITH  "  THE  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN." 

BT 

MAKK  HOPKINS,  D.D.,  LL.D. 


NEW  YORK: 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS. 
1884 


Copyright,  1881, 

By  chakles  scribner'S  sons. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge : 
Stereotyped  and  Printed  by  II.  0.  Houghton  &  Co* 


170 


To  THE 


HON.  WILLIAM  E.  DODGE. 


My  Dear  Sir:  — 

As  the  following  work,  in  its  present  form,  is  due  to  leisure 
that  came  through  your  beneficence,  it  is  fit  that  it  should  be 
dedicated  to  you.  I  wish,  too,  as  my  name  has  so  long  been 
associated  with  yours  in  connection  with  a  great  movement  for 
the  spread  of  Christianity,  that  it  may  also  be  thus  associated  in 
connection  with  a  system  of  Moral  Science  which  is  no  less  in 
accord  with  Christianity  than  with  the  constitution  of  man,  and 
which  will,  as  I  trust,  aid  in  its  promotion. 


With  high  respect  and  regard,  yours. 


MARK  HOPKINS. 


PREFACE. 


♦  ■ 

In  the  preface  to  the  first  edition  of  "  The  Law 
of  Love  and  Love  as  a  Law,"  reasons  were  given 
for  the  publication  of  that  work  in  addition  to  the 
Lectures  on  Moral  Science."  To  the  third  edi- 
tion a  second  preface  was  added,  and  of  that  the 
larger  part  is  here  given. 

In  publishing  a  third  edition  of  the  following 
work  some  notice  of  the  discussions  to  which  it 
has  given  rise  seems  called  for.  In  these  it  has 
apparently  been  forgotten  by  many  how  entirely 
the  work  is  an  exposition  of  that  cardinal  pre- 
cept of  Christian  philosophy,  '  Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neigh- 
bor as  thyself.'  As  imperative  there  is  in  that 
precept  Law;  and  the  one  thing  required  by  that 
law  is  Love.  This  gives  us  '  The  Law  of  Love,' 
and  the  law  practically  carried  out  gives  us  '  Love 
as  a  Law.'  With  this  the  doctrine  of  ends  as 
stated  in  the  '  Lectures  on  Moral  Science  '  is  co- 
incident, since  the  end  of  Love,  so  far  as  there  is 
choice  in  it,  and  so  morality,  must  be  the  good 
of  the  person  loved. 


vi 


PREFACE. 


"  But  while  the  cardinal  principle  of  Christian 
philosophy  is  as  stated  above,  that  of  the  prevalent 
philosophy  is,  '  Do  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right.'  Are  these  identical  ?  If  so,  those  that 
hold  to  the  doctrine  of  an  ultimate  right  may  spare 
their  attacks,  for  I  am  substantially  agreed  with 
them.  If  not,  it  is  for  them  to  reconcile  their  ac- 
ceptance of  the  precept  with  their  acceptance  of 
Christianity  as  a  philosophy.  What  we  need  is  a 
Christian  philosophy.  Not  that  philosophy  is  to 
be  received  on  the  basis  of  revelation.  To  be 
philosophy  it  must  be  received  on  the  basis  of  rea- 
son. But  if  a  revelation  really  from  God  teach  or 
imply  a  philosophy,  it  must  coincide  with  that 
taught  by  reason,  and  ought  to  be  seen  thus  to 
coincide.  If  Christendom  is  ever  to  be  a  fair  ex- 
ponent of  Christianity,  its  Moral  Philosophy  must 
be  that  of  Christianity. 

"  We  need  also  a  philosophy  in  which  the  prac- 
tical shall  be  drawn  from  the  theoretical  part,  so 
that  they  shall  not  stand,  as  in  most  treatises,  like 
the  two  sides  of  the  Yosemite  Valley,  with  a  deep 
gulf  between  them.  If,  as  Dr.  Wayland  says  in 
the  opening  of  his  '  Practical  Ethics,'  the  whole 
Moral  Law  is  contained  in  the  single  word 
'  Love,'  it  would  seem  self-evident  that  the  theo- 
retical part,  the  philosophy,  must  consist  of  an 
exposition  of  Law  and  Love  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, and  as  related  to  each  other.  Such  an  expo- 
sition Dr.  Wayland  did  not  attempt,  nor  can  it  be 


PREFACE. 


vii 


successfully  attempted  by  any  one  of  his  school, 
or  of  the  school  of  Right,  except  as  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  two  precepts  above  given  are  iden- 
tical. 

"  That  those  precepts  can  be  made  identical  I 
do  not  believe.  To  me  they  seem  to  differ  both 
in  their  sphere  and  object.  The  sphere  of  the  one 
is  choice,  and  its  object  good.  To  choose  the  good 
of  beings  capable  of  good,  disinterestedly  and  as 
valuable  in  itself,  is  the  love  required.  Here  the 
sphere  is  choice  without  volition  or  outward  action, 
and  the  obligation  to  choose  thus  is  afBrmed  in 
view  of  good  as  valuable  in  itself,  and  with  no  in- 
tervention of  the  idea  of  right  as  distinguished 
from  that  of  obligation.  The  sphere  of  the  other 
is  volition  and  outward  action,  and  its  object  is 
right,  or  the  right.  As  commonly  defined,  and  in 
its  only  intelligible  sense,  right  is  the  quality  of 
an  action.  This  makes  the  right  to  be  an  abstrac- 
tion, a  mere  intellection,  as  it  is  acknowledged  to 
be,  which  can  become  a  motive  to  action  only  as 
an  element  is  '  surreptitiously  '  borrowed  from  the 
Bensibility  to  combine  with  it  and  make  it  obliga- 
tion. 

"  But  if  the  two  precepts  can  be  made  identical 
in  their  material,  the  whole  form  and  pressure  of 
a  system  of  duty  will  be  different  as  the  one  or 
the  other  shall  be  made  prominent.  The  Ptole- 
maic and  Copernican  systems  differ,  not  in  mate- 
rial, but  in  what  they  made  central ;  and  yet  the 


riii 


PREFACE. 


transition  from  the  one  to  the  other  was  one  of  the 
great  steps  of  progress.  And  so  it  is  here.  Let 
Love  be  made  central,  so  that  in  testing  actions 
men  shall  be  compelled  to  inquire  whether  they 
proceed  from  Love,  and  the  moral  heavens  would 
come  into  order  as  a  system,  and  order  in  society 
would  be  the  result.  The  idea  of  right  I  accept ; 
I  believe  in  it  as  obligatory  from  its  relation  to 
good.  As  thus  related,  and  so  only,  it  loses  that 
affinity  for  fanaticism  so  conspicuous  in  its  his- 
tory, and  which  has  made  religious  wars  and  per- 
secutions more  virulent  and  cruel  than  any  oth- 
ers. The  persecuting  Sauls  and  assassinating 
Balthazars  of  all  ages  have  '  verily  thought  that 
they  ought  to  do  '  what  they  have  done,  and  the 
step  now  needed  is  to  preclude,  as  far  as  possible, 
such  mistakes  by  making  good  and  Love  central, 
and  the  '  Law  of  Love  '  the  test  of  right. 

"  We  also  need,  in  practical  morals,  to  see  the 
guidance  which  Love  may  find  from  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  susceptibilities  and  the  powers  ; 
and  from  the  whole  constitution  of  nature  and  of 
man  through  the  unifying  relation  of  conditioning 
and  conditioned  forces  and  faculties,  and  the  Law 
of  Limitation  based  on  that.  Whoever  will  be  at 
the  pains  to  trace  this  out  will,  I  hope,  find  a  sys- 
tem consistent  with  itself  and  in  harmony  with 
nature  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  the  Scriptures 
on  the  other. 

"  For  the  readier  apprehension  of  the  system, 


PREFACE. 


ix 


which  involves  the  step  above  mentioned,  I  ask 
attention  to  the  following  propositions  which  con- 
tain its  principal  points  :  — 

(1.)  Moral  philosophy  regards  man  only  as 
choosing  and  acting  from  choice. 

(2.)  "  Moral  action  is  rational,  as  distinguished 
from  instinctive  action. 

(3.)  "  Rational  action  implies  a  recognized 
end. 

(4.)  "  There  can  be  no  conception  of  an  end  as 
a  ground  of  rational  action  except  through  a  sen- 
sibility. 

(5.)  The  end  which  man  ought  to  choose  is 
indicated  by  his  moral  nature,  which  affirms  obli- 
gation to  choose  it ;  but  it  is  in  his  power  to  re- 
ject it. 

(6.)  "  This  end  is  the  good  of  all  beings  capa- 
ble of  good,  his  own  included. 

(7.)  "  This  good  has  value  in  itself,  absolute 
value,  which  makes  it  an  object  of  rational  choice 
for  its  own  sake. 

(8.)  "  The  choice  of  this  good  as  the  supremo 
end  is.thej^ve  required  by  the  Law  ;  and  hence,  a 
in  Love,  known  as  Law,  wisdom  and  virtue  are 
identified.    As  obedience  to  moral  law,  it  is  vir- 
tue ;  as  the  choice  of  good,  it  is  wisdom. 

(9.)  "  When  an  act  of  choice  alone  is  required 
without  volition  or  the  use  of  means,  as  in  Love 
or  good-willing,  obligation  is  affirmed  at  once 
without  the  intervention  of  the  idea  of  right,  and 


PREFACE. 


with  no  place  for  it  unless  it  be  regarded  as  syn« 
onomous  with  obligation. 

(10.)  "  The  choice  of  good  being  thus  virtue, 
action  from  this  choice  is  virtuous  action.  The 
good  tree  makes  the  fruit  good. 

(11.)  "  Action  that  would  naturally  tend  to 
promote  this  good  is  right  action,  and  is  obliga- 
tory from  that  tendency. 

(12.)  "  The  rejection  of  the  end,  indicated  by 
the  moral  nature,  and  any  form  of  choice  incom- 
patible with  that  end,  is  lawlessness  and  wicked- 
ness. 

"Identifying  as  above,  wisdom  and  virtue  in 
Love  known  as  Law,  we  find  a  ground  of  har- 
mony between  teleological  and  intuitive  systems. 
It  has  not  been  sufficiently  observed,  that  the 
moral  imperative,  in  which  I  believe  fully,  the 
affirmation  of  obligation  to  love,  can  be'  legiti- 
mately given  forth  only  in  the  apprehension  of 
that  very  good,  which  wisdom  would  choose  for  its 
own  sake.  This  imperative  is  not  the  product  of 
will.  It  is  not,  therefore,  as  the  advocates  of  the 
theory  of  right  persistently  assert,  a  part  of  vir- 
tue. It  is  no  more  a  part  of  virtue  than  it  is  of 
vice,  since  there  could  be  neither  without  it.  It 
is  the  voice  of  our  moral  nature  made  possible  and 
rational  by  the  rational  apprehension  of  good,  and 
can  become  Law  only  as  that  good  is  the  good  of 
all  beings  capable  of  good,  or  at  least  is  compati- 
ble with  that.    In  this  view  of  it,  that  '  Good 


PREFACE. 


xi 


Dess  of  will,'  of  wMcli  Kant  speaks  as  '  the  one 
absolute  good,'  is  not  a  good  at  all.  It  is  good- 
ness —  goodness  because  it  is  tlie  choice  of  good, 
and  without  the  idea  of  that,  the  very  idea  of 
goodness  had  not  been  possible. 

"  It  is  to  be  added  that  if  the  good  be  disin- 
terestedly chosen,  the  fact  that  it  is  a  good  can 
never  make  the  system  utilitarian.  That  the 
system  is  one  of  Love,  the  very  Love  commanded 
and  made  Law  by  God,  would,  it  might  have 
been  supposed,  be  a  bar  to  the  charge  of  utilitari- 
anism.   Love  cannot  be  utilitarian." 

The  above  is  thus  far  retained,  partly  to  show 
that  in  rewriting,  as  I  have  now  done,  the  theo- 
retical part  of  the  work,  the  system  is  not  changed. 
My  objects  in  rewriting  were  two.  Of  these,  one 
was  to  bring  the  present  work  into  closer  relation 
to  the  "  Outline  Study  of  Man."  It  is  really  a 
continuation  of  that  from  the  point  where  up- 
building was  completed,  and  would  naturally  fol- 
low that  in  a  course  of  study  ;  but  as  this  was 
written  before  that,  the  points  of  connection  were 
less  numerous  and  less  obvious  than  I  could  wish. 
I  wished  also  to  carry  over  into  moral  science 
the  method  of  teaching  by  diagrams.  For  this 
there  is  less  scope  here  than  in  mental  science, 
but  it  is  hoped  that  what  has  been  done  may  not 
be  without  benefit. 

Another  object  I  had  in  view  was,  by  giving 
the  system  more  unity,  to  state  it  so  that  it  might 


PREFACE, 


be  more  readily  apprehended.  In  attempting 
this,  I  have  started  from  a  new  definition,  have 
carried  the  subject  of  the  science  back  from  con- 
duct, where  it  is  placed  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer, 
in  his  Data  of  Ethics,  to  man  himself  as  choos- 
ing and  acting  from  choice,  and  have  sought  to 
keep  closely  to  an  exposition  of  the  definition.  It 
should  be  said,  howevei\  that  a  subject  so  complex 
as  this,  and  involving  so  much  of  mental  science, 
cannot  be  understood  without  careful  study. 

The  system  advocated  in  the  following  work 
differs  radically  from  that  commonly  received. 
Some  of  the  differences  have  been  already  men- 
tioned, but  as  the  interest  of  truth  requires  that 
they  should  be  clearly  seen,  the  following  propo- 
sitions are  stated.  In  common  with  most  other 
systems,  it  makes  choice  the  moral  act.  It  then 
differs  from  them  — 

(1.)  In  making  the  ultimate  object  of  choice 
always  a  good  as  furnished  by  the  sensibility, 
and  not  right,  or  the  right  as  furnished  by  the 
moral  nature. 

(2.)  In  making  the  sensibility  a  condition  for 
moral  ideas,  while  it  holds  to  their  origin  as  nec- 
essary, and  from  the  moral  reason.  That  they 
are  conditioned  on  a  sensibility  no  more  affects 
their  character  as  rational,  than  the  fact  that  the 
ideas  of  personal  identity  and  resemblance  are 
conditioned  on  the  idea  of  being  affects  their 
character  as  rational. 


PREFACE. 


xiii 


(3.)  In  making  the  idea  of  rights  and  of  obli- 
gation, as  belonging  to  the  person,  the  primary 
product  of  the  moral  reason,  instead  of  the  idea  of 
right  as  the  quality  of  an  action,  or  of  the  right  as 
an  abstraction. 

(4.)  In  making  the  idea  of  obligation  in  view 
of  a  higher  good  to  be  chosen,  independent  of  that 
of  right. 

(5.)  In  the  place  and  office  now  necessarily 
given  to  the  conscience  as  behind  the  will,  and  as 
privy  councilor  in  guiding  its  choices. 

(6.)  In  the  identity  of  choice,  and  also  of  vris- 
dom  and  virtue,  with  Love. 

(7.)  In  the  ability  we  thus  gain  to  reconcile,  as 
in  no  other  way,  teleological  and  intuitive,  script- 
ural and  rational  systems. 

(8.)  In  bringing  into  moral  science  the  law  of 
the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned,  and  the  law 
of  limitation  based  upon  that. 

Other  points  might  be  mentioned,  and  are,  in 
the  preface  to  the  first  edition,  but  these  are  suffi- 
cient. 

Among  the  above  I  ask  special. attention  to  the 
second,  in  which  the  relation  of  a  good  in  the  sen- 
sibility to  moral  ideas  is  affirmed.  I  hold  to  ob- 
ligation as  strongly  as  any  one.  I  hold  to  a  moral 
nature,  through  which  rights  and  obligation  are 
immediately  and  necessarily  affirmed ;  but  I  hold 
that  obligation  is  obligation  to  choose,  and  because 
I  hold  further,  that  it  is  obligation  to  choose  a 


xiv 


PREFACE. 


good  rather  than  the  quality  of  an  action,  or  an 
abstract  quality,  I  am  regarded  by  some  as  a  util- 
itarian.   Utility  is  a  good  thing  in  its  place,  but 
that  place  is  not  at  the  basis  of  a  moral  system. 
I  would  choose  a  good,  not  for  its  utility,  for  it 
has  none.    It  is  the  only  thing  I  know  of  that 
neither  has,  nor  can  have,  utility.  I  would  choose*) 
it  for  its  own  sake,  and  also  as  under  obligation  to\ 
choose  it,  and  that  behest  of  moral  law  would,  or< 
should,  lead  me  to  adhere  to  the  choice  of  tJiei' 
good,  and  of  the  good  of  others,  which  is  love,^. 
under  every  extremity.    A  system  which  thus 
recognizes  a  moral  nature,  and  the  sacredness  of 
obligation,  is  not  what  I  understand  a  system  of 
utility  or  of  expediency  to  be.    Nor  is  it  a  blend- 
ing of  any  two  systems,  but  a  statement  of  the  re- 
lation of  the  sensibility  and  the  moral  nature  to 
the  will,  of  virtue  to  a  good,  and  thus  the  solution, 
or  at  least  an  attempted  solution,  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult problem  in  theoretical  morals. 

In  the  rewriting,  I  have  given  more  prominence 
than  heretofore  to  Rights,  making  the  idea  of 
them,  in  its  necessary  connection  with  that  of  ob- 
ligation, the  primary  moral  idea,  and  also  making 
them,  in  connection  with  the  desires,  active  prin- 
ciples. I  have  also  placed  the  moral  affections 
among  the  active  principles.  « 

As  the  doctrines  of  the  work  have  not  been 
changed,  the  correspondence  with  Dr.  McCosli  is 
retained,  tliouf^li  witli  some  want,  not  important, 
of  accuracy  in  the  references.^ 
*  See  Appendix. 


CONTENTS. 


PART  L 

THEORETICAL. 
THE  LAW  OF  LOVE. 

MAN  CHOOSING  UNDER  MORAL  LAW. 


Definition,  Division,  and  Preliminary  Statements       .      •  .31 
DIVISION  1. 

Ihe  Intellect  84 

DIVISION  11. 

THE  SENSIBILITY. 
CHAPTER  I. 

The  Sensibility  in  General  •      •  86 

CHAPTER  II. 

A-Good   .  41 

CHAPTER  III. 

Different  Kinds  of  Activity  determining  The  Quality  of  the  Good  45 
CHAPTER  IV. 

Impulsive  Principles  of  Action  «      •  52 

CHAPTER  V. 

Rational  Principles  of  Action  59 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Moral  Affections     .      .      •      •      •      •      •      •      »  ^ 


Xvi  CONTENTS. 

DIVISION  nL 

The  Will  69 

DIVISION  IV. 
CHAPTER  I. 

The  Moral  Nature  73 
CHAPTER  II. 

Moral  Law  79 

DIVISION  V. 
The  Person  85 

DIVISION  VI. 
Eight  and  Wrong  •      •  87 

DIVISION  VII. 

MAN  CHOOSING. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Alternatives  and  Law  95 

CHAPTER  n. 

Wickedness  •      •      •      «  108 

DIVISION  vin. 

Conscience  Ill 


PART  II. 

PRACTICAL. 
LOVE  AS  A  LAW. 

MAN  ACTING  FEOM  CHOICE  UNDER  MORAL  LAW. 

CHAPTER  1. 

PRELIMINARY  STATEMENT. 

Love  as  a  Law  distinguished  from  the  Law  of  Love    .      .      .  119 


CONTENTS.  XVii 
CHAPTER  n. 

Classification  of  Duties.      ••••••••  123 

CLASS  L 

DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 

Classification  •      •      •      •  127 

DIVISION  L 

The  Securing  of  our  Rights  •      .  127 

DIVISION  n. 

The  Supply  of  our  Wants  129 

DIVISION  III. 


THE  PERFECTING  OF  OUR  POWERS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Perfection  as  related  to  Direct  Action  for  others:  of  the  Body 


of  the  Mind  130 

CHAPTER  II. 

Perfection  as  related  to  Unconscious  Influence     •      •      •      •  143 
CHAPTER  IH. 

Perfection  as  related  to  Complacency  145 
CHAPTER  IV. 

Perfection  as  related  to  the  glory  of  God    •      •      *      •      •  147 
CHAPTER  V. 

Perfection  as  related  to  Self-love  .       •«••••  148 
CHAPTER  VI. 

Habits  149 

b 


xviii 


CONTENTS. 


CLASS  n. 

DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW-MEN. 
PRELIMINARY. 

PAQ] 

Self-love  and  the  Love  of  others  .      .      .      •      •      •  .155 
FIRST  GREAT  DIVISION. 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 

DIVISION  I. 
DUTIES  REGARDING  THE  RIGHTS  OF  OTHERS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Of  Rights  157 

CHAPTER  II. 

Personal  Rights :  Life  and  Liberty  166 

CHAPTER  in. 

Right  to  Property  169 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Right  to  Reputation  182 

CHAPTER  V. 

Eight  to  Truth  186 

DIVISION  II. 

DUTIES  REGARDING  THE  WANTS  OP  OTHERS. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Justice  and  Benevolence      .      .      .      .  •    .      .      .       .  189 
CHAPTER  II. 

Supply  of  the  Wants  of  others  194 


CONTENTS, 


DIVISION  in. 

PBBFECTING  AND  DIRECTING  THE  POWERS  OF  OTHERS. 
CHAPTER  I. 

PAGB 

Duty  of  Influence  from  the  Relation  of  Character  to  "Well-being. 
—  Obstacles  to  Change  of  Intellectual  State  and  of  Charac* 
ter  198 

CHAPTER  II. 

Spheres  of  Effort:  Who  may  labor  in  them  208 

SECOND  GREAT  DIVISION. 

DUTIES  FROM  SPECIAL  RELATIONS. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Rights  of  Persons :  Right  and  Rights :  Special  Duties :  The 
Family  210 

CHAPTER  II. 

Government:  Responsibility:  Punishment  219 

CHAPTER  III. 

Relation  of  the  Sexes :  Chastity  233 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Rights  and  Duties  in  Relation  to  Marriage  236 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Law  of  Divorce  244 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Rights  and  Duties  of  Parents  and  Children  247 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Society  and  Government:  The  Sphere  of  Government:  Origin 
of  Government:  Mode  of  Formation         •      .      •      .  255 


£1  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

PAGI 

Goverament  Representative  and  Instrumental:  ThB  'Bight  ot 


Suffrage  269 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Forms  of  Goyemment :  Duties  of  Magistrates  and  Citizens      •  S84 

CLASS  ni. 

DUTIES  TO  GOD. 
CHAPTER  I 

Duties  to  God  defined  •  291 

CHAPTER  n. 

Cultivation  of  a  Devotional  Spirit       ••••••  295 

CHAPTER  III. 

Prayer  801 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Sabbath  «09 

Appendix  •     •  127 


INTRODUCTION. 

» 

DIFFERENT  THEORIES. 

Morality  regards  man  as  active.  Hence  moral 
science  must  imply  a  systematic  knowledge  of  those 
powers  in  man  which  tend  to,  or  regulate  action, 
as  those  powers  are  related  to  each  other,  and  to 
the  objects  that  excite  their  action.  These  powers 
are  related  to  each  other  as  a  system  capable  of 
harmonious  action,  and  of  securing  through  such 
action  the  highest  good  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
whole. 

Into  the  conception  of  a  system  of  active  powers 
the  idea  of  order,  subordination,  and  of  a  supreme 
controlling  powder  must  enter ;  and  that  action  of 
such  a  system  which  would  secure  the  highest  good 
of  the  individual  and  of  the  whole  is  right  action 
Such  action  must  be  rational.  It  presupposes  an 
end  good  in  itself,  and  known  to  be  good ;  but  it 
tan  be  moral  only  as  we  have  a  moral  nature 
affirming  obligation  to  such  action. 

Of  the  nature  and  foundation  of  moral  obliga- 
tion which  I  suppose  to  be  thus  affirmed,  different 
i 


2 


INTRODUCTION, 


accounts  have  been  given.  This  has  arisen  in  part 
from  the  ambiguity  of  language,  but  more  from  a 
partial  apprehension  and  wrong  adjustment  of  the 
facts  and  principles  of  our  complex  nature.  A 
striking  fact,  as  of  association,  or  a  powerful  princi- 
ple, as  of  self-love  or  sympathy,  is  seized  upon  and 
made  to  account  for  everything.  It  becomes  the 
centre  of  a  system  having  in  it,  perhaps,  much  tha 
is  plausible,  and  much  truth  in  its  details,  but  as  a 
system  wholly  false.  Such  systems  are  not  useless. 
They  insure  a  careftil  examination  of  the  facts 
made  central ;  the  incidental  truth  involved,  as  in 
the  treatise  of  Adam  Smith,  is  often  of  much  value ; 
and  something  is  done  in  limiting  and  exhausting 
the  possibilities  of  error. 

And  not  only  are  different  systems  produced  from 
Different  abovc  causcs,  but  the  moral  problem 

the^t^oraf  ^^^^^^  differently  stated.  By  some  it  is 
problem.  made  an  inquiry  concerning  the  moral 
nature ;  by  some,  concerning  the  nature  of  virtue ; 
by  some,  concerning  the  source  and  nature  of  right ; 
by  some,  after  an  ultimate  rule ;  and  by  some,  afler 
the  nature  and  foundation,  or  ground,  of  obliga- 
tion. This  last  I  think  preferable.  In  the  fact  of 
obligation  all  are  agreed.  All  are  agreed  that  all 
mankind  are  under  obligation  to  do  some  acts  and 
to  abstain  from  others.  Without  obligation  there 
*,an  be  no  morality  and  no  law,  and  a  statement  of 
the  ground  and  conditions  and  limitations  of  obliga- 
tion, would  be  a  statement  of  the  theory  of  morals 


INTRODUCTION. 


8 


As  I  propose  to  use  the  term,  a  ground  of  obli- 
gation for  us  must  presuppose  a  moral  nature  in 
as ;  and  the  question  what  that  nature  is,  is  entirely 
different  from  any  that  may  respect  the  ultimate 
ground  or  reason  for  its  activity.  The  nature  and 
constitution  of  the  eye  are  one  thing,  the  nature 
and  constitution  of  light,  without  which  the  function 
of  the  eye  could  not  be  performed  are  another. 
The  eye  and  light  are  related  to  each  other,  and 
each  is  so  indispensable  to  vision  that  either  might 
be  said  to  be  at  its  andation.  But  the  questions 
in  optics  respecting  the  eye,  and  those  respecting 
light,  are  entirely  distinct ;  and  if  the  powers  of  the 
eye  were  regarded  by  one  man  as  the  foundation  of 
the  faculty  of  sight,  and  if  the  properties  of  hght 
were  so  regarded  by  another,  and  if,  because  they 
were  using  the  same  word,  they  were  to  go  on 
under  the  delusion  that  they  were  treating  of  the 
same  thing,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  confusion  that 
must  ensue.  In  the  same  way  the  intellect,  with 
its  capacities  and  laws,  is  one  thing,  and  truth,  the 
object  of  the  intellect,  is  another.  These  so  imply 
each  other  that  without  truth  the  intellect  could 
not  act,  and  either  might  be  said  to  be  the  founda- 
tion of  mental  activity.  Here,  also,  there  would 
be  the  same  confusion  if  men  were  to  mistake  one 
for  the  other,  or,  without  being  aware  of  the  transi- 
tion, were  to  apply  the  same  terms  to  both. 

But  this  is  precisely  what  has  happened  in  specu 
lations  on  morals.    Men  have  sometimes  spoken  of 


mT^ODUCTION. 


the  various  faculties  and  powers  mvolved  in  the 
moral  nature,  such  as  conscience  and  free  will,  as 
lying  at  the  foundation  of  obligation;  sometimes 
they  have  spoken  of  that  ultimate  ground  or  reason 
in  view  of  which  alone  the  moral  nature  can 
legitimately  act,  and  sometimes  they  have  included 
both.  The  fact  of  this  confusion  is  said  hy  Sir 
James  Mcintosh  to  have  been  a  great,  and  indeed 
the  main  reason  of  the  confusion  there  has  been  in 
the  perplexed  speculation'^'  on  the  subject  of  morals. 
Speaking  of  the  difference  c^^tween  the  *'  Theory 
of  Moral  Sentiment,"  and  the  "  Criterion  of  Mo- 
rality," he  says :  "  The  discrimination  has  seldom 
been  made  by  moral  philosophers ;  the  difference 
between  the  two  problems  has  never  been  uniform- 
ly observed  by  any  of  them  ;  and  it  will  appear  in 
the  sequel,  that  they  have  been  not  rarely  alto- 
gether confounded  by  very  eminent  men,  to  the 
destruction  of  all  just  conception  and  of  all  correct 
reasoning  in  this  most  important,  and  perhaps  most 
difficult,  of  sciences." 

But  this  confusion  will  not  surprise  us  if  we  ob- 
serve how  the  speculations  on  these  different  sub- 
jects imply  and  almost  necessarily  run  into  each 
other.  If  we  would  understand  optics,  we  must 
understand  both  the  eye  and  light,  and  that  not 
merely  as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  as  they  are 
related  to  each  other.  If  we  would  understand 
moral  science,  we  must  understand  both  the  facul- 
ties which  8ct  and  thai  in  view  of  which  they  act 


INTRODUCTION. 


5 


but  we  must  be  careful  to  keep  our  speculations  on 
the  one  subject  distinct  from  those  on  the  other. 

If  I  say  that  self-interest  is  the  ground  of  obh'ga- 
tion  I  mean  that  it  is  that  in  view  of  which  obliga- 
tion is  affirmed  by  a  moral  agent  fully  constituted. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  I  say  that  free  will  is  the 
ground  of  obligation,  I  do  not  mean  that  it  is  that 
in  view  of  which  obligation  is  affirmed,  but  that  it 
is  a  power  essential  to  a  moral  agent,  a  necessary 
condition  of  the  affirmation  of  obhgation  by  such 
an  agent. 

If,  again,  it  be  said  that  self-interest  is  the  ground 
of  obhgation,  and  we  would  controvert  that,  we 
need  to  know  what  other  possible  grounds  there 
may  be ;  if  there  may  be  what  are  called  a  prion 
grounds  we  must  know  that,  and  be  able  to  state 
them,  and  this  will  involve  the  question  of  a  'priori 
knowledge  and  principles  of  action,  and  a  decision 
of  some  of  the  highest  and  most  disputed  problems 
")f  mental  science. 

Shall  we  then  regard  as  the  foundation  of  obliga- 
tion those  faculties  which  are  necessary  The  ground 
to  constitute  us  moral  beings  ;  or  that  in  ?Lun^vilw 
view  of  which,  we  being  thus  constituted,  obSat^nis 
obligation  is  affirmed  ?  With  given  facul- 
ties  I  see  a  crow  flying  over  my  head.  In  view  of 
that  fact  I  feel  no  obligation.  With  the  same 
faculties  I  see  a  man  in  danger  of  drowning.  In 
"^iew  of  that  fact  I  do  feel  under  obligation  to  aid 
aim  if  I  can.    Here  is  a  ground  of  difference,  and 


6 


INTRODUCTION. 


of  obligation.  What  is  that  ground  ?  Is  there  any 
ground  common  to  all  cases?  Without  questioning 
what  others  have  done,  and  simply  desiring  distinct- 
ness, I  prefer  to  call  that  the  ground  of  obligation 
in  ^dew  of  which  obligation  is  afBrmed.  In  seeking 
for  this,  however,  we  shall  necessarily  be  drawn 
into  an  examination  of  those  faculties  and  mental 
products  on  which  moral  agency  is  conditioned,  for 
it  must  be  remembered  that  that  in  view  of  which 
obligation  is  affirmed  may  itself,  like  the  idea  of 
right,  be  the  product  of  mental  agency. 

Moral  philosophers  have  indeed  been  divided  in- 
Dependence  classcs,  as  they  have  belonged  to 

on  mental  othcr  of  the  two  great  schools 

science.  ^£  mcutal  scicuce  that  have  divided 
thinkers  from  the  time  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  —  in 
reality,  as  they  have  settled  in  one  way  or  another 
the  great  problem  of  the  origin  of  knowledge.  A 
sensationalist,  believing  that  all  our  knowledge  is 
from  experience,  that  there  are  no  necessary  prin- 
ciples, or  forms  of  knowledge  given  by  the  mind 
itself,  can  believe  in  no  a  priori  principles  of  moral- 
ity, and  will,  almost  of  course,  adopt  a  low,  fluctu- 
ating, and  selfish  system  of  morals.  But  one  who 
finds  in  the  mind  itself  as  well  as  in  the  senses  a 
source  of  primitive  knowledge,  given  indeed,  not 
without  the  senses,  but  on  the  occasion  of  them, 
oiay  consistently,  and  will  naturally,  look  ^to  the 
same  source  for  the  principles,  or  elements,  or  prim- 
\tive  facts,  or  ultimate  ideas,  or  ground,  or  founda- 


INTRODUCTION. 


7 


cion,  or  whatever  he  may  please  to  call  it,  of  morals. 
Hence,  the  great  battle  of  scientific  morality  is  to 
be  foup-ht  on  the  field  of  mental  science. 

On  this  field  some,  as  those  who  so  make  the 
mind  the  product  of  organization  as  to  bring  it 
under  the  laws  of  matter  and  of  necessity,  and  all, 
indeed,  who  deny  the  fact  of  liberty,  so  decide 
mental  problems  as  to  make  morality  impossible. 
Others  necessitate  a  basis  of  self-interest,  or  of 
mere  sentiment,  while  others  still  so  solve  these 
problems  as  to  admit,  in  some  form,  of  what  may 
be  called  a  rational  system. 

Nor,  I  may  remark  in  passing,  need  it  discourage 
those  who  have  not  studied  mental  science  formally, 
that  moral  problems  strike  their  roots  so  deeply  into 
that,  for  on  this  class  of  subjects  sound  judgment  is 
native  to  the  common  mind.  It  is  even  true  that 
wjiere  accurate  statement  is  most  difficult,  intuition 
is  most  certain,  and  when  such  statements  are  maoc 
they  commend  themselves  with  great  readiness  to 
the  common  consciousness. 

With  this  view  of  the  ground  of  obligation  and 
of  the  connection  of  mental  with  moral  yarious 
science,  we  pass  to  consider  some  of  the  ^y^*^^™^- 
bystems  respecting  obligation  and  its  ground  which 
have  been  adopted  by  different  philosophers. 

Of  these  the  first  commonly  mentioned,  as  it  wag 
the  first  in  point  of  time  among  modern  First  theory 
systems,  is  that  of  Hpbbes.    By  him  the 
tjround  of  obligation  was  found  in  the  authority  of 


8 


INTRODUCTION. 


the  Civil  Law.  According  to  Hobbes,  a  regard  to 
personal  advantage  is  the  only  possible  motive  to 
human  action.  "  Acknowledgment  of  power  is 
called  honor."  Pity  is  the  imagination  of  future 
calamity  to  ourselves."  "  Laughter  is  occasioned 
by  sudden  glory  in  our  eminence,  or  in  comparison 
with  the  infirmity  of  others."  "  Love  is  a  concep* 
tion  of  his  need  of  the  one  person  desired."  "  Re- 
pentance is  regret  at  having  missed  the  way." 
There  are  no  social  affections,  no  sense  of  duty,  no 
moral  sentiments.  As  a  desire  for  his  own  pleasure 
is  supreme  in  every  man,  it  will  follow  that  the  state 
of  society  is  naturally  one  of  war.  But  as  nothing 
can  so  interfere  with  this  supreme  desire  or  end  of 
man  as  war,  it  becomes  obligatory  on  men  to  com- 
bine, by  an  expression  of  their  common  will  in  the 
form  of  law,  for  the  preservation  of  peace  :  and  as 
there  is  no  other  possible  standard,  it  follows  that 
men  must  be  bound  by  the  behests  of  law,  whatever 
they  may  be, 

A  system  resting  on  a  view  of  our  nature  so  low 
and  partial,  and  thus  favorable  to  arbitrary  power, 
was  not  fitted  for  permanence  among  a  free  people, 
and  had  nearly  passed  from  remembrance,  except 
.n  the  schools,  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  revive 
it  in  connection  with  the  enforcement  of  the  fugitive 
slave  law.  This  attempt  gave  rise  to  the  expression 
10  prevalent  for  a  time,  of  "  the  higher  law  ;  "  and 
it  really  seemed  at  one  time  that  we  had  a  party 
among  us  who  denied  the  existence  of  any  sucb 
law. 


INTRODUCTION. 


S 


Of  this  system  it  has  been  well  said,  that  it  must 
either  be  right  to  obey  the  law  and  wrong  to  dis- 
obey it,  or  indifferent  whether  we  obey  it  or  not. 
[f  it  be  morally  indifferent  whether  we  obey  it  or 
not,  the  law  which  may  or  may  not  be  obeyed  with 
equal  virtue  cannot  be  a  source  of  virtue ;  and  if  it 
be  right  to  obey  it,  the  very  supposition  that  it  is 
right  implies  a  notion  of  right  and  wrong  that  is 
antecedent  to  the  law,  and  gives  it  its  moral  effi- 
cacy. 

A  second  theory  of  obligation  is  that  it  is  based 

on  self-interest.  Second  the- 

ory  ;  self* 

Much  might  be  said  to  show  that  this  interest, 
was  the  system  of  Paley,  whose  work  was  formerly 
taught  almost  universally,  both  in  England  and  in 
this  country.  Many  things  in  his  book  are  consis- 
tent with  this  theory  only,  while  others  would  seem 
to  imply  that  of  general  utility.  Probably  he  did 
aot  discriminate  sharply  between  them. 

This  system  supposes  the  same  low  and  imperfect 
view  of  the  facts  of  oar  nature  as  is  implied  in  the 
preceding  one.  It  fails  to  show  the  distinction 
between  interest  and  duty,  or  why  all  actions  that 
are  for  our  interest,  as  a  good  bargain,  are  not  vir- 
tuous. It  ignores  or  denies  the  fact  of  disinterested 
affection,  contradicting  thus  the  general  conscious- 
ness which  attributes  merit  to  actions  in  proportion 
as  self  is  forgotten.  As  that  which  is  the  founda- 
tion of  obligation  should  be  supreme  in  our  regard, 
this  system  would  require  us  to  regard  self-interest 


10 


INTRODUCTION. 


supremely,  and  everything  else  as  subordinate  to 
that.  It  would  thus  be  wrong  to  love  God  su- 
premely and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves  ;  and  in- 
deed any  high,  or  noble,  or  generous  act  would, 
according  to  this  system,  be  either  impossible  or 
wrong. 

The  plausibility  of  this  system  arises  from  the 
fact  that  self-interest  has  its  place  in  one  that  is 
correct ;  and  also  from  the  fact  that  men  exalt  self- 
interest  so  unduly,  and  do  so  generally  make  it 
practically  the  centre  of  their  thoughts  and  actions. 

A  third  system  founds  obligation  on  utility.  The 
Third  sys-  asscrtiou  is,  not  only  that  we  are  under 
utility.  obligation  to  do  those  things  that  are  use- 
ful, but  that  their  usefulness  is  the  ground  of  the 
oblio-ation. 

To  set  aside  this  view  it  is  only  necessary  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  terms.  By  a  ground  of 
obligation  we  mean  the  ultimate  reason  in  view  of 
which  it  is  affirmed.  But  by  its  very  definition 
utility  cannot  be  ultimate.  Some  things,"  says 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  "are  valuable,  finally,  or 
for  themselves  —  these  are  ends;  other  things  are 
valuable,  not  on  their  own  account,  but  as  condu- 
cive towards  certain  ulterior  ends  —  these  are 
means.  The  value  of  ends  is  absolute  ;  the  value 
of  means  is  relative.  Absolute  value  is  properly 
called  a  good ;  relative  value  is  properly  called  a 
utility."  Whatever  is  useful,  then,  can  have  value 
^nly  as  it  is  related  to  the  end  which  it  may  be 


INTRODUCTION. 


li 


ased  to  promote.  A  plough  is  useful,  but  only  as 
it  is  related  to  the  value  of  a  crop.  Unless  there 
be  ends  that  have  value  in  themselves,  means  can 
have  no  value,  and  so  nothing  can  be  useful.  But 
no  one  will  contend  that  we  can  be  under  obligation 
to  choose  that  as  an  ultimate  and  supreme  end 
which  can  have  no  value  except  as  it  is  related  to 
an  end  beyond  itself. 

The  plausibility  of  this  system  is  from  the  fact 
that  we  are  so  often  under  obligation  to  choose  that 
which  is  useful,  and  from  a  failure,  in  doing  this,  to 
distinguish  the  ground  from  a  condition  of  obliga- 
tion. The  absolute  value  of  an  end  may  be  the 
ground  of  obligation  to  choose  it,  but  we  can  be 
under  obligation  to  choose  means  only  on  condition 
that  they  shall  be  useful  in  attaining  the  end.  Of 
course  a  system  which  should  place  obligation  to 
choose  an  end  on  the  ground  of  an  intrinsic  value 
that  should  have  no  end  beyond  itself,  and  so  no 
utility,  could  not  properly  be  charged  with  being  a 
system  of  utility. 

The  word  utility  expresses  a  relation  —  a  relation 
between  that  which  is  valuable  in  itself  and  the 
means  of  obtaining;  it.    A  fourth  system,  Fourth 

®  .       */  system ; 

that  of  Dr.  Wayland,  bases  obligation  on  wayiaud. 
the  relations  of  one  being  to  another.  It  is,"  says 
he,  "manifest  to  every  one  that  w^e  all  stand  in 
various  and  dissimilar  relations  to  all  the  sentient 
beings,  created  and  uncreated,  with  which  we  are 
acquainted.  Among  our  relations  to  created  beings 


12 


INTRODUCTION. 


are  those  of  man  to  man,  or  that  of  substantial  equal- 
ity, of  parent  and  child,  of  benefactor  and  recipient^ 
of  husband  and  wife,  of  brother  and  brother,  citizen 
and  citizen,  citizen  and  magistrate,  and  a  thousand 
others.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  as  soon  as  a 
human  being  comprehends  the  relation  in  which 
two  human  beings  stand  to  each  other,  there  arises 
in  his  mind  a  consciousness  of  moral  obligation, 
connected  by  our  Creator  with  the  very  conception 
of  the  relation." 

Here  it  will  be  observed  that  no  enumeration 
of  the  relations  on  which  obligation  depends  is  at- 
tempted. Some  are  specified,  and  there  are  said  to 
be  a  thousand  others."  Nor  is  any  attempt  made 
to  show  wliat  is  common  to  all  these  relations  in 
virtue  of  which  they  are  the  ground  of  obligation. 
Relations  as  such  cannot  be  the  ground  of  obliga- 
tion. Why  must  these  relations  be  between  sensi- 
tive beings?  Why  are  not  all  relations  between 
sensitive  beings,  as  those  of  time  and  space,  the 
ground  of  obligation  ?  The  relative  height  of  two 
men,  as  tall  and  short,  constitutes  a  relation,  but 
not  a  ground  of  obligation.  In  themselves  relations 
Have  no  value,  and  aside  from  the  beings  related 
they  cannot  exist.  They  cannot  be  made  objects 
of  choice  or  grounds  of  action.  There  is  in  them 
nothing  ultimate.  They  are  simply  the  occasion  or 
condition  of  our  ajiprehending  a  ground  of  obliga- 
tion that  lies  wholly  beyond  themselves.  It  is  true 
that  Avhatever  we  do  we  must  do  in  some  relation, 


INTRODUCTION. 


18 


and  this  gives  the  system  its  plausibihty ;  but  this 
incidental  connection  of  relations  with  grounds  of 
action  that  lie  beyond  them  can  never  make  them 
an  adequate  basis  for  a  moral  system. 

Analogous  to  this  system  of  relations  are  two 
others  —  those  of  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  and  Fifth  and 
)f  Wollaston.     Of  these  the  first  founds  teins ;  Dr. 
oblio;ation  on  the  fitness  of  thino;s  :  and  the  woiiaston. 
second  on  conformity  to  truth,  or  to  the  true  nature 
of  thino-s.    A  man  owes  a  debt.    It  is  accordino;  to 
the  fitness  of  things  that  he  should  pay  it,  and  that 
fitness  is  the  ground  of  the  obligation.    It  is  true 
that  there  is  a  difference  between  a  man  and  a  tree, 
and  on  the  ground  of  this  difference  there  is  an 
obligation  to  treat  them  differently.    Not  to  do  so 
would  be  acting  a  lie,  and  so,  according  to  Wol- 
laston, all  immorality  is  an  acted  lie. 

Of  these  systems  it  is  to  be  said  that  both  fitness  /  ^  ^ 
and  truth,  as  that  is  here  used,  express,  not  any-  , 
thing  ultimate,  but  only  a  relation.    Between  tlie  ^ 
fact  of  the  debt  and  its  payment  there  is  a  fitness,  tXX^v^ 
but  it  is  not  on  the  ground  of  its  fitness  that  the  I^iXm^*-'^^^ 
payment  is  to  be  made.    The  fitness  has  no  value  *^ 
in  itself,  and  could  exist  only  as  the  debt  has  value 
in  some  relation  to  an  ulterior  good.    If  there  were 
no  good  of  any  kind  to  be  gained  by  the  payment 
of  the  debt  —  no  satisfaction  of  any  sentiment —  \^ 
there  would  be  no  fitness  in  paying  it.    So  of 
auth.    It  is  true  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
\  man  and  a  tree,  and  that  they  are  to  be  treated 


14 


INTRODUCTION. 


difFerently,  not  however  on  the  ground  of  the  truth, 
which  has  value  only  for  what  it  indicates  beyond 
itself,  but  because  a  man  is  capable  of  a  rational 
good  and  a  tree  is  not. 

It  is  to  be  said,  also,  that  both  fitness  and  truth 
are  terms  quite  too  broad  to  be  used  accurately  as 
the  basis  of  a  system,  since  there  is  a  large  class  of 
fitnesses  and  of  truths  that  have  no  relation  to 
morals.  To  use  a  pen  for  writing  is  according  to 
the  fitness  of  things,  and  is  a  practical  affirmation 
of  the  truth  that  the  pen  was  made  for  that,  but 
there  may  be  in  it  nothing  moral.  Besides,  there 
is  as  much  fitness  in  an  immoral  act  to  produce  evil 
as  there  is  in  a  moral  act  to  produce  good,  and  it  is 
as  much  according  to  the  true  nature  of  things  that 
it  should  produce  evil.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be 
either  the  fitness  or  the  truth  on  which  the  ob- 
ligation depends. 

The  plausibility  of  these  systems  is  from  the  fact 
that  all  obligatory  acts  are  in  accordance  both  with 
the  fitness  and  with  the  true  nature  of  things, 
though  these  are  not  the  foundation  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  do  them. 

Another  system  of  the  same  class  is  that  of 
^lu^'m;  J^Jiiffroy,  which  makes  order  the  basis  of 
Joufifroy.  obligation.  This  was  mentioned  by  me 
\n  my  former  volume,  and  I  have  nothing  to  add  to 
what  was  then  said.  Order  may  be  affirmed  of 
mere  physical  being,  in  which  tliere  can  be  nothing 
moral.  It  expresses^rekti^^ 


INTRODUCTION. 


16 


ft  can  never  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake.  Beings 
may  place  themselves  in  order  for  the  sake  of  an 
end  beyond,  but  not  for  the  order  itself.  At  least, 
such  order  cap'^ot  be  obligatory.  It  would  be  ab- 
surd for  an  army  to  preserve  the  order  of  its  march 
if  that  would  insure  its  destruction.  The  order  of 
an  army  is  for  its  safety  and  efficiency,  and  can  be 
obligatory  on  no  other  ground.  The  same  princi- 
ple apphes  in  all  cases  of  order.  It  can  never  be 
so  valuable  as  to  become  obligatory,  except  as  sub- 
servient to  an  end  beyond  itself. 

From  several  passages  in  Jouflfroy  it  would  appear 
that  he  identified  the  order  of  the  universe  with  its 
end.  Doing  this,  we  can  readily  see  how  he  might 
have  adopted  the  system,  but  to  do  it  is  simply  an 
abuse  of  terms.  Order  cannot  be  the  end  of  the 
universe.  That  must  be  some  good  of  the  beings 
that  compose  the  universe,  which  may  or  may  not 
be  attained  by  means  of  order. 

According  to  an  eighth  system,  the  will  of  God 
IS  the  ground  of  obligation.    We  are,  it  Eighth  sys- 
is  said,  under  obligation  to  do  whatever  of  God. 
He  commands,  simply  because  He  commands  it. 

Philosophically  this  is  the  same  doctrine  as  that 
of  Hobbes,  who  referred  everything  to  the  will  of 
the  lawgiver,  or  of  the  law-making  power,  regarded 
Bimply  as  will,  and  accompanied  by  power.  The 
question  is,  whether  the  will  of  any  being,  regarded 
simply  as  will  and  without  reference  to  the  ends 
?hosen,  can  be  the  ground  of  obligation.    It  is  true 


16 


INTRODUCTION. 


that  the  will  of  God  is  an  infallible  rule,  and  that 
we  are  to  do  unliesitatingly  whatever  He  com- 
mands. It  is  true,  also,  that  this  can  be  said  of  no 
other  will,  whether  of  an  individual  or  of  any  num- 
ber of  individuals  however  organized.  It  is  this 
fact,  that  the  will  of  God  is  to  be  always  and  im- 
plicitly obeyed,  that  gives  the  system  now  in  ques- 
tion its  plausibility.  But  are  we  to  obey  his  will 
simply  because  it  is  his  will  ?  or  from  faith,  that  is, 
because  we  have  adequate  ground  for  implicit  con- 
fidence in  Him  that  his  will  will  always  be  deter- 
mined^'by  wisdom  and  goodness  ?  It  is  precisely 
j^here  that  faith  comes  in.  God  commands  that  for 
which  we  can  see  no  good  reason  except  that  He 
commands  it.  He  may  even  command  that  which, 
aside  fi^om  his  will,  shall  seem  opposed  to  all  our 
apprehensions  of  what  is  right  and  best.  This  ren- 
ders faith  possible,  and  famishes  it  with  a  distinct 
field  for  its  conflicts  and  triumphs.  But  if  his  will, 
simply  as  will,  be  the  ground  of  obligation,  then 
faith  is  impossible,  and  that  great  bond  and  actu- 
ating principle  of  the  social  universe  is  annihilated. 
On  this  supposition  all  the  acts  of  God  would  be 
equally  right  by  a  natural  necessity,  and  the  appeal 
of  Abraham  to  God,  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all 
the  earth  do  right  ?  "  was  absurd. 

Again,  there  is  nothing  ultimate  in  will  whether 
regarded  as  choice  or  as  volition.  In  either  case 
we  distinguish  between  the  act  and  the  object. 
The  act  is  for  the  sake  of  the  object,  and  can  nevej 
ge  an  end  or  object  of  choice  for  itself. 


INTRODUCTION. 


17 


Once  more,  on  this  supposition  moral  science  is  im- 
possible. Science  supposes  uniformity  and  grounds 
of  certainty.  These  may  be  found  in  those  grounds 
of  action  which  ought  to  influence  a  free  being,  but 
never  in  the  acts  of  such  a  being.  The  ground  of 
our  confidence  that  a  free  being  will  pursue  a  given 
course  must  be  faith,  and  not  science. 

This  system  has  been  strangely  adopted  under 
the  impression  that  it  honors  God.  It  renders  it 
impossible  that  He  should  be  honored. 

The  next  system  we  shall  consider  is  that  of  those 
who  say  that  right  is  the  foundation  of  Ninth  sys- 
obligation.  According  to  this,  we  are  to  do  ^^"^ ' 
right  for  the  sake  of  the  right.    This  is,  perhaps, 
the  prevalent  theory  at  the  present  time. 

On  the  face  of  it,  nothing  could  seem  simpler  than 
this  theory ;  but  the  ambiguities  of  the  word  right 
have  produced  confusion.  If  we  take  right  as  an 
adjective  expressing  the  quality  of  an  action,  and 
opposed  to  wrong,  it  is  obvious  that  it  cannot  be  the 
ground  of  obligation,  because  it  expresses  nothing 
ultimate,  but  onlj  a  relation.  Used  thus,  the  only 
conceivable  meaning  of  the  word  right  is  either  con- 
formity to  a  standard  or  rule,  or  fitness  to  attain  an 
end.  So  it  is  commonly  used  by  morahsts.  Eight," 
says  Paley,  mean^  no  more  than  conformity  to 
the  rule  we  go  by,  whatever  that  may  be."  "  The 
adjective  right,"  says  Whew^ell,  "  means  conform- 
able to  a  rule."    He  who  solves  a  sum  according  tc 


18 


INTRODUCTION. 


ft  rule  does  it  right.  In  this  sense  simple  rightness 
does  not  even  involve  a  moral  quality,  and  so  cannot 
be  the  foundation  of  obligation.  Whence  then 
comes  the  moral  quality  ?  Here  is  a  right  act  that 
has  no  moral  quality.  Here  is  another  morally 
right.  Whence  the  difference  ?  This  can  be  only 
from  something  in  the  rule,  or  standard,  or  end  that 
lies  beyond  the  act ;  and  if  the  moral  quality  come 
from  one  or  the  other  of  these,  the  obligation  must' 
also.  But  whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  the  moral 
quality  in  an  action  morally  right,  it  is  plain  that 
the  quality  of  an  action  can  never  be  the  ground  oi 
an  obligation  to  do  that  action.  Look  at  this.  A 
man  does  a  wrong  action  ;  he  steals.  He  does  not 
do  this  for  the  sake  of  the  quality  of  the  action  — 
its  wrongness  ;  but  for  the  end  that  lies  beyond  the 
action.  A  man  does  a  right  action ;  he  gives  money 
hi  charity.  He  does  not  do  this  for  the  sake  of  the 
rightness  of  the  action,  but  to  relieve  a  case  of  dis- 
tress. If  he  were  to  do  it  for  the  sake  of  the  rio-ht- 
ness  of  the  act,  the  act  would  not  be  right.  Think 
of  a  man's  doing  good  to  another,  not  from  good 
will,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  rightness  of  his  own  act. 
Think  of  his  loving  God  for  the  same  reason !  Cer- 
tainly, if  we  regard  right  as  the  quality  of  an  action, 
uo  man  can  be  under  obhgation  to  do  an  act  morally 
right  for  which  there  is  not  a  reason  besides  its 
being  right,  and  on  the  ground  of  which  it  is  right. 
That  reason,  then,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  not  the 
rightness,  must  be  the  ground  of  the  obhgation. 


INTRODUCTION. 


19 


But  are  we  not  under  obligation  to  do  what  is 
morally  right?  Certainly,  always.  So  are  we 
always  under  obligation  to  do  what  is  according  to 
the  fitness  of  things,  and  the  truth  of  things,  and  the 
mil  of  God ;  but  these  are  not  the  ground  of  the 
obligation,  and  the  quality  of  right  in  an  action 
neither  is,  nor  can  be,  the  ground  of  the  obligation 
to  do  it. 

Is  there,  then,  in  morals  a  right  which  is  not  the 
quality  of  an  action  ?  Yes ;  a  man  has  rights.  He 
has  a  right  to  life  and  liberty.  Here  the  word  right 
is  used  as  a  substantive,  and  means  a  just  claim. 
This  we  understand,  and  the  ground  of  it  will  be 
investigated  hereafter,  but  it  has  no  relation  to  our 
present  subject. 

Is  there  still  another  sense  of  the  word  right? 
This  is  claimed,  and  in  this  too  it  is  used  as  a  sub- 
stantive, and  with  the  article  prefixed  —  ''the 
right."  Can  we  here,  as  before,  gain  definite 
notions?  I  fear  not.  The  term  right,''  says  Dr. 
Haven,  in  his  excellent  and  popular  work,  —  and  he 
represents  a  large  class  of  writers,  —  "  expresses  a 
simple  and  ultimate  idea ;  it  is  therefore  incapable  of 
analysis  and  definition."  It  expresses  an  eternal 
and  immutable  distinction,  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things."  And  not  only  right,  but  wrong  is  also 
3ucli  an  idea,  for  he  says,  Might  and  wrong  are 
iistinctions  immutable  and  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things.  They  are  not  the  creations  of  expediency 
!ior  of  law ;  nor  yet  do  they  originate  in  the  divine 


20 


INTRODUCTION. 


character.  They  have  no  origin.  They  are  eter- 
nal as  the  throne  of  Deity ;  they  are  immutable  as 
God  himself.  Nay,  were  God  himself  to  change, 
these  distinctions  would  change  not.  Omnipotence 
has  no  power  over  them,  whether  to  create  or  to 
destroy.  Law  does  not  make  them,  but  they  make 
law.  They  are  the  source  and  spring  of  all  law  and 
all  obligation."  ^ 

I  am  of  those  who  believe  that  there  are  simple 
and  ultimate  ideas.  That  of  existence,  or  being,  is 
one.  All  men  have,  and  must  have  an  idea  of 
something,  of  themselves,  as  existing.  Here  we 
have  the  idea,  and  something  actual  which  corre- 
sponds to  it ;  and  I  understand  what  is  meant  when 
it  is  said  that  existence,  being,  —  not  the  idea,  but  the 
thing, —  had  no  origin,  and  that  it  may  be  the  source 
of  law.  Is  then  the  idea  of  right  such  an  idea  ? 
Is  there  anything  corresponding  to  the  idea,  but 
diflFerent  from  it,  that  has  existed  from  eternity  ? 
Is  it  like  space,  of  which  we  might  plausibly  say 
that  it  existed  independently  of  God  and  of  all 
creatures,  so  that  if  they  were  withdrawn  the 
eternal  right  would  still  exist?  Is  this  true  also  of 
wrong  ?  If  so,  we  might  well,  as  some  do,  put 
right  above  God,  and  wrong  too.  This  seems  to  be 
claimed,  but  cannot  be,  for  we  are  told  that  "  right 
and  wrong  are  distinctions not  things,  but  dis- 
tinctions immutable  and  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things."    But  what  things  ?    We  are  told  again, 

I  Moral  Philosophy^  p.  47. 


INTRODUCTION. 


21 


"  When  we  speak  of  things  and  the  nature  of  things, 
as  appHcable  to  this  discussion,  we  do  not  of  course 
refer  to  material  objects,  nor  yet  to  spiritual  intelli- 
gences, hut  to  the  actions  and  moral  conduct  of  intel- 
Hgent  beings,  created  or  uncreated,  finite  or  in- 
finite." Here,  then,  we  have  moral  action  which  is 
eternal  and  has  no  origin  ;  for  if  the  distinctions  be 
eternal,  inhering  in  the  nature  of  things,  the  things 
themselves  in  which  they  inhere  must  also  be 
eternal.  But  further,  if  these  eternal  distinctions 
inhere  in  these  eternal  actions,  what  is  this  but  to 
make  them  qualities  of  the  actions,  which,  as  we 
have  already  shown,  would  preclude  the  possibility 
of  their  being  the  ground  of  obligation  to  do  the 
actions.  We  have  also  distinctions  in  moral  actions 
—  actions,  observe,  already  moral, — which  are  the 
spring  of  all  law  and  all  obligation."  But  is  this 
what  the  author  really  means  ?  Probably  not,  for  he 
immediately  adds,  We  mean  to  say,  that  such  and 
such  acts  of  an  intelligent  voluntary  agent,  whoever 
he  may  be,  are,  in  their  very  nature^  right  or 
wrong."  This  is  quite  diflferent  from  the  proposi- 
tions with  which  we  have  been  dealing.  It  simply 
amounts  to  saying  that  certain  acts,  not  eternal,  but 
such  as  you  and  I  may  do,  are  right  or  wrong,  and 
that  no  reason  can  be  given  for  it,  except  that  they 
are  so.  Now  I  believe,  and  that,  I  suppose,  is  the 
real  difference  between  us,  the  point  on  which  this 
whole  question  turns,  that  when  an  action  is  right 
or  wrong  a  reason  can  always  be  gi  ren  why  it  is  so, 


22 


INTRODUCTION. 


and  that  in  that  reason  the  ground  of  the  obligation 
is  to  be  found.  We  are  never  to  do,  or  to  intend 
to  do  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  but  we  are  to 
intend  to  do  that,  the  doing  of  which  is  right,  for 
the  sake  of  that  which  makes  it  right. 

The  analogy  is  often  insisted  on,  it  is  by  Dr. 
Haven,  between  mathematical  and  moral  ideas. 
Mathematical  ideas  and  truths,  it  is  said,  are  neces- 
sary and  eternal.  But  how  ?  Is  it  meant  that 
either  ideas  or  truths  can  exist  except  in  some 
mind?  Is  it  meant  that  mathematical  ideas  are 
any  more  eternal  in  the  divine  mind  than  any  other 
ideas  that  are  there  ?  Is  anything  more  meant 
than  that,  by  the  very  nature  of  intelligence  it  is 
necessitated,  if  it  act  at  all  as  intelligence,  to  form 
certain  ideas,  and  also  to  assent  to  certain  proposi- 
tions as  soon  as  it  understands  them  ?  If  this  be 
all,  and  it  could  be  so  understood,  it  would  sweep 
away  much  vague,  not  to  say  unintelligible  phrase- 
ology. Certainly  it  enters  into  our  conception  of 
an  intelligent  being  that  he  must  have  certain  ideas, 
and  into  our  conception  of  a  moral  being  that  he 
must  have  a  knowledge  of  moral  distinctions ;  and 
if  we  suppose  an  intelligent  and  moral  being  to  have 
existed  eternally,  we  must  also  suppose,  according  to 
our  inadequate  mode  of  thinking  on  subjects  invcJ- 
vmg  the  infinite,  that  certain  intellectual  and  moraJ 
ideas  have  also  been  eternal,  though  in  the  order  of 
nature  the  being  must  have  been  before  the  ideas. 
But  this  does  not  make  these  ideas  in  any  sense  in* 


INTRODUCTION. 


23 


dependent  of  God,  or  above  him,  or  a  fountain  of 
law,  or  of  anything  else.  It  simply  enables  us  to 
think  of  God  as  havmg  always  existed,  and  as  hav- 
ing always  had  within  himself  the  conditions  of  in- 
telligent, moral,  and  independent  activity,  so  that 
he  might  himself,  in  his  own  intelligence  and  wis- 
dom, become  the  fountain  of  all  law. 

When,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  existence  of  a 
simple  and  ultimate  idea  is  claimed,  the  appeal  must 
be  directly  to  consciousness.  On  this  ground  one 
may  assert,  and  another  deny ;  and  there  is  nothing 
more  to  be  said.  Neither  argument  nor  testimony 
can  avail  anything.  We  can  only  so  appeal  to  the 
general  consciousness  by  applying  tests  as  to  show 
what  that  consciousness  really  is. 

This  system  will  be  referred  to  again.  It  is 
plausible,  because  every  action  that  is  obligatory  is 
also  right,  as  it  is  also  fit,  and  according  to  the 
divine  will. 

The  only  other  system  of  which  I  shall  speak  is 
that  of  Dr.  Hickok.  According  to  him  a  reason 
can  be  given  why  a  thing  is  right.  "  The  highest 
good,"  he  says  —  and  in  this  I  agree  with  him  — 
"  must  be  the  ground  in  which  the  ultimate  rule 
shall  reveal  itself."  This  is  a  great  point  gained. 
It  concedes  that  right  is  dependent  upon  good  of 
some  kind,  that  is,  that  a  reason  can  always  be  given 
why  a  thing  is  right ;  and  it  only  remains  to  inquire 
what  that  good  is. 

But  here,  if  I  understand  him  rightly,  I  am  still 
compelled   to  differ   from   my  able   and  highly 


24 


INTRODUCTION. 


esteemed  cotemporary.  That  good  we  are  told  is 
the  highest  good,"  ^'  the  summum  bonum,^^  What 
then  is  that  ?  Says  Dr.  Hickok,  The  highest 
good,  the  summum  bonum^  is  worthiness  of  spiritual 
approbation."  By  this,  it  would  seem,  must  be 
meant  worthiness  of  approbation  on  the  ground  of 
the  acts,  or  states,  of  our  own  spirits.  The  doctrine 
then  will  be,  that  the  ultimate  ground  or  reason 
why  a  man  should  do  a  charitable  act  is  not  at  all 
the  good  of  the  person  relieved  for  the  sake  of  that 
good,  but  that  he  may  preserve  or  place  his  spirit  id 
such  a  state  as  shall  be  worthy  of  his  own  approba- 
tion. This  is  stated  most  explicitly.  "  Solely," 
says  Dr.  Hickok,  "  that  I  may  stand  in  my  own 
sight  as  worthy  of  my  own  spiritual  approbation,  is 
the  one  motive  which  can  influence  to  pure  moral- 
ity, and  in  the  complete  control  of  which  is  the 
essence  of  all  virtue."  ^ 

To  those  aware  of  the  endless  disputes  of  the 
ancients  respecting  the  summum  bonum^'^  further 
progress  may  seem  hopeless  if  we  must  first  decide 
what  that  is ;  but  it  will  be  sufficient  for  our  present 
purpose  if  we  decide  the  province  within  which  it 
is.  By  "  the  summum  bonum  "  is  generally  meant 
the  greatest  good  of  the  individual.  That,  it  would 
Beem,  must  be  meant  here,  because  worthiness  of 
approbation  can  belong  only  to  the  individual,  and 
can  be  directly  sought  by  tlie  individual  only  for 
himself.  But  if  this  be  meant,  then  the  "  summum 
hmum^''  and  the  end  for  which  man  was  made,  are 

1  Moral  Science,  p.  60 


INTRODUCTION. 


25 


not  the  same.  Man  was  not  made  to  find  the  ulti- 
mate ground  of  his  action  in  any  subjective  state  of 
his  own,  of  whatever  kind.  He  was  made  to  pro- 
mote the  good  of  others  as  well  as  his  own,  and  the 
apprehension  of  that  good  furnishes  an  immediate 
ground  of  obhgation  to  promote  it.  The  good  of 
the  individual  is  too  narrow  a  basis  to  be  the  ground 
of  obligation  ;  and  besides,  it  is  not  in  accordance 
with  our  consciousness  to  say,  when  we  are  laboring 
for  the  good  of  others,  that  the  ultimate  and  real 
thing  we  are  seeking  is  our  own  worthiness  of 
approbation. 

But  again,  the  man  is  worthy  of  approbation  only 
as  he  is  virtuous.  It  is  virtue  in  him  that  we 
approve.  But  virtue  is  a  voluntary  state  of  mind, 
and  that  can  never  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end. 
By  necessity  all  choice  and  volition  respect  an  end 
beyond  themselves.  But  the  ground  of  obligation, 
as  we  now  seek  it,  is  that  ultimate  end  in  view  of 
which  the  will  should  act.  As  ultimate,  the  reason 
of  the  choice  must  be  in  the  thing  chosen,  and  not 
in  the  choosing.  It  is  therefore  impossible  that  any 
form,  or  quality,  or  characteristic  of  choice,  any 
virtue,  or  goodness,  or  liohness  should  be  the  ground 
of  obligation  to  choose.  The  same  thing  is  to  be  said 
of  law  in  every  form,  and  for  the  same  reason. 
Law  can  never  be  ultimate. 

In  this  case,  as  in  most  of  the  others,  a  rule  may 
be  drawn  from  that  which  is  assumed  as  the  ground 
pf  obligation,  because  no  man  can  be  under  obliga- 


26  INTRODUCTION. 

tion  to  do  anything  that  is  not  in  accordance  with 
his  highest  worthiness.  This  may  be  a  criterion 
or  test,  just  as  the  will  of  God  or  fitness  is,  of  what 
he  ought  to  do,  but  never  a  ground  of  the  obligation 
to  do  it. 

Is  it  asked,  then,  what  is  your  own  system  ?  1* 
is  implied  in  the  opening  remarks  of  the  chapter,  is 
very  simple,  and  can  be  stated  in  few  words. 

In  seeking  the  foundation  of  obligation,  I  suppose 
moral  beings  to  exist.  As  having  intelligence  and 
sensibility  I  suppose  them  capable  of  apprehending 
ends  good  in  themselves,  and  an  end  thus  good  that 
is  both  ultimate  and  supreme.  In  the  apprehension 
of  such  an  end  I  suppose  the  moral  reason  must 
affirm  obligation  to  choose  it,  and  that  all  acts  that 
will,  of  their  own  nature,  lead  to  the  attainment  of 
this  end,  are  right. 

This  puts  man,  as  having  reason,  into  relation  to 
his  end  in  the  same  way  that  the  brutes,  as  having 
instinct,  are  put  into  relation  to  their  end,  and  gives 
us  a  philosophy  in  accord  with  other  philosophies  of 
practical  life.  What  is  the  philosophy  of  the  eye  ? 
It  consists  in  a  knowledge  of  its  structure  and  use, 
or  end ;  and  from  these,  and  these  only,  can  rational 
.•ules  be  drawn  for  the  right  use  of  the  eye  when 
well,  or  for  its  treatment  when  diseased.  Knowing 
these,  we  know  how  we  ought  to  use  the  eye.  We 
know  the  ground  of  our  obhgation  in  reference  to 
it.  It  is  so  to  use  it  that  the  end  of  the  eye  may  be 
most  perfectly  attained.     So  we  ought  to  use  the 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

eye,  and  the  ground  of  our  obligation  is  the  fact  ^^^^^^ 

that  the  eye  lias  relation  to  an  end  that  has  value  in  ^ 

itself.    If  it  had  not,  we  could  be  under  no  such  ^//.^  ^ 

obhgation.    The  same  is  true  of  every  part  of  the 

body,  and  of  every  faculty  of  the  mind.    And  if        '  ' 

true  of  these,  why  not  of  the  man  himself?  Has 

he  an  end  valuable  for  its  own  sake  ?    If  not,  what   ' '-^w  ^ 

is  he  good  for  ?    But  if  he  have  such  an  end,  why 

not,  as  in  case  of  the  eye,  find  in  this  end  the  .  ..j 

reason  of  all  use  of  himself,  that  is,  of  all  rules  of   ^  ' 

conduct,  and  also  the  ground  of  obligation  ?    Can  l"^^"^ 

there  be  anything  higher  or  better  than  that  a  man   ,  / 

should  propose  to  himself  and  choose  the  attainment  '^"^^""^(^v^ 

or  advancement  of  the  very  end  for  which  God 

made  him  ?    What  more  can  God  ask  of  him  — 

or  man  ?    What  more  can  he  wish  for  himself? 


PART  I. 

THEORETICAL. 


THE  LAW  OF  LOVE. 

MAN  CHOOSING  UNDER  MORAL  LAW. 


L 


DEFINITION,  AND  PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 

Moral  Philosophy,  Ethics,  Moral  Science,  is 
the  science  of  man,  choosing,  and  acting  from 
choice,  under  Moral  Law. 

This  definition  covers  the  whole  field  of  moral 
action  —  duties  to  be  done,  rights  to  be  Ground  cov- 

...  ered  by  the 

respected  and  mamtamed,  actions  mor-  definition 
ally  bad,  as  well  as  those  morally  good.  It  goes 
back  of  conduct  to  those  choices  from  which  con- 
duct proceeds,  and  limits  the  field  of  moral  action 
to  such  choices  and  actions  from  choice  as  are  un- 
der Moral  Law.  The  definition  also  recognizes 
the  acknowledged  dependence  of  Moral  upon  Men- 
tal Science. 

Of  other  definitions  the  following  may  be 
added :  — 

"  That  science  which  teaches  men  their  duty 
and  the  reasons  of  it."  —  Paley. 

"  The  science  of  Moral  Law."  —  Wayland. 
The  systematic  application  of  the  ultimate 
rule  of  right  to  all  conceptions  of  moral  con- 
duct." —  Hickoh. 

^'  The  science  of  obligation  or  duty."  —  Presi' 
dent  Fairchild. 


32 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


In  former  editions,  the  science  was  defined  as 
that  which  teaches  men  their  supreme  end,  and 
how  to  attain  it.  In  this,  the  moral  element  was 
assumed. 

In  accordance  with  the  above  definition  we  need 
j-ivisionof  fi^'^t,  to  know  Mau  in  all  that  is  requi- 
/"^Jueuton^"  ^^^^  ^  condition  to  his  choosing  under 
.definition     Moral  Law.      ~  '  h^"  ^  1^  t.L^v  ^v. 

i 

(2.)  We  need  to  know  him  as  choosing  under 
Moral  Law.  '  ' '  C'^  ^^^v^^ 

These  two  give  us  Theoretical  Morals. 

(3.)  We  need  to  know  man  as  acting  from 
jhoice  under  Moral  Law.    ^-  a^-^^-^^^ 

This  gives  us  Practical  Morals,  ^e  thus  have 
the  division  of  our  subject. 

What,  then,  does  man  need  as  prerequisite  to 
his  choosing  under  Moral  Law? 

Since  moral  science  is  rational  as  well  as  moral, 
choosing  within  it  must  presuppose  the  intellect 
for  insight  and  comprehension  ;  since  it  regards 
man  as  active,  and  only  as  active,  it  must  pre- 
suppose the  sensibility  for  motive,  and  the  will 
for  choice  and  volition  ;  and  since  he  is  to  act  un- 
der moral  law,  it  must  presuppose  a  moral  nature 
to  give  moral  ideas,  and  through  which  moral 
Jaw  may  be  revealed.  We  can  no  more  have 
moral  science  without  a  moral  nature  and  moral 
ideas  originally  given,  than  we  can  have  intellect- 
ual science  witliout  an  intellectual  nature,  and 
intellectual  ideas  originally  given.    As  moral  sci- 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


33 


ence  is  thus  the  outcome  of  the  whole  being,  it 
can  be  conceived  of  only  through  the  joint  action 
of  the  intellect,  the  sensibility,  the  will,  and  the 
moral  nature,  and  must  therefore  suppose  man 
fully  constituted  as  a  Person.  It  has  persons  oniy 
nothing  to  do  with  things,  or  with  the  *f  thf 
nature  of  things,  but  only  with  persons, 
nor  has  it  anything  to  do  with  them  except  as 
they  choose  and  act  from  choice. 

Of  the  above,  the  intellect,  the  sensibility, 
the  will,  and  the  moral  nature,  each  is  Personality 
essential  to  personality.  They  do  not  piex. 
constitute  it  as  if  the  person  were  compounded  of 
these,  and  so  complex.  They  are,  rather,  different 
forms  in  which  the  one  indivisible  person  is  mani- 
fested. Nor  is  the  moral  nature  anything  differ- 
ent from  intellect  sensibility  and  will.  It  is  the 
necessary  manifestation  of  a  personality  that  in- 
cludes the  three. 

From  man  as  thus  constituted  we  have  three 
sciences.     From   the  intellect  simply.  Three  sd- 
we  have  intellectual  science  including 
logic.   From  the  intellect  and  sensibility  combined,  ^ 
we  have  aesthetic  science,  involving  intellect  and 
feeling,  but  not  action  ;  and  from  the  intellect, 
the  sensibility,  the  will,  and  the  moral  nature  com- 
bined, we  have  moral  science.    This  is  more  com- 
plex, and  so  more  ditficult.    It  involves,  and  is 
intended  to  control,  the  whole  nature  except  that 
which  is  purely  organic  and  spontaneous. 


DIVISION  I. 


THE  INTELLECT. 

In  examining,  then,  the  constituents  of  our  be- 
ing as  they  are  related  to  choice,  the  first  to  be 
noticed  is  The  Intellect. 

Of  this,  the  bearing  upon  choice  is  indirect. 
Indirectly  Purc  intellect  cannot  be  a  motive.  For 
choice.  that,  some  element  from  the  sensibility 
must  come  in.  (  The  office  of  the  intellect  is  to 
know  what  is,  to  judge  of  agreements  or  disagree- 
ments, to  comprehend  relations,  and  to  furnish 
Underlies  tliosc  idcas  by  which  we  become  rationaly^ 
choice.  Without  the  intellect  the  ideas  of  a  good, 
and  of  moral  obligation,  which  underlie  moral  sci- 
ence, could  not  be  formed  ;  but  no  knowledge  of 
what  is,  or  judgment  of  any  kind,  or  idea  from 
the  pure  intellect,  can  furnish  a  motive,  or  have 
authority.  Knowing,  comparing,  comprehending, 
having  ideas,  as  of  obligation,  formed  by  the  joint 
action  of  the  three  great  constituents  of  our  being, 
and  being  free,  our  active  principles  hold  a  differ- 
ent relation  to  us  from  that  which  the  instincts  of 
the  brutes  hold  to  them.  They  are  impelled  di- 
rectly by  instinct,  that  is,  by  an  impulse  to  action 


INTELLECT. 


35 


without  comprehending  its  end,  and  have  no 
alternative  in  kind.  We  are  free  to  choose  be- 
tween principles  of  action  comprehending  their 
end,  and  have  an  alternative  in  kind.  Thus  it  is 
that,  through  the  intellect,  choice,  and  action 
from  choice,  which  is  conduct,  become  the  choice 
and  conduct  of  a  rational,  and  so  of  a  moral,  being. 
Thus  it  is  that  in  moral  science  the  intellect  is  not 
only  essential  for  the  knowing  of  the  science,  but 
as  aiding  to  furnish  a  portion  of  its  elements. 


THE  SENSIBILITY. 
> 

CHAPTER  L 

THE  SENSIBILITY  IN  GENERAL. 

By  the  sensibility  we  feel.  All  feeling  is  the 
Is  all  feeling  product  of  the  Sensibility  and,  as  we 
Bensibiiity?  hold^  feeling  is  the  concomitant  of  every 
form  of  conscious  activity.  That  all  knowing 
is  by  the  intellect,  and  all  choice  and  volition  by 
the  will,  is  conceded.  Is  it  also  conceded  that  all 
feeling  is  from  the  sensibility?  This  may  be 
doubted. 

The  sensibility  is  of  great  diversity,  and  it  is 
conceded  that  the  desires,  the  affections,  the  emo- 
tions, the  passions,  are  forms  of  it.  But  in  addi- 
tion to  these  there  is  feeling  connected  with  the 
activity  of  the  intellect  and  of  the  will  that  is 
simply  tlie  outgrowth  or  reflex  of  that  activity. 

Through  the  intellect  we  have  the  enjoyment 
conoomitant  that  comcs  from  the  pursuit  and  the  ac- 
aai activity,  quisitiou  of  truth.  Tliis  enjoyment  is 
the  reflex  of  the  activity  of  the  intellect,  and  is  in- 


THE  SENSIBILITY  IN  GENERAL.  37 


separably  connected  with  it.  It  belongs  to  man 
as  rational,  is  of  a  quality  peculiar  to  itself,  and 
can  be  had  in  no  other  way.  Is  it  from  the  sen- 
sibility or  from  the  intellect?  If  the  threefold 
division  of  the  faculties  is  to  be  made  thorough- 
going, it  must  be  from  the  sensibility.  That  we 
have  a  satisfaction  in  the  very  act  of  knowing  no 
one  can  doubt ;  but  if  this  satisfaction  be  not  from 
the  sensibility,  it  will  follow  that  the  sensibility  is 
not  distinctively  the  organ  of  feeling. 

We  have  also,  involved  in  the  activity  of  the 
will  when  it  acts  in  accordance  with  the  ^m_ac. 
moral  nature,  and  inseparable  from  it,  a 
satisfaction  that  is  still  higher  and  more  intense. 
(Virtue  is  from  the  will  as  knowledge  is  from  the 
intellect.  Shall  we  say  then  that  that  satisfaction 
from  virtue  which  is  the  reflex  of  the  activity  of 
the  will,  is  from  the  will,  or  from  the  sensibility  ? 
The  latter  is  our  only  consistent  course.  If  we 
are  to  have  a  sensibility  at  all,  and  define  it  to  be 
the  faculty  of  feeling,  it  would  seem  unreasonable 
not  to  refer  to  it  one  of  the  highest  forms  of  feel- 
ing we  have. 

Accepting  then  in  full  the  threefold  division  of 
the  powers,  we  say,  that  all  knowledge  is  from 
the  intellect,  all  feeling  from  the  sensibility,  and 
all  choice  and  conduct  from  the  will.  And  say 
ing  this,  we  see  what  is  meant  when  we  Pursuit  of 
say  that  we  do  an  act  for  its  own  sake.  ^rTts  o*wn 
This  is  often  said,  and  men  are  exhorted  ^^^®* 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


to  pursue  knowledge,  not  for  any  utility  con- 
nected with  it,  but  for  its  own  sake.  Certainly 
knowledge  may  be  pursued  for  the  sake  of  an  end 
beyond  itself,  as  money,  or  fame.  It  may  also  be 
pursued  with  no  thought  of  anything  beyond  the 
knowledge  itself,  and  the  satisfaction  involved  in 
its  pursuit  and  attainment.  It  is  then  said  to  be 
pursued  for  its  own  sake,  and  the  activity  of  mind 
in  thus  pursuing  it  is  thought  to  be  of  a  higher 
order.    But  would  the  knowledge  be  pursued  if 

^  •     '      there  were  not_  thi^.  satisfaction  ?    Clearly  not. 

S  ^uut^vA-cv^Q^  course  there  can  be  no  activity  in  the  first  in- 
stance, because  of  the  reflex  of  that  activity.  As 
in  all  our  active  principles,  a  spontaneous  tend- 
ency is  presupposed ;  but  if  there  were  no  satis- 
faction as  the  result  of  the  activity,  it  would  not 
be  continued. 

And  what  is  thus  true  of  knowledge  must  be 
true  also  of  virtue.  \  Whatever  the  ob- 

Of  virtue.       .  pi.  ,        .  . 

ject  of  choice  may  be,  it  is  conceded 
that  virtue  consists  in  an  act  of  the  will,  and 
that  there  is  involved  in  this  act  an  inseparable 
^  /  reflex  action  by  which  a  saJbi^factiop^o^  high- 
est kind  comes  to  the  virtuous  person.  )  It  is  a 
consciousness  of  this  satisfaction  that  I  suppose 
to  be  identified  with  the  act  itself  so  as  to  form 
a  part  of  it  by  those  who  say  that  they  do  the 
act  for  its  own  sake.  As  the  act  is  voluntary, 
whatever  the  original  impulse  or  motive  may 
have  been,  if  it  were  known  that  it  neither  did 


THE  SENSIBILITY  IN  GENERAL.  39 


nor  could  result  in  the  good  of  the  agent  him- 
self or  of  any  one  else,  it  could  not  be  ration- 
ally continued. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  will  follow  that 
there  is  no  act  of  the  will  that  is  not  aii  motives  / 

.    ^    from  the  ^ 

preceded,  prompted,  and  accompanied  sensibility. 
by  some  state  of  the  sensibility.,  All  motives  are 
from  that.  '  This  is  generally  admitted.  What 
we  call  rational  motives  are  not  from  reason  di- 
rectly, but  are  those  which  are  shown  by  reason 
to  be  superior  to  others  with  which  they  are  com- 
pared. With  no  desires  or  affections,  no  enjoy- 
ment or  suffering,  all  of  which  are  forms  of  the 
sensibility,  there  could  be  no  choice,  no  volition, 
no  voluntary  action.  But  since  moral  action 
must  be  voluntary,  it  follows  that  there  can  be  no 
moral  action  without  a  sensibility. 

And  not  only  is  moral  action  thus  impossible 
without  a  sensibility,  but  so  also  are  Moral  ideas 
moral  ideas.  Except  on  the  condition  Z^'aslnT^ 
of  beings  who  can  enjoy  and  suffer,  there 
can  be  no  benevolence,  no  justice  or  injustice,  no 
rights  and  no  obligation,  no  right  or  wrong,  and 
no  moral  law. 

Hence,  again,  as  the  existence  of  beings  having 
a  sensibility,  and  motives  from  that,  is  Moral  ideas 

,  .  1.1  1  relate  solely 

a  prerequisite  to  moral  ideas,  so  those  to  persons, 
ideas  can  have  no  such  relation  to  the  nature  of 
things  as  have  those  of  space,  and  time,  and  math- 
ematics, but  only  to  the  nature  of  persons,  and  of 


40 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


these  as  capable  of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  we/ 
shall  then  have  to  deal,  not  solely  with  the  prod-  \ 
nets  of  pure  intellect,  but  with  those  of  the  in-*^ 
tellect,  the  sensibility,  and  will,  combined.   These  "7 
lie  in  a  different  field  and  aye  of  a  different  order. 


a 


CHAPTER  IT. 


A  GOOD. 

Understanding  thus  the  relation  of  the  Sen- 
Bibility  to  moral  ideas  and  moral  action,  we  pass  < 
to  the  fundamental  product  given  by  it  when  act- 
ing normally.    This  is  a  good. 

Of  the  word  good,  the  ambiguities  have  led  to 
so  much  confusion,  that  we  cannot  be  too  careful 
respecting  it.  By  a  good^  I  mean  some  result  in 
a  sensibility  that  has  value  in  itself.  This  may 
be  my  own  or  that  of  another,  but  it  must  be 
known  as  having  value  in  itself,  or  it  cannot  be  a 
good. 

What  then  has  value  in  itself  ?  Nothing  exter- 
nal can  have  —  nothing  that  is  not  subjective,  and 
so  the  product  of  some  activity  within  the  being 
whose  the  good  is.  Not  the  activity  is  a  good, 
but  its  result.  Food,  clothing,  hou?^s,  lands,  have 
no  value  except  as  they  are  related  to  some  want, 
—  want  lying  wholly  within  the  sensibility.  To  a 
disembodied  spirit  they  could  have  no  value.  So 
of  the  products  of  art  and  of  natural  scenery.  If 
there  were  no  feeling  of  admiration,  none  of 
beauty  or  sublimity,  they  would  have  no  value. 


12 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


So  again  of  approbation,  however  expressed.  If 
there  were  no  result  in  a  sensibility  we  should  be 
affected  neither  by  approbation  nor  disapproba- 
tion. There  could  be  no  reward  or  punishment, 
and  so  no  government. 

We  conclude  then  that  a  good  is  that  which  has 
A  good  uiti-  value  in  itself,  for  its  own  sake,  and  that 

mate  for  the  ,  ^       p         i        i  • 

Bensibiiity.  such  good  IS  to  be  louud  ouly  m  some 
result  in  a  sensibility.  This  will  be  ultimate  for 
the  sensibility  as  truth  is  for  the  intellect.  Con- 
cerning this,  the  question  cannot  be  asked.  What 
is  it  good  for  ?  It  is  good  for  nothing  beyond  it- 
self.   It  has  no  utility.    It  is  simply  a  good. 

As  known  by  us,  this  good  is  the  joint  product 
of  the  sensibility  and  of  the  intellect.  In  its  es- 
sence it  is  from  the  sensibility,  but  there  must  be 
intellect,  that  it  may  be  comprehended  in  its  idea 
as  universally  valuable,  and  to  be  chosen  for  its 
own  sake.  As  thus  known,  we  can  not  only  choose 
it  for  ourselves  and  put  forth  efforts  for  its  attain- 
ment, but  can  choose  it  for  others  and  put  forth 
efforts  for  its  attainment  by  them.  That  which 
prompts  the  choice  is  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
good  ;  that  which  prompts  the  effort  is  the  desire 
to  attain  it  for  ourselves,  or  that  it  may  be  at- 
tained by  others. 

As,  then,  a  good  is  always  subjective,  it  must 
Quality  and  be  the  result  of  some  activity  by,  or 
good.  within,  the  individual,  and  such  good 
will  differ  both  in  quality  and  in  quantity,  accord- 


A  GOOD. 


43 


ing  to  the  source  and  degree  of  the  activity.  The 
quality  will  be  high  or  low,  as  the  powers  or  sus^ 
ceptibilities  in  action  are  high  or  low;  and,  within 
limits,  the  quantity  will  be  as  the  degree  of  the 
activity.  In  quality,  such  good  may  pass  from 
the  lowest  animal  gratification  to  the  highest 
forms  of  happiness,  joy,  blessedness  ;  in  quantity, 
it  will  be  limited  only  by  the  capability  of  the 
being  to  sustain  the  activity  without  injury. 

When  a  good  is  thus  spoken  of,  the  word  good 
is  used  as  a  noun,  and  it  would  be  well  if 
the  sense  here  given  could  be  uniformly  ^ 
adhered  to,  but  it  is  not.  When  "  the  true,  the 
beautiful,  and  the  good,"  are  spoken  of,  the 
good"  evidently  means  goodness.  So  also  moral 
good  "  is  constantly  used  by  eminent  writers  to 
signify  goodness,  whereas  I  mean  by  moral  good 
the  satisfaction  that  is  inseparably  connected  with 
that  form  of  activity  which  we  call  goodness,  and 
think  that  any  other  use  of  the  phrase  must  lead 
to  confusion. 

If  what  has  now  been  said  of  the  word  good, 
used  as  a  noun,  be  accepted,  we  shall  Theadjec- 
readily  see  what  its  meaning  as  an  ad-  ^^^^^soo^^- 
jective  must  be.  Nothing  will  be  good  except  as 
it  is  directly  or  indirectly,  voluntarily  or  invol- 
untarily promotive  of  a  good.  This  is  obviously 
true  of  mere  things  whether  beautiful  or  useful. 
If  there  be  any  thing  which  never  has  ministered 
or  can  minister  to  a  good  as  above  defined,  that 


44 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


thing  IS  good  for  nothing.  The  value  of  such 
things  is  Avholly  relative,  and  is  in  proportion  to 
their  adaption  thus  to  minister. 

In  the  same  way,  substantially,  the  adjective 
good  is  applied  to  persons.  A  person  is  good  who 
ministers  voluntarily  to  the  good  of  others.  Such 
a  person  has  goodness  in  its  only  proper,  or  at 
least,  in  its  highest  sense.  In  its  proper  sense 
goodness  is  a  fixed  purpose  and  disposition  to  min- 
ister to  the  good  of  others,  and  moral  good  is  the 
satisfaction  inseparably  connected  with  such  min- 
istration. To  this  satisfaction,  the  term  "  blessed," 
involving  blessedness,  was  applied  by  our  Saviour 
when  he  said,  It  is  more  blessed  to  give  than 
to  receive." 

If  the  above  be  correct,  it  will  follow  that 
(  neither  knowledge  as  from  the  intellect  solely, 
nor  virtue  as  from  the  will,  is  a  good.  As  has 
been  said,  from  the  activity  involved  in  each 
there  is  a  satisfaction  high  and  peculiar,  and  that 
can  be  had  in  no  other  way,  but  this  is  properly 
from  a  pervading  sensibility,  as  pervading  as  con- 
sciousness, and  not  from  intellect  and  will  regarded 
simply  as  powers  of  knowing  and  of  willing.  The 
good  from  virtue  with  the  hope  it  embosoms  is 
such  that  it  may  rationally  sustain  a  man  against 
all  the  might  of  nature.  It  is  such  as  to  make  a 
true  martyrdom  possible,  but  the  good  is  one  thing 
and  the  virtue  another.  They  are  as  distinct  asr 
the  fragrance  and  the  flower. 


CHAPTER  III. 


DrFFERENT  KINDS   OF   ACTIVITY  DETERMINING 
THE  QUALITY  OF  THE  GOOD. 

Since,  as  we  have  seen,  the  kind  of  activity  de- 
termines the  quality  of  the  good,  we  next  need  to 
know  what  the  different  kinds  of  activity  are.  Of 
these  there  is  a  general  division  as  the  activity 
originates  from  without  or  from  within,  Susceptibii- 

.  ities  and 

irom  the  susceptibihties  or  the  powers,  powers. 
These  words,  susceptibilities  and  powers,  point  to 
a  distinction  that  runs  through  our  whole  frame, 
physical  and  mental. 

In  our  physical  constitution  there  is  a  double 
set  of  nerves,  the  afferent  and  the  efferent,  like 
the  double  track  of  a  railway  terminating  in  a 
metropolis.  Provision  is  thus  made  for  action 
upon  us  from  without  inward,  which  terminates  in 
sensation,  and  for  action  by  us  from  within  out- 
wards, which  originates  in  choice  and  volition. 
We  are  thus  acted  upon  and  we  act ;  we  receive 
and  we  give.  We  receive  first,  and  as  a  condition 
of  giving,  and  there  is  a  good  in  that;  living  and 
we  also  give,  and  in  that  there  is  a  ^^^^^^'^^s- 
higher  good,  for    it  is  more  blessed  to  give  than 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


to  receive."  Universally  it  may  be  said  that  ac- 
tivity from  within,  and  its  consequent  good,  is  of 
a  higher  order  than  that  from  without,  and  the 
good  from  that.  The  application  of  terms  here  is 
not  uniform,  but  in  general  it  may  be  said  that 
through  the  susceptibilities,  the  passivities,  the 
movement  from  without  inward,  we  have  pleas- 
pieasure  ^1^0 1  and  that,  through  the  activities, 
and  joy  ^j^^  choiccs,  the  volitions,  the  movement 
from  within  outward,  we  have  joy,  happiness, 
blessedness.  And  as  these  forms  of  good  are  dif- 
ferent in  their  origin,  so  are  they  in  their  quahty. 
By  the  one  we  are  allied  to  the  animals,  by  the 
other  to  the  angels,  being  made  through  the  power 
of  rational  activity  and  affection  but  little  lower 
than  they.  For  the  one  we  are  dependent  on  cir- 
cumstances, for  the  other  on  choice. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked  that  it  is  in  this 
Twodirec-  divisiou  of  our  nature,  and  of  the  kinds 
activity.  of  good,  that  we  find  the  two  great  direc- 
tions of  human  activity.  The  prevalent  tendency 
of  men  is  to  remain  in  indolent  passivity,  enjoying 
the  good  there  is  in  impressions  from  without,  or, 
if  they  act,  doing  so  for  the  sake  of  those  impres- 
sions. Business  men  seek  to  surround  themselves 
with  the  means  of  such  impressions  and  of  such 
good,  and  then  retire.  But  the  good  that  comes 
thus,  wanes,  in  part  by  habit,  and  in  part  by  de- 
cay of  the  organization.  The  deepest  want  is  still 
anmet,  and  the  unrest  remains.    It  was  of  such 


QUALITY  OF  GOOD. 


47 


good  that  Solomon  said  "  it  is  vanity ; "  it  was  of 
such  good  that  Mohammed  constituted  his  Para- 
dise. But  it  is  possible  for  man  to  subordinate 
passive  impressions  and  the  pleasures  from  them 
to  some  form  of  the  activities.  He  may  thus  be- 
come a  curse  or  a  blessing.  He  may  ravage  a  con- 
tinent through  ambition,  or  may  build  up  the 
spirit  in  greater  efficiency  for  benevolent  and  holy 
activity.  In  doing  this  he  will  enter  upon  an  up- 
ward and  ever  brightening  path.  In  such  activ- 
ity with  its  appropriate  surroundings  is  the  essen- 
tial idea  of  the  Christian  heaven. 

Of  the  good  originated  by  movement  from  with- 
out there  are  varieties  and  gradations.  Pleasures 
are  higher  and  lower.  And  then  there  is  an  in- 
termediate region  of  art,  sensuous,  but  interme- 
not  sensual,  and  in  which  high  forms  ^^'^^^  ^^s^^^- 
of  activity  are  blended  with  impressions  from 
without.  These,  however,  we  need  not  here  no- 
tice, but  proceed  to  consider  what  are  distinctively 
the  active  principles  of  our  nature  and  the  good 
from  them. 

Active  principles  are  indirectly  known  through 
their  solicitations  and  promptings.  The  ^^^ive  prin- 
principles  themselves  are  that  in  our  aM^ow^^^ 
constitution  by  which  the  solicitations, 
or  cravings,  or  promptings  occur  when  the  occa- 
sion is  given.  They  are  not  mere  capacities,  as 
the  combustibility  of  wood,  but  are  those  in- 
stinctive tendencies  towards  the  objects  needed 
for  our  well-being  which  are  the  condition  of  ex- 


18 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


perience,  or  of  any  action  at  all.  They  suppose 
something  outside  of  themselves  in  view  of  which 
they  are  originally  called  into  spontaneous  action 
with  no  knowledge  by  the  person  of  the  result. 
Perhaps  the  wisdom  and  beneficence  of  God  are 
nowhere  more  distinctly  shown  in  our  constitu- 
tion than  at  this  point.  The  body  needs  nourish- 
ment, and  there  is  a  principle  placed  in  it  by 
which  there  is  a  direct  correspondence  between 
the  body  of  an  infant  and  the  milk  drawn  from  its 
mother's  breast.  This  principle  abides  and  gives 
occasion  to  the  appetite  when  the  milk  is  needed. 
In  consequence  of  this  the  appetite  goes  out  spon- 
taneously, or,  as  some  would  say,  instinctively, 
towards  its  object,  and  the  result  is  found  to  be 
in  this  and  in  all  analogous  cases,  a  good  either 
to  the  individual  alone,  or  to  both  the  individual 
and  to  others. 

But  for  such  an  immediate  correspondence  be- 
tween the  constitution  and  something  without 
there  could  be  no  original  movement,  and  such 
movement  is  said  to  be  for  the  sake  of  the  object. 
It  is  in  view  of  that,  but  not  for  that.  These 
principles,  whether  physical  or  mental,  reveal 
themselves  both  in  attractions  and  repulsions,  in 
affinities  and  aversions,  and  it  might  as  truly  be 
said  of  the  aversions  as  of  the  attractions  that 
they  are  for  the  sake  of  the  object.  No,  they 
are  not  for  that,  but  for  the  good  of  the  being 
himself  and  of  oth(TS.  They  were  intended  by 
God  for  tl'.at,  and  wlien  the  individual  comes  to 


QUALITY  OF  GOOD. 


49 


take  himself  under  his  own  guidance  he  is  bound 
to  control  all  such  principles,  however  they  may  re- 
veal themselves,  for  the  same  end.  In  themselves, 
so  far  as  they  are  purely  spontaneous,  these  prin- 
ciples have  no  moral  character.  As  de-  jno^ai 
signed  by  God,  they  may  have  for  their  ^^^^^^^er. 
object  our  own  good  or  the  good  of  others,  but 
they  are  neither  selfish  nor  benevolent.  Moral 
character  is  shown  in  their  control.  - 

As  differently  manifested  the  principles  that 
lead  to  action,  called  by  Stewart  active  ciassm- 
principles,  may  be  classified.  They  may 
too,  like  the  forces  of  nature,  the  functions  of  the 
body,  and  the  mental  powers,  be  arranged  as  lower 
and  higher  on  the  principle  of  the  conditioning 
and  the  conditioned.  By  Stewart,  in  his  treatise 
on  the  active  powers,  they  are  classified  as  the 
Appetites,  the  Desires,  the  Affections,  Self-love, 
and  the  Moral  faculty.  He  thus  makes  the  com- 
mon mistake  of  placing  the  moral  faculty  in  the 
same  relation  to  action  as  the  rest  and  giving  it  an 
object  of  its  own. 

The  following  arrangement  of  these  principles 
that  have  corresponding  objects  I  think  prefer- 
able :  — 

Moral  Affections,     Impulsive  after  choice. 
Sdf-bve7^'  j  National  and  Impulsive. 

Rights,  Impulsive  and  Moral. 

Desir^"""""''     !  Impulsive  before  choice. 


50 


MORAL  SCIEKCE. 


The  place  usually  given  to  Conscience  is  above 
Moral  Love,  with  Right  for  its  object ;  while  the 
Moral  Affections  are  not  distinctively  recognized. 

That  the  above  are  in  their  order  as  condi- 
tioning and  conditioned  will  be  readily  seen. 

But  for  those  below,  the  higher  could  not  be, 
Lawofcon-  1^^        lowcr  havc  no  agency  in 

^ntcondi-  producing  the  higher.  This  is  what  I 
tioned  mean  by  the  law  of  the  conditioning 
aiid  the  conditioned  —  a  law  that  pervades  the 
structure  of  the  universe,  and  renders  necessary 
an  agent  distinct  from  itself.  This  law  is  ex- 
plained in  the  "  Outline  Study  of  Man."  It  is 
suflBcient  to  say  here,  that  by  a  condition  I  mean 
that  in  one  being  or  thing  which  is  indispensable 
to  the  being  of  another,  but  has  no  efficiency  in 
A  condition  producing  it.  A  condition  is  thus  distin- 
notacause.  g^;si^e(j  fj^^^^  ^  causc.  God  is  the  cause 
of  matter  and  of  the  universe,  but  not  its  condi- 
tion. Space  is  its  condition,  but  not  its  cause. 
The  foundation  of  a  house  is  its  condition,  but 
not  its  cause,  and  any  attempt  to  make  it  either 
the  cause  or  a  part  of  it  is  in  violation  of  the 
common  judgment  as  indicated  by  the  settled 
usages  of  speech.  Besides  the  foundation,  there 
is  needed  a  builder.  In  the  same  way  the  appe- 
tites, which  are  common  to  animals  and  men,  are 
the  condition,  but  not  the  cause  of  the  higher 
powers  that  belong  to  man  ;  and  in  the  series 
given,  this  principle  applies  all  the  way  up. 


QUALITY  OF  GOOD. 


61 


Practically,  the  rank  of  these  powers,  and  so 
that  of  the  quality  of  the  good  from  their  Bank  intui- 
activity,  is  known  intuitively.  Every  known, 
man  knows,  and  cannot  but  know,  that  the  pur- 
suit of  knowledge  and  the  good  from  that,  is 
higher,  nobler,  more  human  than  that  of  sensual 
pleasure.  It  is  only  by  the  possession  and  exer- 
cise of  noble  faculties  that  man  comes  to  a  sense 
of  dignity,  and  in  such  exercise  he  comes  to  it  in- 
tuitively. No  one  who  has  not  come  to  it  thus 
can  tell  another,  or  be  told,  what  it  is.  And  as 
the  sense  of  dignity  is  thus  known,  so  is  the  rela- 
tive dignity  of  the  different  powers  and  their  prod- 
ucts. This  intuitive  perception  of  an  order  of  the 
powers  as  higher  and  lower,  and  of  the  correspond- 
ing quality  of  the  good  from  them,  is  peculiar  to 
man,  and  is  a  marked  distinction  between  him 
and  the  brutes.  Such  recognition  is  sufficient  for 
practice,  but  for  the  purposes  of  science  we  need 
a  law.  We  need  it  not  only  to  fix  the  quality  of 
the  different  kinds  of  good,  but,  as  will  be  seen 
hereafter,  to  fix  the  limit  of  action  through  the 
law  of  limitation  drawn  from  this. 

Having  then  this  law,  and  this  arrangement 
from  it,  we  notice  briefly  the  several  powers. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


IMPULSIVE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION. 
THE  APPETITES. 

These  are  desires,  but  tliey  are  made  |b  class 
by  themselves,  as  originating  from  the  body,  as 
periodical,  and  as  having  a  physical  limit.  The 
object  of  the  appetites  is  the  well-being  of  the 
body  and  the  continuance  of  the  race.  The  more 
prominent  are  three,  hunger,  thirst,  and  sex,  but 
any  periodical  craving  indicating  a  phj^sical  want, 
as  that  for  air  or  for  sleep,  is  of  the  nature  of  an 
appetite. 

INSTINCT. 

That  instinct  has  exclusive  relation  to  the  ap- 
petites, is  not  supposed,  but  it  is  placed  with  them 
as  equally  essential,  and  as  most  prominent  in 
that  connection.  All  spontaneous  tendencies  are 
of  the  nature  of  instinct,  but  in  connection  with 
appetite  it  is  indispensable.  If  the  young  bird 
did  not  instinctively  open  its  mouth  it  would  per 
ish.  So  also  would  the  lamb  if  it  did  not  know 
in  the  same  way  where  to  seek  for  its  food.  As 
instinct  is  so  far  beyond  the  control  of  will,  and  as 
its  function  in  man,  after  responsible  action  begins, 


IMPULSIVE  PRINCIPLES  OP  ACTION.  63 


is  SO  obscure,  it  is  not  usually  treated  of  in  moral 
science. 

THE  DESIRES. 
As  a  good  of  some  kind  is  the  only  ultimate  ob- 
iect  of  choice,  so  desire  is  the  chief,  if  The  desires: 

,  _     .  _  .        .  .  .         their  nat- 

not  the  only  impulse  to  action  m  seeking  ure. 
it,  and  indeed  to  any  voluntary  action.  He  who 
desires  nothing  will  hope  for  nothing,  will  fear 
nothing,  and  will  do  nothing.  If  there  be  aver- 
sion, it  will  abide  as  a  mere  feeling  till  a  desire  to 
be  removed  from  the  hated  object  leads  to  action. 
Originally,  the  immediate  objects  of  desire  re- 
lated to  our  constitution  as  a  means  of  good  were 
individual,  but  these  were  readily  classified,  so 
that  the  objects  of  the  desires  are  now  expressed 
by  general  terms.  What  we  now  call  the  desire 
of  property  originally  revealed  itself  in  the  desire 
of  some  particular  thing ;  and  so  of  the  others. 
Desire  passes  up  as  an  element  into  the  affections. 
There  can  be  no  love  where  there  is  no  desire  for 
the  good  of  the  object  loved.  It  also  passes  up 
and  blends  with  each  of  the  principles  of  action 
above  it. 

The  desires  being  all  of  the  same  order,  it  was 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  the  law  of  order  of  the 
conditioning  and  conditioned  should  ap- 
ply  to  them  at  all,  and  certainly  not  in  so  pro- 
nounced a  way  as  to  different  orders  of  powers. 
Besides,  as  they  are  more  intimately  related,  the 
diJficulty  from  interdependence,  as  recognized  in 


54 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


the  Outline  Study  when  arranging  the  functions 
of  the  body,  would  be  greater.  Still,  the  attempt 
to  arrange  them  in  part  according  to  that  law  was 
made,  and  the  desires  of  continued  existence,  of 
property,  of  knowledge,  of  power,  and  of  esteem, 
were  placed  vertically  in  the  order  now  mentioned, 
as  lower  and  higher ;  while  those  of  good,  of  lib- 
erty, and  of  society,  were  placed  by  their  side  as 
blending  with  the  others.  Probably  all  would 
agree  that  there  is  room  here  for  something  of  the 
kind,  but  would  not  agree  upon  the  order.  Ac- 
curacy here  is  not  of  the  first  importance;  but 
perhaps  we  may  be  aided  in  our  estimate  of  their 
relations  if  we  place  them  all  in  a  vertical  line  and 
divide  them  into  two  equal  parts,  thus :  — 

Esteem, 

Power, 

Knowledge, 

Property, 

Society, 

Liberty, 

Good, 

Continued  Existence. 
Of  these  the  four  lower  are  of  things  into  which 
we  naturally  come  without  labor,  and  are  the  con- 
dition of  the  successful  pursuit  of  those  above. 

Of  these  several  desires  I  have  treated  slightly 
in  the  Outline  Study,  and  more  fully  in  my  Lec- 
tures on  Moral  Science,  and  nothing  further  need 
be  said  of  them  here,  excepting  a  word  respecting 
liberty  and  good. 


BIPULSIVB  PKINCIPLES  OP  ACTION.  65 


By  liberty  here  is  not  meant  the  liberty  of  man 
as  a  moral  being,  that  is,  liberty  of  Desire  for 
choice.    That  liberty  he  does  not  desire. 
He  has  it  by  necessity,  and  as  a  part  of  his  being. 
The  liberty  desired  is  freedom  from  unjust  re- 
straint by  the  will  of  another. 

The  desire  for  good  is  altogether  peculiar  as  not 
only  blending  with  the  others  and  al-  Desire  for 
ways  present  with  them,  as  the  idea  of 
existence  is  with  all  our  thoughts,  but  as  that 
which  gives  to  the  objects  of  the  desires,  and  to 
the  desires  themselves  as  a  part  of  the  constitution, 
their  whole  value.  It  is  also  peculiar  because  a 
good  is  the  only  thing  that  has  value  in  itself,  and 
is  that  ultimate  end  in  all  forms  of  activity  that 
has  no  utility,  and  can  never  be  directly  sought 
for.  All  we  know  of  our  being  is  its  activities  and 
their  results.  The  activities  are  in  part  directly 
subject  to  our  will;  the  results  only  indirectly,  or 
not  at  all.  There  are  other  ends,  as  the  growth 
of  plants  and  our  own  growth,  that  can  be 
sought  only  indirectly;  but  they  are  of  no  value 
except  with  reference  to  a  good  either  of  our- 
selves or  of  others.  If  there  were  no  conscious  be- 
ing capable  of  a  good,  the  material  universe,  how- 
ever beautiful  or  vast,  would  have  no  value.  It  is 
with  relation  to  this  that  our  being  is  constituted, 
and  neither  reason,  nor  Scripture,  nor  an  enlight- 
ened conscience,  ever  requires  of  us  anything  that 
would  not  be  for  our  own  highest  good,  and,  what 


66 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


is  always  coincident  with  that,  the  highest  good  of 
others.  If  Christ  commands  a  man  to  "lose  his 
life,"  it  is  that  he  may  "  find  it;  if  to  "hate  his 
life  in  this  world,"  it  is  that  he  may  "keep  it 
unto  life  eternal." 

These  peculiarities  of  a  good  as  the  only  object 
of  desire  really  ultimate,  and  as  incapable  of  be- 
ing directly  sought,  are  worthy  of  careful  atten- 
tion. They  show  us  at  once  of  how  little  value 
external  things  may  become,  and,  do  what  we  may 
ourselves,  how  constantly  and  entirely  we  are  de- 
pendent on  an  agency  not  our  own  for  any  good 
we  may  enjoy. 

THE  NATURAL  AFFECTIONS. 

These  differ  from  desires  in  their  object.  The 
Natural  af-    obicct  of  the  desircs  is  thinejs.    The  ob- 

fections.  •  /.     i  ,  .  . 

Their  Ob-      icct  of  the  natural  affections  is  sentient 

jects,  nat-  ,  i  •    n  r^^^  (V 

ure,  and      bcinsfs,  chieflv  pcrsous.    The  affections 

classifica-  ^  *^    ^  * 

tion.  are  more  complex.    Desire  enters  into 

them,  and  so  is  a  condition  for  them ;  but  in  their 
distinctive  character  the  affections  are  the  oppo- 
site of  the  desires.  The  desires  receive ;  the  af- 
fections give.  Though  not  selfish,  the  desires 
have  reference  to  self,  the  affections  to  others. 
True,  as  the  desires  are  ou7'  desires  there  is  a  re- 
flex of  good  to  us;  but  that  is  not  thought  of.  If 
it  could  be,  and  become  the  motive,  the  distinct- 
ive element  of  affection  would  be  lost.  Affection 
is  disinterested.    It  must  be,  or  cease  to  be  at 


BIPULSIVE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION.  67 


all.  Hence,  and  as  spontaneous,  its  beauty.  As 
purely  natural  it  has  no  moral  character ;  but 
moral  character  is  shown  by  dwarfing  it  through 
selfishness  and  vice,  or  by  giving  it  all  the  play 
the  higher  powers  will  allow.  Natural  affections 
are  of  great  diversity,  and  the  character  of  them 
changes  with  their  object.  The  affection  of  the 
parent  for  the  child  is  different  from  that  of  the 
child  for  the  parent.  The  affection  of  the  brother 
for  the  brother  is  not  the  same  as  that  for  the 
sister. 

These  affections  are  usually  classified  as  benev- 
olent and  malevolent.  A  better  nomenclature 
would  be,  beneficent,  defensive,  and  punitive. 
Nothing  either  benevolent  or  malevolent  can  be- 
long to  natural  affection,  but  let  any  one  come  be- 
tween the  affection  and  its  object,  and  the  energies 
of  the  being  will  be  arrayed  in  opposition  in  pro- 
portion to  the  strength  of  the  affection.  The  de- 
sires are  for  the  well-being  of  the  individual,  the 
affections  for  the  preservation  of  the  race  in  early 
life,  and  for  the  well  being  of  society. 

EIGHTS. 

It  is  with  hesitation  that  I  place  rights  among 
o'lr  active  powers,  and  next  in  order.    I  Rights  why 
hesitate  first,  because  no  one,  so  far  as  I  among  act- 
know,  has  placed  them  there;  and  second,  p^ies^"^" 
because  they  involve  an  element  from  the  moral 
nature,  which  has  not  yet  been  reached.  They  are 


58 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


among  our  active  powers  only  as  the  idea  of  a 
right  is  associated  with  a  desire  or  an  affection ; 
but  thus  associated  they  are  among  the  most  pow- 
erful. Men  fight  for  their  rights,  and  feel  justi- 
fied and  ennobled  in  doing  so.  The  idea  of  the 
right  of  a  man  to  himself,  that  is,  to  the  unob- 
structed exercise  of  his  powers  for  their  legitimate 
ends,  is  immediately  given  by  the  moral  reason 
in  connection  with  the  exercise  of  those  powers. 
This  idea  is  fundamental  in  moral  action,  and  per- 
vasive like  the  atmosphere.  It  stands  ready  to 
rush  in  at  any  point  that  is  opened  for  it  by  the 
operation  of  a  specific  desire.  Like  its  twin  idea 
of  obligation,  it  may  stand  by  itself,  or  it  may  be- 
come, when  associated  with  a  desire  or  an  affec- 
tion, the  leading  feature  in  a  principle  of  action 
and  give  it  its  name.  It  is  just  thus  that  we  get 
a  new  principle  by  the  combination  of  the  element 
of  affection  with  desire.  Having  then  an  original 
desire  for  property,  the  idea  of  a  right  immedi- 
ately combines  with  it  when  that  is  brought  into 
action,  and  becomes  the  leading  feature  of  the 
whole.  I  therefore  venture  to  place  as  springs 
of  action  next  above  the  affections,  those  rights 
that  spring  from  the  desires,  as  the  right  to  life, 
to  property,  to  freedom,  to  reputation,  and  the 
still  more  sacred  rights  that  spring  up  in  connec- 
tion  with  the  affections. 


CHAPTEE  V. 


RATIONAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION. 
SELF-LOYE. 

This  has  for  its  object  our  own  good.  In  com- 
mon with  the  principles  of  action  already  object  and 

,  .    .        T  ...  T     nature  of 

mentioned  it  involves  an  instinctive  tend-  seii-iove. 
ency,  and,  in  addition,  a  rational  apprehension  of 
good  as  valuable  in  itself,  together  with  a  compar- 
ison of  the  means  of  attaining  it.  In  the  lower 
principles  of  action  there  is  a  direct  correspond- 
ence between  the  principle  and  its  object,  and  so 
no  comparison.  Each  separate  principle  tends  di- 
rectly to  its  own  object,  and  so,  without  some 
governing  principle,  they  would  become  a  mob. 
But  here  there  is  comparison,  and  if  self-love  be 
true  to  its  own  function,  there  will  be  a  choice  of 
that  which  is  highest  and  best  for  us.  This  gives 
us  from  the  principle  itself  of  self-love,  in  addition 
to  the  good  from  the  active  principle  adopted,  a 
rational  satisfaction  and  sense  of  dignity  in  secur- 
ing our  own  highest  good.  This  we  have  because 
there -is  in  self-love,  and  in  securing  our  highest 
good,  both  rational  activity  and  dignity.  When 
a  being  comes  to  know  himself  as  rational  and 


60 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


moral,  with  impulses  that  are  to  be  controlled, 
there  is  involved  in  that  the  activity  of  reason  and 
conscience,  and  a  conception  of  the  highest  good 
that  is  possible  for  a  rational  and  moral  being  of  a 
seif-ioTe  given  capacity.  It  is  this  good  that  is 
^^^^^  the  proper  object  of  self-love.  It  is  a 
high  and  ineffable  good,  and  the  pursuit  of  it  is 
as  much  a  duty  as  the  pursuit  of  the  good  of  our 
neighbor.  Why  not?  God  estimates  it  as  highly. 
He  is  as  desirous  it  should  be  attained,  and  he 
has  intrusted  the  attainment  of  it  especially  to 
us,  and  in  the  choice  and  pursuit  of  such  a  good 
there  is  a  consciousness  of  dignity  and  worthiness 
wholly  apart  from  any  good  that  may  come  from 
the  activity  of  any  particular  desire  or  affection. 
There  is  just  now  a  tendency  to  confound  self-love 
with  seltishness,  or,  if  that  be  not  done,  to  dispar- 
age efforts  for  our  own  good  as  compared  with 
those  for  the  good  of  othei'S.  Such  efforts  are  not 
to  be  degraded  from  the  high  plane  of  duty.  In- 
deed the  choice  by  each  man  of  his  own  highest 
good  is  a  duty  to  others  and  to  God  as  well  as  to 
himself,  for  the  moment  an  inferior  good 

Eelfishnefls.     .       ,  i  r»  i  i 

IS  chosen  as  supreme,  seli-love  becomes 
belfishness  in  its  principle,  and  will  be  sure  to 
manifest  itself  as  such.  No  man  can  do  this  and 
give  God  and  his  fellow-creatures  their  proper 
place. 

Next  above  self-love,  and  as  having  an  object 
of  its  own  in  the  same  way,  is, 


BATIONAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION.  61 


BATIONAL  LOVE. 

For  this,  self-love  is  a  condition.  Without  a 
knowledge  in  our  own  experience  of  what  a  good 
is,  and  of  its  value,  we  can  have  no  conception  of 
the  good  of  another,  and  no  wish  for  it.  But 
self-love  being  criven,  we  shall  have  in  Elements  of 

•  r»     1  •      1  r»         •        1  rational 

the  formation  of  this  love,  first  m  the  love 
order  of  time,  an  idea  of  the  worth  or  value  of 
the  being  as  distinguished  from  his  worthiness. 
This  involves  an  appreciation  of  both  the  capa- 
bilities and  liabilities  of  the  being.  This,  how- 
ever, is  rather  a  condition  of  the  love  than  one 
of  its  elements.  Second  in  the  order  of  time, 
though  first  in  that  of  nature,  we  have  what  Ed- 
wards calls  a  "  propension  "  of  mind,  or,  as  Dr. 
McCosh  calls  it,  an  "  appetency  "  towards  the  be- 
ing, and  a  desire  that  he  should  attain  his  end. 
This  is  an  indispensable  element  of  the  love,  but 
not  the  love  itself.  It  is  spontaneous,  and  may- 
be overcame  by  other  forms  of  spontaneous  action. 
That  it  may  become  rational  love  there  must  be 
(third)  a  choice  for  the  being  of  his  end  and 
good,  and  such  a  devotement  of  ourselves  to  him, 
that  is  to  the  attainment  by  him  of  his  end  and 
good,  that  we  shall  be  willing  to  make  sacrifices 
for  it  as  we  would  for  our  own.  Of  this  love  the 
central  element  is  choice,  —  the  choice  choice  the 

•     -I  TP!  i»         1  1  (•   central  ele- 

01  the  good  of  others  for  the  sake  of  ment. 
that  good.    If  it  be  not  for  the  sake  of  that  it  is 


62 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


not  disinterested,  it  is  not  love.  This  choice  is  to 
be  made  in  view  of  the  capabilities  and  liabilities 
of  others,  without  reference  to  their  moral  char- 
acter or  to  their  relation  to  us  as  friends  or  ene- 
mies. In  no  other  way  can  we  understand  the 
command  of  Christ  to  love  our  enemies;  in  no 
other  way  can  we  follow  his  example.  Here  the 
governing  motive  is  not  a  sentiment,  or  impulse 
from  behind,  but  an  apprehension  of  reasons 
placed  before  us.  It  involves  the  will;  and  if  it 
do  not  so  involve  it  that  impartial  efforts  would 
be  made  for  the  good  of  others  as  for  our  own, 
it  is  not  the  love  which  our  moral  nature  de- 
mands, and  which  the  Scriptures  demand  as  the 
fulfilling  of  the  law. 

The  capacity  for  this  love  distinguishes  man 
Rational  from  all  creatures  below  him.  It  is  ra- 
tinctive  pre-  tional,  because  none  but  a  rational  being 

rogativeof  i       i    ii  t  i 

man.  can  Comprehend  the  good  and  measure 
its  value ;  and  it  is  moral,  because  it  is  demanded 
by  the  moral  nature,  and  so  demanded  as  to  be 
involved  in  and  to  limit  all  the  virtues.  As  the 
idea  of  being  underlies  and  is  involved  in  all  our 
thinking,  and  as  the  idea  of  a  good  underlies  and 
is  involved  in  all  our  choosing,  so  the  idea  of 
love  underlies  and  is  involved  in  all  the  virtues, 
and  is  so  involved  in  them  as  to  give  them  their 
limit.  It  is  what  the  moral  law  demands  as  affirm- 
ing obligation;  it  is  what  it  limits  as  guarding 
rights,  if  that  can  be  called  limitation  which  ia 


RATIONAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION. 


63 


but  another  aspect  of  love.  The  guardianship  of 
rights  is  that  office  of  loye  that  gives  it  an  aspect 
of  severity.  It  is  in  this  guardianship  Rational 
that  we  find  justice  and  its  cognates.  If  justice, 
there  were  no  rights  to  be  guarded  there,  could 
be  no  justice.  But  justice  has  no  absolute  claim 
like  that  of  love.  If  it  had,  mercy  would  be  im- 
possible, since  there  can  be  no  mercy  where  law 
is  concerned  unless  punishment  might  be  justly 
inflicted.  As  law  has  its  origin  in  love,  having 
always  for  its  end  the  best  good  of  those  under 
it,  there  can  be  no  real  contrariety  between  them, 
and  no  apparent  contrariety  till  the  subject  of 
law  incurs  its  penalty.  Then  law,  supposed  to 
be  just,  can  know  no  mercy;  and  love,  as  the 
originator  of  law,  can  know  no  expedient  that 
will  set  it  aside.  To  the  law  of  love  there  can  be 
no  exception;  but  the  claims  of  justice  may  be 
set  aside  in  favor  of  that  higher  and  more  com- 
prehensive law  if  that  can  be  done,  not  only  with- 
out the  violation  of  any  right,  but  with  the  full  or 
even  fuller  security  of  all  rights.  This,  we  be- 
lieve, can  be  done,  and  has  been  done ;  and  when 
this  is  done,  ''mercy  rejoiceth  against  judgment." 

To  express  this  love,  benevolence  would  be  the 
best  word  if  it  were  not  ambiguous;  but  Benevoienc© 
it  has  been  mischievously  so.  By  some  ^^^^s^ous 
it  has  been  made  identical  with  the  love  cora- 
\aanded  by  the  Scriptures,  and  so  inclusive  of  all 
the  virtues.    By  others  it  has  been  regarded,  as 


64 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


in  part  at  least,  an  impulsion  wliicli  we  share  in 
common  with  the  brutes;  and  others  still  have 
viewed  it  sometimes  in  one  aspect  and  sometunes 
Dr.  Alex-  ^^^^^  Other.  Sajs  Dr.  Archibald  Alex- 
^  ander  :  No  doubt  much  that  deserves 
the  name  of  virtue  consists  in  good-will  to  others 
and  in  contributing  to  their  welfare  ;  but  it  is  not 
correct  to  confine  all  virtuous  action  to  benevo- 
lence. We  can  conceive  of  benevolence  in  a  being 
who  has  no  moral  constitution.  Something  of  this 
kind  is  observable  in  brute  animals."  ^  Again, 
j5jj,i^^p  Bishop  Butler  says,  as  quoted  by  Dr. 
Butler.  Alexander  :  ^  Without  inquiring  how 
far  and  in  what  sense  virtue  is  resolvable  into  be- 
nevolence, and  vice  into  the  want  of  it,  it  may  be 
proper  to  observe  that  benevolence,  and  the  want 
of  it,  singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the  whole 
of  virtue  and  vice."  But  in  his  sermon  on  the 
love  of  our  neighbor  he  says:  "And  therefore  a 
disposition  and  endeavor  to  do  good  to  all  with 
whom  we  have  to  do,  in  the  degree  and  manner 
in  which  the  relations  we  stand  in  to  them  re- 
quire, is  a  discharge  of  all  the  obligations  we  are 
under  to  them."  He  says  further :  "  It  might  be 
added  that,  in  a  higher  and  more  general  w^ay  of 
consideration,  leaving  out  the  particular  nature 
of  creatures  and  the  particular  circumstances  in 
which  they  are  placed,  benevolence  seems  in  the 
strictest  sense  to  include  all  that  is  good  and 

1  Moral  Science,  p.  164.  ^  Ibid,  p.  166. 


KATIONAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION.  65 


worthy, — all  that  is  good  which  we  have  any- 
distinct,  particular  notion  of,  We  have  no  clear 
conception  of  any  positive,  moral  attribute  in  the 
Supreme  Being  but  what  maj^  be  resolved  up  into 
goodness."  The  bishop  even  speaks  of  benevolence 
as  entering  into  our  love  of  God,  which  some  are 
slow  to  allow.  He  says :  "  That  which  we  call 
piety,  or  the  love  of  God,  and  which  is  an  essen- 
tial part  of  a  right  temper,  some  may  perhaps  im- 
agine no  way  connected  with  benevolence.  Yet 
surely  they  must  be  connected  if  there  be  indeed 
in  being  an  object  infinitely  good."  With  this 
ambiguity  in  the  word,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
those  really  in  accord  should  have  seemed  to 
differ. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


^  THE  MOEAL  AFFECTION'S. 

We  have  now  completed  thelist  of  direct  active 
principles  before  acting,  that  is,  before  a  generic 
choice  is  made.  When  such  a  choice  is  made, 
especially  if  it  be  a  choice  of  some  good  regarded 
as  ultimate  and  supreme,  we  may  be  said  to  create 
for  ourselves  active  principles  that  are  spontane- 
ous, but  that  have,  as  determined  by  choice,  a 
moral  character.  Spontaneous  action  is  never 
either  free  or  responsible  except  as  it  is  deter- 
mined by  voluntary  action.  Active  principles 
thus  generated  are  the  MORAL  affections,  and 
the  difference  between  these  and  the  natural  affec- 
tions is,  that  the  moral  affections,  though  seem- 
ingly spontaneous  in  the  same  way  as  the  natural 
affections,  are  conditioned  upon  a  previous  choice, 
and  derive  their  character  from  the  character  of 
that. 

That  the  moral  should  have  been  confounded 
Natural  and  with  the  natural  affections  is  not  sur- 
tions.  prising.  The  difficulty  has  been  in  a 
failure  to  perceive  the  relation  just  stated  of  our 
generic  and  radical  choices  to  subsequent  spon- 


THE  MORAL  AFFECTIONS. 


67 


taneous  action,  the  character  of  which  is  yet  de- 
termined by  the  choice.  This  relation  is  so  inti- 
mate that  even  where  the  choice  is  not  of  the 
most  radical  kind,  it  will  yet  so  control  the  char- 
acter of  a  large  class  of  desires,  of  affections, 
hopes,  fears,  and  subordinate  choices  as  to  cause 
them  to  be  the  reverse  of  what  they  would  have 
been.  Two  men,  who,  with  a  full  apprehension 
of  the  principles  involved,  took  opposite  sides  in 
our  civil  war  must  have  had  opposite  desires  and 
affections,  and  the  events  that  caused  hope  and 
joy  to  the  one  must  have  caused  fear  and  sorrow 
to  the  other.  But  all  this  is  to  be  traced  back  to 
the  original  choice.  That  determined  the  leaders 
under  whom  they  served,  the  army  in  which  they 
marched,  the  friendships  they  formed,  and  very 
largely  the  direction  and  spontaneous  movement 
of  their  whole  sympathetic  and  emotive  nature. 

And  this,  with  the  exception  that  the  choice  is 
more  radical  and  all-pervading,  is  what  takes 
place  under  the  moral  government  of  God.  By  a 
thorough  choice  of  Him  and  his  cause,  the  whole 
current  of  the  soul,  all  its  motives  and  subordi- 
nate choices,  its  dispositions  and  tempers,  its  de- 
sires and  affections,  its  hopes  and  fears,  its  joys 
and  sorrows,  and  its  ultimate  destiny  will  be  the 
reverse  of  what  they  would  have  been  if  an 
opposite  choice  had  been  made.  All  these  are 
spontaneous,  are  independent  of  volition ;  we  are 
responsible  for  them,  but  only  through  their  rela- 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


tion  to  that  generic  and  permanent  choice  which 
determines  character,  and  in  which  character  con- 
sists. 

It  is  but  recently  that  the  distinctive  character 
of  these  affections  has  been  seen,  and  hence  they 
have  not  been  placed  as  a  separate  class  among 
our  active  principles. 

By  some  the  emotions  are  classed  as  active 
Emotions     principles,   and  active    principles  are 

not  Rctiv© 

principles  classed  with  emotions;  but  no  pure 
emotion,  that  is,  no  emotion  destitute  of  the  ele- 
ment of  desire,  belongs  here.  Neither  joy  nor 
sorrow  is  an  active  principle.  These  are  emotions 
that  result  from  our  active  principles  in  success 
or  defeat,  but  the  emotions  themselves  are  not 
active  principles,  nor,  according  to  any  proper 
usage,  are  the  active  principles  emotions. 


DIVISION  m. 


THE  WILL. 

Haying  thus  considered  the  sensibility  as  it  is 
related  to  choice,  we  pass  to  the  third  great  divi- 
sion of  our  nature,  the  will. 

Of  will  there  are  two  functions  —  choice  and 
volition.  These  two,  with  rational  in-  Twofunc- 
tellect  and  sensibility  as  their  condicion,  wui. 
fit  man  to  have  dominion  —  dominion  first  over 
himself,  and  then  over  nature  and  all  inferior 
creatures.  Of  these  two  functions  choice  is  the 
chief.  In  that  alone  is  freedom,  in  that  moral 
quality.  In  its  nature  choice  is  free.  If  it  be 
not,  it  is  not  choice.  Man  is  under  a  necessity 
of  choosing,  but  what  he  shall  choose  he  himself 
freely  determines.  Freedom  in  choosing,  being 
an  essential  mode  in  which  our  being  is  mani- 
fested, is  as  certainly  known  as  the  being  itself. 
Not  more  certainly  does  man  know  the  act  of 
choosing  than  he  knows  its  quality  as  free.  The 
act  itself  is  immediately  known,  and  so  cannot  be 
proved.  It  is  too  certain  for  that,  and  the  same 
may  be  said  of  its  quality  as  free.  Men  may  deny 
freedom  in  words,  but  they  universally  affirm  it  in 


70 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


their  actions,  and  treat  eacli  other  as  if  they  sup- 

posed  themselves  and  others  to  be  free. 

Choice  is  completed,  and  responsibility  under 
When  re-  moral  govcmment  incurred,  when  the 
is  incurred,  choicc  is  fully  made.  No  outward  act 
is  needed.  A  choice  that  will  revolutionize  a 
nation  may  be  made  in  the  quiet  and  darkness 
of  midnight,  and  may  abide  for  an  indefinite 
time  simply  as  a  choice.  As  thus  completed 
by  an  immediate  act,  choice  requires  no  means. 
Hence  outward  force  cannot  so  reach  it  as  either 
to  compel  or  prevent  it.  Hence  too,  as  the  ques- 
tion, How?  always  has  reference  to  means,  no  one 
can  tell  another  how  to  choose.  No  one  can  tell 
a  child  how  to  love  its  father,  or  a  man  how  to 
love  God.  It  will  follow  also,  since  no  outward 
force  can  compel  choice  or  prevent  it,  that  there 
can  be  no  excuse  for  making  a  wrong  choice,  or 
for  not  making  a  right  one.  The  cause  must  be 
wholly  within  the  man,  and  within  him  regarded 
as  free. 

Choice  is  either  specific,  or  generic.  A  specific 
specific  and  choice  is  the  choice  of  a  single  object.  A 
choice^  generic  choice  is  the  choice  of  an  end 
that  can  be  attained  only  by  a  succession  of  subor- 
dinate choices  and  volitions ;  or,  which  is  mucli 
the  same  thing,  the  choice  of  some  one  principle 
of  action  to  which  others  are  to  be  subordinated. 
Of  generic  choices  there  is  a  great  variety  as  they 
are  more  or  less  generic.    The  choice  of  a  pro. 


THE  WILL, 


71 


fession  is  a  generic  choice ;  but  the  most  generic 
choice  possible  is  that  by  which  a  man  accepts  or 
rejects  the  law  of  his  being,  that  is  the  moral 
law.  In  doing  this  he  disposes  of  himself.  This 
he  alone,  of  all  creatures  on  the  earth,  can  do,  and 
that  he  can  do  this  is  his  great  distinction.  He 
can  accept  the  law  of  his  being  and  be  wise,  or 
reject  it  and  be  a  fool.  No  being  below  man  is 
capable  of  being  wise,  or  of  being  a  fool. 

Choice  may  be  either  between  good  of  the  same 
kind,  as  greater  or  less,  or  between  good  choice  be- 
of  different  kinds,  as  higher  or  lower,  things. 
When  it  is  between  good  of  the  same  kind,  it  is 
between  things;  when  of  different  kinds,  between 
different  principles  of  action.    Thus  if  between 
the  sense  of  taste  only  be  addressed  the  P^i^^^^pi^s- 
choice  may  be  between  an  apple  and  a  pear,  but 
it  may  also  be  between  the  indulgence  of  appetite 
and  the  desire  of  knowledge,  or  any  of  the  higher 
forms  of  activity.    In  either  case  the  choice  pre- 
supposes a  knowledge  by  the  intellect  of  that 
which  is  to   be   chosen,  and  an  apprehension 
through  the  sensibility  of  some  good  on  the  ground 
of  which  it  is  to  be  chosen. 

Volition,  the  second  and  secondary  constituent 
of  will,  is  always  preceded  by  choice,  choice  pre- 
not  only  by  a  choice  that  may  be  held  tion. 
in  abeyance,  but  by  an  immediate  choice  to  put  it 
forth.    The  choice  between  an  apple  and  a  pear 


72 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


may  be  made  long  before  either  is  taken,  but  the 
moment  comes  when  the  choice  is  made  to  put 
forth  the  volition,  and  the  office  of  that  is  to 
originate  the  movement  by  which  the  apple  or 
the  pear  is  taken. 


DIVISION  IV, 


CHAPTER  1. 
r  THE  MOBAL  NATURE. 

Fkom  this  the  moral  law  proceeds  when  a  man 
is  a  law  to  himself;  and  through  it  that  same 
law  is  recognized  when  it  is  revealed  directly  and 
in  its  fullness  by  God. 

By  a  nature  we  mean  a  constitution  such  that 
on  given  conditions  certain  results  will  a  nature, 
uniformly  follow.  Of  the  origin  of  ^^^w^^^^^- 
what  is  thus  called  a  nature  no  account  can  be 
given.  That  it  is  can  be  known  only  by  phe- 
nomena uniformly  manifested  ;  nor  can  we  know 
anything  of  the  origin  of  the  phenomena  except 
their  conditions.  The  conditions  being  given, 
fire  will  uniformly  barn,  and  hence  we  say  it  is 
the  nature  of  fire  to  burn.  Because  the  ox  uni- 
formly eats  grass  and  the  lion  flesh,  we  say  it  is 
their  nature  to  do  so.  Because  sensation  uni- 
formly occurs  in  us  on  certain  conditions,  we  are 
said  to  have  a  sensitive  nature.  In  the  same 
way  we  say  that  mankind  have  uniformly,  on  cer- 
tain conditions,  moral  ideas  and  feelings,  and 
hence  that  they  have  a  moral  nature.    We  say 


T4 


MOBAL  SCIENCE. 


that  it  is  as  natural  and  necessary  for  a  man  to 
be  conscious  of  rights,  and  to  feel  under  obliga- 
tion to  do  some  things  and  to  abstain  from  others, 
as  it  is  to  think  or  to  feel.  Endowed  as  he  is, 
he  cannot  help  thinking.  If  he  could  he  would 
not  have  an  intellectual  nature.  In  the  same  way, 
if  he  could  avoid  having  moral  ideas  and  feelings 
he  would  not  have  a  moral  nature. 

This  nature  reveals  itself,  first,  through  the 
Revealed  in  ^OY^X  ov  practical  rcasou,  in  the  recogni- 
tk)n^or°^^'  ^^^^  rights.  No  one  can  exercise  his 
rights.  powers  legitimately  without  a  recogni- 
tion of  his  right  to  himself,  that  is  of  his  right  to 
use  his  natural  powers  for  their  natural  ends  with 
no  interference  from  any  one  else.  This  idea  of 
the  right  of  a  man  to  himself  is  involved  in  the 
very  exercise  of  his  powers,  and  is  revealed  in 
connection  with  every  active  principle  of  our  nat- 
ure. Has  man  an  original  desire  for  property, 
constituting  it  an  end  and  a  good  ?  Then  the 
idea  of  a  right  to  property  will  reveal  itself  in 
connection  with  that  desire,  and  no  mere  expedi- 
ency, nor  any  law  except  that  of  necessity,  may 
interfere  with  that  right.  The  idea  may  not  come 
into  prominence  till  the  right  either  is,  or  is  at- 
tempted to  be,  infringed,  but  then  our  nature  is 
stirred  to  its  lowest  depths.  Rights  are  not  prin- 
ciples  of  action  except  as  they  need  to  be  de- 
fended. 

As  thus  corresponding  to  a  right  on  the  part  of 


THE  MORAL  NATURE. 


75 


others  obligation  can  be  defined,  and  enforced. 
Such  obligation  was  formerly  called  perfect,  while 
one  that  could  not  be  thus  defined  and  enforced 
was  called  imperfect.  According  to  this  the  ob- 
ligation to  pay  a  debt  would  be  perfect ;  to  give 
something  in  charity,  imperfect.  Whewell  would 
limit  the  word  to  the  first  sense,  but  as  commonly 
used,  and  as  I  use  it,  it  transcends  the  region  of 
rights,  and  is  coextensive  with  the  words  ought, 
and  duty. 

But  with  the  idea  of  a  right  comes  also  the  idea 
of  obligation,  for  these  are  reciprocal,  ideaofobu- 
If  I  have  a  right  to  myself,  others  must  ^fifgJi^ts  re- 
be  under  obligation  to  respect  that  right,  ^^^p^o^^i- 
and  I  must  be  under  obligation  to  abstain  from 
interfering  with  the  right  of  another  to  himself. 
It  is  affirmed,  not  solely  on  the  ground  of  the 
rights  of  others  as  made  known  through  our  own, 
but  also  on  the  ground  of  their  worth,  and  of  our 
capacity  to  do  them  good. 

And  here  it  may  be  noticed  that  these  two 
forms,  in  which  the  moral  nature  reveals  scriptural 
itself,  are  recognized  by  our  Saviour  in  ofThTtwo" 
the  two  fundamental  precepts  of  the 
moral  law  given  by  Him.    One  of  these  corre- 
sponds  to  the  first  and  lower  form,  in  which  the 
moral  nature  is  manifested  through  the  constitu- 
tion, and  the  other  to  the  second  and  higher 
form. 

The  precept,  "  AH  things  whatsoever  ye  would 


T6 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


that  men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye  even  so  to 
them,"  is  given  solely  with  reference  to  our  con- 
duct towards  men.  It  founds  itself  on  our  moral 
nature  as  intuitively  made  known  on  the  side  of 
rights,  and  could  be  interpreted  only  by  one 
knowing,  not  his  own  wishes,  but  his  own  rights 
and  the  claims  of  humanity,  and  tbrougii  these 
knowing  what  others  would  have  a  right  to  expect 
from  him.  It  is  the  whole  law  as  the  moral  nat- 
ure reveals  itself  on  the  side  of  rights  and  with 
reference  to  man,  but  not  the  whole  as  that  nat- 
ure reveals  itself  on  the  side  of  capacities  and 
with  reference  both  to  man  and  to  God. 

We  need  then  the  higher  and  broader  precept, 
Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy 
heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy 
strength,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  The  first 
precept  is  "  the  law  and  the  prophets."  It  is 
what  they  taught,  but  on  the  second  "  hang  all 
the  law  and  tlie  prophets."  It  is  said  that  Con- 
fucius and  other  philosophers  have  so  far  under- 
stood our  nature  as  to  give  the  first  precept,  but 
Christ  alone  has  risen  to  the  comprehension  and 
grandeur  of  the  second. 

As  a  product  of  the  moral  reason,  this  idea  of 
Obligation  obligation  is  peculiar,  because  it  is  re- 
Jli'oducL^  hited  to  each  division  of  our  complex 
nature.  As  related  to  the  intellect,  it  is  an  idea  ; 
as  related  to  the  sensibility,  it  is  a  feeling  ;  and 
is  related  to  the  will,  it  is  a  command.    We  call 


THE  MORAL  NATUEE. 


77 


it  sometimes  one  and  sometimes  tlie  other.  It  ia 
not  a  mere  idea,  or  a  mere  feeling,  or,  like  beauty, 
a  sjaithesis  of  the  two.  It  is  also  an  imperative, 
the  "  categorical  imperative."  It  is  commonly- 
called  an  impulse,  and  an  authoritative  impulse. 
Dr.  Wayland  calls  it  so.  But  no  impulse  has  au- 
thority. It  is  not  an  impulse  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  that  word,  since  its  action  is  directly  upon 
the  will,  and  its  function  is,  not  to  impel  a  man 
directly  towards  any  particular  course,  but,  when 
two  principles  of  action  are  in  question,  a  higher 
and  a  lower,  to  require  the  will  to  choose  the 
higher. 

Like  the  other  constituents  of  our  personality, 
the  moral  nature  is  active  from  the  first,  Automatic 
that  is,  from  the  beginning  of  our  moral  moral  uai?^ 
life.    This  is  true,  as  in  the  appetites, 
while  there  is  yet  no  knowledge  of  results.  Chil* 
dren  and  persons  the  most  ignorant  have  at  once, 
in  connection  with  their  active  principles,  an  idea 
of  rights,  and  so  of  justice.    They  have  an  im- 
mediate recognition  that  something  is  due  from 
others  to  themselves,  that  is,  of  rights,  and  recip- 
rocally, that  something  is  due  from  themselves  to 
others,  that  is,  of  obligation.    Under  these  ideas 
the  moral  life  is  developed,  but  they  do  not  suf- 
fice for  a  philosophy.    If  we  would  have  conditions 
that,  we  must  take  possession  of  our  act-  losophy. 
ive  principles,  must  know  them  in  their  relation 
to  each  other,  and  be  able  to  accept  and  justify 


78 


MOKAL  SCIEKOE. 


them  in  the  eye  of  reason,  by  the  results  they 
would  produce.  If  we  see  that  obligation  is  pri- 
marily obligation  to  choose,  and  that  it  always 
demands  the  choice  of  the  higher  principle  of  ac- 
tion and  of  the  higher  good,  we  may  rationally 
accept  it  as  aflBLrming  the  law  of  our  life. 


CHAPTER  n. 


MORAL  IjAW. 

Haying  thus  a  moral  nature  and  moral  ideas, 
man  becomes  subject  to  moral  law. 

To  know  what  moral  law  is,  we  need  to  distin- 
guish it  from  other  kinds  of  law.  Law  is  spoken 
of  as  natural,  civil,  and  moral,  and  these  need  to 
be  defined  separately,  for  I  know  of  no  definition 
that  will  cover  all  the  senses  in  which  the  general 
term,  law,  is  used. 

We  have  then,  first,  natural  law.    A  natural 
law  is  a  uniform  fact,  implying  a  force  Natural 
that  acts  uniformly  and  is  independent  ^'^^^^ 
of  human  will.    If,  as  in  gravitation,  the  rule  in 
accordance  with  which  the  force  acts  is  known, 
that  enters  into  our  conception  of  the  law. 

Of  law  as  thus  understood,  there  are  several 
varieties,  as  physical,  vital,  mental,  in  varieties 
each  of  which  there  is  a  force  uniformly  naturii  law 
directed  to  an  end.  Up  to  a  certain  point,  the 
mind  is  subject  to  this  kind  of  law  no  less  than 
matter.  These  laws,  or  more  properly  uniformi- 
ties, are  the  basis  of  experience,  are  the  condition 
of  education,  and  of  that  intelligent  activity  by 
which  means  are  adapted  to  ends. 


80 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Under  natural  law  all  things  come  alike  to  all. 

Peculiarities  Accidcnt,  imprudencB,  willful  exposure, 

of  natural  t,  t  , 

law.  are  treated  alike.  It  may  even  be  a 
duty  to  incur  injury  by  what  is  called  the  viola- 
tion of  a  natural  law.  One  who  should  be  scorched 
in  an  heroic  effort  to  save  life  would  not  be  said 
to  be  punished.  Indeed,  whatever  harm  may 
come  under  natural  law  does  not,  as  in  other 
cases,  come  from  breaking  the  law,  for  a  natural 
law  cannot  be  broken  by  one  under  it.  The  harm 
comes,  as  in  falling  from  a  precipice,  not  because 
a  natural  law  is  broken,  but  because  it  is  perfectly 
obeyed. 

Civil  law  is  the  expressed  will  of  the  supreme 
authority  of  the  State  in  the  form  of  a 

Civillaw  1         T       .  1  1  T 

command,  and  with  a  penalty  annexed. 
It  may  be  righteous  or  unrighteous.  It  takes  no 
cognizance  of  motives,  but  has  for  its  object  the 
control  of  the  outward  actions  of  men  so  far  as 
they  relate  to  the  rights  of  others.  As  affecting 
the  will  it  reaches  only  to  volitions. 

Moral  law  is  law  which  moral  beings  are  at 
Moraiiawai-  all  times  uuder  obligation  to  obey.  It 

ways  bind-      ,      ,  .     t  .  , 

ing.  IS  binding  upon  every  moral  creature 

under  all  circumstances.  To  a  moral  law  there 
•  can  be  no  exception.  If  there  can  be  an  excep- 
tion to  what  purports  to  be  a  moral  law,  it  is  not 
a  moral  law,  but  a  general  rule  that  is  to  be  in- 
terpreted as  the  case  demands.  If  man  is  to  be 
^  law  to  himself,  moral  law  must  proceed  from 


MOEAL  LAW. 


81 


the  moral  nature,  and  as  thus  proceeding  it  will 
have,  according  to  what  has  been  said,  fj^^^^ 
two  branches,  —  the  law  of  righteous- 
ness,  and  the  law  of  obligation.   The  law  of  right- 
eousness respects  rights,  and  its  precept  is.  No 
right  may  be  violated.    The  law  of  obligation  re- 
spects principles  of  action  as  higher  and  lower, 
and  good  as  varying  in  its  quality,  and  as  greater 
or  less.    Its  precept  is.  Choose  for  yourselves  and 
for  others  the  higher  principle  of  action,  and  the 
nobler  and  greater  good.    These  taken  together 
are  the  moral  law  as  derived  from  the  moral  nat- 
ure.   To  this  law  there  can  be  no  exception,  in 
this  world  or  any  other.    Of  this  law  the  under- ^ 
lying  idea  is  that  of  a  good.    Without  that  idea^ 
there  can  be  no  idea  of  rights,  or  of  an  obligation 
to  do  anything  for  ourselves  or  for  others.  As 
we  shall  see  hereafter,  this  law  in  its  coincident 
two  branches  is  coincident  with  the  law  love. 
of  love.    No  one  who  loves  another  can  violate 
his  rights,  or  fail  to  do  for  him  what  obligation 
demands. 

When  moral  law,  in  either  form  of  it  as  pre- 
sented above,  is  placed  before  an  unper-  obligation 
verted  moral  being  capable  of  under-  affirmed, 
standing  it,  obligation  to  obey  it  is  intuitively  and 
necessarily  affirmed.  If  it  were  not,  man  would 
not  have  a  moral  nature.  The  obligation  is  at 
first  recognized  in  a  particular  case,  but  immedi- 
ately and  necessarily,  not  by  generalization  or  iu- 

6 


82 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


duction,  assumes  a  general  form.  It  is  thus,  by 
the  resolution  of  the  two  branches  of  the  law  into 
the  law  of  love,  that  moral  law  is  the  law  of  obli- 
gation. Where  there  is  obligation  there  is  moral 
law,  and  where  there  is  no  obligation  there  is  no 
moral  law. 

This  affirmation  of  obligation  implies  both  a 
A  law  and  commaud  and  a  penalty,  and  thus  be- 
a  rule.  couies  law.  In  this  it  differs  from  a  rule. 
A  rule  tells  us  how  to  do  a  thing.  A  law  tells  us 
what  to  do  and  commands  us  to  do  it,  but  becomes 
law  only  as  it  is  enforced  by  a  penalty,  or  by 
punishment.  This  affirmation  of  obligation  car- 
ries with  it  the  force  of  the  word  ought ;  but  un- 
less it  be  supposed  to  express  the  will  of  God 
with  his  authority  lying  back  of  it,  it  will  be,  as 
men  now  are,  of  small  force  in  controlling  the 
appetites  and  passions.  Men  fear  but  slightly  the 
reaction  upon  themselves  of  violated  law,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  penalty  in  distinction  from 
punishment. 

The  sphere  of  moral  law  is  the  control  of  the 
Sphere  of  ^^^^  himsclf  iu  his  preferences  and 
moral  law.  choiccs.  Disregarding  outward  manifes- 
tations it  takes  cognizance  of  that  which  can  be 
known  only  to  the  individual  himself  and  to  God, 
of  that  which  in  the  Scriptures  is  called  "  the 
heart."  This  is  its  grand  peculiarity.  It  asserts 
its  prerogative  just  where  moral  forces  have  play 
and  moral  battles  are  waged. 


MORAL  LAW. 


83 


This  law,  or  affirmation  of  obligation,  comes 
from  within  a  man,  as  any  law  must  by  comesfrom 
which  a  man  is  "  a  law  unto  himself."  ^i^hm. 
It  is  given  by  the  moral  reason  when  the  occasion 
comes,  and  is  possible  only  on  the  condition  that 
there  be  a  being  possessed  of  intellect,  sensibility, 
and  will.  With  this  condition  the  idea  and  affir- 
mation of  obligation  is  given  by  the  moral  reason, 
just  as  the  idea  of  beauty  is  given  by  the  aes- 
thetic reason  on  condition  of  intellect  and  sensi- 
bility, or  as  the  idea  of  space  is  given  by  the  pure 
reason. 

The  occasion  comes  when  there  is  opportunity 
for  choice  between  a  higher  and  a  lower  good. 
Obligation  is  primarily  obligation  to  choose,  and 
choice  must  always  be  between  two  objects  re- 
garded as  good,  or  between  two  principles  of  ac- 
tion regarded  as  productive  of  a  good. 

But  though  the  law  is  thus  from  within  the 
man,  it  is  vet  not  of  him  as  having*  choice  Socrates, 

,       .Ti     T     ,  ,  .,  ,    Adam  Smith, 

and  will,  but  comes  by  necessity,  and  Kant, 
as  from  a  somewhat  apart  from  himself.  Hence 
Socrates  spoke  of  it  as  his  demon ;  hence  Adam 
Smith  called  it  "  the  man  within  the  breast ;  "  and 
hence  the  comparison  by  Kant  of  the  moral  law 
to  the  starry  heavens  as  equally  wonderful,  and 
?ts  equally  apart  from  himself.  Only  too,  in  the 
fact  of  a  moral  law  thus  given,  could  Kant  have 
found  what  he  regarded  as  the  strongest  proof  of 
the  being  of  a  God  who  is  a  moral  governor.  It  is 


84 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


an  adequate,  and  the  only  adequate  proof.  From 
the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  as  well  as  from  the 
revealed  fact  that  we  are  in  the  image  of  God,  we 
may  infer  that  a  moral  nature,  and  so  moral  law, 
are  involved  in  the  personality  of  God  as  they  are 
in  our  own. 


DIVISION  V. 


THE  PERSON. 

We  have  now  examined  the  conditions  for 
choice,  and  for  action  from  choice  by  man  as  a 
being  under  moral  law.  In  doing  this  we  have 
considered  the  intellect,  the  sensibility,  the  will, 
and  the  moral  nature,  separately.  This  it  was 
necessary  to  do,  but  we  are  to  be  careful  not  to 
regard  them  as  separate  entities  or  agents.  It  is 
not  the  intellect  that  thinks,  or  the  sensibility 
that  feels,  or  the  will  that  chooses.  It  is  the  man^ 
the  one  indivisible,  intelligent,  self-conscious,  free 
agent  that  thinks,  and  feels,  and  chooses,  and  acts 
from  choice.    We  thus  find, 

THE  PERSON,  OR  EGO. 

We  find  a  being  Avho  knows  himself  as  the  sub- 
ject of  phenomena,  and  so  can  say  1. 

This,  no  being  below  man  can  do.  No  animal 
can  do  it,  nor  the  sun,  nor  the  stars ;  and  the 
power  to  do  it  places  man  above  them  all.  This 
knowledge  of  himself  as  the  subject  of  phenomena 
and  yet  distinct  from  them  is  consciousness ;  and 
the  knowledge  of  himself  as  the  subject  of  moral 


86 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


phenomena  that  pertain  to  his  own  actions  is  at 
the  basis  of  conscience.  Finding  such  a  being,  we 
find,  not  an  act,  but  its  source.  We  do  not  find 
the  quality  of  acts  as  right  or  wrong,  but  rights  ^ 
and  obligations,  righteousness  and  wickedness,  as 
pertaining  to  a  person  who  chooses,  and  who 
knows  with  himself  whether  he  chooses  or  does 
not  choose  in  accordance  with  moral  law.  Here 
we  find,  not  faculties  which  we  may  name,  but  a 
being  who  possesses  these,  and  is  more  than  they. 
Here  we  find  the  tree  which  must  be  made  good 
if  its  fruit  is  to  be  good. 


DIVISION  VI. 


EIGHT  AND  WEONG, 

Thus  far  we  have  been  investigating  the  con- 
stitution of  man  as  furnishing  the  con-  j^^g.^^ 
ditions  of  choice  and  action  from  choice  ^^^^^sity. 
under  moral  law.  Both  the  conditions  and  the  law 
have  their  origin  as  independently  of  the  will  of 
man  as  his  physical  system.  His  active  principles 
he  did  not  originate,  their  relations  he  did  not  es- 
tablish, he  did  not  give  their  law.  We  now  come 
to  man,  not  only  as  so  and  so  constituted,  but  as 
choosing  from 'the  influence  of  these  principles 
and  under  this  law.  This  brings  us  to  a  region 
wholly  different  from  that  in  which  we  have  been. 
We  have  been  in  a  region  of  necessity,  we  now 
come  into  one  of  choice  and  of  freedom. 

rr\  T    jt  •         'J  1  •         T  Of  freedom. 

iowards  this  pomt  everything  that  pre- 
cedes converges ;  from  it  everything  that  manifests 
character  radiates.  Through  this,  man  comes  to 
his  highest  distinction  and  prerogative,  that  by 
which  he  is  able  to  dispose  of  himself  in  choosing 
his  own  end.  All  creatures  below  man  are  sub- 
ject by  necessity  to  the  law  of  their  being.  Man 
chooses  whether  he  will  or  will  not  be  subject  to 
this  law. 


88 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


That  man  has  thus  a  moral  nature  implies  noth- 
ing praiseworthy  in  him.  It  may  be,  and  is,  an 
infallible  indication  of  a  moral  nature  in  God,  and 
of  his  will  that  we  should  be  under  moral  law; 
but  till  we  reach  choice  and  freedom  under  the 
law  given  through  that  nature  there  is  no  virtue 
or  vice,  nothing  riglit  or  wrong,  and  no  ground  for 
reward  or  punishment.  Bat  in  reaching  choice 
under  moral  law  we  find  all  these.  Especially  do 
Riffhtand  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^'^^  ^^'^^  time  the  words 
wroug.  right  and  'ivroiig.  The  object  of  choice  is 
a  good ;  the  act  of  choice  is  right  or  wrong.  The 
theorj^  of  right  was  referred  to  in  the  Introduc- 
tion, bat  from  its  prominence  in  moral  discussions 
it  requires  further  attention. 

Right  has  commonly  been  supposed  to  be  the 
ultimate,  or  rather  the  moral  idea.  So 
it  is  made  by  Whewell.  The  adjective 
W^7i^,"  he  says,  signifies  conformable  to  rule;  and 
it  is  used  with  reference  to  the  object  of  the  rule. 
To  be  temperate  is  the  right  way  to  be  healthy. 
To  labor  is  the  right  way  to  gain  money.  In 
these  cases  the  adjective  right  is  used  relatively, 
that  is,  relativelj^  to  the  object  of  the  rale." 

"It  has  been  said  also  that  we  may  have  a 
series  of  actions,  each  of  which  is  a  means  to  the 
next  as  an  end.  A  man  labors  that  he  may  gain 
money,  that  he  may  educate  his  children ;  he 
would  educate  his  children  in  order  that  tliey  may 
prosper  in  the  world.    In  these  cases  the  inferior 


RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 


89 


ends  lead  to  higher  ones,  and  derive  their  value 
from  these.  Each  subordinate  action  aims  at  the 
end  next  above  it  as  a  good.  And  the  rules  wliich 
prescribe  such  actious  derive  their  imperative  force 
and  validity  each  from  the  rule  above  it.  The 
superior  rule  supplies  a  reason  for  the  inferior. 
The  rule  to  labor  derives  its  force  from  the  rule  to 
seek  gain ;  this  rule  derives  its  force  (in  the  case 
we  are  considering)  from  the  rule  to  educate  our 
cliildren  ;  this  again  has  for  its  reason  to  forivard 
the  i^rosperity  of  our  children,''^ 

"But  besides  such  subordinate  rules  there  must 
be  a  supreme  rule  of  human  action.  For  the  suc- 
cession of  means  and  ends  with  the  corresponding 
series  of  subordinate  and  superior  rules  must  some- 
where terminate.  And  the  inferior  ends  would 
have  no  value  as  leading  to  the  highest,  except 
the  highest  had  a  value  of  its  own.  The  superior 
rules  could  give  no  validity  to  the  subordinate 
ones,  except  there  were  a  supreme  rule  from  which 
the  validity  of  all  these  were  ultimately  derived. 
Therefore  there  is  a  supreme  rule  of  human  ac- 
tion. That  which  is  conformable  to  the  supreme 
rule  is  absolutely  right ;  and  is  called  right  simpl;y 
without  relation  to  a  special  end.  The  opposition 
to  riglit  is  wrong." 

The  supreme  rule  of  human  action  may  also 
be  described  by  its  object." 

''The  object  of  the  supreme  rule  of  human  ac- 
tion is  spoken  of  as  the  true  end  of  human  action, 


90 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


the  ultimate  or  supreme  good,  tlie  summum  honum. 
....  The  question  why  ?  respecting  human  ac- 
tions demands  a  reason  which  may  be  given  by  a 
reference  from  a  lower  rule  to  a  higher.  Why 
ought  I  to  be  frugal  or  industrious?  In  order 
that  I  may  not  want  a  maintenance.  Why  must 
I  avoid  want  ?  Because  I  must  seek  to  act  inde- 
pendently. Why  should  I  act  independently  ? 
That  I  may  act  rightly." 

"  Hence,  with  regard  to  the  supreme  rule  the 
question  why?  admits  of  no  further  answer. 
Why  must  I  do  what  is  right?  Because  it  is 
right.  Why  should  I  do  what  I  ought  ?  Because 
I  ought.  The  supreme  rule  supplies  a  rule  for 
that  which  it  commands  by  being  the  supreme 
rule." 

"  Rightness  and  wrongness  are,  as  we  have  al- 
ready said,  the  moral  qualities  of  actions." 

According  to  this,  when  a  subordinate  end  is  to 
All  rules  gained  right  action  becomes  so  by  its 

aud^'Je'ijon^  rclatiou  to  that  end ;  but  when  the  high- 
est  end  is  to  be  gained,  right  action  has 
no  relation  to  that,  but  only  to  the  rule  for  attain- 
ing it.  We  have  thus,  as  a  ground  of  right  ac- 
tion, sometimes  an  end,  and  sometimes  a  rule  that 
is  simply  a  means  for  attaining  the  end.  But  hav- 
ing admitted  that  the  object  of  the  supreme  rule 
of  human  action  is  the  true  end  of  human  action, 
no  reason  can  be  given  why  the  supreme  rule 
should  not  hold  the  same  relation  to  the  supreme 


RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 


91 


end  01  good  that  any  other  rule  does  to  its  end. 
That  would  make  all  rules,  as  they  obviously  are, 
secondary,  and  would  carry  moral  action  back  to 
the  choice  of  a  supreme  end. 

In  saying  that  we  are  to  do  right  because  it  is 
right,  right  is  made  ultimate.    But  for  Doing  right 

,        •1,1  • ,     •       •   1  ,     because  it  ii 

a  man  to  do  right  because  it  is  right,  nght 
meaning  by  that  as  Whewell  does,  conformity  to  a 
rule  with  no  knowledge  of  the  object  of  the  rule 
or  of  its  validity  from  that,  is  puerile.  The  only 
other  meaning  of  this  phrase,  which  many  regard 
as  expressing  the  sum  of  disinterestedness  and  vir- 
tue, is  that  a  man  is  to  do  what  he  conceives  to 
be  his  duty,  because  he  so  conceives  it.  This  a 
man  may  rationally  do,  but  it  is  not  making  right 
ultimate.  It  presupposes,  if  the  agent  be  intelli- 
gent, an  investigation,  or  a  knowledge  in  some 
way,  of  the  grounds  of  duty  and  of  right.  It  is  a 
singular  view  of  disinterestedness  and  of  virtue  to 
suppose  that  they  consist  in  a  regard  for  an  ab- 
straction for  its  own  sake,  whereas  the  teaching  of 
the  Bible  is  that  we  are  to  love  God  with  all  our 
hearts  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves,  and  that  to 
do  this  is  to  be  disinterested  and  virtuous. 

Whewell  speaks  of  rightness  and  wrongness  as 
the  moral  quality  of  actions.    So  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  speak,  and  it  is  remarkable  to  j^jgi^t  re- 
what  an  extent  many  have  been  misled  end?nhe?°s 
by  this,  as  if  there  were  something  moral 
inherent  in  the  act  itself.   If  we  use  rightness  and 


92 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


wrongness,  or  the  adjectives  right  and  wrong,  as 
we  constantly  do,  to  mean  the  fitness  or  unfitness 
of  an  act  to  accomplish  its  end  whatever  that  may 
be,  then  the  quality  inheres  in  the  act;  but  it  is 
not  a  moral  quality.  The  burglar  says,  I  entered 
by  the  window;  his  companion  replies,  that  was 
right.  The  policeman,  seeking  to  catch  the  burg- 
lar, says,  I  entered  by  the  window,  and  his  com- 
panion says,  that  was  right.  In  this  sense  of  it 
right  depends  on  the  judgment.  When  an  assist- 
ant surgeon  tells  his  superior  that  he  has  cut  off 
a  limb,  the  term  right  or  wrong  in  the  response 
will  have  no  reference  to  motives  or  to  any  moral 
quality,  but  solely  to  his  judgment.  In  this  view 
of  it  a  man  may  intend  to  do  right  and  do  wrong. 
He  may  intend  to  do  wrong  and  do  right.  He 
may  even  be  virtuous  in  doing  wrong  and  wicked 
in  doing  right. 

But  while  the  quality  of  rightness  and  wrong- 
Right  as  '^^^^  above  sense  may  belong  to 
ity notin the  '^^^  ^^^9  moral  quality  can  belong  to  it 
except  in  a  figurative  way.  It  is  con- 
venient to  call  an  asylum  for  the  cure  of  lunatics 
a  lunatic  asylum,  and  so  it  is  convenient  to  call  an 
act  done  by  a  moral  agent  acting  morally  a  moral 
act;  but  there  is  no  more  a  moral  quality  in  the 
act  than  there  is  lunacy  in  the  asylum.  Moral 
quality  can  belong  only  to  a  person. 

The  system  which  thus  makes  right  the  ulti- 
Riphtirame-  mate  moral  idea  has  two  phases.  The 
.tiY©         first  regards  the  sense  or  intuition  ol 


RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 


93 


right  as  immediate  and  infallible.  An  action  is 
right  because  it  is  right,  and  there  is  an  immedi- 
ate intuition  of  it.  This  not  only  admits  of  no 
rule  as  a  standard,  but  of  no  regard  to  conse- 
quences. The  second  phase  of  this  system  not 
only  allows,  but  requires,  the  use  of  the  intellect 
in  seeking  for  relations,  consequences,  utilities, 
but  says  that  the  intuition  of  right  is  given  only 
in  connection  with  these.  It  does  not,  Theintui- 
however,  tell  us  what  the  particular  re-  mateiy  de- 

,    , .  T  T    T  p       J 1       pends  on  the 

iations  and  consequences  needed  lor  the  apprehen- 
in tuition  are.  Fairly  analyzed  it  will  be  good, 
found  that  these  can  be  resolved  into  a  good  in 
some  form,  and  so,  that  this  system  is  coincident 
with  the  one  we  advocate.  If  the  question  be 
whether  it  is  right  to  sell  intoxicating  drinks,  or 
to  give  money  to  street  beggars,  there  can  be  no 
rational  intuition  of  right  till  it  is  known  what 
will  be  for  the  good  of  the  individuals  in  question 
and  of  the  public. 

But  are  there  not  some  actions  right  or  wrong 
in  themselves?  No.  No  action  can  Acts  not 
have  moral  quality  in  itself.  The  only  ^fojig°-n 
meaning  that  can  be  attached  to  that  themselves, 
phraseology  is  that  the  person  doing  the  act  is 
praiseworthy  or  blameworthy.  Except  figura- 
tively no  action  can  be  rewarded  or  punished. 
Not  in  the  action  but  in  the  doer  of  it  do  we  find 
moral  quality,  and  him  it  is  that  we  reward  and 
punish.    In  him  we  find  righteousness  or  unright- 


94 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


eousness,  goodness  or  wickedness.  These  involve 
moral  qualities  whicli  can  belong  only  to  a  per- 
son. The  action  may  indicate,  but  cannot  possess, 
them. 

Is  there  then  nothing  right  or  good  in  itself  ? 
Righteous-  Yes.  Righteousness,  regarded  as  a  form 
goodness.  of  coustaut  activity  in  the  will,  is  right 
in  itself,  and  goodness,  goodwilHng,  is  good  in  it- 
self. Of  these  the  products  in  action  are  right 
and  good,  but  only  relatively,  and  not  in  them- 
selves. Nothing  IS  wrong  in  itself  always  and 
everywhere  but  the  disregard  of  moral  law,  usu- 
ally shown  in  selfishness,  and  its  sure  offspring 
malignity ;  and  nothing  is  right  in  itself  always 
and  everywhere  but  love,  and  those  forms  of  an- 
tagonism to  selfishness  and  malignity  which  love 
must  necessarily  assume. 


DIVISION  VII. 


MAN  CHOOSING. 

—4  

CHAPTER  I. 
ALTERNATIVES  AND  LAW. 

f 

Haying  now  considered  what  is  preliminary  to 
choice  as  a  moral  act,  and  also  right  and  wrong 
as  related  to  such  an  act,  we  wish  to  know  pre- 
cisely what  takes  place  when  we  thus  choose. 

In  order  to  this  we  will  suppose  a  man  given 
to  the  use  of  strong  drink,  and  with  the  inustra- 
pay  for  a  day's  work  in  his  pocket,  to  be 
deliberating  whether  he  shall  take  it  home  to  his 
suffering  wife  and  children,  or  go  to  the  saloon. 
The  question  is  between  choosing  in  accordance 
with  the  cravings  of  appetite  on  the  one  hand,  or 
with  the  promptings  of  affection  and  the  behest  of 
the  moral  law  on  the  other.  It  may  not  be  needed, 
but  as  the  want  of  distinctness  at  this  point  has 
been  so  great,  I  will  venture  to  illustrate  the  rela- 
tions of  the  several  factors  in  a  simple  way,  after 
the  manner  of  the  "  Outline  Study  of  Man," 


96 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


The  person  deliberating  we  will  represent  by 
the  line  A.  We  will  then  place  Affection,  B,  and 
Appetite,  C,  in  front  of  him  as  the  motives  by 
wb.ich  he  is  directly  addressed,  the  one  drawing 
him  upward  along  the  line  D,  the  other  down- 
ward along  the  line  E.  We  will  then  place  Obli- 
gation, or  the  Moral  Law,  F,  back  of  him,  and 
represent  its  behests  as  proceeding  along  the  lines 


This,  as  I  suppose,  presents  the  relation  of  the 
factors  in  all  cases  of  moral  action.  The  direct 
motives  in  this  case  are  affection  and  appetite. 
In  each  there  is  a  good;  but  one  is  higher,  more 
human  and  ennobling  than  the  other;  and  it  is 
between  these  two  kinds  of  good  that  the  choice 
is  to  be  made.  In  a  being  rightly  disposed,  affec- 
tion would  win  without  the  aid  of  the  moral  nat- 
ure. The  man  within  the  breast  would  simply 
stand  by  and  smile  assent;  or,  if  the  tendency 
towards  appetite  were  too  strong,  would  say.  No. 
But  when  appetite  is  strong,  and  affection  is 
strong,  and  the  moral  nature,  now  taking  the 
form  of  conscience,  is  awake,  we  see  what  a  strug- 


MAH  CHOOSIKG. 


97 


gle  of  the  elemental  forces  there  may  be.  But, 
be  the  struggle  greater  or  less,  the  choice  itself, 
the  final  decision  by  which  the  man  disposes  of 
himself,  is  his  own  free  act.  There  is  no 
efficient  cause  of  it,  no  proper  cause  of 
any  kind,  oat  of  himself.  The  act  is  simple,  and 
so  cannot  be  defined.  It  is  direct,  requiring  no 
use  of  means,  and  so  no  one  can  tv-U  another  how 
to  do  it,  and  no  one  can  interpose  to  prevent  it. 
No  force  from  without  or  within  can  so  interfere 
as  to  render  the  act  otherwise  than  free  without 
subverting  the  nature.  Force  has  no  relation  to 
it,  and  motives  have  no  causal  relation.  Tliey 
have  no  efficiency.  The  man  himself,  not  his 
will,  but  he,  the  agent,  is  the  cause  of  the  act, 
and  therefore  he  is  responsible. 

We  here  see  that  while  there  is  but  one  force 
drawing  the  man  to  choose  wrongly,  there  contending 
are  three  acting  to  lead  him  to  choose 
rightly.  On  one  side  we  have  simpl}^  the  crav- 
ing of  appetite.  On  the  other  side  we  have  (1.) 
affection  for  his  family,  having  sole  reference  to 
their  good.  We  have  (2.)  a  sense  of  the  base- 
ness of  sensuality  and  of  the  greater  consonance 
with  his  manhood  of  the  higher  act,  with  its  inev- 
itable reflex  good  to  himself.  We  have  (3.)  the 
affirmation  of  obligation,  the  moral  law. 

Of  these  tliree  the  force  of  each  may  vary  in- 
definitely.    (1.)    Pure  affection,  with  no  con- 
sciousness of  any  other  motive,  may  lead  the  man 
7 


38 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


to  go  to  Lis  family.  As  thus  prompted  the  action 
would  be  beautiful. 

(2.)  A  regard  to  his  own  dignity  and  good 
may  be  the  preponderating  motive.  The  reflex 
of  the  act  in  good  upon  the  man  himself  could 
not  be  the  motive  in  the  very  first  act ;  but  such 
good  reveals  itself  at  once,  and  is  a  rational  and 
worthy  motive.  If  there  were  to  be  no 
other  there  would  be  no  selfishness.  A 
man  is  not  to  blame  for  finding  enjoyment  in  do- 
ing good  if  he  cannot  help  it.  This  reflex  good 
to  the  agent  thus  inevitably  connected  with  affec- 
tion, and  indeed  with  benevolence  in  its  widest 
form,  has  led  some  to  say  that  an  act  purely  from 
affection  or  benevolence  is  impossible.  It  would 
be  if  the  act  could  not  be  done  without  conscious 
reference  to  this  good;  but  it  can  be,  and  is,  just 
as  a  boy  plays  ball  with  no  reference  to  the  health 
and  sound  sleep  promoted  by  it. 

But  (3.)  we  have  the  affirmation  of  obligation. 
Place  and     tlic  moral  law.    The  relation  of  this  to 

office  of  con- 

Boience.  the  act  of  choicc  is  wholly  different  from 
that  of  either  of  the  others.  It  is  not  an  induce- 
ment standing  in  front  to  be  itself  chosen,  but 
is  a  voice  from  behind  saying  of  the  path  that 
leads  to  the  higher  good,  This  is  the  way, 
walk  ye  in  it."  It  presupposes  two  or  more  good 
things,  causes  or  means  of  a  good,  in  front,  be- 
tween which  choice  is  to  be  made,  and  its  func- 
tion is  to  demand  the  choice  of  the  higlier  good 


MAN  CHOOSING. 


99 


In  this  view  of  it  there  is  a  double  motive  for 
the  choice  of  the  higher  good:  one,  its  intrinsic 
value;  the  other,  the  imperative  of  moral  law.  Of 
these  the  imperative  may  so  occupy  attention  that 
the  man  will  seem  to  himself  to  act  wholly  from 
that.  He  may  say  that  he  does  it  because  he 
ought,  from  a  sense  of  duty,  from  principle,  from 
a  regard  to  the  right,  and  because  it  is  right;  and 
this  may  be  the  determining  element  in  his  choice 
as  between  the  two  forms  of  good;  but  if  there 
were  not  in  some  intrinsic  value,  aside  from  the 
affirmation  of  obligation,  a  reason  why  the  choice 
should  be  made  at  all,  obligation  must  base  itself 
upon  nothing.  It  could  not  be  rationally  affirm- 
ed. No  one  can  be  under  obligation  to  anything 
for  which  there  is  not,  aside  from  the  obligation, 
more  reason  than  there  is  against  it.  In  such  ac- 
tion the  moral  element  may  be  more  or  less  prev- 
alent, but  will  always  be  present  while  reason 
holds  its  seat. 

Having  thus  seen  what  takes  place  when  only 
two  active  principles  are  in  question,  we  need  to 
know  what  all  those  principles  are,  and  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other ;  and  to  find  a  supreme  law. 
We  have  already  considered  them  separately ;  but 
perhaps  we  may  be  aided  in  apprehending  their 
relations  if  we  present  them  thus :  — 


100  MORAL  SCIENCE. 


THE  PERSON. 


c 
o 

a: 


Into,  and  above 
this  nature  man 
was  put  to  dress 
uiid  to  keep  it. 


When  a  choice 
is  to  be  made  be- 
tween any  two 
principles  of  ac- 
tion an  influence 
i  s  supposed  t  o 
pass  from  each 
along  the  lines  A 
and  B  to  the  Per- 
son, and  also  from 
the  conscience 
along  the  lines  C 
and  D. 


Righteous    I  n- 

dignation, 
C  o  m  p  1  a  c  e 
Love, 


nt  V 


Rational  Love, 

Self-Love, 

Rights, 

Brother  and  Sis- 

ter, 

Parental, 

Conjugal,  etc., 

Esteem, 

o 

Power, 

Knowledge, 

= 

o  ^ 

Property, 

u  yi 

Liberty, 

Society, 

o 
O 

Instincts. 

Sex, 

Thirst, 

Hunger, 

Activity, 

Sleep, 

Air, 

IMoral 

Affectiona 


Rational 
and 
Moral. 


Natural 
Affections 


>  Desires. 


>  Appetites 


MAN  CHOOSING. 


101 


After  what  lias  preceded,  lifile  need  be  said  of 
the  eiiuiiieration  and  arraiigenieiii:  in  the  r^heappe- 
above  coUimii.  The  felt  needs  of  air, 
sleep,  and  activity  are  not  usually  placed  among 
the  appetites  ;  but  as  originating  in  the  body,  as 
periodical,  and  as  having  a  physical  limit,  they 
come  under  the  definition,  and  the  regidation  of 
them  is  so  within  our  power  and  so  essential  to 
well-being,  that  attention  needs  to  be  drawn  to 
them  as  subject  to  moral  law. 

The  desires  may  be  variously  arranged.  In 
the  preceding  column,  that  of  existence  and  that 
of  good  are  placed  on  the  side  as  pervading  the 
rest.    This  they  necessarily  do.  They 

The  desires. 

are  also  distinguished  from  the  others  by 

the  fact  that  their  objects  can  never  be  directly 

sought. 

But  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  arrangement 
of  the  active  powers,  what  is  contended  for  is,  — 

First,  that  they  differ  from  each  other,  and  that 
that  difference  is  intuitively  perceived,  just  as  the 
difference  between  memory  and  judgment  is  per- 
ceived. 

Second,  that  some  are  higher  than  others,  Hj 
those  who  have  no  theory,  and  no  principle  of 
arrangement,  the  terms  higher  and  lower  are  con- 
stantly applied  to  these  principles. 

Third,  that  as  the  principles  are  higher  or 
lower,  the  quality  of  the  good  from  their  activity 
is  higher  or  lower,  and  that  this  difference  of 


102 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


qualitj^  is  perceived  intuitively.  Speaking  of  the 
"springs  of  action,"  Mr.  Martineau  says,  Imme- 
diately on  their  juxtaposition,  we  intuitively  dis- 
cern the  higher  quality  of  one  than  another,  giv- 
ing it  a  divine  and  authoritative  right  of  prefer- 
ence." 

/  In  connection  with  this  higher  quality  of  the 
Highest  srood,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  as  we  pass 
Wholly  in     up  it  comcs  to  be  more  and  more  m  our 

our  own  i       i        i  •  i 

power.  own  powcr  till  we  reach  the  highest, 
when  it  becomes  wholly  so.  For  the  gratification 
of  the  appetites,  the  desires,  and  the  natural  affec- 
tions we  are  dependent  on  what  is  without  us, 
and  often  beyond  our  reach,  but  no  one  can  pre- 
vent us  from  lovingc  God  and  our  neii^hbor,  or  de- 
prive  us  of  the  good  there  is  from  that  and  the 
accompanying  approval  of  our  conscience.  Here 
we  have  an  independent  source  of  contentment 
and  blessedness.  A  good  man  shall  be  satisfied 
from  himself."  The  highest  duty  and  the  highest 
joy  being  thus  naturally  connected,  we  can  see 
how  it  is  that  in  the  Scriptures  joy  is  made  a 
duty. 

We  say,  Fourth,  that  the  moral  nature,  as  af- 
firming obligation,  is  not  itself  an  active  principle 
having  its  own  object,  but  that  it  acts  directly 
upon  the  will,  or  rather  upon  the  man  himself,  to 
determine  him  in  his  choice  between  two  or  more 
active  principles  or  ends.  Of  principles  of  action 
in  conflict  it  will  always  require  him  to  choose  the 


MAN  CHOOSING. 


108 


higher.  If  there  were  not  principles  of  action  be- 
sides itself  between  which  the  man  might  choose, 
the  conscience  would  have  no  scope. 

We  say,  Fifth,  that  the  law  of  the  conditioning 
and  the  conditioned  gives  us  a  scientific  Law  of  con- 
test of  the  relation  of  the  active  princi-  andTouoi- 
pies  to  each  other  as  lower  and  higher? 
this  law  having  been  as  strictly  observed  in  the 
upbuilding  of  nature  as  the  law  of  gravitation  is 
in  its  permanence.    This  law,  like  that  of  gravi 
tation,  was  known  and  practically  acted  upon 
long  before  the  conception  of  it  entered  into  sci- 
ence. 

We  say.  Sixth,  that  from  the  law  of  the  condi- 
tioning and  the  conditioned  the  la w  of '  ^^^.^  lij^. 
limitation  is  directly  derived,  and  that  it 
is  by  this  law  that  the  normal  action  of  the  lower 
powers  in  their  relation  to  the  higher  is  to  be 
tested.  This  law,  as  stated  in  previous  editions, 
and  in  the  "  Outline  Study  of  Man,"  is,  that  we 
are  at  liberty  to  bring  into  exercise  every  lower 
power,  and  to  derive  from  it  what  enjoyment  we 
may,  provided  such  exercise  be  carried  only  to 
the  point  where  it  will  best  minister  to  all  that  is 
above  it. 

This  gives  us  the  natural  law  of  self-denial.  It 
is  the  denial  for  our  own  sakes  of  a  lower  princi- 
ple of  action  when  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  best  action  of  any  one  above  it.  That  such 
denial  should  be  called  s^Zf-denial  does  not  speak 


104 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


well  for  that  self.  The  Christian  law  would  re- 
quire us  to  take  into  account  the  good  of  others, 
and  to  deny  ourselves  for  that. 

If  now  we  begin  at  the  bottom  of  the  column 
Conj^cience  activc  principles,  and  go  upwards,  we 
pu?si?e^^^"  shall  find  that  the  conscience,  which  has 
principles,  jurisdiction  along  the  whole  line,  will 
enforce  the  law  of  limitation  at  every  point.  Ap- 
petite will  be  at  work  as  an  independent  principle, 
and  may  be  indulged  up  to  the  point  where  it 
will  best  minister  to  the  health  of  the  body,  and 
to  the  highest  efficiency  of  the  powers  above  it ; 
but  the  moment  it  tends  to  transcend  that  limit 
the  conscience  puts  in  a  veto.  And  not  only  so, 
but,  since  appetite  has  for  its  object  only  an  in- 
ferior interest,  the  law  of  limitation  may  arrest  it 
before  reaching  the  point  determined  by  its  own 
law.  Not  seldom  do  higher  interests  require  this. 
The  mother  who  might  properly  satisfy  her  own 
appetite  fully  is  bound  to  arrest  it,  if  need  be,  for 
the  sake  of  her  famishing  children.  As  subordi- 
nate, the  law  of  appetite,  its  own  law,  is  thus 
constantly  liable  to  exceptions  through  the  de- 
mands of  the  higher  nature,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  law  of  limitation.  And  so  it  is  all  the 
way  up.  In  connection  with  every  lower  princi- 
ple of  action  there  are  exceptions,  and  the  law  of 
limitation  comes  in,  until  we  reach  the  higliest 
Theprinci-  principle  of  all.  We  then  find  a  princi 
of  love        pie  thnt  has  no  limitation,  and  a  law 


MAN  CHOOSING. 


105 


ihat  has  no  exception.  We  find  The  Principle 
OF  Love,  and  The  Law  of  Love.  There  is  no^ 
possibility  of  loving  God  too  much,  and  no  danger 
of  loving  our  neighbor, better  than  ourselves,  and 
so  there  is  no  limitation.  There  can  be  no  cir- 
cumstances in  which  we  shall  not  be  under  obli- 
gation to  love  God  with  all  our  heart,  and  our 
neighbor  as  ourselves,  and  so  there  is  no  excep- 
tion. 

The  natural  and  supreme  law  of  our  constitu- 
tion, thus  found  by  a  fair  analysis  of  the  scope  of  the 
powers,  and  an  exposition  of  their  rela-  uw^^^^ 
tion  to  each  other,  will,  of  course,  take  cognizance 
of  the  whole  column  of  active  principles,  whether 
to  prevent  the  encroachment  of  the  lower  upon 
the  higher,  or  of  the  higher  upon  the  lower.  As 
man  now  is,  the  chief  danger  is  that  the  lower 
principles  will  encroach  upon  the  higher.  Hence 
the  law  of  limitation  is  to  be  carefully  guarded  ; 
but  having  once  reached  through  that  and  the  law 
of  the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned  the  su- 
preme law  of  love,  that  law  can  no  more  permit 
excess  in  a  higher  principle  as  it  is  related  to  a 
lower,  than  in  a  lower  principle  as  it  is  related  to 
a  higher.  It  can  no  more  permit  the  injury  of 
health  for  the  sake  of  knowledge,  than  it  can  per- 
mit an  indulgence  in  appetite  that  would  prevent 

the  gaining  of  knowledge.  v 
We  thus  see  that  the  highest  activity  of  rational 

ove  with  reference  to  its  own  ends  as  Having 


106  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

value  in  themselves,  is  the  very  thing,  and  the  only 
Union  of  thing,  that  the  law  demands.  Seeing  this 
love.  we  find  a  perfect  coincidence  between 
the  law  of  our  being  and  its  highest  active  prin- 
ciple, and  thus  do  we  marry  them  —  Law  and 
LoYE,  the  two  mightiest  forces  in  the  universe. 
It  is  this  that  we  have  sought.  This,  and  this 
alone,  so  brings  harmony  into  the  constitution 
that  law,  and  reason,  and  impulse  can  work  to- 
gether. We  thus  find  a  perfect  law  without  bond- 
age, and  perfect  freedom  without  license.  We 
find  a  perfect  law  without  bondage,  because  there 
can  be  no  bondage  where  love  reigns ;  and  we  find 
perfect  freedom  without  license,  because  there  can 
be  no  license  where  law  reigns.  The  highest  har- 
mony of  the  universe  is  in  the  love  of  a  rational 
being  that  is  coincident  with  the  law  of  that  being 
rationally  affirmed ;  and  the  deepest  jar  and  dis- 
cord is  from  the  love,  persistent  and  utter,  of  such 
a  being  in  opposition  to  his  law.  It  is  because 
there  is  in  the  Divine  Being  this  harmony  of  law 
with  love  that  He  is  perfect.  It  is  because  this 
harmony  is  required  in  the  divine  government 
that  that  is  perfect ;  and  no  philosophy  for  the 
regulation  of  human  conduct  can  be  both  vital 
and  safe  in  which  that  same  union  is  not  consum- 
mated.   Such  a  union  is  demonstrably  the  only 


MAN  CHOOSING. 


107 


Thus  it  is  that  while  love  is  a  rational  princi- 
ple of  action,  and  the  highest  possible  TheUwof 

^   ,  Ti     love  the  law 

principle,  it  is  at  the  same  time  and  al-  of  our  being, 
ways  obligatory,  and  so  the  law  of  love  becomes 
the  law  of  our  being.  In  substance,  and  as  ex- 
pressing his  inmost  nature,  love  is  the  one  word 
uttered  by  God  in  the  Bible.  God  is  uttered  by 
Love."  It  is  the  one  word  that  em- 
bodies  his  commands  as  expressed  in  the  Bible. 

"  Thou  shalt  LOYE  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all 
thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  Bythecou- 
It  is  also  the  one  imperative  word  ut-  man. 
tered  by  Him  through  the  constitution  of  man 
regarded  as  a  whole;  and  in  the  coincidence  of 
these  two  utterances  we  find  a  perfect  proof  that 
botli  are  from  Him. 

In  the  highest  generalization,  defining  love  to 
be  the  choice  of  the  good  of  conscious  Love  and 
being  impartially  and  for  its  own  sake,  ^^^^-^^^e. 
the  law  of  love  will  include  self-love  as  well  as 
love  to  others.  Still,  since  each  one  is  specially 
intrusted  to  himself,  and  has  appetites,  passions, 
interests,  temptations,  that  cannot  be  shared  by 
others,  it  is  better  for  practical  purposes  to  regard 
self-love  as  a  separate  principle. 


CHAPTER  ir. 


WICKEDNESS. 

We  have  now  seen  what  the  harmony  of  the 
constitution  would  be,  and  how  it  may  be  at- 
tained. We  turn  for  a  moment  to  the  reverse  of 
this.  In  the  possibility  that  man  can  reject  the 
law  of  his  being  we  find  the  possibility  of  both  sin 
and  immorality. 

Sin  is  the  transgression  of  the  law."  It  is 
^  what  the  Scriptures  call  it,  "  anomia^^^ 
lawlessness.  It  is  the  choice  of  some 
end  or  principle  of  action  lower  than  the  highest 
and  making  it  supreme.  It  is  the  practical  rejec- 
tion by  a  rational  and  moral  being  of  the  law  of 
his  being,  the  moral  law,  the  one  law  for  the  con- 
Uuityof  the  ^^'^^  moral  beings  Avlioever  and  wher- 
law.  Q^rQi^  they  may  be.    Tiiis  law  must  be  re- 

ceived or  rejected  as  a  whole.  For  whosoever 
shall  keep  the  whole  law  and  yet  olfend  in  one 
i  point  is  guilty  of  all."  Any  other  principle  would 
J  permit  each  man  to  transgress  iu  the  direction 
]  of  his  strongest  propensity  and  then  to  excuse 
I  himself,  as  so  many  do,  on  the  ground  of  their 
obedience  in  other  r<'sp(*cls. 


WICKEDNESS. 


109 


This  unity  of  the  law  and  the  necessity  of  re- 
ceiving or  rejecting  it  as  a  whole  divides  two  classes 
men  into  two  classes  —  those  who  ac- 
cept  the  law,  and  those  who  do  not.  None  obey 
it  perfectly,  but  some  recognize  it,  justify  it,  ac- 
cept it,  and  make  it  their  purpose  to  conform 
their  lives  to  it.  With  others  there  is  no  practi- 
cal recognition  of  the  law  as  a  whole.  It  is  not 
their  supreme  purpose  to  make  it  the  law  of  their 
life. 

For  those  who  do  accept  it,  it  becomes  both  a 
principle  and  a  law  of  love,  an  active  principle 
like  any  other,  and  the  supreme  law  as  proclaimed 
by  the  moral  nature.  For  such  there  are  as  many 
forms  of  beneficence  as  there  are  of  besetments 
and  liabilities,  of  wants  and  woes  among  Measure  of 
men ;  and  the  merit  of  the  agent  in  re- 
lieving  them  will  be  measured,  not  by  the  amount 
done,  but  on  the  principle  of  the  widow's  two 
mites,  by  the   amount  of  self-sacrificing  love. 
Other  motives  may  lead  to  beneficence,  but  the 
only  pure  source  and  true  measure  of  it  is  self 
Bacrificing  love. 

For  those,  on  the  other  hand,  who  do  not  accept 
the  law  there  are  as  many  forms  of  sin  as  there 
are  active  principles  lower  than  the  highest,  and 
that  can  gain  occasional  or  permanent  control.  It 
will  matter  much  to  the  individual  and  to  society 
which  of  the  lower  principles  predominates ;  but 
be  it  which  it  may,  the  character  will  be  rad- 


110 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ically  wrong  unless  the  principle  and  the  law  of 
love  be  made  supreme. 

This  unity  of  the  law  and  necessity  of  receiving 
Nosepara-  ^  wliolc,  if  at  all,  shows  too  the  im- 

ionVnVmo^"  possiblHty  of  drawing  a  definite  line  be- 
"^aiity.  tween  religion  and  morality.  It  is  usual 
and  convenient  to  distinguish  duties  of  which  God 
is  the  object,  and  offenses  directly  against  him, 
from  those  of  which  man  is  the  object,  and  offenses 
directly  against  him,  and  thus  to  make  separate 
departments  of  morality  and  religion.  We  say  of 
men  that  they  are  moral,  but  not  religious ;  and 
it  has  been  one  of  the  great  delusions  and  perver- 
sions of  the  world  to  suppose  that  they  could  be 
religious  without  being  moral.    Most  religions 

^  have  been  constructed  on  this  supposition,  and 
not  a  few  have  incorporated  the  grossest  immo- 
ralities into  their  religious  rites.  But  as  the  law 
is  the  moral  law,  any  infraction  of  it  is  strictly,  if 
not  technically,  an  immorality;  and  as  it  is  a 

-  divine  law,  any  infraction  of  it  is  disobedience  to 
God,  and  so  irreligious.    A  true  religion  must  in- 

.  elude  and  require  all  the  duties  of  morality,  but 

*  no  religion  not  from  God  ever  did,  or  ever  will, 
thus  include  and  require  those  duties. 


DIVISION  VIII. 


OF  CONSCIENCE. 

In  treating  of  the  moral  nature  I  said  notlnng 
of  conscience.    The  reason  was  that  I 

The  moral 

include  in  conscience  onlv  those  phenom-  nature  and 

T  .   1         1  conscience 

ena  from  the  moral  nature  which  relate  not  identi- 
cal. 

to  our  own  conduct.    Through  the  moral 
nature  we  are  furnished  with  moral  ideas,  by 
which  we  are  enabled  to  judge  on  moral  subjects 
as  on  others  where  our  own  conduct  is  not  in  ques- 
tion.   We  thus  judge  of  abstract  questions  of 
morality,  and  of  the  conduct  of  others.    But  ac- 
cording to  its  etymology  (con^scio,  a  conscience 
knowing  with),  conscience  is  strictly  the 
knowing  of  ourselves  together  with  a  knowledge 
of  moral  law  as  it  is  related  to  us.    As  As  com- 
commonly  understood,   however,    con-  ?erstood.^ 
science  includes  not  only  knowledge,  but  also  the 
feelings  which  precede,  accompany^  and  follow 
the  moral  act.    It  presupposes  a  moral  nature 
that  furnishes  the  two  fundamental  ideas  of  rights 
and  of  obligation,  and  includes  all  the  phenomena 
that  arise  when  either  of  these  ideas  is  regulative 


112 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


in  our  owii  conduct.  Thus,  tlie  immediate  rec- 
ognition of  riglits  by  children  and  ignorant  per- 
sons is  said  to  be  from  conscience.  They  know 
themselves  together  with  the  moral  law  tliat  is 
involved  in  the  knowledge  of  rights,  and,  when 
their  own  rights  are  concerned,  have  a  peculiar 
class  of  feelings  which  are  attributed  to  the  con- 
science. 

But  the  chief  business  of  conscience  is  to  regu- 
Conscionce  Lite  our  choiccs.  This  it  does,  or  seeks 
choicesl'  to  do,  by  tlic  aflBmiation  of  obligation. 
In  such  cases  we  have  presented  to  us  always 
an  alternative.  We  may  act  from  a  higher  or 
a  lower  principle  of  action.  We  may  choose  a 
nobler  or  a  baser  end,  and  the  moral  nature, 
now  acting  as  conscience,  affirms  obligation  to 
Elements  of  clioosc  the  higher  principle  and  the 
conscience,  ^^oblcr  end.  Then  will  come  delibera- 
tion for  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  often  a  pro- 
tracted and  severe  struggle ;  then  the  choice ;  then 
the  selection  of  means  to  carry  out  the  choice ;  and 
then,  on  reflection,  self-approbation  or  remorse. 
These  are  the  phenomena,  and  so  far  as  the  moral 
nature  is  concerned  in  them,  they  are  all  commonly 
attributed  to  conscience. 

We  may  then  define  conscience  to  be,  first,  the 
knowledge  of  ourselves  together  with  the 

Definitions.     ,  i    i  c  i   i  t 

knowledge  oi  moral  law,  and  as  we  are 
related  to  that.    This  excludes  feelinor. 


OF  CONSCIENCE. 


113 


Or,  second,  we  may  define  it  to  be  the  whole 
moral  consciousness  of  man  in  view  of  his  own 
actions  and  as  related  to  moral  law.  Tliis  will 
include  the  testifying  state  Avhich  accompanies  the 
struggle  while  deliberation  is  going  on,  and  also 
the  self-approbation  or  remorse  that  may  follow. 

From  what  has  now  been  said  we  may  see  how 
far  the  conscience  is  infallible. 

The  moral  nature  necessarily  affirming  moral 
law  in  both  its  branches,  when  a  moral  Conscience 

.  _  ,  when  iufal- 

beuig  sees  that  a  proposed  action  will  ubie. 
come  under  that  law,  the  conscience  will  judge 
of  it  infallibly  as  right  or  wrong.  Accepting  the 
law  respecting  rights,  the  conscience  will  infal- 
libly judge  it  wrong  to  steal  because  stealing  is, 
by  its  definition,  the  violation  of  a  right.  There 
may  be  question  whether  a  given  act  comes  under 
the  law,  and  the  judgment  may  err,  but  when  the 
act  is  known  to  come  under  the  law  the  judgment 
is  infallible. 

We  next  inquire  whether  the  conscience  can  be 
educated. 

Those  who  make  it  wholly  intuitive  necessarily 
say  no.    And  as  they  say  on  the  one  can  he  con- 
hand  that  it  cannot  be  educated,  so  they  educated? 
say  on  the  other  that  it  cannot  be  blunted  or 
seared. 

But  if  we  regard  conscience  as  including  feeling, 
as  practically  we  must,  we  have  an  indirect  con- 
trol over  it,  call  it  education  or  what  you  please, 

8 


114 


MOJRAL  SCIENCE. 


by  which  the  whole  tone  of  our  moral  life  may  be 
changed.  We  may  habitually  neglect  to  bring  our 
actions  before  the  tribunal  of  conscience  at  all ; 
we  may  deal  unfairly  with  ourselves  and  bring 
them  disingenuously,  —  and  one  of  these  we  shall 
certainly  do  if  we  choose  a  wrong  supreme  end  ; 
or  we  may  form  the  habit  of  bringing  our  actions 
uniformly  and  fairly  before  that  tribunal.  Be- 
sides, the  general  law  of  feeling  applies  here,  by 
which,  if  it  be  rationally  cherished,  it  becomes 
purer  and  stronger,  or,  if  it  be  repressed,  its  foun- 
tains are  dried  up.  Hence  the  conscience  re- 
garded as  a  whole,  may  become  more  and  more 
sensitive  and  pervasive,  or  it  may  become  blunted 
and  seared.  The  man  may  become  hardened, 
"  past  feeling,"  "  twice  dead,"  "  plucked  up  by 
the  roots  ; "  or  his  path  may  be  that  of  the  just, 
"shining  more  and  more  unto  the  perfect  day." 

Looking  back  now  over  the  system  we  have 
considered,  it  is  claimed  for  it,  — 

1st.  That  it  is  drawn  from  the  constitution  of 
man  and  accords  with  it. 

2d.  That  it  accords  with  Christianity. 

8d.  That  through  the  principle  of  the  condi- 
tioning and  the  conditioned  it  brings  man  into 
harmony  with  nature. 

4th.  That  in  the  law  of  limitation  it  furnishes  a 
principle  to  be  applied  by  the  individual  in  ad- 


OF  CONSCIENCE. 


115 


justing  the  claims  of  each  tendency  and  spring  of 
action  except  the  highest. 

6th.  That  it  reconciles  discrepant  systems. 

6th.  That,  if  fully  accepted,  it  would  result  in 
the  perfection  of  the  individual  and  of  society. 


PART  II. 

PRACTICAL. 


LOVE  AS  A  LAW. 

BIAN  ACTING  FROM  CHOICE  UNDER  MORAL  LAW. 


L 


PKELIMINARY  STATEMENT. 

LOVE  AS  A  LAW  DISTINGUISHED  FROM  THE  LAW  OF 
LOVE. 

Haying  considered  the  Law  of  Love,  we  now 
proceed  to  Love  as  a  Law.  If  we  would  conduct 
life  by  philosophy  it  is  not  enough  to  know  its 
law  and  its  end.  We  must  also  know  how  to 
apply  that  law  and  to  reach  that  end.  We  need 
both  parts  of  that  perfect  wisdom  which  it  is  the 
part  of  moral  science  to  teach.  Perfect  wisdom 
consists  in  the  choice  of  the  best  ends  and  of  the 
best  means  to  attain  them.  In  this,  wisdom  dif- 
fers from  skill,  —  perfect  skill  consisting  in  the 
best  use  of  means  whatever  the  end  may  be. 
What  belongs  to  the  choice  of  ends  we  have  con- 
sidered. Love  is  our  general  principle  and  primal 
wisdom.  We  now  come  to  another  part  of  our 
definition,  and  inquire  what  love,  working  under 
the  law  of  limitation,  would  require  us  to  do. 
According  to  the  Scriptures,  Love  is  the  ful- 
filling of  the  law."  Hence  the  Law  of  Love  and 
of  obligation  or  duty  are  coincident.  The  reason 
is  that  love  is  that  which  the  law  requires,  and 
with  which,  if  love  be  perfect,  it  is  satisfied. 


120 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


This  Is  conceded,  or  at  least  not  denied,  by  wri- 
ters on  morals ;  and  yet  when  specific  duties  are  to 
be  deduced,  they  either  do  it  wholly  from  the 
stand-point  of  conscience  and  not  of  love,  or  incon- 
sistently, from  love  out  of  regard  to  the  Scriptural 
law.  But  accepting  the  Scriptural  doctrine,  be* 
lie  vino;  that  the  Law  of  Love  covers  the  domain  of 
morals,  we  proceed  to  inquire  what  that  law  re- 
v-juires. 

This  inquiry  It  will  be  observed  Is  wholly  deduc- 
tive. Li  all  inquiries  respecting  duties  except  the 
Uighest,  there  are  two  orders  of  questions :  The 
first  asks,  What  ought  to  be  done  ?  The  second, 
How  ought  it  to  be  done  ?  To  the  broadest  pos- 
sible What  ?  "  on  this  subject,  but  one  answer  can 
be  given.  "  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God 
with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 
This  is  the  law  of  love.  As  a  spiritual  act,  it  is 
the  primal  wisdom,  and,  corresponding  to  it  there  is 
no  "  How  ?  "  No  one  can  explain  to  another  how  to 
love,  because  the  love  is  a  primitive  act,  and  no 
means  can  intervene. 

Thus  regarded  love  is  an  act  and  a  choice, 'and 
as  rational  must  itself  have  a  motive.  Love  as  an 

act  and  as  a 

There  must  be  a  reason  on  the  ground  motive, 
of  which  love  may  be  demanded  by  the  con- 
science. That  reason,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the 
worth  of  being,  or  its  capacity  of  good  and  evil. 
But  the  act  having  been  done,  the  generic  choice 
having  been  made,  love  becomes  a  motive  in  all  sub- 


LOVE  AS  A  LAW. 


121 


sequent  acts.  The  first  and  great  question  is,  What 
does  the  laiv  demand  ?  To  this  the  reply  is.  Love. 
The  second  question  is,  What  does  Love  demand  ? 
And  to  every  "  What  ?  "  here,  there  is  a  How  ?  " 
Or,  if  we  please,  all  questions  of  this  order  may  bo 
comprised  in  one,  —  How  shall  the  demands  of  love 
be  carried  out  ? 

It  is  hi  morals  as  in  astronomy.  In  that  we  first 
find  the  law,  and  then  apply  it.  The  law  being 
given,  we  inquire  at  what  time  the  sun  and  moon 
ought  to  be  in  such  relation  as  to  produce  an  eclipse. 
This  inquiry  is  of  a  different  order  from  those  which 
have  it  for  their  object  to  find  the  law,  or  the  rea- 
sons of  it.  If  we  suppose,  with  Kepler,  each 
planet  to  be  accompanied  by  an  angel,  whose  busi- 
ness it  is  to  see  that  its  radius  vector  shall  describe 
equal  areas  in  equal  times,  all  the  inquiries  and 
eftbrts  of  the  angel  might  have  relation  solely  to 
that  result ;  but  without  understanding  both  the 
law  and  the  reasons  of  it,  he  could  know  nothing 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  heavens. 

Failing  to  distinguish,  at  this  point,  as  most  have 
Love  as       douc,  betwecu  love  as  an  act  demanded  bv 

choice  and  ,  i    •       i  r» 

as  emotion,  the  couscieuce  and  itselt  requn^mg  a  mo- 
tive, and  love  as  the  motive  of  subsequent  sub- 
ordinate acts  and  demandino;  them,  we  fall  into 
confusion.  In  the  one  case  we  have  the  law 
of  love  ;  in  the  other  love  as  a  law.  In  the 
first  case  the  main  element  of  the  love  is  choice  ^ 
*  See  Bac  Sermon^  1861. 


122 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


rather  than  emotion.    In  the  second  the  choice  is 

implied,  but  emotion  seems  more  prominent.  I:i 
the  first  the  choice  is  like  the  body  of  the  sun,  iii 
itself  dark  ;  in  the  second  it  is  like  the  same  body 
with  the  elements  of  light  and  heat  and  beauty 
gathered  and  floating  around  it. 

Over  the  subordinate  inquiries  arising  under  love 
Office  of  a  law,  the  conscience  must  w^atch.  de- 

ftnrintei-^  maudiug  not  only  perfect  uprightness  and 
candor,  but  such  painstaking  in  informhig 
the  judgment  as  to  secure  that  secondary  wisdom 
which  more  often  bears  the  name,  and  by  which 
means  are  adapted  to  ends.  But  ^^hile  the  con- 
Bcience  must  keep  watch  of  the  processes,  the  pro- 
cesses themselves  are  carried  on  by  the  intellect. 
The  great  work  of  the  conscience  is  done  in  an- 
swering the  first  question,  and  in  holding  the  will 
in  the  form  of  choice  up  to  a  perfect  correspond- 
ence wdth  the  law\  Subsequently  its  w^ork  will  be 
to  bring  subordinate  choices  and  specific  volitions 
into  conformity  with  the  generic  choice,  and  in 
doing  so,  questions  that  will  be  relatively  principal 
and  subordinate,  the  "  What?  "  and  the  How  ?  " 
will  constantly  arise. 

Accepting  then  the  law  of  love,  we  shall  need  to 
inquire,  what  in  the  several  departments 
of  duty  does  that  law  require,  and  how 
are  those  requirements  to  be  carried  out? 


ri. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DUTIES. 

In  answering  the  above  questions,  a  classification 
of  duties  is  needed. 

In  this  we  shall  be  guided  by  that  principle  of  sub- 
Principieof  ordinatiou,  on  which  the  law  of  limitation 
tion.  is  based,  as  stated  in  the  third  of  the 

Lectures  on  Moral  Science.  It  is  as  true  of 
duties  as  it  is  of  forces,  faculties,  and  enjoyments, 
that  those  are  lower  which  are  conditional  for 
others. 

But  are  some  duties  conditional  for  others  ? 
First  de-  The  couditiou  of  good  work  is  a  good  in- 
Kve."^  strument,  of  good  fruit  a  good  tree  ;  and 
of  doing  good  to  others,  and  glorifying  God,  a  good 
man. 

Our  first  and  lowest  duty  will  then  respect  our 
own  state,  including  both  disposition  and  capacity. 
The  first  and  imperative  demand  of  love  is,  that  we 
secure  those  conditions  in  ourselves,  by  which  our 
power  to  do  good  will  be  the  greatest. 

We  thus  reach  our  first  class  of  duties  under 
S^'duties^  the  law  of  love.  They  are  those  wdiich 
iSves*       respect  ourselves.     They  respect  eithei 


124 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


our  own  inward  state  or  outward  condition ;  and 
till  we  reach  absolute  perfection,  will  have  for 
their  object  a  change  for  the  better  in  one  or  the 
other  of  these.  They  are  not  distinctively  duties 
to  ourselves,  though  involving  all  that  has  com- 
monly been  regarded  as  sucli;  but  will  include 
everything  possible  to  enable  us  to  benefit  others 
and  glorify  God.  Hence  they  will  be  held  as  du* 
ties,  not  so  much  from  regard  to  ourselves,  as  on 
other  and  higher  grounds. 

The  SECOND  CLASS  OF  DUTIES  are  those  to  our 
fellow  men.    These  will  have  for  their  ob-  ge^oDd  cia^sj 
ject,  until  they  reach  perfection,  a  change  ou^^feuow 
for  the  better,  either  in  their  state  or  condi- 
tion. 

That  these  are  lower  than  our  duties  to  God  will 
probably  be  conceded,  but  are  they  condi-  These  con- 
tional  for  them?    In  a  sense  they  are.  ou^dutier 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  an  innate  or 
connate  idea  of  God,  and  of  duty  to  him  as  all-per- 
vasive, it  is  true  that  practically,  and  in  a  normal 
state,  the  parent  would  be  known  before  God,  and 
that  God  would  be  known  throu^rh  him.    The  si^r- 
nificance  of  "  Our  Father  which  art  in  heaven,"  is 
reached  only  through  a   knowledge  of  what  a 
father  on  earth  is  ;  and  our  duties  to  tlie  earthly, 
iypify  those  to  the  heavenly  Father,  and  prepare 
us  for  them. 

But  besides  this  priority  of  time,  and  so  a  condi- 
tioning from  the  order  in  which  the  faculties  are 
developed,  duties  may  be  so  related  that  one  cannot 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DUTIES. 


125 


be  consistently  or  acceptably  performed  except  on 
the  condition  that  another  has  been.  One  who  de- 
frauds another  may  not  bestow  charity  upon  liim. 
He  must  be  just  before  he  is  generous.  In  the 
same  way  immediate  duties  to  God  so  imply  those 
to  men,  that  a  man  is  in  no  condition  to  do  the 
former  who  has  not  done  the  latter. 

This  requires  attention.  It  is  the  essence  of 
No  religion  supcTstition,  and  has  been  the  curse  of  the 
morality.  racc,  to  frame  something  called  religion 
that  could  be  gone  through  wdth  formally,  and  be 
rested  on  for  salvation,  to  the  neglect  of  the  love  of 
man,  and  the  duties  from  that.  Hence  we  need  to 
emphasize  the  impossibility  of  religion  without  moral- 
ity. This  the  Scriptures  do  both  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment and  the  New.  I,"  says  God,  hate  robbery 
for  a  burnt-offering."  When  ye  spread  forth  your 
hands,  I  Avill  hide  mine  eyes  from  you,  yea  when 
ye  make  many  prayers  I  will  not  hear ;  your  hands 
are  full  of  blood  ;  wash  ye,  make  you  clean,  put 
away  the  evil  of  your  doings  from  before  mine 
eyes ;  cease  to  do  evil,  learn  to  do  well ;  seek 
udgment,  relieve  the  oppressed,  judge  the  father- 
less, plead  for  the  widow."  "  If,"  says  the  Saviour, 
"  thou  bring  thy  gift  to  the  altar,  and  there  re- 
memberest  that  thy  brother  hath  aught  against 
thee,  leave  there  thy  gift  before  the  altar  and  go 
thy  way ;  first  be  reconciled  to  thy  brother,  and 
then  come  and  offer  thy  gift."  If  a  man  say,  I 
love  God,  and  hateth  his  brother,  he  is  a  liar.  For 


126 


MORAL  SCIENCS. 


be  who  lovetli  not  his  brother  whom  he  hath  soeil, 

how  can  he  love  God  whom  he  hath  not  seen  ?  " 
This  view  cannot  be  too  strongly  enforced,  and 
ought  to  enter  into  the  substance  of  every  treatise 
on  duty. 

As  prior  then  in  time,  and  as  prerequisite  for  ac- 
ceptable worship,  our  duties  to  our  fellowmen  are 
conditional  for  our  duties  to  God. 

Our  THIRD  CLASS  OF  DUTIES  will  be  tliose  to- 
wards God. 

These  are  higher  than  any  other  because  of  their 
object,  of  the  higher  faculties  involved,  Third  class; 
and  because  they  imply  all  the  others.  God. 
If  the  love  of  man  be  first,  as  it  would  be  in  a  child 
growing  up  normally,  it  will  be  conditional  for  that 
of  God,  which  will  follow  as  certainly  as  the  full 
day  follows  the  morning  twilight ;  but  when  once 
there  is  the  love  of  God,  it  will  be  seen  to  include 
or  imply  the  love  of  his  creatures.  As  man  now 
is,  the  true  relation  seems  to  be,  when  specific 
duties  are  required,  the  performance  first  of  tliose 
toward  man  as  a  condition  of  the  acceptable  per- 
formance of  those  toward  God. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  classifying  physical 
foi'ces  as  higher  and  lower,  we   begin  ciassifica- 
with  that  which  is  broadest,  and  at  each  ties  as 

...     higher  and 

step  in  our  ascent  comprehend  fewer  mdi-  broader, 
iduals,  till  we  reacli  man  ;  but  in  classifying  duties 
we  reverse  the  process  ;  we  begin  with  that  which 
is  narrowest,  and  as  we  ascend  reacli  the  broadest 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES 


127 


and  grandest  generality,  including  not  only  our 
duties  to  all  the  creatures  of  God  with  whom  we 
are  in  relation,  but  to  God  himself. 


CLASS  I. 

DUTIES  TO  OUKSELVES. 
I. 

CLASSIFICATION. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  the  first  class  of 
Conditions  diities  in  detail.  These  will  require  tliat 
thls^duties  ^ve  secure  those  conditions  in  ourselves  by 
ai  to  our  dSl  whicli  we  cau  work  most  efficiently  under 

tiestoothers.  the  kw  of  loVC. 

These  conditions  are  : — 

1.  That  we  secure  our  rights  ; 

2.  That  we  supply  our  wants  ;  and 
8.  That  we  perfect  our  powers. 

Of  these  each  in  its  order  is  conditional  for  the 
next,  and  they  will  include  all  that  we  need  to  do 
for  our  own  good,  and  to  enable  us  to  do  good  to 
vtliers. 

DIVISION  I.  ' 

THE  SECURING  OF  OUR  RIGHTS. 

We  are  to  secure  our  rights  so  far  as  they  may 
be  a  condition  to  our  best  working  under  the  law 
of  love. 

The  only  right  that  must  be  secured  for  the  above 


128  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

snd  is  that  to  life.  As  long  as  there  is  life  men 
may  act  under  this  law,  in  whatever  condition  they 
may  be.  Hence  the  right  to  life  is  more  sacred 
than  any  other,  and  hence  the  right  to  defend  it 
even  by  taking  the  life  of  another.  God  has  en- 
dowed men  with  life,  has  placed  them  in  their 
positions  here,  often  with  many  others  dependent 
upon  them,  has  implanted  within  them  an  instinct 
of  self-preservation,  has  made  the  life  of  each  as 
sacred  as  that  of  any  other,  that  security  of  life 
which  the  instinct  guards  is  essential  both  to  the 
well-being  of  society  and  of  the  individual,  and  if, 
with  these  interests  in  question,  life  is  wrongfully 
assailed,  it  not  only  comes  within  the  law  of  love  to 
defend  it  by  taking,  if  necessary,  the  life  of  another, 
but  it  is  an  imperative  duty.  God  does  not  regard 
life  as  too  sacred  to  be  taken  for  the  violation  of 
natural  law,  and  it  is  not  only  by  a  righteous  moral 
law  that  life  is  taken  in  such  cases,  but  by  a  natural 
law  implanted  in  the  constitution. 

The  right  to  life  must  be  defended  to  the  utmost. 
Of  the  other  great  rights,  as  of  liberty,  property,  and 
reputation,  we  may  be  deprived  and  still  work  under 
the  law  of  love.  These  ricrhts  we  are  to  secure  as 
far  as  possible  in  compatibility  with  that  law, 
but  as  no  absolute  rule  can  be  laid  down,  and  as 
the  subject  of  rights  will  be  treated  further  on,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  speak  o^  them  more  fully  here. 
It  is  only  to  be  said  that  at  each  point  we  are 
to  yield  or  defend  these  rights  as  the  law  of  love 
wisely  interpreted  may  require. 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


129 


DIVISION  11. 

THE  SUPPLY  OF  OUR  WANTS. 

The  second  condition  of  our  action  under  the 
law  of  love  is  the  supply  of  our  wants. 

By  wants  is  here  meant  those  things  which  are 
necessary  for  the  well-being  of  the  body  and  the 
mind.  These  and  nothing  beyond  are  essential  to 
full  work  under  the  law  of  love.  To  provide  these 
requires  toil,  and  this  toil  every  one  not  incapacitated 
by  feebleness  or  infirmity  is  bound  either  to  undergo 
himself,  or  to  pay  others  an  equivalent  for  it.  No 
duty  is  more  strongly  insisted  on  in  the  Scriptures 
than  this.  Not  to  perform  it  not  only  violates  the 
first  law  of  equity,  but  deprives  us  of  all  position 
and  stand-point  from  which  to  labor  for  others. 

DIVISION  III. 

THE  PERFECTINQ  OF  OUR  POWERS. 

Having  life  and  having  our  wants  supplied,  we 
ti  :e  next  to  perfect  our  powers.  This  is  the  third 
duty  to  ourselves  under  the  law  of  love.  It  is  of 
much  wider  scope  than  those  before  treated  of,  but 
that  the  law  of  love  requires  it  will  be  seen  if  we 
look  at  the  ways  in  which  we  can  minister  to  the 
good  of  others. 

These  are  three  :  — 
9 


130 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


1st.  By  putting  forth  our  energies,  physical  and 
mental,  directly  to  that  end.  Relation  of 

2d.  By  exerting  over  them  an  uncon-  the^good^o? 

.    ^  others. 

scious  miluence. 

3d.  By  awakening  in  them  the  joy  of  compla- 
cency. 

For  each  of  these  the  one  comprehensive  con- 
dition and  duty  is  our  own  perfection.  "  Be  ye 
therefore  perfect."  How  is  this  duty  to  be  per- 
formed ? 

CHAPTER  1. 

perfection  as  related  to    direct  action  for 
others:  of  the  body:  of  the  mind. 

According  to  the  views  in  the  prehminary  state- 
ment, the  process  in  attaining  this  per-  Perfection 
rection  must  be  one  ot  ujobuildiyig.  In  ing. 
the  language  of  the  Scriptures,  it  must  be  an 
edification."  This  gives  us  a  point  of  departure 
and  a  method^  which  the  term  "  self-culture  "  does 
not.  In  this  view  the  instrumental  powers,  the 
appetites,  the  desires  and  natural  affections,  and  the 
intellect  are  given  us  that  through  them  we  may 
build  up  a  perfect  body  and  a  perfect  mind.  These 
powers  we  can  control  in  three  ways.  We  can 
incite^  restrain^  and  guide  them,  and  these  we  are  to 
do  partly  from  the  good  there  is  from  their  own 
regulated  activity,  but  chiefly  as  they  are  con- 
ditional for  the  moral  and  s])i ritual  nature.  Of  thai 
nature  our  perfection  would  require  the  fullest  pos- 
sible expansion  and  activity. 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


131 


In  building  ourselves  up  then  so  as  to  become 
Physical      eiFective  workino;  powers,  we  be<£in  with 

perfection  ,      .      .  ^       ^  ^      ^  ^  ,  ^  , 

first.  the  body.    Love  would  reqiure  us  to  seek 

physical  perfection,  because  this  would  include 
strength^  leauty^  and  grace^  and  each  of  these  would 
aid  in  the  highest  ministries  of  love.  The  more 
strength  love  has  to  wield,  the  more  efficient  it  will 
be  ;  the  more  it  is  clothed  in  beauty  and  in  grace, 
the  more  satisfaction  it  will  give. 

For  the  perfection  of  the  body  we  are  dependent 
To  this  end    ou  tlic  appctites,  the  lowest  of  the  instru- 

law  of  limit- 
ation for       mental  powers  over  wdiich  we  have  con- 

the  appe-  ^ 

tites.  trol.    As  lower,  they  are  a  condition  for 

all  that  is  above  them,  but  their  immediate  object 
is  the  upbuilding  and  well-being  of  the  body,  and  the 
continuance  of  the  race.  Through  them  we  appro- 
priate such  things  as  the  body  needs,  and  we  have 
only  to  say  that  in  dohig  this  tliey  are  to  be  held 
strictly  subject  to  the  law  of  limitation.  By  their 
constitution  they  are  in  a  measure  self-regulating, 
but  must  always  require  rational  control  with  ref- 
erence to  their  ends.  They  may  be  of  any  degree 
of  strength,  and  be  indulged  to  any  extent  up  to 
the  point  where  they  cease  to  be  in  the  best  man- 
ner a  condition  for  tlie  activity  of  that  wliich  if? 
above  them.  The  stronger  they  are  the  better,  if 
their  action  be  for  the  strength,  beauty,  and  grace 
of  the  body,  and  for  tlie  upbuilding  of  the  inteHec- 
tual  and  moral  powers  ;  and  all  pleasure  through 
them  that  is  incidental  to  such  upbuilding,  or  ^ven 
compatible  with  it,  is  legitimate. 


132 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


From  the  varying  relations  of  the  appetites,  moro 
precise  rules  for  their  regulation  cannot  be  laid 
down. 

As,  however,  the  evils  from  the  appetites  are  so 
ereat,  we  may  not  pass  them  without  Danger  from 

,  the  appe- 

notice.  The  first  great  danger  from  the  tites. 
natural  appetites  is,  that  men  will  find  in  the  good 
from  them  their  supreme  end.  This  multitudes  do. 
Such  are  sensualists ;  for  the  character  is  always 
determined  by  that  in  which  the  supreme  end  is 
found.  Such  persons  may  wallow  in  gross  sen- 
suality, or  seek  their  gratifications  in  a  refined  and 
fashionable  way,  but  they  will  belong  to  the  sty 
of  Epicurus,  will  live  unworthily,  and  will  die  and 
be  forgotten,  leaving  the  world  no  better  for  their 
having  lived  in  it. 

The  second  great  danger  from  these  appetites,  is 
ihat  those  who  have  higher  aims  will  be  constantly 
allured  and  seduced  by  them,  so  that  the  whole 
tone  of  their  life  will  be  lowered.  Those  are  few 
to  whom  some  soil  from  sensuality  does  not  cling. 
"  Fleshly  lusts "  not  only  injure  the  body,  but 
"  war  against  the  soul." 

The  third  danger  from  the  appetites  is  in  the  for- 
mation of  those  that  are  artificial.  These  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  upbuilding,  as  the  substances  ors 
which  they  fix  are  all  poison  and  incapable  of  beinj} 
assimilated.  The  pleasure  from  them  terminates 
in  itS(^Jf ;  the  tendency  to  increase  the  amount  of 
the  stimulus  is  strong ;  the  nervous  system  ia  ivu 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


133 


paired  by  tliem ;  habits  are  formed  which  hold 
men  in  fearful  bondage,  and  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  the  best  state  of  the  moral  powers  and 
the  highest  sjoiritual  exercises  are  compatible  with 
habitual  stimulation,  either  alcoholic  or  narcotic. 
If  God  had  judged  it  best  that  man  should  have  an 
appetite  for  these  substances,  doubtless  He  would 
have  implanted  it. 

Held  in  their  proper  place,  the  appetites  are  pro- 
ductive only  of  good ;  but  looking  at  the  history  or 
at  the  present  state  of  man,  we  find  the  amount  of 
misery  and  degradation  from  abuse  of  the  natural 
appetites,  and  from  artificial  ones  which  are  them 
selves  an  abuse,  to  be  appalling  beyond  description. 
Of  the  great  corruption  of  the  heathen,  one  of  the 
most  prominent  forms  is  sensuality,  their  very  re- 
liorion  beino;  often  but  a  deification  of  this.  Of  coun- 
tries  nominally  Christian,  especially  in  their  great 
cities,  the  corruption  is  unutterable,  and  seldom,  if 
ever,  has  Christianity  so  pervaded  a  community  as  to 
lift  them  wholly  out  of  this  slough.  Hence  we 
raise  a  warning  cry  at  this  point.  Hence  a  right 
training  of  the  young  must  involve  a  control  by 
them  of  their  appetites,  since  a  failure  here  is  a 
failure  in  all  that  is  above  them. 

But  wliile  the  proximate  object  of  the  appetites 
Appetites  is  the  perfection  of  the  body,  they  alone 
2ient.  are  not  surhcient  tor  that,  ror  its  highest 
strength,  beauty,  and  grace,  there  are  needed  ir. 
addition  health  and  physical  training. 


l34 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


1.  Health.  This  is  to  the  body  what  virtue  ia 
to  the  soul,  its  normal  state,  its  p;ood  ;  and 

„        1  .  .        .  1    ,  1  Health. 

lor  this,  attention  is  needed,  not  only  to 
the  appetites,  bat  to  air,  exercise,  sleep,  and  cloth- 
ing. The  care  of  health  through  these  is  a  duty, 
not  only  from  the  consequences  to  ourselves  of  its 
failure,  but  because  the  power  of  love  would  thus 
be  paralyzed,  and  instead  of  aiding  others  we  should 
become  a  tax  upon  their  energies,  if  not  a  burden. 
Needless  ill-liealth  in  its  myriad  forms  is  an  incubus 
upon  society  ;  and,  though  it  may  seem  harsh  to 
call  it  so,  it  is,  as  a  violation  of  the  law  of  love,  a 
crime. 

This  whole  subject  is  not  as  yet  brought  as  it 
should  be  within  the  domain  of  the  conscience. 
The  consequences  of  neglecting  the  laws  of  health, 
of  imprudence,  and  excess,  are  constantly  attributed 
to  a  mysterious  Providence.  They  have  the  same 
relation  to  Providence  as  typhoid  fever  in  the  filthy 
wards  of  a  cit}'.  They  are  visitations  under  Prov- 
idence rendered  necessary  by  the  neglect  and  folly 
of  man. 

2.  Physical  training.   Health  alone  will  not  secure 
perfection  of  form  or  of  power.    Espe-  physical 
cially  will  it  not  secure  grace,  which  is 

higher  than  beauty,  and  is  expressed  chiefly 
through  motion.  Hence  the  need  of  physical 
training. 

The  true  subject  of  education  is  man  in  the  unity 
soul  and  body.    If  either  factor  be  neglected, 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


loO 


the  Ino-hest  results  cannot  be  reached.    Hence  a 

o 

well  regulated  system  of  physical  culture  is  not  only 
a  legitimate  part  of  education,  especially  of  a  liberal 
education,  but  it  is  demanded.  In  this  we  have  de- 
clined from  the  wisdom  of  the  anrients. 

Physical  training  may  be  carried  too  far ;  it  may 
Physical  bccomo  Qu  ciid.  Not  Subordinated  to  a 
to^be'"^  higher  culture,  or  out  of  proportion,  it  is 
guarded.  ^  deformity  and  a  nuisance.  It  also  needs 
to  be  guarded  against  an  ambition  to  perform  diffi- 
cult and  danp-erous  feats.  If  it  can  be  warded  at 
these  two  points,  it  must  become  an  essential  ele- 
ment in  our  system  of  education. 

Strength,  beauty,  grace,  —  these  are  the  fruits  of 
physical  trainino;  and  health.    Of  these 

Results       -It/  ~ 

strength  is  put  forth  solely  under  the  di- 
rection of  will,  and  its  exertion  for  others  may  im- 
pose obligation.  Beauty  and  grace,  on  the  other 
hand,  produce  their  effects  without  our  direct  voli- 
tion. They  are  as  an  emanation,  a  fragrance,  a 
soft  green,  which  w^e  admire  and  enjoy  without  feel- 
ing obligation. 

Are  we  then  under  obligation  even  with  regard 
to  the  body,  to  seek  not  only  strength  to  be  used  by 
will  for  the  good  of  others,  but  also  those  perfec- 
tions and  accomplishments  even  which  may  become 
a  source  of  pleasure  when  contemplated  by  them  ? 
Y"es,  even  though  they  are  so  often  sought  and  dis- 
played from  vanity.  By  all  means  let  beauty  be 
•ought ;  beauty  of  person,  and  even  of  dress.  This 


136 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


natui'e  teaches.  The  flowers  are  not  simply  become 
mg,  they  are  beautiful.  Nor  do  the  Scriptures 
forbid  it.  The  Apostle  Peter,  with  his  quiet  and 
solemn  eye,  does  not  condemn  outward  adorning 
except  as  in  antagonism  to  the  higher  ornament 
of  a  meek  and  quiet  spirit ; "  "  the  plaiting  of 
hair,"  and  "  wearing  of  gold,"  and  "  putting  on  of 
apparel,"  are  not  to  be  the  adorning.  Rightly  sub- 
ordinated they  may  have  their  place,  but  are  as 
nothing  when  compared  with  the  hidden  man  of 
the  heart,  which  is  in  the  sight  of  God  of  great 
price." 

Let  grace  be  cultivated.  That  costs  nothing. 
But  let  nothing  be  done  from  self  as  central.  Let 
it  be  in  sympathy  with  the  tendency  of  every  or- 
ganizing and  vital  force  in  nature  towards  perfec- 
tion, and  as  putting  us  in   harmony  with  the 

Kosmos."  Above  all  let  it  be  for  others.  If 
vanity  could  but  be  exorcised  by  love,  accomplish- 
ments would  at  once  fall  into  their  place  and  be- 
come admirable.  The  taint  which  attaches  to  them, 
as  in  the  service  of  vanity  and  egotism,  would  be 
removed,  and  the  social  questions  which  arise 
concerning  them  would  be  easily  settled. 

But  if  we  are  to  seek  a  perfect  body,  perfection 
much  more  a  perfect  mind. 

Here  again  there  must  be  upbuilding.  Love 
Deing  presupposed,  its  first  business  will  be  to  put 
and  hold  in  its  place  each  of  the  instrumental 
powers. 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


137 


Of  these  the  desires  are  to  the  mind  what  the 

itaMon^f^r'   ^PP^*^^^^  ^^'^  body.    They  are  nat- 

the  desires,  ural  aiid  iiccessary  principles  of  action, 
having  no  moral  character  in  themselves,  but  re- 
quiring control.  Like  the  appetites  they  are  to  be 
governed,  not  on  the  principle  of  repression,  but 
by  being  made  to  minister  to  something  higher. 
Let  the  desire  of  hfe,  and  of  property,  and  of  knowl- 
edge, and  of  power,  and  of  esteem,  have  their  full 
scope,  provided  they  violate  no  right  of  others,  and 
that  what  they  appropriate  is  used  in  the  service  of 
the  affections,  and  under  the  guidance  of  conscience. 

But  here,  as  in  the  appetites,  we  must  draw  atten- 
Dangers       tiou  to  tlic  x^rcat  dano'er  there  is  from 

from  the  .  ^  ^ 

desires.       pcrvcrsiou  and  abuse. 

And  here,  also,  the  first  danger  is  that  the  object 
of  some  one  of  the  desires  will  be  adopted  as  the 
supreme  end. 

In  this  case  the  character  formed,  and  the  re- 
sults, are  very  different  from  those  when  the  ap- 
petites are  thus  adopted.  The  appetites  have  a 
natural  limit.  They  are  satisfied,  and  cease  their 
craving ;  excess  in  them  ultimately  and  speedily 
debilitates  both  body  and  mind  ;  the  sphere  of  the 
sensualist  is  narrow  ;  he  dies  and  is  forgotten.  But 
the  desires  have  no  natural  limit.  They  grow  by 
what  they  feed  on,"  and  are  all  absorbing.  Hence 
we  have  the  poltroon  when  we  should  have  the 
martyr ;  we  have  the  miser,  emaciated  and  cowering 
over  his  gold  ;  we  have  the  pale  student  outwatch- 


138 


MOEAL  SCIENCE. 


ing  the  stars  ;  we  have  the  conqueror  desolating 
continents,  and  the  shifting  devotee  of  pubhc  opin 
ion  These  fill  the  \Yorld  with  their  deeds.  They 
trample  on  appetite,  and  may  seem  nobler  than  its 
slaves,  but  are  equally  in  bondage,  and  some  of 
them  beyond  comparison  more  mischievous. 

And  here  it  may  be  well  to  state  what  that  is  in 
which  the  selfishness,  and  idolatry  too,  of  selfishness 
the  race  consist.  It  is  in  adopting  as  their  ^^'^  idolatry, 
supreme  end  the  good  there  is  from  the  activity  of 
some  lower  part  of  their  nature.  This  is  selfish- 
ness. Its  primary  form  is  not  that  of  enmity  to 
God,  or  to  any  one  else.  There  is  no  conscious 
malignity.  It  disclaims  this  when  imputed  to  it, 
and  says,  Is  thy  servant  a  dog  that  he  should  do 
this  thing?"  Not  interfered  with,  it  is  good-na- 
tured, perhaps  cuhivated  and  elegant.  But  let  any 
one,  ej^^en  God,  come  between  it  and  the  end  made 
supreme,  and  it  becomes  aversion,  enmity,  bitter 
and  uncompromising  reb.ellion.  In  such  cases,  the 
form  varying  with  the  appetite  or  desire,  and  scope 
being  given,  there  is  no  form  of  deception,  and  no 
extent  or  refinement  of  cruelty  to  which  a  people 
civilized,  and  cultivated  through  art,  will  not  go. 

This,  too,  is  idolatry.  It  is  the  true  idolatry  of 
the  race,  which  has  always  found  symbols  to  rep- 
resent that  which  they  have  made  their  supreme 
end,  and  who  have  really  worshipped  their  own  sel- 
fish passions  as  reflected  in  those  symbols. 

It  need  only  be  added  that  those  who  have  choseD 


DUTIES  TO  /OURSELVES. 


139 


higher  ends  are  in  constant  clanger  through  inor- 
dinate desire,  even  more  than  through  inordinate 
appetite. 

After  the  desires,  the  affections  will  require  at- 
The  affec-  teution  hj  ouo  wlio  would  perfect  himself 
uraTknd*'  as  an  agent  for  doing  good.  The  affec- 
tions  are  Natural  and  Moral.  The  differ- 
ence between  these  is,  that  the  moral  affections  are 
consequent  upon  acts  of  will  or  choice,  and  derive 
their  character  from  the  character  of  these  acts. 
The  natural  affections  are  found  in  us  acting  spon- 
taneously, like  the  desires. 

For  the  most  part  the  natural  affections  do  not 
require  repression.  They  rather  need  culture,  and 
under  that  are  capable  of  expanding  into  great 
beauty.  Nor  is  there  from  them  such  danger  of 
abuse  that  attention  need  be  drawn  to  it  here.  It 
is  sufficient  to  say  that  they  are  to  be  developed 
under  the  law  of  limitation. 

The  Intel-  Of  ^hc  instrumental  powers  it  only  re- 
mains  to  speak  of  the  Intellect. 

The  necessity  of  training,  and  if  possible,  per- 
fecting the  Intellect  if  a  man  would  do  much  for 
his  own  good  or  that  of  others,  is  admitted.  To 
this  every  seminary  of  learning  testifies.  Its  rela- 
tive importance  is  doubtless  overestimated,  since 
education  has  come  to  mean  chiefly  the  training  of 
the  intellect. 

The  general  statement  here  is  that  the  law  of 
love  requires  that  every  talent  and  means  of  in« 


140 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


fluence,  wlietlier  general  or  professional,  should  be 
cultivated  to  the  utmost. 

Does  an  artisan  fail,  as  in  making  a  steam  boiler, 
to  provide  in  the  best  way  for  the  safety  and  com- 
fort of  the  community;  is  a  physician  ignorant  of 
thu  right  remedy,  or  a  lawyer  of  the  precedent  on 
which  his  case  turns ;  does  the  clergyman  lack 
quickening  and  persuasive  power ;  each  is  con- 
demned by  the  law  of  love,  and  responsible  for  the 
consequences  if  tlie  failure  could  have  been  avoided. 
There  may  be  faithfulness  at  the  moment,  —  at  the 
bedside,  in  the  court-room,  in  immediate  jDrepara- 
tion  for  the  pulpit  —  but  the  failure  and  guilt  may 
lie  far  back  in  the  indolent  self-indulgence  and  dis- 
sipation of  the  years  of  preparatory  study. 

We  now  pass  to  the  Governing  Powers.  It  is  one 
thing  for  a  person  to  improve  his  instru-  Governing 
mental  powers,  as  he  might  his  knife  or 
his  reaper,  and  another  to  improve  those  which  are 
more  distinctively  himself.  It  is  in  these  that  we 
find  the  worth  and  dignity  of  man,  in  these  the 
image  of  God.  In  these  is  the  germ  of  immortality ; 
in  these  the  seat  of  spiritual  conflict. 

For  the  education  of  these  powers  there  are  no 
institutions  except  those  of  Christianity,  imp^o^g. 
Tlie  Church  with  its  Bible,  and  ministry,  ^ll^'J^H^, 
and  the  Spirit  of  God  pervading  all,  is 
God's  institution  for  the  education  of  these  powers, 
and  training  them  up  into  the  likeness  of  Christ, 
and  so  of  God.    Nor  would  human  institutions  be 


DUTIES  TO  OUESELVES. 


141 


of  any  avail.  Improvement  here  must  begin  in  the 
Will  itself,  by  its  submitting  itself  to  the  laws 
of  reason  and  of  conscience,  and  opening  the 
whole  man  to  every  high,  and  holy  influence 
which  God  may  bring  to  bear  upon  him.  Ail 
powei^  are  to  be  improved,  and  these  no  less 
than  others,  by  their  being  exercised  in  the  sphere 
and  under  the  conditions  appointed  for  them  by 
God.  So  only.  But  the  sphere  of  these  powers  is 
to  rule.  Hence  they  can  be  improved  only  as  they 
are  permitted  to  be  active  in  ruling.  But  that 
they  should  do  this  nothing  can  secure  but  that 
ultimate  act  of  choice  which  determines  character, 
.and  which  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  all  institutions 
and  external  appliances.  If  these  powers  be  held 
in  abeyance,  their  place  being  usurped  by  appetite 
or  desire  in  the  form  of  passion,  they  will  be  dwarfed 
and  perverted,  and  will  manifest  themselves  in 
every  form  of  superstition  and  fanaticism. 

Such  is  the  sphere  of  the  governing  powers.  He 
who  would  cultivate  them  must  permit  them  to 
govern,  and  to  govern  uniformly.  So  shall  they 
gain  strength,  and  so  shall  he  walk  in  increasing 
Hght  until  ''the  perfect  day." 

But  the  conditions  under  which  these  powers  are 
Oonaitions  ^ct,  and  the  helps  offered,  require  to  be 
and  helps.  J^^owu  uo  Icss  than  their  sphere.  These 
cannot  here  be  treated  of  at  large,  but  I  desire  to 
advert  to  the  subject  of  immediate  divine  aid,  be- 
fause  that  is  so  generally  regarded  as  alien  to  phi- 


142 


MORAL  SCIENCE* 


losophy.  It  is  not  so,  for  the  whole  philosophy  of 
upbuilding  would  lead  us  to  anticipate  that  man  in 
his  highest  powers  would  be  connected  with  that 
which  is  still  higher.  And  in  this  it  is  accordant 
with  the  voice  of  heathen  antiquity,  and  of  the 
Scriptures.  Alwaj's  men  have  spoken  of  the  voice 
of  God  within  them,  and  the  Scriptures  speak  of 
the  "  light  that  lighteth  every  man  that  cometh 
Into  the  world."  The  expressions  vary,  but  the 
import  is  that  there  is  a  direct  access  of  the  Spirit 
of  God  to  the  spirit  of  man,  both  for  illumination 
and  quickening.  For  the  reception  of  these  the 
Moral  Reason  is  adapted  as  the  flower  is  adapted  to 
receive  the  light  and  warmth  of  the  sun,  and  no 
symbol  could  be  more  beautiful  than  that  of  the 
flower  that  turns  itself  to  the  sun  and  follows  it  in 
its  course. 

But  are  we  not  here  in  danger  of  mysticism  ? 
Yes;  but  only  as  we  are  in  danger  of 
conflagration  from  the  use  of  fire.  Let  us 
be  cautious  and  encourage  no  mysticism.  Let  us 
also  be  cautious  and  neither  ignore  nor  quench  any 
light  offered  us  by  God.  This  is  a  vital  question  in 
our  upbuilding.  I  hold  that  this  communication 
and  aid  are  in  strict  accordance  with  philosophy, 
and  my  conviction  is  that  whoever  attempts  perfect- 
ing his  directive  powers  without  prayer,  and  open- 
ing his  mind,  by  putting  away  wickedness,  to  the 
'Uuminating  and  quickening  influences  of  the  Spirit 
'>f  God,  will  fail  of  success. 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


143 


It  is  only  hy  thus  building  up  himself  thro-ugh  tho 
whole  range  of  his  faculties,  that  man  can  reach 
the  highest  efficiency  when  he  would  put  forth 
direct  acts  of  will  in  the  service  of  love. 

CHAPTER  n. 

PERFECTION  AS  RELATED  TO  UNCONSCIOUS  INFLUENCE, 

The  second  mode  of  doing  good  to  others  is  by 
unconscious  influence  or  example. 

This,  in  its  highest  degree,  requires  perfection  not 
so  much  of  the  powers,  as  in  their  control  and  mode 
of  action.  No  lower  power  may  act  beyond  the 
point  at  which  it  becomes  a  condition  for  the  action 
of  a  higher.  The  appetite  for  food  or  drink  may 
not  be  so  indulged  as  to  prevent  the  fullest  activity 
of  the  desire  of  knowledge  or  of  power.  The  desire 
of  power  may  not  become  so  engrossing  as  to  dwarf 
the  affections  or  stifle  any  claim  of  justice  or  of 
right.  Napoleon  cared  nothing  for  appetite,  but 
was  gluttonous  of  power.  When  a  man  chooses  the 
object  of  any  lower  power  for  his  supreme  end,  that 
determines  his  character,  his  energies  are  directed 
to  that,  his  development  is  around  it,  and  he  be- 
comes unsymmetrical,  as  a  tree  whose  upward  sap 
is  arrested  and  expands  it  into  a  deformity.  This 
most  men  do.  They  lack  the  controlling  and 
directive  power  needed  to  keep  the  faculties  in 
subordination,  and  even  if  they  choose  the  highest 


144 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


end  are  long  in  bringing  moral  symmetry  into  their 
lives.  Only  when  this  is  done  are  they  in  a  con- 
dition to  exert  the  highest  unconscious  influence 
over  others,  and  when  this  is  done,  this  influence  is 
more  efficient  than  any  other. 

The  direct  power  of  man  over  nature  is  slight 
compared  with  that  which  he  gains  through  her  own 
forces.  The  same  is  true  of  society.  As  God  in- 
tended man  to  be  a  social  being,  He  implanted  in 
him  those  principles  by  which  he  may  have  a  com- 
mon life,  and  through  which  that  life  may  be  reached 
and  m.odified  throughout  a  nation,  and  for  ages. 
Among  these  principles  is  that  sympathy  and  un- 
conscious imitation  by  which  families  and  nations 
are  assimilated,  and  to  reacli,  as  it  may  be  done,  the 
common  life  through  this  is  the  sublimest  work  of 
man. 

It  is  in  early  life  that  this  unconscious  imitation 
is  most  operative.  Every  child  is  a  Chinese.  Give 
him  a  cracked  saucer  for  a  model,  and  he  will  make 
a  cracked  set.  The  child  needs  formal  teaching  by 
words,  but  his  principles  are  formed  and  practical 
habits  moulded  chiefly  by  that  action  of  those 
around  him  which  expresses  their  inner  life.  From 
this  there  is  a  subtle  and  pervasive  influence  that 
no  direct  teaching  can  counteract.  It  is  thus  that 
families,  neighbornoods,  sections  of  country  an 
reached  and  assimilated,  and  to  this  all  contribute. 
It  is  through  this  that  great  men,  men  great  in 
character  and  action,  reach  their  highest  influence 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


145 


They  are  simply  set  in  the  firmament  of  the  past, 
and  sliine. 

Doubtless  the  power  of  a  book,  of  the  word  spoken, 
of  mere  teaching,  is  great,  but  this  silent  shining 
addresses  different  principles,  and  under  different 
conditions.  Power  is  from  the  inner  Hfe  in  its  in- 
tegrity, and  this  is  most  perfectly  and  certainly 
revealed  by  action.  Hence  "  Example  is  better 
than  precept."  The  word  not  weighted  from  the 
life  sounds  hollow.  Hence  the  folly  as  well  as  guilt 
of  attempting  to  substitute  anything  for  that  thor- 
ough sincerity  of  character  from  which  alone  good 
influences  can  legitimately  flow. 

We  here  find  a  special  danger  to  preachers,  and 
to  all  who  teach  professionally  or  formally.  They 
are  tempted  to  "  say  and  do^not."  There  is  no 
surer  way  to  destroy  self-respect  and  bring  such 
teachings  into  contempt.  Against  such  teachers 
the  Bible  denounces  its  heaviest  woes.  "  Woe 
unto  you  Scribes  and  Pharisees,  hypocrites,  for  ye 
devour  widows'  houses,  and  for  _a  pretense  make 
long  prayers  :  therefore  ye  shall  receive  the  greater 
damnation." 

CHAPTER  III. 

PERFECTION  AS  RELATED  TO  COMPLACENCY. 

The  third  way  of  benefiting  others  through  a 
care  for  our  own  state,  is  by  awakening  in  them  the 
'oy  of  complacency. 

10 


146 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Under  the  former  head  we  regarded  man  as 
active,  with  powers  to  be  addressed  ;  under  this  we 
regard  him  as  having  susceptibiUties.  Our  object 
then  was  action,  character  ;  it  is  now  enjoyment. 

The  highest  susceptibiUties  are  moral,  and  it  is 
from  manifestations  of  moral  character  that  we 
have  our  highest  enjoyment  through  the  susceptibiH^ 
ties.  Through  these  we  have  the  love  of  compla- 
cency, the  sense  of  moral  beauty  and  grandeur, 
esteem,  veneration,  and  the  emotions  which,  in 
their  highest  form,  become  worship. 

For  the  susceptibility  to  natural  beauty  and 
grandeur  God  has  provided.  Nature  is  full  of  ob- 
jects that  correspond  to  this  ;  it  is  among  our 
purest  and  best  sources  of  enjoyment,  and  is  the 
forerunner  and  type  of  the  higher  enjoyment  from 
the  beauty  of  hoUness.  But  the  moral  susceptibih- 
:ies  can  be  awakened  only  by  character.  For  these 
the  great  provision  is  in  God  himself,  whose  charac- 
ter is  perfect ;  but  aside  from  this,  these  susceptibili- 
ties may  be  drawn  out  in  high  activity  by  human 
character.  If  all  people  were  to  reflect  the  image 
of  Christ  in  their  radical  character,  the  ideals  of 
literature  and  art,  or  rather  something  more  beau- 
tiful and  better,  would  live  and  act  before  us,  and 
no  one  can  estimate  the  enhanced  joy  from  moral 
beauty. 

It  is  an  office  of  Love  to  increase  material  beauty. 
She  smiles  upon  the  marriage  of  taste  with  industry. 
She  would  esteem  it  a  crime  to  mar  nature  ;  she 


DUTIES  TO  OUBSELVES.  l4? 

ivould,  if  possible,  restore  the  beauty  of  Eden. 
How  much  more  then  must  Love  feel  under  obliga- 
tion to  increase  moral  beauty  ;  how  much  more  a 
crime  to  diminish  it.  In  a  community  whose  moral 
nature  is  developed,  high  moral  character  is  the 
purest,  the  best,  the  amplest  contribution  to  mere 
enjoyment  that  can  be  made.  It  is  better  than 
pictures  or  statues  or  landscape  gardens.  Such  a 
contribution  every  man  can  make  by  attending  to 
his  own  state,  and  it  is  among  the  more  imperative 
obligations  of  Love  to  do  this. 

That  this  end  of  love  would  be  most  fally 
reached  by  our  perfection,  is  too  plain  to  need 
enforcement.  Everywhere  the  highest  complacency 
demands  perfection. 

CHAPTEK  IV. 

PERFECTION  AS  RELATED  TO  THE  GLORY  OP  GOD. 

We  have  thus  seen  that  our  own  perfection  is 
a  condition  of  our  best  ministrations  to  others  in 
each  of  the  three  ways  in  which  it  is  possible  for 
us  to  minister  to  them,  and  that  love  would  there- 
Pore  oblige  us  to  seek  that  perfection.  We  are  also 
under  obligation  to  seek  it,  because  it  is  a  condition 
of  our  most  fully  glorifying  God. 

God  is  glorified  by  the  manifestation  of  his  per 
fections.  In  the  products  of  his  wisdom  and  power 
He  is  glorified,  as  they  are  seen  to  be  perfect.  He 


148 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


IS  more  glorified  as  He  himself  is  seen  to  be  perfect 
in  his  moral  character  and  government,  and  as  He 
is  loved  and  obeyed  by  creatures  made  in  his  image. 
This  love  and  obedience  are  the  sum  of  human  duty : 
they  are  perfection.  They  are  also  the  glorifying 
of  God,  and,  it  may  bo  added,  the  enjoying  of  Him, 
That  God  should  be  glorified  by  us  voluntarily,  and 
enjoyed  in  any  other  way,  we  cannot  conceive.  In 
this  view  of  it,  therefore,  perfection  can  hardly  be 
said  to  be  a  condition  of  glorifying  God.  It  is  the 
glorifying  of  Him. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PERFECTION  AS  RELATED  TO  SELF-LOVE. 

From  the  above  it  appears  that  love  to  others  and 
to  God  would  require  us  to  seek  our  own  perfection. 
But  this  is  just  what  would  be  required  by  a  reason- 
able self-love,  and  is  there  no  place  for  that  ?  Yes  ; 
and  we  here  reach  the  point,  not  only  of  the  recon- 
ciliation of  self-love  with  benevolence,  but  of  their 
convergence.  Self-love  is  legitimate.  Our  own  good 
IS  of  intrinsic  value,  and  w^e  are  especially  bound 
to  care  for  it  as  it  is  that  part  of  the  universal 
good  which  is  more  especially  intrusted  to  us.  God 
cares  for  it,  and  why  not  we  ?  In  doing  this  we 
bave  reason  to  believe  that  we  not  only  work  with 
Him  for  our  own  good,  but  as  He  himself  works. 

From  hence,  also,  it  is  evident,"  says  Edwards,  ir 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


149 


liis  "  Treatise  on  the  Nature  of  Virtue,''  ^'  that  the 
divine  virtue,  or  the  virtue  of  the  divine  mind,  must 
consist  principally  in  love  to  himself."  If  this  be 
correct,  our  virtue  will  consist  in  some  degree  in 
love  to  ourselves.  While,  therefore,  we  allow  self- 
love  a  place  in  prompting  efforts  for  our  own  per- 
fection, it  is  a  subordinate  one. 

It  is  Avorthy  of  notice  that  it  is  no  part  of  the 
divine  law,  as  directly  expressed,  that  we  love  our- 
selves. It  is  simply  implied  in  the  command  to 
love  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  The  reason 
doubtless  is  the  deep  harmony  there  is  between 
loving  God  and  our  neighbor  and  loving  ourselves. 
So  perfectly  coincident  are  they  as  reciprocally  re- 
sulting, both  and  equally,  from  perfect  powers  act- 
ing rightly,  that  if  we  love  God  and  our  neighbor 
we  do  the  very  thing  that  self-love  would  require, 
and  there  is  no  need  of  enforcing  a  further  law. 
To  love  God  and  our  neighbor  is  the  best  w^ay  of 
loving  ourselves. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

HABITS. 

Iz  speaking  of  individual  upbuilding  and  perfec- 
tion, the  subject  of  habits  may  not  be  omitted. 

Habits  presuppose  original  faculties  and  suscep- 
Habits,  ac-  tibilitics  by  which  acts  are  done  and  im- 
paaeive.  prcssious  are  received  independently  ol 
habit.     They  are  formed  by  repeated  voluntary 


150 


MOBAL  SCIENCE. 


action  of  the  powers,  and  by  repeated  impressions 
on  the  sensibihty.  No  man,  therefore,  is  born  with 
habits,  but  every  one  has  a  tendency  to  form  them ; 
and,  according  to  the  distinction  just  made,  they 
will  be  either  active  or  passive. 

Active  ^  habits  are  formed  by  the  repetition  of 
voluntary  acts.  It  is  an  ultimate  fact  in  ^^^j^^ 
our  constitution,  that  repetition,  practice, 
use,  produces,  always  facility  in  doing  the  acts  re- 
peated, and  sometimes,  in  addition,  a  tendency  to 
do  them.  Facility  and  tendency,  —  these  are  the 
results  of  acts  voluntarily  repeated,  which  required 
at  first  careful  attention  and  painful  effort.  Both 
facihty  and  tendency  are  spoken  of  as  the  result  of 
habit,  but  they  need  to  be  distinguished ;  and  we 
also  need  to  distinguish  a  tendency  to  do  a  thing  in 
a  particular  manner,  from  a  tendency  to  do  it  at  all. 
By  repetition  one  gains  facility  in  writing  his  name, 
and  a  tendency,  if  he  write  it  at  allj  to  do  so  in  a  par- 
ticular way  ;  but  he  does  not  gain  a  tendency  to 
write  his  name.  For  doirio;  that  a  rational  motive 
is  required.  The  same  may  be  said  of  all  acquired 
skill.  This  is  gained  by  the  repetition  of  acts 
giving  facility,  and  a  tendency  to  do  the  thing  in  a 
particular  manner.  But  in  some  cases  a  step  further 
is  taken,  and  a  tendency  is  acquired  to  do  the  thing 
•tsolf.  This  may  go  so  far  that  habitual  action  may 
seem  automatic,  and  not  only  not  to  be  from  the 
will,  but  to  be  in  opposition  to  it.  It  is  this  ten- 
dency which  is  more  particularly  spoken  of  as 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


151 


"  habit."    This  it  is  that  may  need  to  be  guarded 

against,  or  to  be  overcome. 

Of  such  a  constitution  the  object  is  evident.  It 
Object  of  not  to  trammel  us,  or  to  reduce  us  to 
habits.  routine,  but  to  enable  us  so  to  incorporate 
into  our  being  the  results  of  voluntary  action  as  to 
avail  ourselves  of  those  results  with  the  least  pos- 
sible attention,  and  so  that  the  mind  may  be  free 
to  enter  upon  new  fields  of  effort.  This  it  is  desir- 
able to  notice,  because  many  writers  have  enlarged 
the  sphere  of  habit  quite  too  much. 

Such  being  the  nature  of  active  habits,  and  the 
object  of  that  constitution  by  which  they  are  formed, 
it  is  obvious, — 

1.  That  men  must  be  responsible  for  their  habits, 
Responsi-     and  for  all  acts  done  from  them.  Not 

bility  for  •pit*  •  • 

habits.  only  do  specific  habits  origmate  in  the  will 
as  prompted  by  original  and  controlling  faculties 
that  act  independently  of  habit,  but  they  can 
never  wholly  escape  from  the  control  of  will. 

2.  It  is  obvious  that  when  men  rest  in  any  form 
Habits  con-  habitual  action,  they  defeat  the  end  for 
fcTut  norto  which  the  capacity  for  habits  was  given, 
trammel  us.  y^j^j^,}^  jg      gjyg  freedom  to  enter  upon 

new  fields  of  activity.  Habit,  as  habit,  is  automatic 
and  mechanical.  It  is  simply  conservative,  while 
man  never  reaches  a  point  where  conservatism  is 
not  for  the  sake  of  progress.  Hence,  while  we  are 
to  seek  by  repetition  all  possible  facility  and  power, 
we  are  to  guard  sedulously  against  being  brought 


152 


MORAL  SCIENCE* 


mto  bondage  to  any  tendency.    It  is  sad  to  see  the 

power  of  rational  will  and  free  choice  narrowed 
down  by  any  blind  force,  natural  or  acquired. 

3.  It  is  obvious  that  bad  habits  may  be  formed 
as  well  as  ^ood  ones.    In  these  there  is 

^         .  .  .       Bad  habits. 

a  tendency  to  increase  m  strength  m- 
definitely  ;  and  when  we  have  this  accumulated 
power  thus  added  to  the  force  of  original  passion, 
we  have  a  bondage  the  most  fearful  known.  Hence 
the  w^isdom  of  letting  evil  alone  "  before  it  be  med- 
dled with  " 

4.  It  is  a  point  of  wisdom  to     set  the  habits," 
as  Paley  says,  "  so  that  every  change  may  The  "set" 
be  a  change  for  the  better."    In  illustra- 

ting  this  he  says  that  the  advantage  is  with  those 
habits  which  allow  of  an  indulgence  in  the  devia- 
tion from  them.  The  luxurious  receive  no  greater 
pleasure  from  their  dainties  than  the  peasant  does 
from  his  bread  and  cheese  ;  but  the  peasant,  when- 
ever he  goes  abroad,  finds  a  feast ;  whereas  the 
epicure  must  be  well  entertained  to  escape  disgust. 
Those  who  spend  every  day  at  cards,  and  those 
wlio  go  every  day  to  plough,  pass  their  time  much 
alike  ;  but  then  whatever  suspends  the  occupation 
of  the  card-player  distresses  him  ;  whereas  to  the 
laborer  every  interruption  is  a  refreshment  ;  and 
this  appears  in  the  different  effects  that  Sunday 
produces  upon  the  two,  which  proves  a  day  of  rec- 
reation to  the  one,  but  a  lamentable  burden  to  tho 
other."  1 

1  Moral  Philosophy^  chap.  vl. 


DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 


153 


Passive  liabits,  as  has  been  said,  are  formed  by  re- 
Passive  peated  impressions.  These,  no  less  than 
habits.  active  habits,  have  it  for  their  end  to  regu- 
late action.  This  they  do  by  their  effect  both  upon 
the  enjoyment  and  the  suffering  caused  by  impres- 
sions. The  end  being  action,  the'  means  are  disre- 
garded ;  and  emotions  and  impressions,  both  pleas- 
ant and  unpleasant,  are  moderated  by  such  habits 
when  they  woukl  interfere  with  the  best  condi- 
tion for  action.  The  doctrine  of  Bishop  Butler  is 
that,  From  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  passive 
impressions,  by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker. 
Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through  the  mind  are 
felt  less  sensibly  ;  being  accustomed  to  danger 
begets  intrepidity,  —  that  is,  lessens  fear  ;  to  dis- 
tress, lessens  the  passion  of  pity ;  to  instances  of 
others'  mortality,  lessens  the  sensible  apprehension 
of  our  own.  And  from  these  two  observations 
together,  —  that  practical  habits  are  formed  and 
strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and  that  passive 
impressions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  upon 
us,  —  it  must  follow  that  active  habits  may  be 
gradually  forming  and  strengthening  by  a  course 
of  acting  upon  such  and  such  motives  and  excite- 
ments, whilst  these  motives  and  excitements  them- 
selves are  by  proportionable  degrees  growing  less 
sensible,  —  that  is,  are  continually  less  and  less 
sensibly  felt,  even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen."  ^ 
This  shows  how  needful  it  is  that  motives,  excite- 

1  Analogy^  Part  I.,  chap.  v. 


154 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ments,  sympathies,  legitimately  connected  with  ac- 
tion, should  be  followed  by  sucli  action,  for  no  one 
is  so  hardened  and  hopeless  as  he  who  has  become 
famihar  with  such  motives  without  corresponding 
action.  "  Going,"  says  Butler,  "  over  the  theory 
of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  draw- 
ing fine  pictures  of  it ;  this  is  so  far  from  neces- 
sarily or  certainly  conducing  to  form  a  habit  of  it 
in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  that  it  may 
harden  the  mind  in  a  contrary  course,  —  that  is, 
form  a  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral  consid- 
erations." 

But  wliile  the  aboVe  gives  us  the  relation  of 
active  and  passive  habits,  and  contains  Qualification 

.     1  \       n    ^  .of  Butler's 

practical  truth  or  the  utmost  moment,  it  doctriue. 
may  be  questioned  whether  the  doctrine  of  passive 
impressions,  as  stated,  does  not  require  qualification. 
No  proof  is  given  by  Butler  that  from  our  very 
faculty  of  habits,  passive  impressions  must  grow 
weaker."  It  is  even  conceivable  that  they  might 
grow  stronger.  The  law  applies  to  all  that  depends 
on  physical  organization  as  now  constituted,  perhaps 
goes  further,  but  is  not  a  necessary  law  of  intellect 
and  sensitive  being.  Let  that  on  which  sensibility 
depends  remain  unworn,  as  surely  it  may,  and  there 
will  be  no  reason  why  the  thousandth  impression 
should  not  be  as  vivid  as  the  first. 


CLASS  II. 

DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW  MEN. 

Duties  to  our  fellow  men  will  fall  into  two  great 
iivisions,  wliicli  we  shall  treat  separately,  with 
li visions  under  each. 

I.  Duties  to  men  as  men. 

II.  Duties  growing  out  of  special  relations. 

PRELIMINARY. 

SELF-LOYE  AND  THE  LOVE  OF  OTHERS. 

In  passing  to  these  we  must  not  omit  to  say  that 
Self-love       as  love  to  our  fellow  men  requires  atten- 

and  love  of       .  t  •  i 

others  re-      tiou  to  our  owu  conciition  and  state,  so 

ciprocally  .  .  . 

dependent,  selt-love  rcquircs  attention  to  then'  condi- 
tion and  state.  If  we  can  best  minister  to  our  fel- 
low men  only  as  Ave  are  perfect,  they  can  best 
minister  to  us  only  as  they  are  perfect.  As  social 
beings,  our  whole  interest  and  enjoyment  will  de- 
pend upon  the  condition  and  state  of  others,  and 
the  promotion  of  their  well-being  is  that  of  oui 
own.  So  intimate  and  reciprocally  dependent  are 
a  rational  self-love  and  a  love  of  others.  They  are 
Qot  only  not  opposites,  as  some  have  supposed, 


156 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


but  are  different  phases  of  one  common  principle, 
equally  necessary  to  the  common  end. 

In  our  duties  to  others  the  law  is  that  we  shall 
love  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  We  must  then 
do  for  him  as  we  would  for  ourselves.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  we  are  to  regard  our  own  rights,  to  sup- 
ply our  wants,  and  to  perfect  and  direct  our  powers 

If,  then,  we  would  love  our  fellow  men  as  we  do 
ourselves,  we  must  — 

1.  llegard,  and,  if  necessary,  aid  in  securing 
their  rights  ;  — 

2.  Supply  their  wants  ;  and  — 

3.  Do  what  we  can  to  perfect  and  direct  their 
powers. 

These  will  include,  and  in  their  order  as  lower 
and  higher,  all  our  duties  to  our  fellow  men. 

In  these  ways  we  are  to  "do  good  to  all  as  we 
Lave  opportunitv."     But  through  rela-  Ground  of 

1  T  1      1*'  1        r>{     1     '     1'       •  1       special  rights 

tions  established  by  (jrod,  mdicatmg  the  and  duties, 
ends  not  only  of  the  individual,  but  of  the  family 
ind  of  society,  we  are  required,  while  we  give  to  all 
their  riglits,  to  supply  the  wants  and  to  seek  to  per- 
fect and  direct  the  powers  of  some  rather  than  of 
others.  To  empower  us  to  do  these  more  effec- 
tually, we  may  have  special  rights  over  persons  ; 
we  may  owe  them  special  duties  ;  and  they  may 
have  special  claims  and  be  under  special  obligations. 
This  will  give  us  what  have  been  called  the  "  right3 
\)f  persons "  in  distinction  from  the  "  rights  of 
things,"  and  w^ill  recpiire  a  separate  consideration 
of  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  family  and  of  society 


FIRST  GREAT  DIVISION. 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 


DIVISION  I. 

DUTIES  REGARDING  THE  RIGHTS  OF  OTHERS. 


CHAPTER  L 

OE  RIGHTS. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  pass  to  the  consideration 
of  rights. 

Of  rights  the  correlative  is  obhgation,  and  the 
obhgations  corresponding  to  rights  give  the  lowest 
form  of  duty  to  others.  For  the  most  part  riglits 
are  guarded  by  negative  precepts,  the  command 
being  Thou  shalt  not."  They  belong  to  others 
already,  and  can  be  taken  or  withheld  from  them 
only  by  positive  injury.  This  love  can  never  do. 
The  least  that  love  can  do  for  others  is  to  respect, 
find  concede  to  them,  all  their  rights ;  and  no  one 
who  violates  or  withholds  the  rights  of  another  can 
consistently  claim  to  be  benevolent  toward  him. 
That  we  give  to  others  their  rights,  is  therefore  the 
'Oroper  condition  of  all  higher  forms  of  duty. 


158 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


As  actions  are  right  from  their  relation  to  an  end, 
60  all  rights  are  founded  in  the  relation  of  those 
things  to  which  men  have  a  right,  to  some  Foundation 
end  indicated  through  our  nature,  and  to 
be  attained  either  by  ourselves  or  others. 

For  every  active  principle  in  man,  for  every 
natural  desire,  affection,  or  capacity,  indicating  an 
end  to  be  attained,  there  is  a  corresponding  natural 
ri<2:ht :  and  these  rio;hts  are  hio;her  or  lower  accord- 
ing  to  the  dignity  and  sacredness  of  the  end,  or 
which  is  the  same  thing,  of  that  part  of  our  nature 
in  which  they  originate.  Thus  theje  are  rights 
which  would  secure  the  attainment  by  instinct  of 
its  ends,  and  by  the  appetites  of  their  end.  And 
so  of  the  desires,  and  of  the  intellect,  and  of  the 
natural  affections,  and  of  the  moral  and  spiritual 
nature.  Whoever  is  permitted  to  pursue  unob- 
structedly  all  the  ends  indicated  by  these  several 
active  principles,  has  all  his  rights  ;  and  in  doing 
so  he  has  a  right  to  have  and  to  do  everything  that 
will  not  interfere  with  the  riMits  of  others.  If  ob- 
structed  on  any  other  ground,  he  would  not  have 
all  his  rio;hts.  Havino;  endowed  man  with  active 
principles,  the  purpose  of  God  evidently  was  to 
place  him  in  such  conditions  that  he  should  be  in 
duced,  re(juired,  and  enabled  to  secure  the  eiids 
indicated  by  those  principles  ;  and  when  in  the 
pursuit  of  those  ends  he  is  arrested  by  any  niter- 
ference  with  such  divinely  constituted  conditions, 
the  indignant  protest  which  arises  in  the  breast  of 
%very  man  is  the  voice  of  God  in  the  assertion  of 


DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW-MEN. 


159 


rights.  We  are  so  constituted  that,  in  appi-ehend- 
ing  the  relation  between  these  active  principles  and 
their  ends,  the  moral  reason  necessarily  forms  the 
idea  of  rights. 

Rights,  as  thus  founded,  are  of  several  kinds. 

And  1st,  There  are  what  have  been  called 
Kinds  of  "rights  of  tilings"  and  ''rights  of  per- 
rights.  sons."  Tliis  is  a  radical  distinction,  and 
needs  to  be  clearly  understood. 

Men  have  a  right  to  things  that  they  may  be 
enabled  to  attain  their  own  ends.  They  have 
rights  over  persons  that  they  may  enable  those  per- 
sons to  attain  their  ends.  Rights  of  things  are  to 
guard  against  the  encroachment  of  others,  and 
their  sole  correlative  is  obligation  on  the  part  of 
others.  From  the  use  of  anything  to  which  one 
man  has  a  right,  others  are  under  obligation  to  ab- 
stain, and  to  abstain  wholly.  Of  rights  over  others, 
having  it  for  their  object  to  enable  them  to  attain 
their  end,  the  correlative  is  still  obligation  on  the 
part  of  others  ;  but  they  also  involve  obligation  on 
the  part  of  him  in  whom  the  right  vests  to  those 
others.  The  parent  has  a  right  over  the  child,  and 
the  child  is  under  obligation  to  respect  that  right ; 
but  the  parent  is  also  himself  under  obligation  to 
the  child  to  use  that  right  solely  for  the  end  for 
ivhicli  it  was  given. 

As  rights  have  their  foundation  in  their  relation 
Limit  of  ^^^9      ^^^^y         their  limit  in  the 

'^^^^       same  relation  >   Relatively  to  others  a  mau 


160 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


may  Iiave  a  right  to  do  what  he  will  with  his  own, 
but  iu  truth  and  before  God,  no  man  has  a  right 
to  use  anything  except  for  the  end  for  which  it  was 
given.  No  man  has  a  right  to  destroy  his  property 
wantonly,  or  to  use  it  foolishly,  though  no  other 
man  may  have  a  right  to  prevent  him. 

Here,  too,  we  find  not  only  the  foundation,  but 
the  hmit  of  all  rioihts  of  p:overnment  whether  human 
or  divine.  If  any  being  be  in  a  position  to  secure 
his  own  ends  mdependently  of  all  others,  then  no 
other  being  can  have  any  rights  over  him.  It  is  on 
this  ground  that  any  right  over  God  is  impossible, 
and  his  right  over  his  creatures  as  moral  Governor 
is  not  from  his  relation  to  them  as  Creator  and  Pre- 
server, as  these  relations  are  simply  from  his  power, 
but  it  is  from  his  capacity  and  disposition  to  do  for 
them  what  is  necessary  for  the  attainment  by  them 
of  their  end.  Moral  government  is  by  law,  and  no 
man  will  say  that  it  would  be  right  in  God  to  give 
his  creatures  a  law  that  would  lead  them  astray  in 
seeking  their  supreme  end.  So  far  as  we  can  vm- 
derstand  it  the  whole  end  of  the  moral  government 
Df  God  is  to  lead  his  creatures  to  the  attainment  by 
them  of  that  end.  If  any  one  should  fail  of  this 
ultimately  and  finally,  and  it  should  appear  that  God 
had  not  provided  conditions  by  which  it  was  possible 
for  lihn  to  attain  it,  the  fault  would  not  be  in  the 
creature.  But  there  will  be  no  such  failure.  No 
creature  shall  ever  be  able  to  charge  such  a  failure 
apon  God.    Hence  the  righteousness  of  his  govern- 


DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW-MEN. 


161 


ment,  liis  right  under  that  government  to  control 
his  creatures,  and  the  guilt  of  their  rebelhon.  In 
the  same  way  parents  and  civil  rulers,  holding  rela- 
tions established  by  God,  through  which  their  aid  is 
indispensable  to  others  in  the  attainment  of  their 
ends,  have  rights  over  them,  but  only  for  the  attain- 
ment by  them  of  those  ends.  If  any  man  make  use 
of  another  for  his  own  ends  simply,  he  uses  him  as 
a  tJdng.  This,  when  done  by  an  individual,  is 
slavery  ;  when  done  by  a  government,  it  is  tyranny. 

Rights,  again,  are  natural,  and  adventitious. 
„.  , ,  Natural  rio-hts  are  both  of  thino-s  and  of 

adve^i-^^'^  persons.  They  are  those  which  would 
tious.  belong  to  man  if  there  were  no  civil 
government.  A  man  has  a  natural  right  to  those 
means  and  conditions  of  good  which  God  has  pro- 
vided to  enable  him  to  secure  his  end,  such  as  air, 
light,  water,  the  unappropriated  products  of  the 
^arth  and  waters,  and  the  fruit  of  his  own  labors. 
Parents  have  also  a  natural  rio;ht  to  the  obedience 
and  respect  of  their  children,  and  children  to  the 
love  and  care  of  their  parents,  because  these  grow 
out  of  natural  relations.  Adventitious  rights  are 
those  which  grow  out  of  civil  society.  No  man  is 
naturally  a  ruler,  or  judge,  or  sheriff,  or  legislator. 
These  have  rights  as  such,  but  they  are  adven- 
titious.   So  also  are  many  of  the  rights  of  property. 

Rights  are  also  alienable  and  inalienable.  Alien- 
Rigbts  alien-  able  rio;hts  are  those  which  may  be  law- 

able  and  in-     n  ^^         ^       ^  ^  ^  tt-  i 

iUenabie.     lully  transferred  to  another'.    VV  e  do  nol 
U 


162 


MOFvAL  SCIENCE. 


here  inquire  what  others  may  unlawfully  do  in  de- 
priving us  of  rights,  w^hich  will  still  be  ours  and 
may  again  be  exercised  when  we  have  the  power, 
but  what  we  may  do  in  transferring  to  others  rights 
which  will  cease  to  be  ours.  The  ground  of  this 
di?tinction  will  be  found  in  the  ends  which  these 
rights  respect.  All  rights  from  the  lower  powers, 
as  the  desires  and  natural  affections,  that  do  not 
respect  the  supreme  end,  are  ahenable.  A  man^ 
may  transfer  to  another  his  property,  or  -his  right 
over  his  child.  But  a  man  has  an  inalienable  right 
to  himself  in  the  use  of  all  those  means  and  condi- 
tions which  are  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  his 
supreme  end.  These  he  cannot  alienate,  and  no 
one  can  rightfully  deprive  him  of  them.  No  man 
may  low^er  his  true  manhood ;  but  if,  without  doing 
this,  he  can  alienate  or  part  with  anything,  he  is  at 
liberty  to  do  it. 

If  the  foundation  of  rights  has  been  correctly 
stated,  it  will  follow  that  the  rights  of  all  ^q^^^i 
men  are  equal.  As  rights  are  founded  "s^^®* 
pn  ends  indicated  by  active  principles,  if  men  have 
l  ommon  active  principles  and  a  common  end,  that  is, 
if  they  are  men,  they  must  have  common  and  equal 
rights.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,,  and  the  foundation  of  republican 
'nstitutions.  The  condition  in  which  men  are 
born,  and  tlieir  natural  endowments,  may  be  of  the 
greatest  diversity,  but  the  right  of  one  Iniman  being 
fee  all  the  means  and  conditions  given  him  by  God 


DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW-MEN.  163 


for  attaining  his  ends  must  rest  on  the  same  ground^ 
and  be  as  perfect  and  sacred  as  that  of  any  other. 

Tiiat  men  have  equal  rights  has  been  regarded  as 
self-evident,  but  some  confusion  has  arisen  from  not 
distinguishing  clearly  between  the  rights  of  things 
Rights  of  and  of  persons.  As  rerards  riMits  of  per- 
persons  to     SOUS  a  practical  evasion  has  been  attempted. 

*e  distm-  I  ...  ,  . 

tinguished.  Ji^\\  children,  it  is  said,  are  indeed  born  with 
equal  rights,  but,  as  unable  to  secure  their  own  ends, 
they  need  for  a  long  time  to  be  under  guardianship, 
and  if  there  are  persons  or  races  who  are  under  the 
same  need,  they  may  be  treated  in  an  analogous  way. 

This  is  true,  but  before  the  desired  application  of 
it  may  be  made,  it  must  be  shown  that  such  persons 
are  really  unable  to  take  care  of  themselves.  There 
are  idiots  and  incompetent  persons  who  must  be 
thus  cared  for,  but  to  suppose  large  classes  or  races 
to  be  left  thus  and  without  natural  guardianship 
would  be  an  imputation  upon  Providence ;  there 
are  no  such  races.  It  must  also  be  shown  that  any 
such  assumed  guardianship  is  a  rightful  one,  and 
will  secure  its  legitimate  ends.  Such  a  guardian- 
ship for  tlie  ends  of  those  over  whom  it  is  assumed, 
would  not  be  coveted.  The  law  of  love  would  re- 
quire us  first  to  give  all  persons  their  rights,  and  if, 
lifter  a  fair  trial,  they  are  unable  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  then  to  have  guardians  appointed  by 
lawful  authority,  and  for  their  good.  This  would 
be  wholly  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  slavery,  which 
2onsists  in  using  persons  as  things,  and  for  our  own 
ends. 


164 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Tlie  rights  which  men,  all  men,  thus  have  as  em- 
powered of  God  to  secure  their  own  ends, 
are  those  of  Justice  and  of  Truth,  which 
last  is  also  a  form  of  justice. 

As  between  man  and  man,  justice  consists  in  con- 
ceding and  rendering  to  every  one  alj  his  rights. 
He  who  has  all  his  rights  has  no  injustice  done  him. 
Divine  Justice  consists  not  only  in  this,  but  also  in 
rendering  to  every  one  his  deserts.  These  two 
forms  of  justice  are  entirely  distinct.  Desert  of 
punishment  depends  upon  guilt ;  but  with  guilt  as 
such  and  in  distinction  from  injury  to  the  individual 
and  to  society,  man  cannot  deal.  That  depends 
upon  the  heart,  which  he  cannot  know  and  can 
have  no  claim  to  regulate.  Man  looks  on  the  act 
and  infers  the  motive.  He  may  not  punish  ex- 
cept on  the  presumption  of  a  bad  motive,  but  his 
punishment  must  be  graduated,  not  by  the  pre- 
sumed badness  of  the  motive,  but  by  the  tendency 
of  the  act  to  injure  society.  God,  on  the  other  hand, 
looks  at  the  motive  and  disregards  the  act.  He  sees 
and  punishes  guilt  in  intention  w^here  there  is  no 
outward  act.  Hence  "  Veno-eance  belono-s  to  Him." 
He  only  can  administer  punitive  justice.  Man  may 
guard  rights  ;  he  may  prevent  any  violation  of  them 
in  the  name  of  justice  and  within  its  limits.  And 
the  sentiment  of  justice  w^ithin  him  may  find  satis- 
faction in  such  punishment,  but  the  measure  of  pun- 
ishment by  him  must  be  found  in  its  necessity  to 
guard  the  rights  of  society,  and  not  in  any  satis- 


DUTIES  TO  OUR  FELLOW-MEN. 


165 


faction  of  absolute  punitivQ  justice.  Any  othei 
right  can  be  had  only  from  direct  revelation. 

We  now  pass  to  consider  more  particularly  the 
rights  which  belong  to  all  men. 

But  in  doing  tliis  we  must  notice  an  element 
Security  an  whicli  euters  iuto  our  conception  of  all 
.element in     rights — that  of  securitv.    The  rio;ht  to 

the  concep-         &  JO 

tion  of  right,  g^curity  in  the  possession  and  use  of  any- 
thin  o;  rests  on  the  same  fjround  as  the  rio[;ht  to  the 
thino;  itself,  since  the  end  on  Avliich  the  riMit  is 
based  cannot  be  fully  attained  without  this.  With- 
out security  there  is  no  enjoyment  or  free  use  of 
anything,  and  perfect  security  alone  gives  its  full 
value  to  a  possession.  This  is  the  element  and  con- 
dition in  connection  with  our  rights  which  we 
value  more  than  any  other.  Hence  this  element  is 
recognized  in  law  ;  and  if  there  be  good  reason  to 
believe  that  any  one  will  violate  the  rights  of  others, 
he  may  be  bound  over  to  keep  the  peace. 


CHAPTER  II. 


PERSONAL  rights:  LIFE  AND  LIBERTY. 

Security  being  thus  imphed  in  all  rights,  the 
first  class  which  we  shall  notice  is  those  of  the 
Person. 

Every  person  has  a  riglit  to  life,  and  to  such 
security  and  freedom  as  will  enable  him  to  attain 
the  several  ends  indicated  by  his  active  powers. 

On  the  riglit  to  life  all  others  depend.  This  is 
the  first  guarded  in  the  Decalogue.  It  is  j^jgi^^to 
also  the  first  mentioned  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  where  it  is  said  to  be  inahenable. 
It  is  so.  It  may  be  forfeited  for  crime  ;  it  m.ay  be 
surrendered  for  the  sake  of  principle  or  of  humanity, 
but  cannot  be  alienated  for  a  consideration. 

How,  then,  may  the  right  to  life  be  so  forfeited 
■:hat  others  may  have  the  right  to  take  it  hq^^^, 
away  ? 

This  may  be  done  in  four  ways,  and 

1.  By  attempting  the  life  of  another.  The  right 
to  take  life  in  defending  life  is  recognized  by  tlio 
laws  of  all  countries  and  by  all  persons,  except  a 
Pew  extreme  non-resistants. 

2.  The  right  to  life  may  be  forfeited  by  attempt- 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS:  LIFE  AND  LIBERTY  167 


mg  house-breaking  or  robbery  in  the  night.  The 
law  properly  makes  a  distinction  between  such 
attempts  by  day  and  by  night,  and  in  the  latter 
case  justifies  the  taking  of  hfe.  Still  every  such 
attempt  will  not  make  this  morally  right,  and  for 
such  cases  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down, 

3.  The  riglit  to  life  may  be  forfeited  by  resisting 
the  officers  of  the  law.  If  officers  of  the  law  are 
resisted  in  its  execution,  they  have  a  right,  as  a  last 
resort,  to  take  life.  If  a  mob  which  they  have 
been  commanded  to  disperse,  will  not  disperse,  they 
have  a  right  to  fire  upon  it. 

4.  The  right  to  life  is  forfeited  by  murder,  that 
is,  by  taking  life  with  malice  aforethought. 

The  death  penalty  was  early  authorized  and  de- 
manded by  the  Bible,  not  from  cruelty,  but  on  the 
very  ground  of  the  sacredness  of  human  life. 
"  Whoso  sheddeth  man's  blood,  by  man  shall  his 
blood  be  shed,  for  in  the  image  of  God  made  He 
man.^^  The  estimate  placed  by  a  lawgiver  upon 
any  right,  can  be  measured  only  by  the  penalty  by 
which  he  guards  it  ;  and  as  death  is  the  highest 
possible  penalty,  they  who  impose  this  show  the 
highest  possible  estimate  of  the  value  of  life.  That 
is  a  sophism  by  which  those  who  reject  this  penalty 
would  persuade  themselves  or  the  community  that 
in  so  doing  they  are  more  humane  than  others,  or 
Bet  a  higher  value  on  human  life.    It  is  the  reverse. 

But  the  riglit  to  take  life  can  depend  upon  no 
estimate  of  its  value  by  us.  It  must  come  either 
lirectly  or  indirectly  from  God,  —  directly  by  rev- 


168 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


elation,  and  indirectly  from  its  necessity  to  tlie 
ends  of  government.  Government  is  from  God, 
and  has  thus  a  right  to  do  what  is  essential  to  its 
own  being  and  ends  ;  and  if  the  security  which  is 
its  great  end  can  be  attained  only  by  the  death  of 
those  who  would  destroy  it,  then  society  may  put 
them  to  death.  Society  has  thus  the  right,  and 
must  judge  how  far,  in  the  varying  phases  of  civil- 
ization and  Christianity,  it  may  be  necessary  to  use 
it. 

The  rights  of  the  Person  are  also  infringed  by 
any  violence  actual  or  attempted.  An  assault  is 
violence  attempted.  Battery  is  any  degree  of  vio- 
lence, even  the  slightest  touch  in  anger,  or  for  in- 
sult. Violence  may  also  result  in  wounding  or  in 
maiming  the  person  attacked. 

Under  rights  of  the  person  is  also  included,  — 
the  Right  to  Liberty.  By  this  is  here  Ri^htto 
meant,  not  freedom  of  choice,  but  the  ^'^^^y- 
liberty  of  external  action  in  carrying  out  our  choices. 
It  is  the  right  to  do  whatever  any  one  may  choose, 
provided  he  does  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
another. 

Liberty  to  this  extent  is  plainly  essential  to  the 
end  of  man  as  a  responsible  being,  and  hence  a 
natural  right.  It  is  also  inalienable  so  far  as  it  is 
necessary  to  the  higliest  end  of  any  man  ;  but  if 
by  parting  with  some  portion  of  it,  —  for  even 
slavery  does  not  wholly  take  it  away,  —  a  man  can 
better  subserve  the  great  ends  of  love,  he  is  at 
liberty  to  do  it. 


CHAPTER  III. 


RIGHT  TO  PROPERTY. 

The  Riglit  to  Property  reveals  itself  through  an 
ItBfounda-  original  desire.  The  affirmation  of  it  is 
early  and  universally  made,  and  becomes 
a  controlling  element  in  civil  society. 

The  sense  of  this  right,  thus  originally  given,  is 
deepened  by  observation  and  reflection.  Without 
this  society  could  not  exist.  With  no  right  to  the 
product  of  his  labor  no  man  would  make  a  tool,  or 
a  garment,  or  build  a  shelter,  or  raise  a  crop. 
There  could  be  no  industry  and  no  progress. 

It  will  be  found  too,  historically,  that  the  general 
well-being  and  progress  of  society  has  been  in  pro- 
portion to  the  freedom  of  every  man  to  gain  prop- 
erty in  all  legitimate  ways,  and  to  security  in  its 
possession.  Let  the  form  of  the  government  be 
what  it  may,  if  there  but  be  freedom  of  industry, 
and  security  in  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  its 
results,  there  will  be  prosperity. 

The  laws  of  every  government  relate  largely  to 
property.  They  regulate  the  modes  of  its  acquisi- 
tion and  transfer,  and  punish  violations  of  the  right. 

The  acquisition  of  property  is  required  by  love, 


170 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


because  it  is  a  powerful  means  of  benefiting  others. 
There  is  no  giving  without  a  previous  get-  property  to 
ting.  A  selfish  getting  of  property,  tliough  ^^^^^^^^-i 
better  than  a  selfish  indolence  or  wastefulness,  is 
not  to  be  encouraged  ;  but  the  desire  of  property 
working  in  subordination  to  the  affections  should 
be.  Most  blessed  would  it  be  if  all  the  desires 
could  thus  work,  but  especially  this.  Industry, 
frugahty,  carefulness,  as  ministering  to  a  cheerful 
giving,  would  then  not  only  be  purged  from  all 
taint  of  meanness,  but  would  be  ennobled.  "  There 
have,"  says  Chancellor  Kent,  ^'  been  modern 
theorists,  who  have  considered  separate  and  ex- 
clusive property  as  the  cause  of  injustice,  and  the 
unhappy  result  of  government  and  artificial  insti- 
tutions. But  human  society  would  be  in  a  most 
unnatural  and  miserable  condition  if  it  were  pos- 
sible to  be  histituted  or  reorganized  upon  the  basis 
of  such  speculations.  The  sense  of  property  is 
graciously  bestowed  upon  mankind  for  the  purpose 
of  rousing  them  from  sloth  and  stimulating  them  to 
action.  It  leads  to  the  cultivation  of  the  earth,  the 
institution  of  government,  the  establishment  of  jus- 
tice, the  acquisition  of  the  comforts  of  life,  the 
growth  of  the  useful  arts,  the  spirit  of  commerce, 
the  productions  of  taste,  the  erections  of  charity, 
and  the  display  of  the  benevolent  affections." 

Property  may  be  acquired,  — 

1.  By  a])propriating  so  much  of  those  things 
which  God  has  given  to  all  as  we  need  for  oui 


RIGItT  TO  PROPERtY. 


171 


own  use.  Some  things  which  God  has  given  to  all, 
Direct  modes  as  air  and  sun1io;ht,  cannot  be  appropriated, 

»f  acquiring  ^     '  ,  4 

.property.  and  SO  cannot  become  property.  iiut 
the  spontaneous  fruits  of  the  earth,  the  products  of 
the  waters,  and  so  much  land  as  may  be  necessary 
for  individual  support,  and  as  shall  be  permanently 
occupied,  may,  by  appropriation,  become  property. 

2.  Property  may  be  acquired  by  labor. 

Labor  is  the  chief  source  of  value,  and  the 
laborer  has  a  right  to  the  value  he  creates.  This 
is  a  natural  right  resulting  directly  from  a  man's 
right  to  himself.  It  may  not  be  easy,  it  is  not,  to 
adjust  the  questions  that  arise  between  the  claims 
of  accumulated  labor  in  the  form  of  capital  and  of 
labor  directly  applied,  or  wages  ;  but  the  principle 
is,  that  the  value  created  should  be  shared  in  pro- 
portion to  the  labor  represented  or  applied. 

In  the  above  ways  property  may  be  acquired 
Indirect  directly.  It  may  also  be  acquired  indi- 
modes.        rectly,  and  — 

1.  By  exchange.  This  may  be  either  by  barter, 
which  is  an  exchange  of  commodities  ;  or  by  bargain 
and  sale,  in  which  the  purchaser  gives  money. 

2.  By  gift.  The  right  to  give  away  property  is 
involved  in  the  right  of  ownership. 

3.  By  will.  The  right  to  bestow  property  by 
will  is  admitted  in  all  civilized  countries.  This  is 
natural  and  beneficial  to  society.  The  right  how- 
ever is  not  absolute,  but  may  be  so  limited  by  law 
as  not  to  counterwork  the  general  spirit  of  the  in- 
ititutions  of  a  country. 


172 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


4.  By  inheritance.  When  persons  die  intestate, 
their  property  is  inherited  by  their  relatives  in 
accordance  with  law. 

5.  By  accession.  "  This  is  the  right  to  all  that 
one's  own  property  produces,  whether  that  property 
be  movable  or  immovable,  and  the  right  to  that 
which  is  united  to  it  by  accession  either  naturally 
or  artificially.  This  includes  the  fruits  of  the  earth 
produced  naturally  or  by  human  industry,  the  in- 
crease of  animals,  and  the  new  species  of  articles 
made  by  one  person  out  of  the  materials  of  another." 
"  Also  title  by  alluvion,  or  the  deposit  of  earth  by 
natural  causes."  ^ 

6.  By  possession.  To  prevent  litigation  the  laws 
properly  fix  a  limit  beyond  which  a  man  shall  not 
be  disturbed  in  the  possession  of  property,  however 
it  may  have  been  acquired.  This  gives  no  moral 
right,  but  is  what  is  called  "  right  by  possession." 

The  right  of  property  is  exclusive.    No  man,  no 
state,  has  the  right  to  take  it  away  without  ^^^.g  ^^^^ 
an  equivalent,  and  the  owner  has  a  right 
to  put  it  to  any  use  he  may  please  that  is  consistent 
with  the  rights  of  others. 

Property  may  be  real  or  personal.  Real  estate 
consists  of  lands  and  of  appurtenances,  as  Property 

real  or  per- 

houses,  trees,  shrubs,  that  cannot  be  easily  sonai. 
moved.    All  other  property  is  personal. 

With  the  exceptions  to  be  mentioned  hereafter, 
ihe  right  of  property  is  violated  if  it  be  taken  with- 

1  Kent's  Commentaries. 


KIGItT  rp  PROPERTY. 


178 


out  tlie  free  consent  of  tlie  owner;  or  if  throiign 
rbis  right  concealment  or  deception  tlie  owner  fail 
lated  to  have  a  full  know^ledge  of  tlie  equiva- 

lent offered.  If  property  be  taken  with  consent 
enforced  by  fear,  or  by  violence  without  consent,  it 
is  robbery. 

If  taken  by  forcibly  entering  a  dwelling  in  the 
night,  it  is  burglary. 

If  simply  taken  without  the  knowledge  or  con- 
sent of  the  owner  with  no  violence,  it  is  theft. 

If  property  be  taken,  and  through  concealment 
or  misrepresentation  the  owner  be  ignorant  of  the 
equivalent  offered,  it  is  cheating. 

If  the  equivalent  offered  be  a  forged  paper,  it  is 
fraud.  The  line  between  fraud  and  cheating  is  not 
sharply  drawn.  In  a  large  sense  they  cover  the 
same  ground,  but  while  there  is  fraud  in  all  cheat- 
ing, yet  forgery  is  a  fraud,  and  not  cheating. 

If  property  be  taken  with  consent  obtained  by 
lying  or  deception  without  an  equivalent,  it  is  ob- 
taining property  under  false  pretences. 

Of  these,  robbery,  as  violating  both  the  rights  of 
person  and  of  property,  is  tlie  highest  crime.  As 
violating  both  the  rights  of  security  and  property, 
burglary  comes  next.  The  others  are  criminal  in 
the  eye  of  the  law,  for  that  is  the  only  criminality 
that  can  here  be  estimated,  as  they  tend  to  unsettle 
the  right  of  property  and  disturb  the  order  of 
society,  and  this  tendency  may  vary  with  time  ana 
circumstances. 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


The  right  of  property  is  exclusiv^e,  but  as  it  is  an 
niferior  good,  it  may  not  stand  in  the  way  Ground  of 
of  the  great  interests  of  the  community,  or  fe?eice  with 
of  the  hfe  of  the  individual.  Hence  the 
community  have  the  right,  provided  for  and  asserted 
ander  all  governments,  of  taking  in  a  legal  way, 
and  for  a  fair  equivalent,  private  property  for  the 
convenience  and  safety  of  the  public.  And  indi- 
v-iduals  have  the  right  to  take  property  as  food  to 
preserve  life. 

It  is  commonly  said  that  the  right  of  property 
precludes  the  taking  of  the  least  thing  without  the 
consent  of  the  owner,  but  consent  may  sometimes 
oe  presumed.  The  rule  is  to  take  nothing  we 
should  not  be  willing  the  owner  should  see  us  take. 
To  take  an  apple  in  passing  through  an  orchard  is 
not  stealing. 

In  the  ways  above  mentioned  ^^roperty  is  wrong- 
luUy  taken.  It  may  be  taken  rightfully  with  the 
Tree  consent  of  the  owner,  whether  as  a  gift  or  for 
an  equivalent.  If  for  an  equivalent,  it  may  be  by 
exchange  or  by  purchase. 

The  law  of  excliange,  as  already  indicated,  is 
chat  each  party  should  have  a  full  knowl-  j^^w  of  ex- 
edge  of  that  which  is  offered  as  an  equiva- 
lent.  In  exchange  intrinsic  values  are  not  ccnsid- 
er<xl,  but  tlie  convenience  or  taste  of  the  parties. 
[I('nce  a  fair  transaction  can  require  nothing  but 
freedom  from  constraint,  and  a  full  knowledge  by 
dach  party  of  the  equivalent  offered. 


ItlGHT  to  PROPERTY. 


175 


The  law  of  exchange  by  purchase,  or  of  buying 
and  selHng,  is  the  same,  so  far  as  the  seller  is  con- 
cerned, as  that  of  simple  exchange,  except  that  a 
trader  is  bound  to  ask  for  that  in  which  he  professes 
to  deal,  no  more  than  the  market-price.  A  fair 
transaction  requires  tliat  there  shall  be  no  conceal- 
ment or  deception  in  the  article  sold,  that  no  more 
than  the  market-price  be  demanded,  and  that  no 
improper  motive,  as  vanity,  or  a  depraved  appetite, 
be  appealed  to.  In  selling  an  article  in  which  he 
does  not  profess  to  deal,  a  man  may  ask  what  he 
pleases. 

Property  may  be  permanently  and  rightfully 
alienated,  by  gift,  by  exchange,  and  by 
sale.  It  is  also  permanently  alienated  by 
gambling.  This  has  different  forms.  In  some  cases, 
as  in  dice  and  in  lotteries,  it  is  simply  an  appeal  to 
chance.  In  others,  as  in  cards,  there  is  a  mixture 
of  chance  and  skill.  In  others,  as  in  betting,  of 
chance  and  judgment.  In  all  cases  the  object  is 
gain  without  an  equivalent,  and  while  there  is  such 
gain  on  one  side  there  is,  on  the  other,  loss  without 
compensation.  In  legitimate  trade  both  parties  are 
benefited  ;  in  gambling  but  one.  Legitimate  trade 
requires  and  promotes  habits  of  industry  and  skill ; 
gambling  generates  indolence  and  vice,  and  stimu- 
lates a  most  infatuating  and  often  uncontrollable 
passion.  It  is  wholly  selfish,  and  wholly  injurious 
hi  its  effects  upon  the  community.  That  a  practice 
thus  inherently  vicious  should  be  resorted  to  for 


176 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


charitable  purposes,  does  not  change  its  character, 

but  only  tends  to  confound  moral  distinctions. 

But  are  all  appeals  to  chance  in  the  distribution 
of  property  xrambling  ?    Not  necessarily,  Alienation 

.f,  1    n        '     ^       '  •  1  1         ®^  property 

it  we  deiine  it  by  its  motives  and  results,  by  chance 

.       .  .       .  p.         -xT'T'ii    iiot  always 

A  picture  is  given  to  a  rair.  JNo  individual  gambling, 
will  give  for  it  its  value  ;  that  value  is  contributed 
by  a  number,  and  the  picture  disposed  of  by  lot. 
This  differs  from  an  ordinary  lottery  :  1st,  Because 
there  are  no  expenses,  and  all  that  is  given  goes  for 
an  object  w^hich  the  parties  are  gathered  to  promote. 
2d,  The  prize  is  given  so  that  nothing  is  taken  for 
prizes  from  the  amount  paid  in,  but  the  whole  goes 
for  the  proposed  object.  8d,  This  may  be  done 
from  a  simple  desire  that  the  fair  should  realize  the 
worth  of  its  property  and  so  benevolently.  And 
4th,  Appeals  to  chance  under  these  conditions  are 
not  likely  to  be  so  frequent  or  general  as  to  en- 
danger the  habits  of  the  community.  All  this  may, 
and  should,  in  fairness,  be  said.  It  should  also  be 
said,  1st,  That  no  form  of  charity  should  be  tolerated 
for  a  moment  that  in  the  actual  state  of  a  com- 
munity will  foster  a  spirit  of  gambling.  It  should 
be  said,  2dly,  That  any  attempt  to  promote  a  benev- 
olent object  by  an  appeal  to  selfish  motives  is 
wrono;.  Benevolent  mvino;  is  a  means  of  Christian 
culture,  but  selfisli  giving  in  the  form  of  benevo- 
lence is  a  deception  and  a  snare.  If  tlie  cause  of 
benevolence  cannot  be  supported  bcnevolentlj^  it 
had  better  not  be  supported  at  all.    Any  other 


RIGHT  TO  PROPERTY. 


177 


mode  of  supporting  it  will  dry  up  its  fountains. 
While  therefore  we  do  not  say  that  all  appeals  to 
chance  in  the  distribution  of  property  are  gambling, 
we  do  say  that  all  combinations  and  arrangements 
to  cause  persons  to  give  money  for  benevolent  ob- 
jects otherwise  than  benevolently  are  wrong,  and 
more  especially  if  they  tend  to  promote  a  spirit  of 
gambling. 

Cut  not  gambling  only,  speculation  also  requires 
attention  in  its  relation  to  morals.  In 
some  of  its  forms,  as  in  buying  and  selling 
stocks,  or  wheat,  when  there  is  no  delivery,  what 
is  called  speculation  is  mere  gambling.    It  is  sim- 
^v^hatis       ply  bettino;  on  the  question  of  a  future 

tailed  specu-       *^  ,  ?  -r»       •  i  . 

lation.  market  price.  But  in  speculation,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  gambling,  the  speculator  does  not 
expect  to  get  something  for  nothing.  There  is 
a  bargain  and  a  transfer  of  what  each  party  ac- 
cepts as  an  equivalent.  Speculation  is  purchase  or 
sale  in  the  expectation  of  a  change  of  prices.  With 
fixed  prices,  which  are  the  basis  of  ordinary  profits, 
it  is  impossible.  The  problem  here  is  to  give 
enterprise  and  sagacity  a  fair  field  without  vio- 
lating the  law  of  love.  And  1st,  If  the  ground  on 
which  a  change  of  prices  is  expected  is  equally 
known,  or  accessible  to  both  parties,  all  agree  that 
the  transaction  is  fair.  2d,  If  one  party  has  the 
power  to  cause  fluctuations  in  price,  and  buys  or 
Bells  with  the  intention  of  cloino;  this,  all  will  ao-vee 
that  this  is  swindling.  But  3d,  If  there  be  g 
12 


178 


MOKAL  SCIENCE. 


certainty  that  there  will  be  a  rise  of  price  m 
consequence  of  an  event  known  only  to  the  pur- 
chaser, then  tlie  inquiry  is  whether  he  may  avail 
himself  of  his  knowledge.  On  this  opinions  differ. 
It  may  be  said  on  the  one  hand  that  the  owner 
receives  full  compensation  for  his  property  as  esti- 
mated by  any  price  he  may  have  given  for  it,  any 
labor  he  may  have  bestowed  upon  it,  or  any  expec- 
tations he  may  have  formed  from  it,  and  that  if 
there  is  to  be  an  increase  of  value  without  labor  — 
if  somebody  is  to  gain  witliout  loss  to  anybody,  it 
may  as  fairly  be  the  man  who  by  his  enterprise  or 
good  fortune  has  the  knowledge  as  he  who  has  the 
property.  It  may  be  said  on  the  other  hand  that 
when  a  man  raises  a  crop,  he  does  it  with  the  ex- 
pectation of  any  advantage  that  may  accrue  through 
unforeseen  events,  and  that  for  a  quicker  or  more 
fortunate  man  who  has  bestowed  upon  it  no  labor 
at  all,  to  step  in  and  seize  an  advantage  that  would 
have  been  his  in  the  natural  course  of  events  is 
not  strictly  honest,  to  say  nothing  of  the  law  of 
love. 

In  solving  such  cases,  it  may  be  said  that  society 
may  be  established  and  exist  permanently  cooperation 

,  ,  ,  and  coiiipe- 

on  two  pnnci[)les  —  that  of  competition,  tuion. 
and  that  of  cooperation.  The  first  has  its  advantages, 
and  the  evils  of  it  are  diminished  as  general  intelli- 
gence  is  increased.  Under  it  the  evils  of  ignorance 
are  felt  pecuniarily,  and  intelligence  is  thus  stimu- 
lated.   Under  this  system  transactions  like  the 


RIGHT  TO  PROPERTY. 


179 


above  would  be  allowable.  It  is  only  transactions 
based  on  such  a  system  that  human  law  can  regulate. 
But  the  principle  of  cooperation  is  far  higher,  and 
the  results  would  be  better.  Tliis  would  require 
that  each  man  should  be  made  acquainted  with  the 
facts,  and  not  only  be  permitted  to  act  in  view  of 
them,  but  be  advised  respecting  them. 

The  above  is  a  common  case.  There  is  anothei 
less  common  and  differing  from  it  in  one  respect. 
A  man  discovers  a  mine  on  the  farm  of  another. 
May  he  buy  the  farm  and  say  nothing  of  the  mine  ? 
In  the  above  case  advantao;e  would  accrue  to  the 
holders  of  the  property  despite  the  will  of  him  who 
had  the  knowledge,  but  here  the  Avhole  increased 
value  comes  from  the  knowledge  and  is  dependent 
upon  it.  May  not  he  then  who  has  the  knowledge 
avail  himself  of  the  whole  of  the  increased  value  ? 
So  it  would  seem,  and  yet  if  men  had  confidence  in 
each  other  as  disposed  to  act  on  the  principle  of 
cooperation,  the  owner  would  be  informed  of  the 
facts,  and  would  share  the  profits  equally  with  hin* 
who  informed  him. 

In  connection  with  this  subject  it  should  be  saio 
that  nothing  tends  more  strongly  to  demoralize  a 
community  than  unsteady  prices.  It  unsettles  in- 
dustry, and  promotes  a  spirit  of  gambling ;  and  any 
legislation  that  so  tampers  with  the  currency,  or 
disturbs  values  in  any  way  as  to  produce  this,  will 
affect  disastrously  the  moral,  no  less  than  the  pecu- 
Qiary  interests  of  the  country. 


180 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


But  property  is  not  only  parted  with  permanently 
bv  sale  or  exchange,  but  also  temporarily  Temporary 

/  .  Tr»    •     1  •  alienation 

tor  a  compensation.  It  it  be  money,  it  of  property, 
is  loaned ;  if  real  estate,  it  is  rented  ;  if  a  horse,  it  is 
let. 

Money  differs  from  other  property  in  being 
created  by  law  for  the  public  convenience.  Hence 
its  amount,  the  conditions  on  which  it  may  be 
issued,  and  the  rate  of  interest  have  always  been  re- 
garded as  proper  subjects  of  legislation.  The  pub- 
lic must  have  a  right  to  prevent  that  which  it  creates 
for  its  convenience  from  becoming  an  injury,  but 
the  precise  legislation  required  Avill  be  a  question  of 
expediency  rather  than  of  morals.  Where  money 
is  abundant,  and  the  amount  in  a  country  is  large, 
and  especially  in  a  commercial  community,  it  may 
be  wise  to  permit  men  to  take  what  interest  they 
can,  when  under  other  circumstances  it  would  not. 
And  banks,  being  created  for  the  convenience  of 
the  public,  may  be  restricted  in  their  rate  of  interest 
when  individuals  would  not.  Their  possible  com- 
bination and  power  to  control  the  currency  may 
require  this.  The  rule  is,  that  all  possible  freedom 
compatible  with  the  ])ubhc  interest  should  be  con- 
ceded in  their  use  of  money  both  to  banks  and  to 
individuals.  This  being  understood,  bargains  in 
roizard  to  interest  are  to  be  reo-ulated  on  the  same 
principles  as  other  bargains. 

When  money  is  loaned,  money  is  to  be  returned, 
out  when  real  estate  is  rented,  or  when  horses  ana 


EIGHT  TO  PROPERTY. 


181 


carnages  are  let,  the  same  property  is  to  he  re- 
turned. In  the  mean  time  the  property  may  be 
abused ;  and  this  gives  rise  to  the  rule  in  such  cases 
that  it  is  to  be  used  only  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  rented  or  let,  and  that  the  same  care  is  to 
be  taken  of  it  that  a  reasonably  careful  man  would 
take  of  his  own  property.  If,  in  connection  with 
such  care,  the  property  should  be  injured  by  acci- 
dent in  the  use  contemplated  in  the  bargain,  the 
loss  will  fall  on  the  owner ;  if  in  any  other  use,  on 
the  person  in  temporary  possession. 

Property  is  also  often  lent  without  compensation 
simply  for  the  convenience  of  the  borrower.  In 
this  case  the  lender  is  under  obligation  not  to  de- 
mand it  arbitrarily  and  without  reference  to  the 
specific  use  for  which  it  was  borrowed.  The  bor- 
rower is  under  obligation  to  use  the  property  with 
care  and  to  return  it  promptly. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


RIGHT  TO  REPUTATION. 

The  next  right  that  belongs  to  man  is  that  of 
Reputation. 

The  desire  of  esteem  is  as  natm^al  as  that  of 
property,  and  is  equally  the  foundation  of  a  right. 
With  most  it  is  a  stronger  desire,  and  so  the  foun- 
dation of  a  right  that  is  more  precious.  If  there 
are  those  who  say  with  the  Roman  miser,  — 

"  Populus  me  sibilat  at  mihi  plaudo, 
Ipse  domi  simul  ac  nummos  contemplar  in  area," 

"  The  people  hiss  me,  but  I  applaud  myself  at  home, 
while  I  gloat  over  my  hoarded  riches,"  —  they  are 
but  few.  In  the  Scriptures  a  desire  for  this  is  en- 
couraged, and  it  is  set  above  property.  A  good 
name  is  rather  to  be  chosen  than  great  riches,  and 
lovino;  favor  rather  than  silver  and  wld."  With 
many,  reputation  is  dearer  than  life,  and  as  society 
is  now  constituted,  the  means  of  enjoying  life  are 
even  more  dependent  on  this  than  upon  property. 
If  knowledge  is  power  so  is  reputation,  and  espe- 
cially is  it  power  in  the  form  of  influence.  If  then 
a  man  have  such  a  possession,  we  may  not  detract 
from  it  except  for  a  good  reason. 


RIGHT  TO  REPUTATION. 


183 


The  most  common  mode  in  which  the  riglit  of 
This  right  reputation  is  viohited  is  by  slandfir.  The 
uteJ^  sun-  essence  of  this  hes  in  diminishing  the  rep- 
utation  of  another  without  good  cause, 
whether  by  truth  or  falseliood.  It  was  formerly  a 
maxim  of  law  the  greater  the  truth,  the  greater 
the  slander."  The  reason  of  this  was  that  the 
truth  tended  more  to  injure  reputation  than  false- 
hood. Now,  however,  the  courts  accept  the  plea 
of  truth  in  mitigation  of  damages,  and  generally  in 
full  justification.  The  malice  or  the  mischief  may 
be  as  great,  or  even  greater,  if  only  truth  be  told ; 
but  society  is  not  bound  to  shield  a  man  by  its  laws 
from  the  natural  results  of  his  own  acts  when  fairly 
made  know^n. 

Slander  may  be  malicious,  selfish,  or  inconsid- 
erate. It  is  seldom  probably  from  pure  malice. 
That  is  not  the  usual  form  of  human  wickedness. 
But  there  is  scarcely  a  position  or  occupation  in  life 
in  which  any  considerable  reputation  wdll  not  so  bring 
him  wdio  has  it  into  competition  with  others,  that  it 
shall  either  be,  or  be  supposed  to  be,  for  their  in- 
terest to  have  it  diminished.  And  as  the  facilities 
for  slander  are  almost  unlimited,  as  the  modes  of  it, 
by  insinuation,  hints,  injunctions  of  secrecy,  so  tend 
to  veil  its  real  nature,  as  it  has  so  many  shades,  and 
as  there  is  not  the  same  danger  of  legal  prosecution 
as  in  taking  from  the  property  of  another,  our  treat- 
ment of  others  in  regard  to  their  reputation,  when 
they  are  in  competition  with  us,  becomes  one  of  the 
most  trying  tests  of  character. 


184 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


The  test  of  character  is  however  scarcely  l<^ss 
aevere  under  the  temptations  in  the  ordinary  inter- 
course of  society  to  inconsiderate  slander.  There 
is  here  no  mahce,  no  competition,  no  special  object, 
but  topics  of  conversation  are  needed  ;  there  is 
excitement  in  telling  news,  and  words  really  slan- 
derous are  uttered  unmindful  of  the  exa^-oierations 
that  are  sure  to  follow,  and  of  the  deep  wounds 
they  may  give*  In  such  a  case  lack  of  criminal 
intention  is  no  more  an  excuse  than  it  would  be  in 
a  man  who  should  throw  the  slates  of  a  roof  he 
might  be  repairing  into  the  street  of  a  city  careless 
of  the  passers  below. 

Arainst  the  hio-her  forms  of  slander  a  man  of 
average  principle  would  be  guarded,  but  it  was 
probably  with  special  reference  to  these  lighter 
forms  that  the  Apostle  James  says,  "If  any  man 
offend  not  in  word  the  same  is  a  perfect  man  and 
able  to  bridle  the  whole  body."  Christians  are  re- 
quired to  lay  aside  all  evil  speaking."  They  are 
to  be  put  in  mind  to  speak  evil  of  no  man."  So 
carefully  do  the  Scriptures  guard  the  sacred  and 
precious  right  of  reputation. 

It  would  appear  thus  that  there  are  two  distinct 
CDses  in  speaking  of  others  when  reputa-  Reputation 

^.         .      .  T     J.^  •     1-      ^vhen  rijjfhtly 

tion  IS  m  question.    In  tlie  one  an  mdi-  diminished, 
vidual  has  a  reputati(m,  and  we  know  of  nothing  he 
has  done  either  in  gaining  it  or  since  it  was  gained 
that,  if  truthfully  stated,  wovdd  diminish  it.  To 
diminish  reputation  in  such  a  case  would  be  to  add 


RIGHT  TO  REPUTATION. 


185 


the  guilt  of  lying  to  that  of  slander.  We  have  no 
more  right  to  do  it  than  we  have  to  steal.  ^'  In  the 
second  case  an  individual  has  a  reputation,  but  we 
know  things  either  in  regard  to  his  mode  of  gain- 
ing it,  or  that  he  has  done  since,  which,  if  truthfully 
stated,  would  diminish  or  perhaps  blast  it.  ]  In  this 
case  we  are  not  only  permitted  to  state  what  we 
know,  but  are  bound  to  do  it  when  required  to  do 
it  by  justice,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  innocent, 
or  for  the  good  of  the  offender ;  but  we  are  to  do  it 
with  the  temper  and  limitations  required  by  the  law 
of  love. 

*    But  reputation  may  be  diminished  not  only  by 
slander,  but  also  by  ridicule.    The  object 

Ridicule.  pi..  i  rr^i  . 

01  this  IS  to  awaken  contempt.  IJus  may 
be  proper  when  provoked  by  pretense  or  affectation, 
by  extravagance  or  absurdity,  perhaps  by  persistent 
awkwardness  or  carelessness,  but  never  to  brino: 
into  contempt  anything  that  is  genuine.  The  mo- 
ment this  is  done,  —  and  it  may  be  done  towards  any 
man, — however  keen  the  wit,  or  perfect  the  mimicry, 
or  droll  the  caricature,  we  obscure  the  distinction 
between  that  which  is  reputable  and  venerable, 
and  that  which  is  contemptible,  and  thus  not  only 
wrong  the  individual,  but  undermine  those  higher 
sentiments  on  which  the  stability  of  the  community 
depends.  Ridicule  is  an  effective  weapon,  but  re- 
quires care  in  its  use,  and  out  of  its  sphere  is  de- 
moralizing and  dangerous,  * 


CHAPTER  V. 


RIGHT  TO  TRUTH. 

We  have  now  considered  the  rights  commonly" 
mentioned  as  belonging  to  all  men,  —  the  general 
right  to  security,  the  right  to  life,  to  liberty,  to 
property,  and  to  reputation.  I  am  inclined  to  say 
there  is  still  another  —  the  right  to  truth. 

This  has  the  same  foundation  as  other  rights,  that 
is,  in  its  necessity  to  men  for  the  attainment  by 
them  of  their  ends ;  it  is  often  so  spoken  of  as  to 
imply  that  it  is  a  right,  as  when  one  is  said  to  have 
no  right  to  the  truth,  and  in  grave  cases  men  are 
put  under  oath  and  the  riglit  is  enforced  by  law. 
We  should  hence  have  naturally  expected  that  it 
would  be  reo-arded  as  a  rio;ht  and  classed  amono;  the 
others.  Whewell  does,  indeed,  place  the  right  of 
contract  among  the  primary  rights  of  men,  and 
bases  it  on  the  need  of  mutual  understanding.  But 
in  that  mutual  understanding  which  is  essential  to 
the  order  of  society  there  is  no  proper  contract. 
Nor  is  such  understanding  by  any  means  wholly 
based  on  anything  that  can  be  called  either  a  con- 
tract or  a  promise.  Men  act  on  expectation  based, 
either,  as  in  nature,  on  uniformity  of  causation 


RIGHT  TO  TRUTH. 


187 


without  reference  to  obligation;  or  on  confidence  in 
those  who  have  voluntarily  excited  expectation  and 
who  feel,  on  that  ground,  bound  not  to  disappoint 
it.  Which  then  is  the  prevalent  element  in  the 
affairs  of  life  ?  A  man  keeps  a  shop.  Do  I  expect 
to  find  it  open  during  business  hours  because  he  is 
under  contract,  or  has  promised  to  keep  it  open? 
No,  he  may  shut  it  up  for  a  holiday,  as  John  Gilpin 
did  his,  and  break  no  contract ;  or  he  may  shut  it 
up  indefinitely  and  give  no  notice.  My  expectation 
in  this,  and  in  a  multitude  of  similar  cases,  is  based 
on  that  uniform  operation  of  motives,  which,  aside 
from  any  sense  of  obligation  and  in  compatibihty 
with  freedom,  gives  stability  and  consistency  to  con- 
duct. It  may  be  difficult,  it  is,  to  separate  expec- 
tation thus  based  from  that  ^vhich  rests  upon  an 
implied  promise.  This  always  exists  when  expec- 
tation is  voluntarily  excited,  and  carries  obligation 
with  it,  and  it  is  from  the  two  combined  that  we 
feel  so  secure  of  the  uniform  conduct  of  those 
around  us.  So  far,  however,  as  a  right  exists  in 
this  case,  I  should  prefer  to  call  it  a  right  to  truth 
rather  than  a  right  of  contract,  though  it  is  perhaps 
of  little  consequence  what  we  call  it. 

But  such  cases  are  on  the  same  general  ground 
with  others,  in  which  there  is  certainly  no  contract. 
All  human  interests  connect  themselves  with  truth. 
As  has  been  said,  men  act  on  expectation,  and  can 
act  successfully  only  as  their  expectations  are  well 
founded,  that  is,  as  they  are  founded  in  truth.  Bui 


188 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


God  has  made  men  so  dependent  on  each  other  for 
hiformation,  that  neither  the  ends  of  the  individual 
nor  those  of  society  can  be  attained  unless  the  repre- 
sentations which  they  make  to  each  otlier  are  large- 
ly true,  and  what  I  say  is,  that  when  any  legitimate 
end  of  another  depends  on  his  being  told  the  truth, 
he  has  a  right  to  the  truth.  It  must  be  so  or  there 
are  no  rii^hts.  A  traveller  asks  the  rio-ht  road. 
He  has  a  right  to  the  truth.  A  child  asks  if  a  berry 
be  poisonous.  It  has  a  right  to  the  truth,  and  such 
cases  are  so  numerous,  that  a  right  to  truth  seems 
to  me  among  the  most  sacred  and  important  of  our 
rio;hts. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  who  shall  decide  when  a 
man  has  a  right  to  the  truth.  In  some  cases  the 
law  decides  it.  Where  it  does  not,  the  person  of 
whom  it  is  demanded  must  decide.  Certainly  he 
who  asks  an  impertinent  question,  or  any  question 
not  essential  to  the  attainment  by  himself  of  some 
legitimate  end,  has  no  right  to  the  truth,  though 
the  absence  of  such  right  will  not  justify  a  lie. 

A  right  to  truth,  as  stated  above,  will  include 
that  of  contract  whether  express  or  implied. 

If  any  say  that  a  right  which  cannot  be  en- 
forced is  no  right,  it  is  replied  that  this  is  enforced 
every  time  an  oath  is  taken,  for  the  only  object  of 
an  oath  is  to  enforce  the  truth ;  and  that  this  right 
can  be  enforced  quite  as  fully  as  the  right  to  repu- 
tation. 


DIVISION  II. 

DUTIES  BEGARDING  THE  WANTS  OF  OTHERS. 


CHAPTER  L  • 

JUSTICE  AND  BENEVOLENCE. 

Having  considered  Rights,  we  next  pass  to  the 
supply  of  Wants.  This  is  the  second  great  class 
of  duties  required  by  love  as  a  law. 

The  transition  here  is  from  the  duties  of  justice, 
to  those  of  benevolence.  Between  these  there  are 
important  differences.  These  were  formerly  indi- 
cated by  saying  that  the  obligations  and  claims  of 
justice  were  perfect,  while  those  of  benevolence 
were  imperfect.  But  this  form  of  expression  was 
objected  to  as  weakening  the  force  of  obligation, 
and  of  late  the  differences  themselves  have  been 
too  much  overlooked. 

But  it  is  one  thing  for  a  man  to  ask  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  debt,  and  quite  another,  however  great 
may  be  his  need,  to  ask  for  charity.  In  the  first 
case  he  has  a  right  to  the  money,  and  the  person 
owing  it  is  under  obligation  to  pay  it  on  the  ground 
of  that  right.  In  the  second  case  the  person  asking 
has  no  right  to  the  money,  but  it  may  still  be  right 


190 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


for  the  person  asked  to  give  it,  and  he  may  be 
under  obligation  to  do  so.  There  may  be  a  claim 
of  humanity,  if  not  of  justice,  and  an  obhgation  on 
the  PTound  of  that  claim  where  there  is  no  rioht. 

Hence  the  first  difference  between  the  duties  of 
justice  and  those  of  benevolence  will  be  that  one 
respects  rights,  and  the  other  right.  These  are  gen- 
erally coincident,  that  is,  it  is  generally  right  for  a 
man  to  do  what  he  has  a  right  to  do  ;  but  they  may 
be  opposed.  A  rich  landlord  may  have  a  right  to 
collect  his  rent  from  a  poor  widow  upon  whom  un- 
expected and  unavoidable  misfortune  has  fallen,  and 
take  from  her  her  last  crust  and  her  last  blanket, 
but  it  would  not  be  ridit.  The  rent  miMit  be 
justly  due,  the  claim  might  be  valid  in  law,  the  law 
might  enforce  it,  and  properly,  for  otherwise  there 
could  be  no  law ;  but  it  would  not  be  morally 
right. 

A  second  difference,  growing  out  of  the  first,  is, 
that  as  rights  are  capable  of  definition  and  precise 
limitation,  the  obligations  growing  out  of  them  may 
be  enforced  by  human  law,  whereas  that  which  is 
right,  being  incapable  of  such  definition  and  limita- 
tion, the  oblioation  oirowino;  out  of  it  cannot  be  thus 
enforced.  Hence  the  proper  business  of  legislation 
iS  to  secure  to  all  their  rights,  and  not  to  oblige  any 
to  do  right.  If  there  are  courts  of  equity  their 
object  is  not  to  compel  the  doing  of  right,  but  to 
prevent  the  doing  of  wrong  through  the  imperfec- 
tions and  under  the  forms  of  law,    Thnt  leglslatior 


JUSTICE  AND  BENEVOLENCE. 


191 


should  seek  to  pass  from-  the  guardianship  of  rights 
to  an  attempt  to  compel  the  doing  of  right,  is  nat- 
ural ;  but  this  has  seldom  been  done  without  con- 
fusion and  mischief. 

A  third  difference  between  the  duties  of  justice 
and  those  of  benevolence  is,  that  while  rights  are 
the  ground  of  a  claim,  and  he  in  whom  they  vest 
may  properly  be  indignant  if  the  claim  be  not  met, 
he  who  asks  aid  as  charity  can  never  make  a  claim, 
and  has  no  c-round  for  indio-nation  if  his  claim  be 
refused.  It  may  be  that  the  person  asked  is  under 
obligation  to  give,  but  of  that  lie  who  asks  is  not 
to  be  the  judge.  If  he  might  be,  two  spheres 
totally  different  would  be  at  once  confounded. 
Goodness  must  be  free  to  choose  its  own  methods, 
else  it  would  not  be  goodness.  The  rich  man  who 
refused  all  applicants  for  aid,  and  lived  in  odium 
that  he  might  accumulate  enough  to  supply  a  city 
with  water,  was  afterwards  justified  and  lauded. 
He  was  under  obligation  to  be  beneficent,  but  was 
at  liberty  to  choose  his  own  methods  ;  and  even  if 
he  had  not  chosen  to  recognize  the  obligation,  it 
was  not  for  those  who  had  no  claim  on  him  but  that 
of  humanity  to  call  him  to  account. 

A  fourth  difference  is,  that  w^hile  a  fulfillment  of 
the  obligations  corresponding  to  rights  excites  no 
gratitude,  a  fiilfillment  of  obligation  in  doing  right 
by  supplying  wants,  does  excite  gratitude.  No  man 
is  grateful  for  the  payment  of  a  debt.  It  is  simple 
ustlce,  and  is,  or  should  be,  a  matter  of  coui'se. 


192 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


But  if  wants  are  gratuitously  supplied,  even  though^ 
as  in  the  case  of  the  good  Samaritan^  the  benefactor 
could  not  fail  of  supplying  them  without  a  violation 
of  obligation,  gratitude  is  felt.  The  reason  is  that 
iu  the  one  case  the  man  receives  simply  what  is  his 
own,  what  he  has  a  right  to,  and  may  claim  ;  and 
•  this  is  always  thus  wdiere  simple  justice  is  done. 
The  natural  order  of  things,  except  as  provided  for 
by  the  natural  affections,  is  that  every  one  should 
have  his  rights  and  supply  his  own  wants.  In  this 
there  would  be  no  call  for  gratitude,  while  any 
interference  with  this  order  by  an  infraction  of 
rights  would  awaken  indignation.  But  when  this 
natural  order  has  been  broken  in  upon,  and  there 
is  want  or  suffering  for  which  he  who  gives  relief 
is  in  no  way  responsible,  then  the  supply  of  that 
want,  and  the  relief  of  that  suffering,  can  come  onlj' 
from  simple  goodness  ;  and  such  goodness  manifested 
in  behalf  of  any  individual  is  the  proper  ground  of 
gratitude.  Be  it  that  the  benefactor  is  under  ob- 
lio;ation  to  be  good.  The  action  of  the  moral 
nature  enters  into,  and  forms  a  part  of  goodness. 
But  this  obligation  having  been  recognized,  and 
goodness,  instead  of  its  opposite,  having  been  freely 
chosen,  the  exercise  of  such  goodness  towards  an 
individual  whose  rights  we  have  not  violated,  and 
whose  wants  and  sufferings  are  from  no  agency  of 
ours,  is  a  ground  for  gratitude,  and  all  the  ground 
.here  can  be.  There  is  no  contrariety,  as  some 
Beem  to  think,  between  a  pervasive  moral  nature 


JUSTICE  AND  BENEVOLENCE. 


193 


on  the  one  hand,  and  the  utmost  freedom  of  choice 
and  the  fullest  play  of  every  generous  affection  on 
the  other.  That  these  affections  should  have  wide 
scope  is  right,  and  if  there  be  obligation  it  is  only 
to  the  choice  of  that  which  is  inherently  lovely  in 
the  promotion  of  good. 


13 


CHAPTER  11. 


SUPPLY  OF  THE  WANTS  OF  OTHERS. 

With  tins  view  of  the  differences  between  the 
duties  of  justice  and  those  of  benevolence  we  pro- 
ceed to  consider  what  the  law  of  love  would  require 
in  the  supply  of  physical  wants. 

Give  a  person  all  his  rights,  and  it  is  to  be 
expected  that  he  will  supply  his  own  wants.  From 
the  feebleness  of  infancy  and  of  age,  and  from 
sickness,  this  is,  however,  often  impossible  ;  and 
then,  though  there  be  no  claim  but  that  of  human- 
ity, love  would  require  others  to  supply  them. 

Here  two  propositions  are  to  be  established. 
Tlie  first  is,  that  whenever  a  person  has  Love  de- 
all  his  rights,  and  it  is  possible  for  him  to  futemgent 
supply  his  own  wants,  love  not  only  does 
not  require  us  to  supply  them,  but  positively  for- 
bids it  if  our  doino;  so  would  encourao-e  either  indo- 
Icnce  or  vice. 

Intelligent  activity  is  the  great  source  of  good  to 
man.  It  is  the  foundation  of  self-respect  and  of  the 
respect  of  others.  Beauty  of  person  and  talent  we 
admire,  but  these  are  gifts.  Will,  intelligently 
exerted  for  a  worthy  end,  is  the  only  object  of 


SUPPLY  OP  THE  WANTS  OP  OTHERS.  195 


approval.  Mental  attainments  always,  and  wealth 
generally,  —  the  great  means  of  doing  good  to 
others, — depend  on  such  activity.  There  is  be- 
sides, as  the  inseparable  concomitant  of  such  activ- 
ity, a  satisfaction  of  the  highest  kind,  and  that  can 
come  in  no  other  way.  Of  this  activity,  want  is 
the  appointed  stimulus.  Opposed  to  it  is  indolence, 
a  besetting  sin  of  the  race  ;  the  mother,  not  only 
of  imbecility,  but  of  every  vice  —  and  in  the  stern 
contest  of  God's  ordinance  of  want  with  this  sin, 
love   cannot  interfere.    An  apostle  commanded, 

If  any  w^ould  not  work,  neither  should  he  eat." 

The  second  proposition  is  that  when  it  is  im- 
when  wants  P^ssiblc  for  pcrsous  to  supply  their  own 
J^ppiied  by  ^vauts,  Lovc  requircs  that  they  be  sup- 
others.        p]j^j  others. 

This  impossibiHty  as  it  appears  in  infancy,  in  sick- 
ness, in  disability  from  accident  or  sudden  calamity, 
and  in  old  age,  is  divinely  appointed  as  a  part  of 
our  condition  here  ;  and  over  against  it  we  find  the 
promptings  and  claims  of  natural  affection,  of  friend- 
ship, of  neighborhood,  and  of  humanity.  In  tlie 
spontaneous  play  of  these,  if  we  could  but  exclude 
indolence  and  vice,  we  should  find  an  adequate  pro- 
vision for  the  supply  of  all  wants.  The  w^ants  and 
liabilities  of  each  would  but  tend  to  the  union  of 
the  whole,  and  the  burden  of  their  supply,  if  indeed 
it  would  be  a  burden,  would  not  be  greater  than 
the  discipline  of  character  would  require.  Nc 
legislation  would  be  needed.    But  indolence  and 


196 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


^ce  do  exist,  and  from  them  come  want  and  suffer- 
ing that  assume  such  proportions  as  to  require 
legislative  action.  May  not,  then,  such  want  and 
suffering  be  left  to  the  provision  made  by  law  ? 
No  ;  and  this  for  the  sake  of  both  parties. 

Legislation  can  do  much,  but  when  its  provisions 
are  best  administered  it  is  impersonal ;  Legislation 

iM         1       1  f>  -XT  •  1       not  suffi- 

Iike  the  laws  oi  JNature,  it  must  p^o  by  eienttose- 

?      1       cure  this 

general  rules,  and  so  cannot  touch  the  supply, 
heart.  It  has  in  it  the  power  of  relief,  but  not  of 
reform.  It  may  reach  want,  but  not  character,  and 
till  that  is  reached  nothing  effectual  or  permanent 
is  done.  The  present  life  is  net  retributive,  tbut 
disciplinary,  and  when  the  laws  of  well-being  have 
been  so  far  transo-ressed  as  to  brino;  want  and  suffer- 
ing  that  call  for  charity,  these  should  lead  to  refor- 
mation. But  this  they  seldom  do.  More  often  we 
find  either  a  hardened  defiance  or  a  languid  and 
hopeless  discouragement.  What  is  then  needed  is 
such  kindness  and  sympathy  as  will  bring  to  the 
poor  and  suffering  and  degraded  the  hope  of  res- 
toration to  his  own  self-respect,  and  to  the  respect 
and  love  of  others.  This  can  come  only  from  a 
manifestation  of  individual  and  personal  interest. 
Love  begets  love,  and  for  all  who  can  love  tliere  is 
hope.  If  love  thus  manifested,  and  seconded  by 
the  natural  fruits  of  transgression,  will  not  work  a 
reformation,  no  human  effort  can  avail. 

Nor  will  the  highest  interests  of  the  benefactor 
aimself  permit  that  the  relief  of  want  and  suffering 


SUPPLY  OF  THE  WANTS  OF  OTHERS.  197 


from  indolence  and  vice  should  be  left  to  legislation 
alone.  If  we  except  the  forgiveness  of  enemies,  and 
kindness  to  those  injurious  to  us  personally,  there  is 
no  way  in  which  Christ  can  be  imitated  so  closely 
as  by  doing  good  to  the  degraded  through  their  own 
fault,  and  to  those  seemingly  lost.  There  is  no 
achievement  like  that  of  lifting  a  man  sunk  in  vice 
and  enchained  by  evil  habits  onto  the  high  ground 
of  Christian  manhood,  and  fixing  him  permanently 
there  ;  and  the  more  there  is  of  sympathy,  and  of 
<iffort  for  this,  the  more  is  the  character  improved. 

For  the  sake  of  both  parties  then,  we  are  for- 
bidden  to  remit  the  care  of  the  poor  by  their  own 
fault  to  pro^'ision  made  by  law. 


DIVISION  III. 

PEEFECTING  AISTD  DIKECTING  TIIE  POWERS  OF  OTHERS. 


CHAPTER  1. 

DUTY  OF  INFLUENCE  FROM  THE  RELATION  OF  CHAR- 
ACTER TO  WELL-BEING  OBSTACLES  TO  CHANGE 

OF  INTELLECTUAL  STATE  AND  OF  CHARACTER 

But  we  are  not  only  to  supply  the  physical  wants 
of  men  as  vv^e  have  opportunity,  we  are  also  to  seek 
to  perlcct  and  direct  their  powers. 

In  speaking  of  our  duty  to  ourselves,  nothing  was 
said  of  directing  the  powers,  because  they  were  sup- 
posed to  be  under  the  direction  of  the  law  of  love. 
Tlie  inquiry  was  what  love,  supposed  to  exist, 
would  require  us  to  do.  But  as  a  condition  of  well- 
being,  a  right  direction  of  the  powers,  so  far  as  it 
can  be  distinguished  from  perfection,  is  even  more 
important  than  that.  It  is  necessary  to  progress 
toward  perfection. 

There  is  here  a  distinction  to  be  made  between 
the  intellectual  and  moral  powers.  l^or  the  im- 
provement of  the  moral  powers  the  two  conditions 
of  activity,  and  right  direction,  are  requisite,  but 
activity  alone  is  needed  to  improve  the  intellectuai 


DtTY  OF  INFLUENCE,  ETC. 


199 


powers.  The  burglar  gains  adroitness  and  skill  in 
picking  the  lock  as  rapidly  as  the  lock-maker  in 
guarding  against  him.  With  given  activity  it 
matters  little  for  purposes  of  skill  and  efficiency 
on  what  objects  the  intellect  is  employed,  or  for 
what  end.  But  if  the  moral  powers  are  not  em- 
ployed on  right  objects  and  directed  to  a  right 
end,  there  is  not  only  perversion  but  deterioration^ 
The  more  active  they  are  the  more  they  deterio- 
rate. If,  therefore,  we  would  do  the  highest  good 
to  men  we  must  seek,  not  only  to  perfect  their 
powers,  but  to  perfect  the  moral  powers  by  direct- 
ing them  rightly.  Our  object  must  be  to  produce 
a  change  not  merely  in  the  condition,  but  in  the 
state  of  men  ;  and  not  merely  in  their  intellectual 
state  involving  acquisitions  and  capacity,  but  in 
their  moral  state  which  involves,  or  rather  which  is, 
character. 

And  here,  in  character,  whether  we  would  con- 
fharlc'tV^  suit  for  our  own  good,  or  that  of  others, 
being.^'  ^^e  find  that  condition  of  well-being  which 
is  to  be  sino-led  out  as  the  one  thino;  needful." 
It  is  to  be  distinguished  from  everything  else  — 
from  all  dispositions  and  tendencies  so  native  as  to 
be  wholly  independent  of  choice,  and  which,  if  they 
lie  back  of  choice,  have  yet  no  moral  character  till 
Ihey  are  sanctioned  by  that.  It  is  to  be  distin- 
guished fi'om  all  characteristics,  which  are  accidental 
peculiarities  ;  from  acquisitions,  which  are  what  we 
gain,  whether  of  material  or  of  power,  character 
being  imphed  ;  and  from  all  accomplishments,  which 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ai*e  acquired  perfections  in  ourselves,  and  means  of 
pleasing  others,  if  we  have  a  disposition  to  please 
them.  So  far  from  consisting  in  any  of  these 
things,  it  is  this  that  controls  and  directs  them  all. 
Tliis  can  transform  and  renovate  all  dispositions, 
can  remedy  all  infelicities  of  temperament  and  of 
temper.  Character  can  triumph  over  the  most  ad- 
verse circumstances,  turning  them  into  means  of  its 
own  advancement.  It  can  transfigure  and  glorify 
the  humblest  lot.  It  is  the  possibility  of  this  in 
our  humanity,  and  its  capacity  for  it  that  gives  to 
that  humanity  its  highest  value,  and  it  is  the  higher 
manifestations  of  this  that  give  it  its  dignity.  What 
then  is  it  ?  It  is  the  very  essence,  not  of  our  sub 
stantial  being  as  given  by  God,  but  of  ourselves  as 
having  capacity  to  choose  our  own  ends,  and  to 
take  our  own  place  in  his  universe.  It  is  deter- 
mined by  and  consists  in  our  radical  choice.  It  is 
our  deepest  love.  When  we  know  what  the  su- 
preme chosen  end  of  any  man  is,  we  know  his 
character.  This  it  is  that  determines  his  affinities 
in  the  moral  world  where  the  attractions  and  re- 
pulsions are  stronger  than  they  are  in  the  physical 
world.  With  this,  the  deepest,  central  love  of  its 
being,  right,  humanity  comes  into  such  a  relation 
to  the  Maker  and  Proprietor  of  all,  that  it  enters 
into  the  possession  and  inheritance  of  all  things : 
vvitli  this  wrong,  it  not  merely  falls  away  into  in- 
dillerence  to  all  that  is  good,  but  into  repugnance 
to  it,  and  enters  a  realm  of  positive  evil  and  suffer- 
ing corresponding  to  the  good  of  which  it  is  capable. 


DUTY  OF  INFLUENCE,  ETC. 


201 


From  this  relation  of  character  to  well-being  it 
mast  be  our  duty  to  do  what  we  can  that  tlie  char- 
acter of  others  should  be  right;  but  the  intellec- 
tual acquisitions  and  power  of  others,  and  especially 
their  character,  hold  a  relation  to  our  efforts  en- 
tirely different  from  the  supply  of  their  wants.  If  a 
nian  fail  to  supply  his  own  wants  we  can  do  it  with- 
out his  cooperation,  or  at  least,  we  can  so  provide 
for  them  that  his  cooperation,  unless  he  may  choose 
to  commit  suicide,  is  a  matter  of  course  ;  but  no 
man  can  be  benefited  to  any  great  extent  intellec- 
tually, or  at  all  morally,  without  his  own  active  co- 
operation. We  have  direct  power  over  matter,  but 
can  reach  mind  only  by  influence.  If  any  one 
choose  he  can  oppose  a  barrier  to  anything  we  can 
do  that  we  cannot  overcome. 

And  not  only  so,  there  is  a  tendency  in  ignorance 
„   .    ,      and  vice  to  erect  such  barriers.    Mind  has 

Barriers  to 

iutinence,     j^-g  ^^'^  inevticB  as  wxll  as  matter.  The 

Ignorance 

andTice.  ignorant  person  sees  what  he  sees  and  is 
content  with  it.  He  is  not  content  with  the  igno- 
rance as  such,  but  with  knowdedge,  that  is,  with  what 
he  knows,  and  every  person  who  is  content  with 
what  he  knows  is  in  the  same  condition,  only  he 
may  be  a  little  less  ignorant.  The  man  has  knowl- 
edo;e,  it  is  his  knowledo;e  :  in  the  lio-ht  of  it  he  sees 
iind  walks,  he  sees  nothing  beyond,  and  so  desires 
aothing.  If  this  knowledge,  however  limited,  be 
eonnected  with  customs  of  lono;  standinor  so  that  in 
the  light  of  it  the  man  walks  where  his  fathers 


202 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


walked,  and  if  enlargement  of  knowledge  would 
draw  after  it  a  change  of  associations  and  habits, 
and  especially  if  fancied  interest  from  short-sighted 
views  come  in,  then  will  new  ideas  not  only  not  be 
welcomed,  but  they  will  be  resisted.  And  so  strong 
is  this  tendency  that  if  a  people  be  ignorant  there  is 
no  hope  that  enlightenment  will  spring  up  from 
themselves.  There  is  no  example  of  it  in  history. 
It  must  come  from  above,  or  from  without ;  when  it 
does  come  it  will  be  resisted,  and  the  resistance  will 
be  in  proportion  to  the  ignorance  and  the  fancied 
interests  in  question. 

But  if  this  be  true  of  ignorance,  much  more  vrill 
it  be  of  vice.  Vice  involves  habits  of  action,  chosen 
habits.  Its  very  essence  is  in  these.  It  relates  not 
merely  to  associations  of  thought,  to  ordinary  cus- 
toms and  the  routine  of  life,  but  to  the  whole  direc- 
tion and  tendency  of  the  man,  to  the  tenor  and 
current  of  his  affections  and  choices.  Vices  differ 
as  appetites,  desires,  passions  may  be  stronger  ;  but 
they  have  a  common  root  in  the  fact  that  the  man 
is  not  lifted  from  the  plane  of  indulgence  in  that 
propensity  which  is  strongest,  whatever  it  may  be,  to 
the  higher  ground  of  subjugating  all  propensities 
and  merely  impulsive  tendencies  to  the  demands 
of  intelh'gent  choice,  and  the  voice  of  conscience 
speaking  in  accordance  with  that.  It  makes  a 
radical  difference  whether  the  conduct  has  its  root 
in  rational  choice  and  be  sanctioned  by  the  con- 
science, or  in  blind  impulsion  of  whatever  kind. 


DUTY  OF  INFLUENCE,  ETC. 


203 


In  tlie  one  case  the  man  is  controlled  by  what  In 
the  Scriptures  is  called  the  spirit  in  opposition  to 
the  flesh,  and  in  the  other  by  that  which  is  called 
the  flesh  in  opposition  to  the  spirit.  In  its  nature 
all  impulsion  is  blind.  Each  appetite  and  desire 
finds  its  motive  in  its  own  object.  .In  themselves, 
impulsion,  desire,  appetite,  have  no  moral  character, 
but  the  man  wdio  gives  himself  up  to  the  control  of 
any  one  of  these  has  a  moral  character.  He  lays 
aside  his  true  manhood.  He  debases  himself. 
Outwardly  he  may  do  nothing  unseemly,  but  he 
permits  that  to  rule  which  ought  to  serve.  He  falls 
into  bondao;e,  and  nothino;  but  favorino;  outward 
circumstances,  or  an  amiable  temper,  or  a  selfish 
prudence,  can  stand  between  him  and  any  crime. 
In  a  sense  and  to  a  certain  extent  the  impulsive 
and  the  rational  powers  may  be  coincident,  but  they 
can  never  act  in  the  same  manner,  nor  have  the 
same  end.  Impulsion,  appetency  of  every  kind,  are 
independent  facts  in  our  constitution.  They  are  to 
control  us  up  to  a  certain  point,  and  then  are  to  be 
regulated.  Up  to  the  point  where  they  need  reg- 
ulation they  may  be  said  to  be  coincident  with  the 
rational  power,  but  they  are  blind  ;  they  are  essen- 
tially of  the  nature  of  servants,  and  wdioever  gives 
\iimself  up  to  the  permanent  guidance  and  control 
of  any  one  of  them,  or  to  be  controlled  by  them  in 
turn  as  each  may  be  strongest,  is  in  bondage.  This 
bondage  may  assume  a  great  variety  of  forms,  and 
be  more  or  less  inveterate  and  debasin^^,  but  in 


204 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


3veiy  fV)rm  it  is  bondage,  and  more  to  be  dreaded 
than  that  which  is  physicaL  We  call  it  bondage, 
and  it  is  so.  It  is  an  unnatural  position,  a  degrada- 
tion. Let  the  spiritual  nature  with  its  powers  of 
comprehension  abdicate  its  seat  and  work  in  sub- 
jection to  the  lower  and  blind  nature  of  appetency 
and  impulsion,  and  the  broad  wisdom  appropriate  to 
that  nature  deo;enerates  into  the  cunnino;  of  the 
Berpent.  Intellectual  power  becomes  a  curse,  and 
instead  of  holding  his  erect  position  and  communing 
with  the  heavens,  the  man,  that  which  is  distinc- 
tively so,  goes  upon  his  belly  and  eats  dust. 

This  bondage  is  felt,  but  it  is  ciiosen,  for  though 
it  be  bondage,  there  is  yet  in  it  a  certain  freedom, 
the  freedom  of  abandonment  and  insubjection. 
There  is  in  it  no  trouble  or  sacrifice  of  self-denial, 
for  the  higher  nature,  in  whose  behalf  alone  self- 
denial  is  possible,  is  set  aside.  If  we  add  to  this 
the  blindness  and  paralysis  that  come  upon  the 
spiritual  powers  when  they  are  thus  ignored  and 
abused,  the  light  that  is  within  us  becoming  dark- 
ness, we  shall  not  wonder  that  it  is  so  seldom,  if 
Bver,  that  any  one  who  has  come  under  the  power 
of  this  bondage  breaks  away  from  it  of  his  own 
accord,  or  by  his  own  strength. 

We  have,  then,  three  conditions  of  humanity  in 
vheir  order  as  lower  and  higher,  in  which  Three  con- 
we  fire  required  to  put  foi'th  efforts  in  its  ^^llJriug"" 
oehalf :  ]>hysic;d  want,  ignorance,  and  I 
will  not  say  vice,  but  that  state  in  which  the  ra» 


DUTY  OF  INFLUENCE,  ETC. 


206 


tional  and  spiritual  powers  are  in  bondage  to  those 
that  are  impulsive. 

Of  these,  physical  want,  as  producing  immediate 
First  phys-  Suffering,  and  as  addressing  us  through 
leal  want.  ^j^^  scuscs,  makcs  an  appeal  that  is  uni- 
versally felt.  Hence  all  mankind  have  a  sympathy 
with  the  disposition  that  would  relieve  such  want. 
From  the  time  of  Job,  and  doubtless  from  the  be 
ginnmg,  men  have  commended  him  who  has  been 
"  eyes  to  the  blind,"  and  feet  to  the  lame,"  and  a 
"  father  to  the  poor,"  and  who  has  "  caused  the 
widow's  heart  to  sing  for  joy."  Besides,  physical 
suffering  is  often  unavoidable.  It  may  be  from 
hereditary  disease,  or  from  misfortune,  or  accident, 
and  no  possible  agency,  or  want  of  agency,  on  the 
part  of  the  sufferer  can  come  in  to  check  our  sym- 
pathy. It  is  to  be  said,  too,  though  giving  to  sup- 
ply pliysical  suffering  often  requires  delicacy,  yet 
that  we  approach  in  this  less  near  to  the  centre  of 
j.  ersonality,  and  are  less  in  danger  of  wounding 
either  self-love  or  a  just  self-respect. 

But,  with  the  evils  from  ignorance,  all  this  is  in 
6<K;ond  and  ^  gTcat  mcasurc  rcvcrsed  ;  and  with  those 
nor^ncl°"  from  spiritual  bondage,  and  from  vice,  as 
and  vice.  distinguished  from  its  physical  effects,  it  is 
wholly  so.  There  is  here  no  immediate  suffering  ; 
the  senses  are  not  appealed  to  ;  there  is  nothing  to 
measure  the  evil,  and  those  who  are  the  subjects  of 
the  evil  are  not  conscious  of  it.  Ignorance  may  be 
&om  indolence  and  neglect,  or  from  mere  wilfuliness. 


206 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


It  is  often  self-complacent,  or  perhaps  makes  itself 
unconsciously  ridiculous  and  absurd.  Still  less 
visibly  do  spiritual  bondage,  and  vice  except  in  its 
lower  forms,  connect  them.selves  with  suffering. 
Around  these  wealth  and  learning  and  accomphsh- 
ments  are  oft^n  gathered  ;  they  array  themselves 
in  the  fashions  and  organize  the  gayeties  and  pomps 
of  this  world.  Having  their  seat  within,  and  being 
connected  with  much  that  is  attractive,  it  is  not  for 
one  man  to  say  how  far  they  exist  in  another.  As 
they  must  be  from  choice  and  involve  the  supreme 
choice,  and  are  always  wrong,  whoever  seeks  to 
remove  them  must  venture  into  the  very  seat  of 
personality,  and  always  with  direct  or  implied  cen- 
sure. It  is  not  therefore  to  be  wondered  at  that 
while  those  who  have  relieved  physical  suffering, 
and  those  who  have  enlio-htened  io:norance  throuo:h 
the  regularly  constituted  forms  of  education  have 
been  welcomed  and  commended,  those  who  have 
sought  to  enthrone  conscience  and  benefit  men 
spiritually  should  have  been  thought  intrusive  and 
fanatical,  and  should  have  been  resisted  and  per- 
secuted. The  truth  is,  that  over  large  portions  of 
the  earth  this  form  of  doing  good  has  not  been 
attempted.  Its  necessity  has  not  been  recognized. 
Its  very  nature  has  not  been  understood.  Christ  is 
the  only  person  who  ever  made  this  his  sole  aim,  or 
%t  least,  who  made  all  things  else  subservient  to 
^his.  He  alone  saw  clearly  what  was  the  great 
want  of  the  race.    This,  we  can  now  see,  has  its 


DUTY  OF  INFLUENCE,  ETC. 


207 


foundation  in  the  nature  and  condition  of  man,  as 
much  so  as  pliysical  or  intellectual  want,  and  also 
that  it  should  be  recomiized  as  furnishins:  the  hiMi- 
est  sphere  of  labor  for  the  good  of  man.  But  this 
sphere  has  not  been  recognized  distinctly,  and  this 
labor  has  not  been  done  except  where  the  teachings 
of  Christ  have  come.  He  first  revealed  fully  the 
motives  and  conditions  of  successful  work,  lie  inau- 
gurated the  system  by  his  own  crucifixion,  and  it 
has  been  carried  forward  since  only  by  the  spirit  of 
self-renunciation  which  He  thus  illustrated. 

In  each  of  the  spheres  above  mentioned,  it  is 
more  blessed  to  give  than  to  receive.  The  reason 
Giving  and  ^^^^^  g^^'^^g  ii^^phcs  a  Superiority  of  the 
receiving.  g[yQY  in  tlic  possessiou  of  the  thing  given, 
and  also  the  exercise  of  faculties  capable  of  confer- 
ring a  higher  joy.  He  who  would  relieve  physical 
want  must  have  money,  or  food,  or  clothing  to  give ; 
he  who  would  enlin;hten  the  io;uorant  must  have 
knowledge,  and  he  who  would  lift  another  from  any 
form  of  spiritual  bondage  or  vice,  can  work  effec- 
tually only  by  standing,  in  some  points  at  least, 
above  him. 


CHAPTER  n. 

SPHERES  OF  EFFORT  :  WHO  MAY  LABOB  IN 
THEM. 

But  while  tliere  are  thus  these  three  great  fields 
of  labor,  and  while  it  is  more  blessed  in  each  to  mve 
than  to  receive,  the  question  arises,  who  may  enter 
in  to  labor  in  them. 

In  the  first,  the  field  of  physical  want,  the  ca- 
pacity, the  right,  and  the  obligation  have  always 
been  supposed  to  go  togetlier.  If  any  man  had 
^wealtli,  and  was  disposed  to  employ  it  in  relieving 
such  wants  as  wealth  can  directly  relieve,  no  one 
has  objected ;  but  to  labor  as  teachers,  and  also  for 
the  spiritual  interests  of  men,  men  have  been  espe- 
cially set  apart.  This  has  been  done  for  good  rea- 
jons,  but  I  suppose  that  here  also  the  capacity  gives 
the  right  and  imposes  the  obligation.  For  the  sake 
of  order,  and  to  miard  ao;ainst  error,  o:overnments 
and  ecclesiastical  bodies  have  assumed  to  authorize 
teachers  and  those  qualified  to  minister  to  the  spir- 
itual wants  of  men,  but  they  have  no  power  except 
to  exclude  those  who  have  not  the  capacity.  Ca- 
pacity is  given  of  God,  and  no  man  or  body  of  men 
aas  a  right  to  forbid  one  who  has  it  to  do  a  good 


SPHERES  OF  EFFORT  :  WHO  MAY  LABOR  IN.  209 


work  to  his  fellow  men.  If  one  who  has  capacity 
be  tlius  forbidden,  it  is  still  his  duty  to  go  on  as  the 
Apostles  did,  doing  his  work  and  taking  the  conse- 
quences. This  may  bring  on  conflicts  and  tiu'n  the 
world  upside  down,  but  any  other  doctrine  would 
be  fatal  to  progress. 

As  referring  to  distinct  parts  of  our  nature,  tho 
Three         tlircc  s])heres  of  beneficence  spoken  of 

Bi)heres  dis-  ^  put** 

criminated,  abovc  uccd  to  be  carcfully  discrnnmated, 
and  in  the  minds  of  very  many,  the  third  needs  to 
be  legitimated.  We  need  not  merely  to  see  their 
limitations,  but  especially  the  difficulties  and  obsta-* 
cles  of  each.  We  need  also  to  see  their  relations 
as  higher  and  lower,  the  lower  good  being  a  condi- 
tion for  the  hio-her,  and  the  lower  work  furnishino; 
the  best  introduction  to  that  which  is  higher,  and 
the  best  standing-point  for  it.  He  who  fails  to  do 
good  to  the  bodies  of  men  when  that  is  in  his  power 
and  they  need  it,  or  who  fails  to  enlighten  the  ig- 
norant when  he  can,  w^ill  enter  upon  a  higher  work 
at  a  great  disadvantage,  if  indeed  he  can  succeed  in 
it  at  all.  We  need,  finally,  to  see,  what  it  has  been 
my  general  object  to  impress  in  these  remarks,  that 
each  of  these  spheres  is  open  to  all  who  can  enter 
ill,  and  that  the  relations  of  men  to  each  other  as 
jien,  impose  upon  all  the  obligation  to  do  for  others 
in  each  of  these  spheres  whatever  they  can. 
U 


SECOND  GREAT  DIVISION. 


DUTIES  FROM  SPECIAL  RELATIONS. 


CHAPTER  L 

RIGHTS  OF  PERSONS  :  KIGHT  AND  RIGHTS  :  SPECIAl 
DUTIES:    THE  FAMILY. 

We  have  now  seen  that  it  is  our  duty  to  do  good 
to  all  — 

1.  Bv  concedhio;  to  them  their  no;hts  : 

2.  By  supplying  their  wants  ;  and 

3.  By  du^ecting  and  perfecting  their  powers. 
But  this  good  is  to  be  tluis  done  to  all  in  their 

simple  relation  to  us  as  felk)w  men.  As  such  they 
stand  to  us  in  the  relation  of  perfect  equality  —  not 
necessarily  an  equality  of  condition,  but  an  equality 
of  rights.  We  have  no  right  over  them,  they  have 
no  claim  upon  us  on  the  ground  of  having  been 
m  any  way  specially  committed  to  us. 

But  in  the  relations,  constituted  by  God,  of  hus- 
band and  wife,  and  of  parent  and  child,  ^ 
and  others  c'^'owino:  out  of  these,  there  is 

<^  '  of  ppecial 

a  commitment  of  each  to  each,  and  of 

^omo  to  others ;  and  there  is  a  foundation  laid  foi 


RIGHTS  OF  PERSONS,  ETC. 


211 


what  have  been  called- the  rights  of  persons,  with 
their  corresponding  duties,  claims,  and  obligations* 
As  has  been  said,  the  right  of  parents  over  the 
child  is  from  the  fact  that  God  has  so  committed 
the  child  to  them,  that  they  are  either  indispensa- 
ble to  the  attainment  by  the  child  of  its  end,  or  can 
do  for  it  what  no  one  else  can.  This  right,  thus 
founded,  involves  the  duty  on  the  part  of  the  par- 
ents of  doing  what  they  can  to  enable  the  child  to 
attain  its  end.  This  is  the  very  purpose  for  which 
the  right  over  the  child  was  given,  and  no  duty  can 
be  more  imperative. 

We  have  thus,  in  special  relations  of  which  those 
Special  ^^^^  family  are  but  an  example,  an  oc- 

casion  for  special  duties.  As  we  pass  to 
the  consideration  of  these  duties  that  arise  from 
or  under  the  "  Rights  of  Persons,"  we  make  an 
important  transition.  We  come  into  a  region  in 
many  respects  new.  It  is  one  thing  to  treat  of 
duty  among  equals  having  a  common  standard,  law, 
or  authority,  to  which  they  must  alike  defer,  and 
quite  another  to  treat  of  it  among  beings  who  have 
reciprocal  rights  and  duties,  claims  and  obligations. 
In  the  one  case,  the  standard  may  be  simply  imper- 
sonal law,  or  what  must  mean  the  same  thing,  —  the 
law  of  obligation  as  revealed  in  each  one,  and  so 
there  be  no  responsibility  except  of  the  being  to 
himself.  There  covild  be  no  government,  no  obe- 
dience, no  punishment.  In  the  other  case,  all  these 
V^ill  exist,  and  in  treating  of  these  duties,  new  ques* 


212 


MOEAL  SCIENCE. 


tions  and  principles  must  be  involved  that  will  re- 
quire attention. 

And  first,  it  may  be  well  to  notice  more  fully, 
though  it  does .  not  belong  here  exclu-  Relation  of 
sively,  tlie  relation  to  each  other  of  Right,  Kilhts*.^ 
and  of  Rights.  Neither  of  these  can  be,  except 
with  reference  to  an  end.  The  idea  of  an  eternal 
Ri«2:ht  existino;  in  the  order  of  thouo;ht  before  God, 
or  any  being  who  could  have  the  conception  of  an 
end,  and  controlhng  him,  is  to  me  inconceivable. 
RiMit  relates  to  what  beino;s  are  to  do ;  rio-hts  to 
what  they  may  claim  and  require  others  to  do. 
That  is  the  right  thing  to  be  done  in  a  family  by 
which  the  ends  of  the  family  as  God  instituted  it 
would  be  attained,  and  a  parent  has  rights  that  he 
may  cause  those  ends  to  be  attained.  In  the  im- 
perfection  of  human  arrangements  men  may  have 
legal  rights  which  it  would  not  be  right  to  enforce, 
but  it  would  be  a  contradiction  to  say  that  they  can 
have  a  right  morally  to  do  that  which  is  not  right. 
He  who  enforces  his  nVlits  for  the  end  for  which 
they  were  given,  does  right;  he  who  does  it  for 
any  other  end  is  a  tyrant. 

We  next  ask  attention  to  the  claims  of  ^ 

The  family 

special  duties  and  of  the  family,  out  of  of^^pedaT 
which  they  all  grow.  ^'t'iits 

It  is  said  by  some  that  we  are  to  regard  every 
man,  and  labor  for  him  according  to  his  intrinsic 
worth,  irrespective  of  any  special  relation  to  lis. 
This  has  a  show  of  breadth  and  of  liberality,  but 


RIGHTS  OF  PERSONS,  ETC. 


213 


is  contrary  to  nature,  -  and  would  defeat  its  own 
end. 

If  there  be  one  set  of  arrangements  more  illus- 
trative than  others  of  the  divine  wisdom  and  good- 
ness, it  is  that  by  which  the  knowledge  and  strength 
and  affection  of  the  parent  —  that  natural  affection 
which  fixes  upon  the  child  as  his  own  — is  set  over 
ao-ainst  the  imiorance  and  weakness  and  vitter  de- 
peiidence  of  the  child.  This,  if  any  thing  can,  in- 
dicates the  ministry  to  which  the  child  is  to  be 
entrusted.  Throughout  animated  nature  the  good 
of  the  whole  is  reached  by  specific  ministries  indi- 
cated and  animated  by  specific  affections.  Through 
them  a  large  part  of  the  good  on  the  earth  is  con- 
ferred and  enjoj^ed,  and  he  Avho  would  set  them 
aside,  would  set  aside  one  of  the  widest  and  most 
pervading  of  all  the  provisions  and  arrangements 
made  by  God. 

It  will  follow  from  what  has  just  been  said,  that 
those  who  thus  go  contrary  to  nature  must  defeat 
their  own  end.  Is  that  end  the  happiness,  or  the 
best  care  of  the  race  ?  The  race  has  no  existence 
separate  from  the  individuals  of  whom  it  is  com- 
posed, so  that  what  is  best  for  each  individual  is 
best  for  all.  But  It  is  found  that  the  happiness  of 
individuals  is  best  promoted  by  a  flilthful  attention 
to  those  special  duties  which  are  Involved  in  these  re- 
lations which  God  has  established.  The  children  oi 
each  parent  are  committed  to  liim.  This  gives  him 
a  specific  duty.    These  are  his  platoon  as  an  undei 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


officer  in^tlie  great  army  of  the  race.  There  may 
be  higher  duties  hi  relation  to  the  army  and  its 
commander  than  the  care  of  his  platoon.  Exigen- 
cies may  occur  when  this  shall  be,  for  no  natural 
affection  or  impulse  can  give  absolute  law,  but  un- 
der all  ordinary  conditions  it  is  the  business  of  each 
parent  to  take  care  of  his  own  children.  It  is  not 
for  him  to  look  the  world  over  and  compare  his 
children  wdth  those  of  others  and  decide  on  their 
relative  value  or  worthiness.  By  the  voice  of  na- 
ture and  of  God,  as  w^ell  as  by  every  advantage  of 
labor  and  of  influence,  his  first  duty  is  to  his  own 
children,  and  as  this  is  the  case  w^itli  every  other 
man,  it  w^ill  follow^  that  in  this  way  all  children  wuU 
be  taken  care  of  in  the  best  possible  manner. 

And  what  is  thus  true  of  the  parental  relation  is 
true  in  its  measure  of  all  the  relations  of  kindred, 
as  of  brother  and  sister,  and  the  more  distant  grades 
of  affinity.  It  is  also  true  of  those  to  whom  we 
are  bound  by  friendship,  of  those  to  whom  gratitude 
is  due,  of  those  who  stand  in  the  relation  of  neio:h- 
bors  and  even  of  fellow  citizens. 

Of  course  specific  affections  need  regulation. 
There  is  danger  of  excess  in  them  and  of  absorp- 
tion by  them.  They  do  not  give  law,  but  are  as 
much  intended  to  have  an  influence  in  social  life  as 
the  instincts  are  in  the  control  of  the  body.  With- 
in limits,  and  under  ordinary  conditions,  a  man  may 
••ationally  yield  himself  to  the  guidance  of  liis  in- 
Itincts  with  the  conviction  that  they  arc  the  voice 


RIGHTS  OF  PERSONS,  ETC. 


215 


of  a  hiVlier  reason  than  his  own.  Let  a  man  iVnore 
Instinct  and  Appetite  in  the  care  of  liis  animal  life, 
and  hand  the  care  of  that  life  over  to  Reason  to  be 
provided  for  on  scientific  principles  and  there  will 
be  no  longer  spontaneity  or  beanty  in  that  life,  and 
its  efficiency  will  be  impaired.  In  the  same  way, 
if  we  disallow  those  feelings  which  naturally  spring 
from  the  near  affinities  and  proximities  of  social  life 
we  take  away  its  warmth  and  spontaneity,  and  sub- 
stitute the  limited  and  discordant  views  of  individ' 
uals  for  the  wisdom  of  God. 

The  family  is  the  ordinance  of  God,  and  its  un 
derlying  idea  is  religious.  It  is,  indeed,  a  training- 
school  for  the  community  and  the  state,  but  only  as 
preparatory  to  fitness  for  a  place  in  that  great  family 
above  of  which  the  family  here  is  a  ty])€,  and  foi 
which  it  should  be  a  preparation.  It  is  the  first 
form  of  human  society,  the  foundation  and  source 
of  all  other  forms,  and  as  that  is  such  will  they  be. 
It  was  because  the  family  is  thus  the  fountain-head 
of  society,  and  must  determine  its  character,  that 
our  Saviour  insisted  so  strongly  upon  its  sacredness. 
In  nothing  were  his  teachings  more  in  opposition  to 
the  spirit  of  his  time,  or  to  the  general  spirit  of  the 
world,  and  nothing  in  those  teachings  caused  greater 
surprise  to  his  disciples.  But  he  knew  his  ground, 
he  abated  no  jot  from  the  strictness  of  his  require- 
ments, and  the  history  of  the  world  since  shows  the 
wisdom  of  his  precepts.  Without  this  the  materials 
for  a  free  government  never  have  been  furnished 


216 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


and  never  can  be.    Tins  it  is,  just  this,  that  oui 

people  need  not  only  to  see,  but  to  have  impressed 
upon  them,  for  it  is  upon  the  purity,  the  sacredness, 
and  the  well-ordering  of  families  that  the  perma- 
nence of  our  institutions  must  depend.  Have  what 
public  schools  you  will,  enlighten  the  people  as 
you  may,  and  without  the  family  as  formative,  — 
formative  of  habits  of  obedience  and  of  a  temper  of 
mutual  forbearance,  ■ —  and  as  offering  in  its  spirit 
the  only  model  of  a  right  government,  the  perma- 
nence of  free  institutions  in  any  such  form  as  will 
make  them  a  blessing  is  impossible. 

On  this  point  I  feel  that  I  cannot  speak  too 
strongly,  because  we  are  here  at  the  root.  Most 
questions  of  what  is  called  social  science  pertain  to 
the  branches,  but  in  this  —  the  right  constitution 
and  ordering  of  families,  —  is  God's  social  science, 
and  if  men  will  but  learn  and  apply  this  fully,  most 
other  questions  that  now  pertain  to  that  science  will 
disappear.  Remove  the  swamp  and  the  malaria  and 
there  will  be  no  occasion  to  discuss  the  mode  of 
treating  tlie  epidemic. 

15 ut  while  insisting  thus  upon  the  claims  of  the 
family,  I  would  not  be  insensible  to  those  Basis  of 

1  IT  •  cominun- 

of  the  idea  that  underlies  communism,  ism. 
The  basis  of  conmiunism  is,  for  the  most  part,  sec- 
ular and  economic,  and  its  advantages  are  wholly  so. 
It  seeks  the  best  distribution  and  results  of  labor. 
But  may  not  these  be  as  well  reached  through  the 
^amily  as  in  any  other  way  ?    If  not,  it  would  be  s 


BIGHTS  OF  PJIESONS,  ETC. 


strange  exception  to  the  law  by  wliicli  that  which  is 
lower  is  best  attained  by  attaining  most  fully  tliat 
which  is  higher.  The  difficulty  has  been  that  fam- 
ilies have  not  been  so  ordered  as  to  attain  the  higher 
end,  and  then,  in  their  isolation  and  selfishness  evils 
have  arisen  for  which  communism  has  been  sug- 
gested as  a  remedy.  This  has  been  tried  with  every 
advantage  by  earnest,  enthusiastic,  and  cultivated 
people,  but  has  uniformly  failed.  It  ahvays  will. 
But  while  there  will  be  economic  as  well  as  so- 
cial evils  as  long  as  the  real  end  of  the 

Cooperation.  •  •    •  i  m  i  r  i  ' 

family  m  training  up  cliildren  lor  (jrocl  is 
not  reached,  and  wdiile  communism,  as  dispensing 
with  the  family,  can  never  succeed,  yet  another  idea, 
represented  by  another  word,  has  arisen,  through 
which  a  measure  of  success,  perhaps  a  large  one, 
may  be  hoped.  That  word  is  cooperation.  To  this 
there  is  no  objection.  Through  this,  in  perfect 
compatibility  with  family  relations  and  interests, 
much  may  be  done  to  diminish  labor,  to  increase 
production,  and  to  divide  more  equally,  not  to  say 
justly,  the  common  results  of  labor  and  of  capital. 
How  much  may  be  done  in  this  way  we  do  not  yet 
know.  The  experiment  has  not  been  fiiily  tried. 
Let  it  be  tried.  Let  whatever  can  be  done  in  this 
way  be  done  ;  but  let  us  hold  fast  to  God's  institu- 
tion of  the  family.  Let  us  hold  fast  to  the  doctrine 
of  special  duties  made  imperative  upon  us  by  our 
personal  relations.  Let  us  not  put  off  work  at  our 
5jwn  doors  for  distant  work,  mistaking  indolence,  or 


218 


MORAL  SCIEKCE. 


sentimentalism,  or  the  love  of  notoriety,  or  all  to- 
gether, for  either  philanthropy  or  religion.  Finding 
a  chart  laid  down  for  us  in  the  voyage  of  life,  let  us 
follow  it,  and  not  venture  in  seeking  the  good  of 
the  whole  to  substitute  our  own  wisdom  for  the 
wisdom  of  God. 


CHAPTER  n. 

government:  responsibility:  punishment. 

Accepting  these  special  duties,  or,  indeed,  recog- 
nizino;  Rights  of  Persons  at  all,  we  reach  at  once 
the  right  of  the  parent  to  command,  and  the  corre- 
Bponding  obligation  of  the  child  to  obey;  or,  more 
generally,  we  reach  the  right  of  one  moral  being  to 
govern  another,  involving  both  command  or  author- 
ity, and  obedience  ;  we  reach  Faith  as  the  only  ra- 
tional ground  of  obedience  ;  we  have  Responsibility, 
both  of  those  who  govern  for  the  governed,  and  of 
those  who  are  governed  to  those  who  govern  ;  and 
we  have  Punishment.  These  are  great  ideas  in 
morals  ;  the  larger  part  of  our  duties  are  connected 
with  them,  but  tliey  can  have  place  only  under  a 
system  of  special  relations,  and  in  connection  with 
special  rights  growing  out  of  the  relations  and  caus- 
ing the  duties  to  vary  endlessly  as  the  relations 
vary.    At  these  ideas  we  need  to  look. 

The  foundation  of  the  right  of  government  and 
Govern-  limitations  as  they  are  related  to  an 

ment.  ^^^^  hsive  already  been  referred  to.  This 
right  first  appears  in  the  parent.  If  he  is  to  secure 
the  end  of  the  child,  it  is  indispensable  that  he 


220 


MOHAL  SCIENCE. 


should  have  the  right  to  control  him.  So  flir  as 
that  may  be  necessary,  he  has  a  right  to  control 
him  physically  and  by  force.  Such  control  in  very 
early  years  he  is  bound  to  exercise.  Subsequently 
he  lias  a  right  to  command,  and  the  child  is  under 
obligation  to  obey.  This  is  properly  government  — 
the  control  of  one  intelligent  and  moral  being  by 
the  expressed  will  of  another.  On  the  one  side 
there  is  a  command,  on  the  other  there  is  obe- 
dience. 

And  by  obedience  here  is  not  meant  conformity 
to  the  will  of  the  parent  on  the  m^ound  of 

^  -TP  1  m      T  Obedience. 

perceived  reasons  aside  trom  that  will.  It 
is  one  thing  to  appeal  to  the  reason  of  a  child, 
showing  him  the  reasons  wdiy  w^e  wish,  or  command 
him  to  do  a  particular  act  so  that  he  may  do  it,  not 
on  the  ground  of  the  command,  but  of  the  reasons ; 
and  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  give  the  command 
without  reasons,  and  to  be  obeyed  simply  on  the 
ground  of  the  command.  Of  these  only  the  last 
is  obedience.  If  the  child  so  sees  the  reasons  for 
action  that  he  would  perform  the  act  on  the  ground 
of  those  reasons  without  regard  to  the  will  of  the 
parent,  such  an  act  cannot  be  in  obedience  to  that 
will.  There  are  parents  who  seek  to  control  their 
children  by  such  presentation  of  reasons  and  call  it 
government ;  but  it  is  not  government.  The  child 
may  do  right,  and  this  may  be  the  best  thing  for  the 
oarent  to  do,  but  he  should  not  delude  himself  with 
the  idea  that  he  governs,  or  that  the  child  obeys. 


GOVERNMENT:  RESPONSIBILITY:  PUNISHMENT,  221 


To  obey  is  to  do  the  will  of  another,  simply  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  his  will.  He  who  obeys  may  see 
reasons  for  it,  or  against  it,  or  see  no  reasons  at  all, 
but  he  would  do  the  act  equally  in  either  case  be- 
cause he  was  commanded  to  do  it.  If  that  be  not 
the  reason,  it  is  not  obedience. 

Now  it  is  just  this  obedience  to  which  the  parent 
has  a  right,  and  which  the  child  is  bound  to  yield. 
But,  you  will  ask,  is  not  the  child  a  rational  crea- 
ture, and  is  not  his  reason  to  be  appealed  to  ?  Yes, 
his  reason  is  to  be  appealed  to,  but  in  so  far  as  he  is 
under  government  in  distinction  from  influence, 
that  reason  is  to  be  exercised,  not  in  an  attempt  to 
comprehend  the  reasons  by  which  the  will  of  the 
parent  is  determined,  which  would  be  to  put  him- 
self upon  an  equality  with  him,  but  in  comprehend- 
ing the  reasons  for  confidence  or  faith  in  the  parent. 

This  brings  us  to  consider  the  great  principle  of 
Principle  faith  which  underlies  all  rational  control  of 
of  faith.  Qj^g  being  by  another.  This  is  a  rational 
principle,  wholly  so,  having  two  branches  as  it  makes 
its  demands  upon  the  understanding  or  the  will, 
and  is  expressed  in  belief  or  in  obedience.  Their 
common  root  is  confidence.  Belief  because  another 
says  it,  is  confidence  expressed  in  believing  ;  obe- 
dience because  another  commands  it,  is  confidence 
expressed  in  action.  This  is  the  great  and  only  pos- 
sible uniting,  elevating,  and  assimilating  principle 
where  an  inferior  being  is  to  be  governed  by  the 
vnll  of  a  superior,  that  is,  to  be  governed  at  all ;  or 


222 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


where  any  one  being  is  to  be  governed  by  the  will 
of  another.  The  child,  the  subject,  the  being  gov- 
erned, may  not  know  the  reason  of  the  command, 
but  he  knows  that  he  who  gives  it  is  wise  and  good, 
and  he  feels  that  it  is  the  most  rational  thing  he  can 
do  to  believe  a  proposition  simply  because  he  says 
it,  and  to  do  an  act  simply  because  he  commands  it. 

As  this  rational  faith  is  the  sole  principle  of  gov- 
ernment aside  from  fear  or  force,  it  be-  ^.^ith  and 
comes  us  to  examine  it  well  as  needed  in  e*^^^*^^^®^* 
this  relation  of  parent  and  child,  where  we  first 
find  the  need  of  it.  In  early  life  children  need  to 
be  controlled  wholly  by  their  parents,  and  they  are 
to  be  so  guided  that  they  may  pass  gradually  from 
that  control  to  a  perfect  independence  of  them,  and 
to  a  wise  course  of  action  under  the  government  of 
God.  In  this  subjection  and  control  there  is  to  be 
no  shade  of  degradation,  no  slavish  fear,  but  only  a 
control  made  necessary  by  the  condition  of  the 
child,  I  will  not  say  to  the  fulfillment  of  its  destiny, 
but  to  the  attainment  of  its  end.  Such  control  will 
be  reached  by  a  subjection  in  perfect  faith,  both  of 
the  understanding  and  the  will  of  the  child  to  the 
understanding  and  will  of  the  parent,  and  in  no 
other  way.  This  will  be  government ;  it  will  be 
subjection,  but  it  will  be  government  by  one  quali- 
fied both  by  wisdom  and  by  love  to  govern  ;  it  will 
De  submitted  to  in  the  recognition  and  full  faitli  of 
this  wisdom  and  love,  and  can  therefore  have  in  it 
nothing  misleading  or  degrading.   The  child  simplji 


GOVERNMENT :  RESPONSIBILITY  :  PUNISHMENT.  223 


works  under  the  law  of  love  in  his  pecuhar  rela- 
tions as  ordained  by  God ;  and  that  is  all  that  any 
creature  can  do.  He  is  to  rise  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble to  his  position  of  independent  action,  but  in  the 
process  of  thus  rising,  his  wisdom  and  duty  are  to  be 
subject  to  his  parents.  If  the  parent  be  what  he 
should  be,  the  end  will  thus  be  reached  perfectly. 
If  he  be  not  wholly  what  he  should  be,  such  sub- 
iection  will  still  be  generally  right  and  best,  but  if 
the  parent  become  disqualified  by  vice  or  imbecil- 
ity to  direct  the  child  to  his  end,  then  the  civil  law 
may  interfere,  or  the  child  may  himself  seek  other 
protection  and  guidance.  This  shows  that  the  duty 
does  not  arise  from  the  mere  relation.  Remove  the 
idea  of  an  end  to  be  attained,  and  that  of  duty  will 
also  disappear. 

And  here  we  find,  not  merely  the  principle  of 
Responsi-  faith,  which,  though  rational,  wholly  so, 
and  under  the  circumstances  the  only 
rational  thing  possible,  is  yet  not  philosophy  at  all, 
any  more  than  instinct  is,  but  we  also  find  the  fact  of 
responsibility.  This  also  has  two  branches.  There 
is  both  a  responsibility  for  others,  and  to  others ; 
though  responsibility  for  others  must,  except  in  God, 
ultimately  resolve  itself  into  responsibility  to  an- 
other. This  is  a  great  fact  in  morals,  and  the 
ground  of  it  needs  to  be  clearly  stated. 

If  any  hold  that  the  will  of  another  is  the  ground 
of  obligation,  responsibility  to  him  will  follow  of 
course.    But  if  a  man  bo  under  obligation  on  a 


224 


MORAL  SCIENCE!. 


ground  independent  of  the  will  of  another,  how  can 

he  be  responsible  to  that  other  ?  Most  philosophers 
do  in  fact  find  a  ground  of  obligation  other  than  the 
mere  will  of  any  being ;  but  all  our  duties  are  so 
connected  with  responsibility,  and  all  the  duties  of 
every  created  being  must  be,  that  many  have  not 
thought  of  duty  as  possible  without  that.  Respon- 
sibility has  seemed  to  them  to  be  involved  in  the 
very  conception  of  law^,  as  much  so  as  obligation. 
And  in  one  sense  it  is ;  but  in  any  sense  in  which  a 
moral  beino;  can  be  a  law  unto  himself  it  is  not  in- 
volved  ;  and  the  question  is,  how  such  a  being,  thus 
capable  of  being  a  law  to  himself,  can,  consistently 
with  this,  become  so  subject  to  another  as  to  be 
responsible  to  him. 

This  difficulty  has  been  clearly  seen  by  Dr. 
Hickok,  and  he  sets  it  aside  by  saying,  that  inas- 
much as  positive  authority  must  have  other  ends 
than  spiritual  worthiness,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with 
pure  morality,  and  pure  morality  has  nothing  to  do 
with  it  except  to  see  that  none  of  its  requisitions  are 
j^pposed  to  morality.  "  Pure  morality,"  he  says, 
"in  the  contemplation  of  such  occasions  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  cover  all  the  methods  of  dealing  with 
human  conduct,  and  thus  other  systems  of  motives 
must  be  found  and  classified  w^liich  do  not  du'ect 
ihemselvcs  immediately  to  the  end  of  highest  wor- 
thiness, and  tliereby  otlier  rules  of  human  action 
must  be  attained  than  tlie  ultimate  rule  of  pure 
morality.   But  no  such  motives  may  be  applied,  ana 


GOVERNMENT:  RESPONSIBILITY:  PUNISHMENT.  225 


iio  siicli  rules  adopted  contrary  to  the  claims  of  pure 
morality."  ^  Again,  it  is- said  of  authority  that,  ''it 
is  introduced  as  a  necessary  means  of  constraint 
where  pure  morality  will  not  admit  of  an  appli- 
cation ;  but  in  no  case,  and  for  no  reason,  may  it  be 
used  in  conflict  with  morality ;  and  hence  the  neces- 
sity of  subjecting  all  authority  to  the  criterion  of  a 
rigid  Moral  Science  by  wdiicli  only  can  it  be  known 
that  it  is  nothing  but  righteous  authority  that  has 
been  tolerated.  Positive  authority,  thus,  must  come 
within  the  field  of  a  pure  moral  science.  It  will  not 
govern  by  morality,  but  it  must  govern  in  full  ac- 
cordance with  morality."  ^ 

Here  it  may  be  asked,  if  positive  authority  does 
not  govern  by  morality,  what  it  does  govern  by ; 
and  also  how  any  authority  can  be  a  ''  righteous  au- 
thority "  that  has  no  moral  quality  and  is  exercised 
outside  of  the  field  of  morality.  All  government, 
as  such,  is  by  authority,  and  it  would  seem  desirable 
to  find  a  ground  for  that  by  which  the  government 
of  God  may  be  a  moral  government,  and  not  simply 
not  immoral. 

The  question  respecting  the  ground  of  responsi- 
Kighteous  tility  then  recurs,  and  an  answer  to  it  is 
i,uthority.  suggested  in  the  expression  used  above, 
"  Righteous  authority,"  that  is,  an  authority  having 
its  foundation  in  Rights.  Has  the  parent  a  right 
to  govern  ?  If  so,  responsibility  must  follow,  for 
without  that  there  can  be  no  government.  This  is 
1  Moral  Science^  p.  146.  2  ji^id,^  p.  143. 

16 


226 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


self-evident.  On  what  ground  then  can  govern- 
ment be  justified  ?  Why  not  leave  each  moral  be- 
ing to  the  control  of  his  own  moral  nature,  and  to 
the  results  of  his  own  action  under  the  guidance  of 
that  nature  ?  There  might  then  be  guilt  on  the 
violation  of  obligation,  the  shock  of  which  would  be 
felt  within  his  own  being,  but  no  responsibility  to 
another.  This  is  so  with  God.  He  is,  and  can  be 
responsible  to  no  one  ;  but  the  responsibility  of  crea- 
tures to  Him  must  follow  directly  from  the  posses- 
sion by  Him  of  the  right  to  govern  them.  These 
must  go  together.  To-day  a  child  is  at  large  in  the 
streets.  He  has  no  responsibility  to  any  teacher, 
and  no  teacher  has  any  right  over  him.  To-morrow 
the  parent  places  the  child  in  a  school,  and  now  the 
teacher  has  rights,  and  the  child  is  responsible. 
The  teacher  not  only  has  the  right,  but  is  under 
obligation  to  use  all  legitimate  means  to  attain  the 
ends  of  the  school,  and  the  pupil  is  responsible  to 
him  for  that,  and  only  that  which  would  interfere 
with  those  ends.  Any  authority  needed  to  attain 
those  ends  is  righteous  authority,  as  growing  out  of 
his  rights,  and  no  other  authority  is  righteous.  So 
the  responsibility  of  the  child  to  the  parent  is  directly 
from  the  right  of  the  parent  to  control  him,  and  must 
be  coextensive  with  that  right.  But,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  rights  of  the  parent  are  from  his  relation  to  the 
end  of  the  child  and  of  the  family,  which  he  is  und^r 
obligation  by  the  affirmation  of  his  own  moral  nature 
to  take  every  proper  means  to  secure,  and  so  the 
child  must  be  directly  responsible  to  him. 


GOVERNMENT:  RESPONSIBILITY:  PUNISHMENT.  227 


And  not  only  is  there  responsibility  to  others,  but 
fiesponsi-  also,  as  has  been  said,  for  others.  If  these 
Dthers.  do  ultimately  coalesce  from  the  fact  of  the 
responsibility  of  all  to  God,  yet  this  aspect  of  the 
subject  requires  attention.  The  parent  is  responsi- 
ble for  the  welfare  of  the  family,  that  is,  he  is  under 
obligation  to  God  to  see  that  that  welfare  is  guarded 
and  promoted.  He  not  only  has  a  right  but  is  un- 
der obligation,  on  the  ground  of  that,  to  guard  their 
rights.  So  far  as  he  is  able  he  is  bound  to  see  that 
no  selfishness  of  one  shall  so  encroach  upon  another 
as  to  debar  him  from  the  exercise  of  any  natural 
right  or  the  attainment  of  any  legitimate  end.  Here 
again  we  have  the  right  of  government,  not  merely 
that  the  end  of  the  individual  may  be  attained,  but 
that  the  rights  of  all  may  be  guarded.  From  his 
very  pcisition  the  parent  must  be  the  guardian  of  the 
child  if  his  rights  are  to  be  secured,  or  if  his  end  is 
to  be  attained  ;  and  hence  we  see  that  rights,  gov- 
ernment, and  responsibility  have  a  common  ground 
in  their  necessity  for  the  attainment  of  a  common 
end  having  intrinsic  value,  and  in  view  of  which 
obhgation  is  immediately  affirmed.  The  child  is 
bound  to  have  faith  in  the  parent  because  he  has 
reason  to  believe  that  he  is  wise  and  good,  and  will 
do  all  things  for  the  ends  of  the  family  ;  and  the 
man  is  bound  to  have  faith  in  God  because  he  has 
reason  to  believe  that  He  is  wise  and  good,  and  will 
do  all  thing's  for  the  ends  of  his  intelhVent  and 
moral  kingdom ;  and  so  the  child  and  the  man  cau 


228 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


joyfully  submit  to  government,  and  acknowledge 
responsibility  under  it  with  the  conviction  that  so 
only  can  they  work  for  that  end  in  view  of  which 
obligation  is  affirmed.  So  only  can  conduct  become 
rational,  so  only  can  we  have  science  in  the  place 
of  blind  impulsions,  and  unity  in  the  principle  of 
conduct  in  our  various  relations. 
^  There  is  one  point  more  concerning  responsibility 
It  always  has  respect  to  some  person.    A  Responsi- 

.TIT-  A-         1    bility  toa 

man  may  violate  obligation  as  ainrmed  person, 
within  himself,  and  it  be  nothing  to  another  except 
as  a  moral  being ;  but  if  he  be  responsible  to 
that  other,  then  a  failure  to  meet  that  responsibility 
is  a  violation  of  a  right  that  must  admit  and  may 
demand  retribution.  If  a  parent  command  a  child 
to  do  an  act  which  he  has  a  right  to  command,  the 
child  is  directly  responsible  to  him  for  obedience. 
If  the  child  refuse  to  obey,  not  only  is  an  ordinance 
of  God  that  is  inwrought  into  the  very  structure  of 
society  set  aside,  but  the  personal  rights  of  the  pa- 
rent are  invaded.  Not  only  is  obligation  violated 
and  guilt  incurred,  but  there  is  a  direct  personal 
affront,  an  infringement  of  a  sacred  right,  and  the 
parent  is  bound  to  vindicate  that  right  in  the  only 
way  possible,  that  is,  by  punishment. 

We  have  thus  the  origin,  not  only  of  the  right  of 
government,  but  of  punishment,  the  idea  punishment 
and  right  of  which  are,  indeed,  involved 
in  the  very  notion  of  government.     The  conse- 
:|uences  within  the  moral  being  himself,  of  violating 


GOVEROTIENT  :  RESPONSIBILITY  :  PUNISHMENT.  229 


obligation,  the  shock  that  may  ensue,  whatever  that 
maybe,  is  not  punishment.  It  cannot  be.  Punish- 
ment is  the  vindication  by  a  person,  through  some 
positive  infliction,  of  violated  rights.  In  no  other 
way  can  such  rights  be  vindicated,  and  rights  gen- 
erally be  protected,  except  possibly  by  some  expres- 
sion of  a  displeasure  as  great  as  would  be  manifested 
oy  inflicting  the  punishment.  In  no  other  way  can 
the  attitude  of  the  person  towards  his  own  authority 
and  rio-hts,  or  towards  universal  nVhteousness  as 
sailed  through  these,  be  indicated,  and  his  mora 
character  be  made  to  appear.  Government  being 
by  authority,  is  an  expression  of  Will^  and  if  punish- 
ment is  to  sustain  government,  that  too  must  be, 
and  must  be  known  to  be,  an  expression  of  the  same 
will.  Evil  may  be  suffered  and  inflicted  that  is  not 
punishment.  Evil  from  accident,  or  misfortune,  or 
from  the  law&  of  nature  regarded  as  impersonal,  is 
not  punishment.  Nor  is  evil  inflicted  by  equals 
upon  equals  punishment,  nor  that  inflicted  from 
anger,  or  malice,  or  for  the  sake  of  discipline.  This 
latter,  evil  inflicted  for  the  sake  of  discipline,  is  gen- 
erally supposed  to  be  punishment,  and  parents  say 
to  children  that  they  punish  them  for  their  own 
good.  But  if  that  be  the  sole  end  the  infliction  of 
evil  has  no  reference  to  law,  and  cannot  be  properly 
punishment.  Punishment  presupposes  a  law  ad- 
Qiinistered  by  a  personal  lawgiver  having  rights. 
It  presupposes  a  righteous  penalty  annexed  to  the 
law,  and  that  the  law  has  been  violated.  These 


230 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


conditions  being  given,  punishment  is  the  infliction 
of  a  previously  declared  penalty  by  the  will  of  the 
lawgiver  for  the  sake  of  sustaining  the  authority 
of  the  law.  That  authority  can  be  sustained  in  no 
other  w^ay.  Nothing  but  a  penalty  proclaimed,  and, 
if  need  be,  inflicted,  can  make  known  and  measure 
the  regard  of  the  lawgiver  for  the  law.  Hence,  as 
entering  into  the  very  conception  of  government, 
punishment  is  justified.  It  can  never  be  wanton, 
or  capricious,  or  revengeful,  for  evil  thus  inflicted 
would  cease  to  be  punishment,  but  the  extent  of  it 
must  be  measured  by  its  necessity  for  the  attain- 
ment of  the  ends  of  government,  and  what  that 
extent  should  be  only  a  righteous  and  competent 
lawgiver  can  judge.  Obviously,  as  proclaimed  be- 
forehand, the  penalty  must  express,  and  that  only 
can,  the  estimate  by  the  lawgiver  of  his  own  rights, 
and  of  the  rights  of  others  that  are  in  question,  and 
also  his  benevolent  desire  to  present  the  highest 
moral  motives  the  case  will  allow  to  prevent  the  in- 
fraction of  law.  And  then,  whatever  it  is  right  to 
affix  as  a  penalty  beforehand  it  must  be  not  only 
right,  but  necessary  to  inflict  as  punishment,  else, 
unless  some  adequate  reason  can  be  given,  all  gov- 
ernment must  be  abandoned. 

In  connection  with  the  above,  two  things  are  to 
be  noticed.    The  first  is,  that  the  proper  violation  of 

rights 

crround  of  punishment  under  any  govern-  proper 

.        ^        ,  .   1     .  p     1  V        •  ground  of 

ment  is  not  the  violation  ot  obligation,  punisnmeivi 
Uiat  is,  guilt  as  such,  but  only  the  violation  of  jo^ 


GOVERNMENT  :  RESPONSIBILITY  :  PUNISHMENT.  231 


gation,  as  that  violates  rights.  In  human  govern- 
ments this  is  avowedly  so.  They  do  not  claim  to 
punish  guilt  as  such,  or  to  measure  it  except  as  it 
violates  the  rights  of  the  community.  Under  the 
divine  government  it  happens,  or  rather  it  must  be, 
that  the  violation  of  obligation  and  of  the  divine 
rights,  and  so  of  tlie  rights  of  his  intelligent  uni- 
verse, correspond,  but  the  punishment  is  not  in 
view  of  the  guilt  as  such,  but  as  it  is  guilt  that  vio- 
lates the  rights  of  others.  There  must  be  guilt. 
That  is  the  only  condition  of  punishment,  but  not 
its  ground.  If  we  may  suppose  guilt  that  would 
violate  no  rights  of  God,  or  of  any  other  being, 
however  detestable  it  might  be  in  itself,  or  whatever 
the  consequences  might  be  within  the  being  himself, 
it  would  be  no  ground  of  punishment.  There  is  no 
abstract  inexorable  justice  that  would  require  it, 
and  hence,  even  though  guilt  may  have  been  in- 
curred, if  the  rights  of  all  be  perfectly  preserved 
and  secure,  punishment  may  be  righteously  omit- 
ted.   It  will  not  be  demanded. 

The  second  point  to  be  noticed  in  connection  with 
Appeal  of     the  above,  is  that  the  appeal  of  penalty 

penalty  to  _  .  _  i       p  .  . 

worthy  fear,  whcu  threatened,  and  oi  punishment, 
when  inflicted,  is  not  primarily  to  any  form  of  the 
Sensibility  that  can  be  reached  through  positive  in- 
fliction. This  appeal  is  not  therefore  to  the  fear  of 
Buffering  as  suffering  merely,  but  of  suffering  as  it 
may  be  caused  by  that  recoil  of  personality  against 
aggression  upon  its  rights,  which  is  an  inherent  and 


232 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


essential  part  of  righteousness  —  a  fear  of  suffering 

as  expressing  the  disapprobation  of  the  lawgiver, 
and  felt  to  be  deserved.  This  is  no  unworthy  fear, 
as  some  seem  to  suppose. 

There  are  three  sources  of  suffering  to  us  as 
moral  beings.  The  first  is,  the  recoil  of  Three 
our  own  moral  nature  when  the  law  of  its  moral  suLr- 
beinor  is  transo-ressed.  This  is  remorse,  in 
which  a  man  constantly  accuses  and  condemns  him- 
self. The  second  is  the  expression  of  disapproba- 
tion by  others  without  any  act  of  will  put  forth 
towards  us.  They  may  do,  and  we  may  fear,  n  J 
hostile  act,  but  the  look  of  mingled  displeasure  and 
sorrow  is  felt  and  remembered  with  a  pang,  and 
this  feeling  will  increase  with  the  excellence  and 
dignity  of  the  being,  and  if  we  have  wronged  him 
personally,  with  his  kindness  and  love  towards  us. 
A  third  source  of  suffering  to  us  as  moral  beings  is 
from  a  direct  act  of  will  w^ithdrawing  from  us  con- 
ditions of  good,  and  inflicting  upon  us  positive  evil. 
To  avoid  each  of  these,  to  avoid  simple  suffering 
even,  would  be  a  suitable  motive  ;  but  it  is  not  by 
the  fear  of  suffering  that  moral  creatures  can,  or 
ought  to  be  governed.  Not  30  does  God  or  any 
wise  man  seek  to  govern  them,  but  by  the  fear  of 
penalty.  It  is  by  the  moral  nature  alone  that  suf- 
fering can  be  known  as  punishment,  and  hence  it 
is  to  that  nature,  and  to  no  ignoble  and  unworthy 
fear,  that  punishment  appeals. 


CHAPTER  in. 


RELATION  OF  THE  SEXES:  CHASTITY. 

We  have  now  considered  the  general  topics  con- 
nected with  the  transition  from  those  duties  which 
we  owe  to  all  men,  to  those  special  rights  and  du- 
ties which  are  indicated  by  our  special  relations, 
and  it  will  be  next  in  order  to  consider  the  rio;hts 
and  duties  themselves. 

The  special  relation  on  which  all  others  depend 
is  that  of  the  sexes.  In  connection  with  this  the 
first  general  duty  is  that  of  Chastity. 

Chastity  is  a  duty  of  the  individual  both  to  him- 
self and  to  the  community. 

Effect  upon       1st.  It  is  a  duty  to  the  individual  him- 

the  Individ- 

self. 

By  chastity  is  meant  personal  purity,  and  upon 
the  violation  of  this,  whether  by  solitary  or  social 
vice,  God  has  set  the  seal  of  his  condemnation  by 
the  effects  of  it  upon  both  the  body  and  the  mind. 

All  solitary  vice  tends  to  weakness  and  insanity, 
the  extent  of  both  which  from  this  cause  is  little 
Buspected ;  and  in  connection  with  the  social  vice 
there  is  a  disease,  one  of  the  most  loathsome  and 
WTetched  ever  known,  which  seems  to  have  been 
gent  as  a  special  judgment  and  check  upon  it. 


2U 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Nor  is  the  effect  upon  the  mind  less  debasing. 
"However  it  may  be  accounted  for,"  says  Paley, 

the  criminal  intercourse  of  the  sexes  corrupts  and 
denraves  the  mind  and  moral  character  more  than 
any  single  species  of  vice  whatsoever.  That  ready 
perception  of  guilt,  that  prompt  and  decisive  resolu- 
tion against  it,  which  constitutes  a  virtuous  charac- 
ter, is  seldom  found  in  persons  addicted  to  these 
indulgences.  They  prepame  an  easy  admission  for 
every  sin  that  seeks  it ;  are  in  low  life,  usually  the 
first  stage  in  men's  progress  to  the  most  desperate 
villainies ;  and  in  high  life  to  that  lamented  disso- 
luteness of  principle,  which  manifests  itself  in  a 
profligacy  of  public  conduct,  and  a  contempt  of  the 
obligations  of  religion  and  of  moral  probity.  Add 
to  this  that  habits  of  libertinism  incapacitate  and 
indispose  the  mind  for  all  intellectual,  moral,  and 
religious  pleasures,  which  is  a  great  loss  to  any 
man's  happiness." 

2.  Obedience  to  the  law  of  chastity  is  a  duty  to 
the  community.  From  the  time  of  Sodom,  EEFectupon 
sins  of  licentiousnesss  have  been  the  chief  munity. 
cause  of  the  corruption  and  downfall  of  nations. 
There  is  no  ruin  and  degradation  like  that  which 
these  sins  bring  upon  the  woman,  and  there  is  no 
general  debasement  like  that  of  a  great  city  deeply 
tnfected  with  this  class  of  vices,  and  those  that  in- 
evitably accompany  them.  If  men  could  be  brought 
to  obey  the  laws  of  God  in  regard  to  chastity  and 
marriage,  and  also  in  regard  to  narcotic  and  intox- 


RELATION  OF  THE  SEXFS  :  CHASTITY. 


235 


(eating  substances,  laws  written  not  only  in  liig 
Word,  but  in  their  physical  and  moral  nature,  the 
great  obstacle  to  the  intellectual  and  moral  improve- 
ment of  the  race  would  be  removed.  Abstinence 
from  these  is  not  virtue.  It  may  give  greater  skill 
to  fraud,  or  more  power  to  ambition,  but  it  is  a  con* 
dition  of  virtue.  It  is  in  connection  with  these 
sins  that  man  is  capable  of  degrading  himself  below 
the  brutes  ;  and  through  them  what  is  called  civiliza* 
tion,  that  is,  skill  in  literature  and  the  arts,  and  in 
producing  the  elegancies  and  luxuries  of  life,  may 
coexist  with  a  state  of  society  to  which  the  savage 
state  would  be  infinitely  preferable.  Certainly 
every  one  owes  it  to  society  to  do  what  he  can  to 
relieve  it  from  this  incubus. 

In  combating  this  class  of  sins  in  ourselves  the 
Theimagi-    proDcr  poiut  to  OTard  is  the  imagination 

Dation  to  be    ^    f   ^  ^  ,  ^  . 

guarded.  and  the  thoughts.  This  is  the  citadel. 
With  this  sufficiently  guarded,  we  may  go  anywhere 
and  be  subject  to  any  form  of  outward  temptation, 
for  "  to  the  pure  all  things  are  pure."  But  few 
only  can  go  thus.  Against  no  class  of  sins  do  we 
more  need  to  put  up  the  petition  :  Lead  us  not 
into  temptation."  We  need  to  guard  the  senses, 
especially  as  temptation  may  come  through  them  ir 
the  guise  of  the  fine  arts,  which  have  often  been  of 
great  efiiciency  in  corrupting  a  people. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


RIGHTS  Al^^D  DUTIES  IN  RELATION  TO  MARRIAGE. 

After  the  general  duty  of  chastity  it  will  be  in 
order  to  consider  :  — 

1.  The  rights  and  duties  of  the  sexes  in  their  re- 
lations to  each  other  previous  to  marriage. 

2.  The  rights  and  duties,  in  their  relation  to  each 
other,  of  those  who  are  married. 

3.  The  law  of  divorce. 

4.  The  rights  and  duties  of  parents. 
6.  The  duties  and  rights  of  children. 

1.  Of  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  sexes  in  their 
relations  to  each  other  previous  to  marriage. 
These  will  relate,  first,  to  the  period  pre-  Rights  and 

,  .  ,        -  ,    ,  duties  befor« 

vious  to  beino;  eno;ao;ed  to  be  married.  engagement. 

That  is  a  critical  period  when  young  persons  first 
twake  to  a  consciousness  of  those  sentiments  wln'ch 
are  to  unite  them  so  closely,  and  to  affect  so  nearly 
their  own  happiness  and  that  of  the  coming  gener- 
ations. A  new  world  is  opened  up  to  them  full  of 
Fusceptibihty,  emotion,  sentiment,  romance,  passion 
and  with  capabihties  of  both  happiness  and  misery 
•inutterable.    What  shall  be  done  ?    Left  to  them- 


BIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  IN  RELATION  TO  MARRIAGE.  237 


selves,  there  is  danger  of  imprudence  and  misjudg* 
ment.  Controlled  by  others,  there  is  danger  that 
that  which  is  highest  in  sentiment  and  purest  in  af- 
fection will  be  sacrificed  to  fancied  interest,  or  to 
ambition.  It  is  not  easy  for  the  parties  themselves, 
much  less  for  others,  to  distinguish  the  glamour  of 
a  transient  infatuation  from  the  conscious  recogni- 
tion and  opening  affection  of  two  natures  made  to 
supplement  each  other.  In  the  freshness  and  glow 
of  such  sentiments  prudence  is  spurned,  and  an  ap- 
peal to  duty  seems  cold  and  impertinent.  Hence, 
in  some  countries,  in  most  indeed,  young  persons 
have  been  kept  during  this  period  under  the  strict- 
est surveillance,  and  everything  pertaining  to  mar- 
riage has  been  regulated  by  others.  Among  the 
Moravians,  partners  were,  until  recently,  assigned 
by  lot.  There  are  persons  living  in  this  country 
now  who  obtained  their  wives  in  that  way.  But  in 
this  country  now  it  is  virtually  in  the  hands  of  the 
young  people  themselves,  giving  rise  doubtless  to 
greater  haj)piness  in  some  cases,  but  in  others  to 
mistakes  and  scenes  both  ludicrous  and  sad.  By 
those  who  have  had  opportunity  to  observe  it  has 
been  gravely  questioned  which  course  is  best.  In 
any  way  there  will  be  persons  unmatched  and  mis- 
matched. But  however  this  may  be,  this  matter 
not  only  now  is,  but  will  continue  to  be  chiefly  in 
the  hands  of  those  more  immediately  concerned,  and 
in  view  of  that  they  have  duties  whethe]'  they  wit 
beed  them  or  not. 


238 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


And  here  the  one  duty  of  those  whose  affections 
are  yet  free  is  to  withhold  themselves  from  any  at- 
tempt to  awaken  affection  in  another  except  with  a 
view  to  marriage.  '  This  will  be  hard  where  there 
IS  conscious  beauty  and  power ;  vanity  and  pride 
will  plead  strongly,  and  many  will  go  as  far  as  they 
can  or  dare.  But  the  existence  of  an  affection  that 
cannot  be  requited  is  a  great  evil,  and  to  awaken 
purposely,  or  to  seek  to  awaken  such  an  affection, 
is  a  crime.  It  is  trifling  with  feelings  that  God  in- 
tended should  be  sacred,  and  causes  a  revulsion  that 
nothing  else  can.  (  It  makes  cymes  and  misan- 
thropes of  the  most  hopeless  kind.  ^  One  who  can 
thoughtlessly  or  heartlessly  trifle  with  a  true  affec- 
tion, or  who  mocks  at  it  and  treats  all  claim  to  it 
as  a  pretense,  is  lost,  —  is  incapable  of  even  conceiv- 
ing of  the  great  happiness  there  is  in  affection  with 
security  for  its  basis,  and  which  God  intended  should 
be  connected  with  the  marriage  state.  Only  when 
there  is  a  view  to  marriage  may  that  more  intimate 
acquaintance  be  sought  which  will  justify  an  en- 
gagement, and  when  the  parties  are  on  this  footing, 
the  one  duty  is  frankness  in  relation  to  everything 
that  could  affect  the  feelings  of  the  opposite  party. 

After  an  engagement  is  entered  into,  the  rights 
md  duties  of  the  parties  become  more  Rights  and 

.         .  ,  .  Ill     tiuties  atter- 

dennite.  ine  parties  are  now  betrothed,  engagrment 
affianced,  engaged  to  each  other  by  a  promise  only 
^ess  sacred  than  that  of  marriage.  They  are,  and 
diould  be  known  to  be,  in  such  relation  to  each 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  IN  RELATION  TO  MARRIAGE.  239 


otlier  that  it  would  be  criminal  in  either  of  them  to 
seek  the  affection  of  another,  and  that  it  will  be 
criminal  in  any  other  to  seek  the  affection  of  either 
of  them. 

Tlie  length  of  an  engagement  involves  no  prin- 
ciple except  that  neither  party  has  a  right  to  pro- 
long the  time  beyond  that  desired  by  the  other, 
without  good  reason.  In  general,  short  engage- 
ments are  best. 

The  levity  ^d  capriciousness  with  which  such  en- 
gagements are  broken  are  to  be  deprecated.  If  it 
be  found  that  there  was  concealment  or  deception 
in  relation  to  anything  material  at  the  time  of  the 
engagement,  or  if  there  be  gross  immorality  or 
licentiousness  subsequently,  the  other  party  will  be 
justified  in  breaking  the  engagement.  Nothing 
short  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  can  justify  such 
a  step  of  one  party  without  the  consent  honorably 
obtained  of  the  other.  An  engagement  is  not  mar- 
riage, but  only  preliminary  to  one,  the  object  of 
which  is  a  happy  life  in  the  attainment  of  the  ends 
of  marriage.  Incident  to  an  engagement,  though 
not  the  object  of  it,  is  a  more  perfect  acquaintance, 
and  if,  in  connection  with  this  it  should  appear  that 
their  mutual  happiness  is  not  likely  to  be  secured, 
and  this  shall  be  the  opinion  of  each,  they  are  not 
only  at  liberty,  but  are  bound  to  break  an  engage- 
ment which  they  find  to  have  been  made  under  a 
misapprehension^  though,  it  may  be,  without  fau)^ 
on  either  side. 


240 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Perhaps  it  ought  to  be  said,  as  the  affections  of 
woman  are  stronger  than  those  of  man,  and  as  she 
is  not  allowed  the  initiative,  so  that  the  injury  of  a 
broken  engagement  would  be  greater  to  her,  it  is 
incumbent  on  the  man  to  be  especially  scrupulous 
on  this  point. 

*    The  reciprocal  rights  and  duties  of  husbands  and 
wives  grow,  like  all  others,  from  the  law  lights  and 
of  love,  but  from  that  law  as  applied  in  husbind^s 
this  special  and  most  intimate  and  s^ycred 
relation.    With  the  affection  that  should  form  the 
basis  of  marriage,  the  happiness  that  may  flow  from 
it  is  greater  than  any  other  not  distinctively  religious. 
It  is,  indeed,  made  in  the  Scriptures  a  type  of  that 
higher  happiness  which  is  to  flow  to  the  church  from 
her  union  with  Christ.    A  failure  to  attain  this  hap- 
piness can  arise  only  from  ignorance  or  from  a  want 
of  right  purposes  and  dispositions. 

There  is  often  ignorance  or  misapprehension  of 
the  reciprocal  rights  and  duties  involved  in  mar- 
riage. God  has  indicated  in  the  structure  of  the 
physical  frame,  and  in  the  mental  characteristics 
which  correspond,  different  spheres  of  duty  for  the 
husband  and  the  wife.  The  adaptation  of  each  sex 
to  its  sphere  is  equally  perfect,  and  as  both  are  parts 
of  one  indivisible  race,  the  terms  superior  and  in- 
ferior are  not  properly  applicable.  |  What  is  needed 
is  a  distinct  recognition  by  each  sex  of  its  own 
sphere,  and  a  cheerful  acceptance  of  its  responsi- 
^jiUties  and  duties.     The  object  is  unity  through 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  IN  BELATION  TO  MARRIAGE.  241 


diversity,  and,  within  limits,  the  greater  the  diver- 
sity the  greater  the  beauty  of  the  possible  unity. 
If  God  has  made,  as  He  has,  by  nature  and  by 
revelation,  the  husband  the  head  of  the  house,  then 
the  truest  and  best  happiness  of  the  wife  will  be 
found  only  in  recognizing  him  in  that  relation.  If 
God  has  made  it  the  business  of  the  wife  to  "  guide 
the  house, then  the  husband  will  find  his  peace  and 
happiness  in  giving  her  the  reins  in  that  depart- 
ment. Of  course  there  are  exceptions,  as  there  are 
to  the  command  to  children  to  obey  their  parents. 
If  the  parent  become  imbecile,  or  intoxicated,  or 
command  the  child  to  steal,  he  is  bound  not  to  obey. 
The  relation  is  changed,  and  the  law  of  love  must 
be  interpreted  by  the  relation.  So  it  is  universally. 
If  through  ignorance,  or  inadvertence,  or  wayward 
speculations  and  theories  of  equality  that  recognize 
no  difference,  the  natural  relations  fail  of  recognition, 
the  full  benefits  of  marriage  cannot  be  realized, 
though  the  temper  may  be  right. 
'  But  while  ignorance  is  one  cause  of  failure  in 
Caxifles  of  married  life,  the  great  source  of  trouble  is 
riess.  a  want  of  right  purposes  and  dispositions. 

It  is  some  form  of  selfishness  on  one  part,  or  both. 
The  husband  is  imperious,  exacting,  unsympathiz- 
ing,  self-indulgent,  perhaps  sensual  to  the  extent  of 
vice.  The  wife  is  indolent,  neglectful,  extrava- 
gant, peevish,  unsympathizing.  Perhaps  there 
was  an  original  failure  of  a  full  commitment  of  each 
to  each,  so  that  there  never  has  been  that  conscious 

16 


242 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


unity  an  i  perfect  confidence  in  which  the  charm  of 
married  Hfc  consists,  for  next  to  loving  with  a  per- 
fect love  is  the  happiness  of  a  perfect  confidence, 
and  of  an  assurance  that  love  is  returned.  The 
great  duty  then  will  be  to  cherish  and  cultivate 
mutual  love. 

But  can  love  be  cultivated  ?  On  this  point  there 
is  much  misapprehension.  Love  is  radi-  cultivation 
cally  an  act  of  will.  True,  that  which 
leads  to  marriage  is  accompanied  by  admiration,  by 
desire,  by  sentiment,  but  these  do  not  become  love 
till  the  will  authorizes  them  by  an  act  of  choice,  and 
this  fact  gives  the  will  an  indirect  control  over  all 
the  emotions  and  feelings  connected  with  it. 

In  the  first  place  then,  each  can  cultivate  those 
quaUties  in  themselves  that  will  tend  to  secure  love. 
Each  can  seek  to  become  more  lovable.  A  reso- 
lute purpose  and  persevering  effort  in  this  will  work 
surprising  changes,  and  is  far  better  than  complaints 
of  want  of  affection.  Such  complaints  tend  only  to 
aggravate  the  difficulty.  In  the  second  place,  hus- 
band and  wife  may  seek,  and  are  bound  to  seek,  the 
improvement  of  each  other ;  and  by  this  I  mean  not 
merely  intellectual  improvement,  but  improvement 
in  all  that  is  a  ground  of  esteem  and  of  rational  affec- 
tion. The  mode  and  measure  of  this  will  so  depend 
upon  their  relative  age,  upon  acquirements  and 
temperament,  that  no  details  can  be  given  ;  but  a  dis- 
position to  give  and  to  accept  aid  in  this  way  will 
gi^atly  tend  to  mutual  love.    But  in  the  third  place, 


WGflTS  AND  DUTIES  IN  RELATION  TO  MARRUGE.  243 


and  which  is  perhaps  quite  as  important  as  either, 
we  can  form  the  habit  of  looking  at  excellences  and 
overlookincr  deficiencies  and  even  faults.    Let  each 

o 

party  adopt  the  spirit  of  the  couplet  — 

"  Be  to  her  virtues  veiy  kind, 
Be  to  her  faults  a  little  blind." 

and  it  would,  I  will  not  say  pour  oil  upon  the 
troubled  waters,  but  would  prevent  them  from  ever 
becoming  so  troubled  as  to  cast  up  mire  and  dirt." 
This  I  say  on  the  supposition  that  there  are  faults 
to  be  overlooked  and  follies  to  be  kind  to,  but  if 
there  are,  and  I  have  known  such,  husbands  whose 
wives  h^-ve  for  them  no  faults  or  follies,  and  if  there 
are  wives  whose  husbands  have  none,  these  remarks 
do  not  apply  to  them. 

In  these  ways  a  vast  deal  may  be  done  in  the  cul- 
tivation of  mutual  love,  and  this,  as  inclusive  of  all 
other  duties,  and  sure  to  draw  them  after  it,  and 
also  as  being  so  little  understood  and  appreciated,  is 
the  one  great  duty  that  needs  to  be  inculcated  upon 
those  in  the  marriage  state. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  LAW  OF  DIVORCE. 

Marriage,  as  we  have  seen,  involves  a  union 
Bacredness  altogether  peculiar.  In  its  perfection  it  is 
Df  marriage.  ^  spiritual  uuion,  and  only  in  it  does  the 
life  of  each  party  become  complete.  That  this  union 
should  be,  and  should  be  understood  to  be  for  life,  is 
essential  to  the  interests  of  both  parties,  to  the  wel 
fare  of  children,  and  to  the  interests  of  the  State. 
Only  on  the  condition  of  such  understanding  can 
there  be  a  perfect  commitment  of  each  to  each,  and 
that  perfect  community  of  interest  and  of  life  which 
radically  separates  marriage  from  all  forms  of  pros- 
titution and  unlawful  cohabitation.  As  thus  pecu- 
liar and  sacred,  the  original  institution  of  God  was 
that  the  union  should  be  of  one  man  with  one 
woman,  and  for  life.  Under  the  Mosaic  dispensa- 
tion divorce  was  permitted  on  various  grounds, 
but  the  original  ground  and  sacredness  of  marriage 
was  not  lost  sight  of.  This  appears  from  a  remark- 
able passage  in  Malaclii  showing  the  unreasonable- 
ness and  evils  of  both  polygamy  and  divorce,  and 
the  displeasure  of  God  towards  them.  "  And  this," 
lays  he,  "  have  ye  done  again,  covering  the  altar  of 


THE  LAW  OF  DIVORCE. 


245 


cho  Lord  with  tears,  with  weeping,  and  with  crying 
out,  insomuch  that  he  regardeth  not  the  offering  any 
more,  or  receiveth  it  with  good  will  at  your  hand. 
Yet  ye  say,  wherefore  ?  Because  the  Lord  hath 
been  witness  between  thee  and  the  wife  of  thy  youth 
against  whom  thou  hast  dealt  treacherously.  Yet 
is  she  thy  companion  and  the  wife  of  thy  covenant. 
And  did  not  he  make  one  ?  Yet  had  he  the  residue 
of  the  Spirit."  He  might  have  made  any  number  as 
easily.  "  And  wherefore  one  ?  "  continues  the  pro- 
phet. That  he  might  seek  a  godly  seed.  There- 
fore take  heed  to  your  spirit,  and  let  none  deal 
treacherously  against  the  wife  of  his  youth.  For 
the  Lord  God  of  Israel  saith  that  he  hateth  putting 
away."  What  a  picture  !  Poor  wronged  women 
bathing  the  altar  of  God  with  their  tears  ;  those  who 
did  the  wrong  seeking  to  be  rehgious  by  offerings 
while  they  yet  held  on  to  the  wrong  ;  God  rejecting 
their  offerino-s,  assertino;  the  law  of  marriao:e,  declar- 
ing  that  He  made  one  w^oman  for  a  perpetual  union 
with  one  man  that  the  children  might  be  trained  for 
Himself,  and  implying  that  this  could  be  done  in  no 
other  way. 

The  original  law  of  marriage,  thus  asserted  by 
Malachi,  Christ  fully  restored.  This  law  is  based 
on  the  very  nature  of  marriage,  and  is  confirmed 
by  the  fact  that  rather  more  males  than  females  are 
born,  allowance  being  made  for  their  greater  expos- 
ure to  the  causes  of  death.  This  has  been  so  felt 
to  be  a  law  of  nature  that  among  various  nations, 


246 


MORAL  SCIENCfi. 


the  Romans  and  Scythians,  who  have  not  had  the 
light  of  revelation,  marriage  has  been  held  sacred, 
adultery  has  been  punished  by  death ;  and  the  very 
law  of  divorce  laid  down  by  Christ  has  been 
adopted.  Hence  it  is  the  duty  of  Christian  States 
to  make  this  law  their  standard,  and  to  approximate 
it  as  nearly  as  the  state  of  public  sentiment  will 
allow.  No  doubt  there  are  cases  of  peculiar  hard- 
ship. Persons  of  uncongenial  temperaments  and 
tempers  are  united.  There  will  be  ill-assorted  mar- 
riages and  misadjustments  of  every  degree.  There 
will  be  vice  and  abandonment  on  one  part  or  the 
other,  and  such  cases  are  liable  to  be  of  peculiar 
hardship  to  the  woman.  But  facility  of  divorce 
will  set  back  its  influence  to  the  very  fountain-head 
of  the  institution.  It  will  affect  the  spirit  with  which 
marriage  is  entered  upon  ;  it  will  generate  and  mul- 
tiply the  very  evils  for  which  divorce  is  sought. 
Nothing  can  so  tend  to  repress  petty  differences, 
liable  to  become  exaggerated  into  permanent  feuds, 
as  the  consciousness,  always  felt  like  a  pervading  at- 
mosphere, even  when  it  is  not  recognized,  that  they 
are  inseparably  united  and  must  be  mutually  depend- 
ent. If  facility  of  divorce  be  sought,  as  it  is,  on  the 
ground  of  cases  of  special  hardship  to  women,  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  the  evils  of  divorce  fall 
with  peculiar  hardship  upon  her,  and  that  the  purity 
and  general  elevation  of  the  sex  will  always  be  in 
proportion  to  the  strictness  with  which  the  Jaw  of 
marriage  is  enforced. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  PARENTS  AND  CHILDREN, 

In  considering  the  reciprocal  riglits  and  duties  of 
parents  and  children,  we  are,  as  before,  to  be 
guided  by  the  Law  of  Love  interpreted  by  the  re- 
lation. The  child  is  entrusted  to  the  parents  by 
God.  In  its  original  weakness,  ignorance,  and  en- 
tire dependence,  the  parents  have,  and  must  have, 
the  rio;ht  of  entire  control.  As  the  child  becomes 
capable  of  taking  care  of  itself,  this  right  will  be 
modified,  till,  at  length,  when  the  occasion  for  it 
shall  cease,  the  rio;ht  will  cease  altoo-ether.  This  is 
typified  by  what  we  see  among  the  lower  animals. 
They  have  no  knowledge  of  rights,  but  the  care  and 
control  of  the  young  is  provided  for  by  an  in- 
stinct which  ceases  when  the  young  are  able  to  take 
care  of  themselves.  If  the  young  need  no  care, 
there  is  no  instinct,  showing  how  carefully  every- 
thino;  in  nature  is  furnished  and  regulated  with  ref- 
erence  to  ends. 

The  right  of  control  thus  belonging  to  the  parent 
is  to  be  used,  first,  to  promote  the  end  of  the  child, 
^nd  second,  of  the  family. 

The  end  of  the  child  is  not  identical  with  what  19 


218 


MOKAL  SCIENCfi. 


sometimes  called,  and  supposed  to  be,  the  good  of 
the  child,  consisting  in  his  own  personal  advance- 
ment or  enjoyment,  in  some  summum  bonum^^ 
that  can  belong  to  him  alone ;  but  it  is  the  very  end 
indicated  in  his  constitution,  and  for  which  God 
made  him,  that  is,  not  merely  to  be  a  recipient  of 
good,  but  an  originator  and  promoter  of  it,  in  sym- 
pathy ^\ith  God  in  his  spirit,  and  in  harmony  with 
Him  in  his  methods.  It  will  tlms  enter  into  the  con- 
ception of  his  end  .that  he  should  promote  the  good 
of  the  family. 

In  marriage  and  in  the  birth  of  children  the  fam- 
ily is  constituted.  This  is  a  divine  institution  hav- 
ing an  end  that  can  be  reached  only  through  all 
its  members;  and  while  the  child  may  not  be,  as 
the  ancients  supposed,  used  selfishly,  as  a  thing,  for 
the  good  of  the  parent,  he  may  yet  be  required  to  do 
all  things  that  are  legitimately  for  the  ends  of  the 
farfiily.  He  may  be  required  to  labor  for  the  com- 
mon support,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  parent  so  far 
to  control  each  child  that  no  one  shall  interfere 
with  the  riglits  of  any  of  the  others. 

This  right  of  control  may  and  should  be  en- 
forced by  physical  means  if  necessary.  There  is  an 
end  to  be  attained  for  the  child  himself  It  is  of 
the  last  importance  to  him  that  he  should  be  taught 
obedience  and  subordination.  These  are  in  the  or- 
der of  God's  providence,  and  he  who  does  not  know 
how  to  obey  will  never  know  how  to  rule.  The 
wime  thing  is  important  to  the  peace  of  the  family 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  PARENTS  AND  CHILDREN.  219 


and  of  society,  and  must  be  secured  by  every  legit- 
imate means.  Let  persuasion  be  tried.  Let  reason 
be  appealed  to  ;  but  if  these  will  not  suffice,  the  rod 
should  not  be  spared.  Perhaps  the  rod  was  for- 
merly used  too  much.  It  will  be  quite  as  mischiev- 
ous in  every  way  to  use  it  too  little.  The  child  has 
a  rational  nature,  but  may  not  be  reasonable.  He 
has  also  an  animal  nature,  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  that  should  not  be  appealed  to.  Do  you  think 
it  degrading  to  your  child  to  whip  him  ?  You  need 
not  do  that.  Whip  the  mule  that  is  in  him.  If 
possible  whip  it  out  of  him,  and  then  you  will  have 
a  child  and  not  a  mule.  The  less  we  have  of  the 
use  of  the  rod  the  better,  but  government,  subor- 
dination, order,  must  be  maintained,  and  if  these 
cannot  be  had  without  the  rod,  the  parent  is  dere-* 
lict  in  his  duty  if  he  do  not  use  it. 

The  rights  of  the  parent  are  for  the  sake  of  his 
First  duty  of  ^utics,  and  to  enable  him  to  perform 
pfyoV p^Z/J?"  them.  His  first  duty  is  to  provide  for  phys- 
ical wants,  j^^i  ^ants,  in  whole  or  in  part,  according 
to  the  age  of  the  child,  and  to  make  such  provision 
as  shall  comport  with  his  condition  in  life.  He  is 
bound  to  provide  for  his  health  and  physical  devel- 
opment, and  to  put  him  to  no  such  employment  in 
kind  or  degree  as  shall  interfere  with  these. 

The  second  duty  of  the  parent  is  to  secure  such 
Second  duty;  intellectual  cducatiou  and  such  training, 
education,  some  industrial  pursuit,  or  in  some  pro- 
fession, as  shall  secure  his  support  and  his  useful- 


260 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


ness  as  a  citizen.  It  might  be  supposed  that  nat- 
ural affection  would  secure  this,  but  in  all  states  of 
society  there  are  individual  cases  in  which  it  does 
not,  and  it  is  found  that  liio;h  civilization  and  ao-o-re- 
gate  labor  have  hitherto,  by  some  misadjustment, 
precipitated  a  stratum  of  society  in  which  artificial 
appetite  and  animal  want  have  so  been  the  prevail- 
ing element  as  to  subordinate  natural  affections, 
making  the  children  mere  instruments  of  selfishness, 
and  dooming  them,  almost  by  necessity,  to  a  similar 
condition.  It  is  this  state  of  things  that  has  justi- 
fied, and  that  alone  could  justify  an  interference  by 
society  with  the  hours  of  labor,  which,  we  should 
naturally  suppose,  parents  would  best  know  how  to 
regulate.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  parent  to  make  over 
to  society  good  material  for  its  upbuilding,  and  if 
any  class  of  parents  fail  to  do  this,  society  not  only 
has  the  right,  but  is  bound  in  self-defense  to  inter- 
fere. 

The  third  great  duty  of  the  parent  relates  to 
moral  and  religious  training.  (  Man  does  Third  duty; 
not  live  by  bread  alone,"  nor  can  the  ^i^^o^g^ 
child.  He  is  capable  of  being  trained  for  ^^^^^^"g- 
God,  and  God  has  entrusted  him  to  the  parent  that 
he  may  be  thus  trained.  The  only  effectual  way  in 
which  tlie  parent  can  do  this  is  himself  to  be  what 
the  child  should  be.  There  is  in  example  an  im- 
perceptible and  pervading  influence  that  can  be  had 
in  no  other  way.  Let  this  be  good  in  principle,  and 
judicious  in  outward  form,  and  all  other  good  in- 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  PARENTS  AND  CHILDREN.  251 

Alienees  will,  almost  of  course,  fall  into  its  train. 
Let  this  be  evil,  and  it  will  be  mainly  through  this, 
in  connection  with  physical  deterioration,  that  the 
miquities  of  the  fathers  will  be  visited  upon  the 
children  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation. 

But  besides  this,  much  may  be  done  in  giving 
direction  to  reading,  in  regulating  associations,  in 
forming  habits.  And  all  this,  especially  the  forma- 
tion of  habits  of  thouo-ht  and  feelino-  as  well  as  of 
action,  is  to  be  begun  very  early.  They  will  then 
become  incorporated  into  the  life  as  they  will  not  be 
likely  to  be,  and  perhaps  never  can  be  afterwards. 
In  all  this  there  is  to  be  care  not  to  do  anything 
obtrusively  or  in  excess.  Much  harm  has  been 
done  by  bending  the  bow  too  far.  It  flies  back.  It 
may  be  difficult  in  the  stress  and  pressure  which 
active  business  life,  and  especially  public  life,  brings 
upon  men  to  give  the  time  needed  for  such  training 
of  children,  but  no  folly  can  be  greater  than  that  so 
common  in  this  country,  by  which  parents  make 
themselves  slaves  to  lay  up  money  which,  for  want 
of  right  training  and  moral  qualifications  in  the 
children,  becomes  their  ruin.  Nothing  can  be  more 
Bad  or  instructive  than  the  history,  in  this  regard, 
of  many  of  our  wealthy  families.  It  is  no  less  the 
wisdom  of  parents,  in  behalf  of  their  children  than 
in  behalf  of  themselves,  to  "  seek  first  the  Kingdom 
of  God  and  his  righteousness."  The  highest  value 
of  wealth  must  be  to  purchase  for  children,  indi- 
rectly of  course,  more  knowledge,  more  wisdom. 


252 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


more  health,  better  habits,  to  give  them  better  facil- 
ities for  usefuhiess,  and  more  chances  of  it ;  in 
short,  to  raise  them  to  a  higher  manhood.  Thus  a 
high  manhood,  a  pure,  elevated  womanhood,  is  the 
end  to  be  reached.  If  it  can  be  reached,  as  cer- 
tainly it  may,  without  wealth,  that  is  of  httle  conse- 
quence. If  wealth  becomes  obstructive  of  this,  it 
is  a  curse.  But  it  need  not  be  thus  obstructive. 
Instead  of  vanity,  pride,  dissipation,  luxury,  effemi- 
nacy, tlie  result  of  wealth  may  be,  and  should  be, 
the  training  of  famihes  not  only  in  the  knowledge 
and  virtues  that  give  dignity  to  life,  but  also  in 
every  accomplishment  that  can  give  it  grace. 

We  now  pass  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  chil 
dren. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  a  rio;ht  and  an  oblio;ation 
are  reciprocal  :  that  wherever  there  is  a    Rights  of 

^  ...  children 

right  there  is  a  corresponding  obligation,  cbums. 
This  is  not  strictly  true.  The  parent,  as  a  parent,  is 
for  the  sake  of  the  child.  His  rights  are  to  enable 
him  to  perform  his  duties,  and  both  are  for  the  sake 
of  the  child,  and  these  rights  and  duties  commence 
before  there  can  be  either  duties  or  conscious  rights 
on  the  part  of  the  child.  And  when  the  child  be- 
comes capable  of  duties  and  conscious  of  rights,  these 
have  generally  no  reference  to  the  end  of  the  parent. 
The  rights  give  no  right  of  control,  but  are  simply 
claims,  and  the  duties  are  mostly  such  as  are  re 
quired  by  the  well-being  of  the  child,  which  is,  oi 
«llould  be,  the  great  object  desired  by  the  parent. 


BIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  PARENTS  AND  CHILDREN.  253 


The  duties  of  children  may  all  be  comprised  in 
Duties  of  ^^^^  word  "AoTior,"  as  that  is  used  in 
:hiidrea.  ^he  Fifth  Commandment.  This  sentiment 
of  honor  towards  the  parent,  expressing  itself  ir 
outward  act  accordino;  to  the  chanmno;  relation  of 
parent  and  child  in  the  progress  of  the  child  towards 
maturity,  would  hold  the  parent  and  child  in  per- 
petual harmony,  and  would  secure  to  both  every 
end  contemplated  by  the  parental  relation.  The 
child  that  honors  his  father  and  mother  will  render 
them  implicit  obedience  in  his  early  years.  If,  as 
his  power  and  right  of  self-control  are  increased,  it 
should  become  his  duty  to  differ  in  any  respect  from 
the  parent,  or  even  to  disobey  him,  as  in  rare  and 
exceptional  cases  it  may  be,  the  spirit  of  the  law 
will  still  be  preserved,  and  all  will  be  done  that  can 
be  with  a  good  conscience,  to  meet  not  only  the 
commands,  but  the  feelings  and  the  wishes  of  the 
parent.     The   temper   expressed   by  this  word 

honor,"  is  precisely  that  which  is  needed  to  fit 
die  child  for  his  duties  towards  God  and  towards 
society  as  represented  by  government.  This  spirit, 
extending  itself  from  the  parental  relation  into  all 
others,  permeating  the  character,  becomes  a  foun- 
tain of  courtesy,  and  makes  the  difference  between 
a  people  reverent,  mutually  respectful,  and  capable 
of  self-control,  and  an  irreverent,  reckless,  profane 
mass  of  individuals  incapable  of  self-government, 
and  sure  to  inaugurate,  sooner  or  later,  in  the  name 
wf  liberty,  a  state  of  society  compared  with  which 


254 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


despotism  would  be  a  blessing.  So  long  as  children 
honor  their  parents  in  this  land,  there  will  be  piety 
towards  God,  and  freedom  in  the  State  ;  but  if  these 
fountains  be  corrupted,  whatever  form  governments 
may  assume,  men  will  fall  off  from  their  allegiance 
to  God,  and  the  spirit  and  benefits  of  freedom  will 
depart. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


SOCIETY  AND  GOVERNMENT:  THE  SPHERE  OF  GOV* 
ERNMENT :  ORIGIN  OF  GOVERNMENT  :  MODE  OF 
FORMATION. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  Civil  Society  and 
Civil  Government. 

Government  is  the  agent  of  society  for  the  ac- 
Government  complishmcnt  of  its  cnds,  and  like  the 
how  divine,  f^ixjily^  is  a  divinc  institution.  By  a  divine 
institution,  we  mean  one  made  necessary  by  God 
through  relations  ordained  by  him  for  the  attain- 
ment of  our  end.  The  fact  that  food  is  necessary 
to  sustain  life,  makes  the  use  of  it  of  divine  ap- 
pointment ;  and  the  fact  that  the  end  of  the  child 
cannot  be  attained  except  through  control  by  the 
parent,  gives  the  parent  rights  directly  from  God, 
and  imposes  upon  the  child  corresponding  duties. 
No  assent  or  contract  on  the  part  of  the  parent,  or 
of  the  child,  is  required  to  constitute  the  family  so 
far  as  to  render  valid  every  right  and  obligation 
needed  for  the  attainment  of  its  ends.  The  rights 
and  duties  are  from  the  ends.  The  relations,  caus- 
ing the  family  to  be  what  it  is,  indicate  those  ends, 
and  through  them,  the  will  of  God.     These  rela- 


256 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


dons  and  ends  man  cannot  change.  He  can  only 
act  or  refuse  to  act  in  conformity  with,  or  in  refer- 
ence to  them.  Acting  in  conformity  with  these 
relations,  and  with  reference  to  these  ends,  the 
blessings  intended  to  flow  from  the  family  will  be 
realized,  and  as  there  is  a  failure  in  this,  evil  will 
residt.  The  institution  is  from  God,  it  cannot  be 
changed  by  man.  All  he  can  do  is  to  conform,  or 
refuse  to  conform,  to  the  relations  it  involves,  and 
seek,  or  refuse  to  seek  the  ends  indicated  by  those 
relations. 

And  precisely  so  it  is  with  Civil  Government.  It 
is  a  divine  institution,  if  not  as  directly,  ^.^.^  ^^^^ 
yet  as  really  as  is  the  family.  The  dhiuHnsti- 
rights  which  society  has,  and  which  it  may 
rightfully  exercise  through  some  form  of  govern- 
ment it  has  from  no  contract.  Men  may,  if  they 
choose,  express  the  rights  and  duties  involved  in 
government  in  the  form  of  a  contract,  but  it  is  a 
mistake,  and  may  lead  to  mischievous  consequences 
to  suppose  that  these  rights  and  duties  originate  in 
any  form  of  contract.  By  the  constitution  of  God 
the  ends  of  the  individual  can  be  attained  only 
through  government,  and  therefore  the  rights  of 
government  and  the  duties  of  individuals  under  it 
originate  in  the  same  way  as  tlie  rights  and  duties  of 
parents  and  of  children.  The  individual  is  born  in 
Bociety.  That  is  his  natural  state,  and  as  thus  born 
both  society  and  he  have  reciprocal  rights  and  duties. 
These  he  may  recognize  and  have  all  the  beneliti 


SOCIETY  AiSD  GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


257 


of  society  and  of  government,  or  he  may  refuse  to 
recognize  them  and  be  deprived- of  tliese  benefits, 
but  the  rights  and  duties  exist  independently  of 
his  wilL  They  exist,  and  in  entering  into  society, 
the  individual  comes  under  no  new  obhgation,  and 
gives  up  no  right. 

It  is  said  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
that  *'  Governments  derive  their  just  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed."  If,  as  most  have 
supposed,  this  refers  to  the  foundation  of  govern- 
ment, and  not  to  its  form,  the  above  view  is  opposed 
to  it.  Such  a  doctrine  would  exclude  the  will  of 
God  as  underlying  government.  It  would  also  take 
away  its  authority,  for  the  consent  that  may  be 
given  at  will  may  be  withdrawn  at  will.  Besides, 
the  principle  would  require,  not  merely  the  consent 
of  a  majority,  but  of  every  man.  Such  a  doctrine 
may  please  the  popular  ear,  and  be  accepted  when 
there  is  no  strain  upon  the  government ;  but  when, 
as  in  our  late  struggle,  there  is  such  a  strain,  the 
instinct  of  the  nation  sets  aside  the  doctrine  of  mere 
contract  or  consent,  and  practically  asserts  an  au- 
thority resting  on  a  deeper  basis.  Its  form  of  gov- 
ernment a  nation  may  ordain  and  change.  If  that 
government  overstep  the  hmit  of  just  authority  it 
may  be  resisted,  but  within  those  limits  its  rights 
are  from  God. 

The  distinction  between  society  and  government 
Distinction    ^^^^^        morc  prominent  if  we  suppose 
jTety^and^"    ^^^^^  individual  composing  the  society  to 
foTMument        perfect,  that  is,  to  exercise  a  perfect 
17 


268 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


6elf-gc7ernment.  In  that  case  nothing  that  30uld 
properly  be  called  government  would  be  ne8ded. 
There  might  be  regulations  respecting  all  matters 
requiring  uniformity  and  involving  no  principle,  as 
the  age  for  voting,  or  the  distribution  of  the  prop- 
erty of  one  dying  intestate.  These  might  be 
made  by  the  united  experience  and  wisdom  of  the 
community,  and  to  them  all  would  conform,  not  as 
under  government,  but  as  apprehending  the  rea- 
son of  them,  or,  at  least,  the  necessity  of  uniform- 
ity. We  should  thus  have,  with  perfect  family 
government,  and  perfect  self-government,  which  is 
simply  obedience  by  the  individual  to  the  law  of 
God,  society  without  civil  government,  but  capable 
of  being  organized  into  a  civil  government  when- 
ever the  occasion  should  arise. 

Such  occasion  can  arise  only  as  civil  government 
may  be  needed  to  enable  individuals  to  Ground  and 
reach  their  end,  and  it  will  have  no  right  ordvn  gov- 
to  do  anything  which  will  not  contribute 
to  that.  Government  can  have  for  a  legitimate 
end  only  the  good  of  the  governed.  The  object  of 
it  is  to  do  that  for  the  individual  whereby  he  may 
be  enabled  to  attain  his  end  which  he  could  not  do 
for  himself. 

What  then  can  government  do  for  the  individua 
which  he  cannot  do  for  himself? 

To  answer  this  question  fully  we  must  contem 
plate  govemment  in  two  aspects  :  Is**,  as  the  indi- 
vidual may  take  a  part  in  forming  and  administering 


SOCIETY  AND  GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  259 


it ;  and  2dly,  as  it  is  an  agency  standing  apart  from 
the  individual  and  above  him  for  the  doing  of  that 
which  he  could  not  do  himself. 

In  treatino;  of  p-overnment  it  has  been  this  latter 
Participation  aspect  that  has  been  almost  wholly  re- 

derelops  the  i    i       rn  i  ^• 

governed.  gardcd.  li  we  supposc  a  despotic  govern- 
ment to  do  for  the  people  all  that  it  can  do,' — let  it 
be  wholly  paternal,  —  yet  the  influences  under  which 
the  individual  will  be  formed  will  be  wholly  different 
from  those  under  a  free  government  where  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  individual  to  understand  and  take  part 
in  the  formation  and  the  administration  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Free  institutions  have  their  value  not 
merely  from  their  greater  tendency  to  secure  the 
rights  of  the  individual,  but  also  from  their  educa- 
ting, formative,  developing  power.  Free  institutions 
tend  to  become,  and  will  become  in  themselves,  a 
great  university  for  political  education,  as  well  as  a 
sure  guarantee  that  provision  shall  be  made  for  uni- 
versal education  in  other  directions.  As,  therefore, 
man  has  a  right  to  the  best  means  of  development 
as  well  as  to  the  best  conditions  for  action  under  a 
government,  it  may  be  said  that  he  has  a  right  to 
free  institutions  whenever  and  wherever  he  is  capa- 
ble of  so  administering  them  as  to  secure  their 
ends. 

But  apart  from  this,  regarding  government  as 
Bomething  already  formed,  the  inquiry  arises  what 
it  can  properly  do  for  the  individual  which  he  could 
Qot  do  for  himself,  for,  as  self-help  is  the  great  coa 


260 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


dition  of  growth,  it  must  dwarf  the  individual,  and 
deaden  enterprise  to  have  the  government  do  what 
the  individual  can. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  first  and  great 
function  of  government  is  to  secure  to  all  Government 
tlieir  rights.  Of  rights  we  have  already  ^e^^j^^ts^ 
spoken.  They  include  all  that  is  necessary  ^* 
for  the  attainment  by  the  individual  of  his  end. 
Give  man  his  rights  in  regard  to  Life,  to  Liberty, 
to  Property,  to  Reputation,  to  Truth,  and  give  him 
Security  respecting  all  these,  and  you  do  for  him 
all  that  is  essential.  If,  with  such  conditions,  he 
fail  of  attaining  the  ends  he  ought  to  attain  it  must 
be  his  own  fault. 

•  It  is  sometimes  said  to  be  a  separate  ofSce  of  gov- 
ernment not  only  to  secure  the  rights,  but  Government 

to  redress  the  wrongs  of  the  individual,  dress  wrongs. 
There  is  room  for  this  distinction,  though  the  secur- 
ing of  rights  and  the  redress  of  wrongs  are  really 
the  same  thing  viewed  in  different  aspects.  If  a 
man  has  been  wronged  it  is  his  right  to  have  that 
wrong  redressed  if  that  be  possible,  and  if  that  be 
not  possible,  it  is  the  right  of  society  to  demand 
Buch  punishment  as  will  give  them  all  the  security 
of  which  the  case  admits.  The  great  end  therefore 
of  a  government  is  to  secure  promptly  and  efficiently 
the  rights  of  all  who  are  under  it,  and  it  is  a  good 
government  in  proportion  as  it  does  this.  This,  of 
course,  can  be  done  only  as  there  is  perfect  equality 
?br  all  in  the  eye  of  the  law.    It  is  against  the  vio- 


SOCIETY  AiSD  GOYEKNMENT,  ETC. 


261 


lation  .f  a  right  as  such,  of  any  right,  of  the  right 
of  the  humblest  and  poorest,  that  the  government  is 
to  guard,  and  if  any  difference  be  made  it  should  be 
in  favor  of  the  humble  and  the  poor.  The  prompt^ 
efficient,  impartial  protection  of  rights  and  the  re- 
dress of  wrongs,  is  then  the  first  great  office  of  gov- 
ernment. 

A  second  legitimate  function  of  government  is  to 
Government  S^^^  facilities,  somctimcs  for  individual,  but 
ute^nter-^^^  moTe  oftcu  foT  associatcd  enterprise.  It 
may  thus  limit  and  regulate  copyrights, 
and  patent-rights,  and  may  incorporate  companies  to 
enable  them  to  pursue  branches  of  business  which 
could  not  well  be  undertaken  by  individual  enter- 
prise. Whatever  individual  protection  or  further- 
ance any  individual  may  need  to  attain  the  ends  of  any 
lawful  form  of  industry  he  ought  to  have  —  provided 
no  special  privilege  be  given  him,  for  no  partiality 
or  favoritism  should  be  shown  in  legislation.  And 
in  incorporations,  as  of  banks,  the  acts  should  be 
passed  not  at  all  for  the  special  benefit  of  those  who 
are  incorporated,  but  of  the  public.  All  such  acts 
should  either  be  open  to  all,  or  should  be  limited 
iolely  by  a  regard  to  the  public  good. 

This  general  head  of  furnishing  facilities  opens  a 
field  of  legislation  into  which  abuses  may  readily 
creep  ;  still  it  is  not  only  legitimate,  but  well-nigh 
indispensable.  Government,  as  the  agent  of  society, 
may  even  undertake  enterprises  in  its  own  name  that 
shall  furnish  facilities  for  the  people  generally,  but 


262 


MOBAL  SCIENCE. 


the  utmost  caution  is  needed  in  selecting,  and  in 
carrying  forward  such  enterprises.  It  is  a  special 
danger  under  our  form  of  government  that  public 
enterprises  will  be  entered  upon  for  private  advan- 
tage, and  that  they  will  be  carried  forw^ard  both 
wastefully  and  corruptly. 

These  then  are  the  direct  objects  which  a  govern- 
ment may  propose  to  itself, —  the  protection  of  all 
rights,  the  redress  of  wrongs,  and  the  furnishing  of 
facilities,  without  favoritism,  for  the  enterprise  of 
the  people. 

There  is  also  an  object  which  must  be  regarded 
as  lemtimate,  which  largely  mves  tone  to  Seif-preser- 

^  '  J  &  vationof 

the  measures  adopted  under  every  form  govemment. 
of  government,  and  that  is  its  own  preservation. 
Whatever  has  a  riglit  to  be  has  a  right  to  all  the 
means  necessary  to  its  permanence  and  well-being. 
Hence  despotic  governments,  assuming  their  right 
to  be,  must  maintain  standing  armies.  Hence  lim- 
ited monarchies  must  have  an  aristocracy  to  stand 
between  them  and  the  people,  and  both  must  exer- 
cise control  over  both  education  and  rehVion. '  With- 
out  these  no  monarchy  has  been  permanent,  or  can 
be.  If,  by  extraordinary  talent  and  sagacity,  a  man 
\ike  Louis  Napoleon  may  seize  the  reins  and  hold 
them  for  his  lifetime,  it  is  yet  felt  that  his  govern- 
ment has  no  permanent  basis.  Louis  Napoleon 
had  a  son  who  would  naturally  succeed  him,  but 
if  you  asked  a  Frenchman  what  would  happen  if 
the  father  should  die,  he  would  simply  shrug  hi^ 


SOCIETY  AND  GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  263 


shoulders,  and  say  nothing.  It  was  the  instinct 
of  self-preservation  that  led  Napoleon  and  the 
English  aristocracy  to  take  part  against  ns  in  our 
late  struggle,  and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  every 
established  form  of  government  and  every  invested 
interest  should  be  governed  in  the  same  way. 
j  it  is  on  the  principle  we  are  now  considering  tlic^t 
tience  right  frcc  govemmcnts  havo  the  right  to  pro- 
meutto       vide  for  and  maintain  schools  instead  of 

naintain 

schools.  standing  armies,  and  to  restrict  the  right 
of  voting  and  of  office-holding  within  such  limits 
as  the  safety  of  the  Republic  may  require.  The 
apprehension  of  these  two  rights,  especially  of  the 
right  to  tax  the  property  of  all,  whether  they  have 
or  have  not  children  to  educate,  has  been  slow  in 
finding  its  way  into  the  public  mind,  and  would  still 
be  contested  even  in  many  parts  of  our  own  coun- 
try, but  it  rests  on  solid  ground  if  it  can  be  shown, 
as  clearly  it  can,  that  virtue  and  intelligence  are  the 
essential  conditions  of  a  free  and  popular  govern- 
ment. It  is  only  on  this  ground  that  this  right  can 
rest,  for  the  government  can  have  no  right  to  take 
property  of  one  man  for  the  benefit  of  others  unless 
it  be  essential  to  its  own  beino;  or  well-beino;. 

But  may  not  the  governmer.t  promote  intelligence 
Legislation    and  moralitv  for  their  own  sake  ?    May  it 

not  directly  i      .  i  t         i      p        i  • 

formcraiity.  not  legislate  dircctly  tor  their  promotion 
as  ends  ?  No.  It  must  protect  the  rights  of  all, 
redress  their  wrongs  and  give  them  facilities  such 
as  a  government  only  can  give,  and  leave  the  pro- 
motion of  virtue  and  intelligence,  except  as  these 


264 


MORAL  SCIENCE, 


may  bo  demanded  for  its  own  being  or  efficiency,  to 
individual  effort,  or  to  voluntary  association.  Es- 
pecially is  it  to  be  said  that  government  may  not 
interfere  in  any  way  with  religion  except  as  such 
interference  may  be  required  by  the  principles  above 
mentioned. 

But  may  there  not  be  legislation  in  favor  of  tem- 
perance? No.  The  promotion  of  temperance  is 
no  proper  object  of  legislation.  Temperance  has 
the  same  relation  to  legislation  that  honesty  has. 
The  laws  against  stealing  are  not  for  the  promotion 
of  honesty,  but  for  the  protection  of  rights  ;  and  in 
the  same  way  if  the  traffic  in  ardent  spirits  did  not 
interfere  directly  or  indirectly  with  the  rights  of 
others  it  would  not  be  a  proper  subject  for  legisla- 
tion. Let  those  wlio  carry  on  this  traffic  guarantee 
the  public  against  the  crime  and  increase  of  tax- 
ation it  occasions  and  there  need  be  no  lemslation 
on  the  subject.  But  the  moment  any  business  can 
be  shown  to  be  the  cause  of  crime  on  which  the 
courts  estabhshed  by  the  government  must  sit,  or  of 
taxation  which  the  government  must  assess  and 
collect,  it  comes  within  the  range  of  legislation,  and 
the  community  have  a  right  to  the  best  legislation 
that  can  be  devised  for  their  protection.  Neither 
liquor  sellers  nor  liquor  dealers  have  any  rights  be- 
yond the  point  where  their  acts  begin  to  touch  the 
right  of  others  to  property  or  to  security,  or  even 
their  right  to  be  ])rotected  from  those  moral  con- 
iitions  which,  as  human  nature  is  now  constituted. 


SOCIETY  AND  GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  265 


will  insure  the  corruption  of  the  young  and  of  the 
weak  through  temptations  addressed  to  their  senses, 
and  which  are  obtruded  upon  them. 

Much  has  been  said  of  attempts  to  make  men 
moral  by  legislation,  and  of  prescribing  to  men  what 
they  shall  eat  and  drink ;  but  no  one  who  under- 
stands the  proper  objects  of  legislation  would  think 
of  doing  either  of  these.  If  morality  may  be  indi- 
rectly promoted  by  legislation,  so  much  the  better. 
If,  in  order  to  abate  taxation  and  crime  and  nuis- 
ances, it  may  become  necessary  to  render  intoxica- 
tino;  drinks  less  accessible  than  some  who  midit 
safely  use  them  would  desire,  this  is  not  the  object 
intended,  but  only  the  means  necessary  for  a  legiti- 
mate end. 

It  will  appear  from  the  above,  that  in  addition  to 
True  end  of  uieasurcs  nccdcd  for  its  owu  preservation, 
government.  cliicf  fuuctiou  of  govcmment  is  the 
removingjof  obstacles.  Its  end  is  attained  when  all 
the  individuals  under  it  attain  their  end.  But  this 
can  be  done  only  through  the  positive  exertion  by 
each  one  of  his  own  faculties,  and  all  that  govern- 
ment can  do  is  to  secure  favorable  conditions  for  this. 
The  fatal  mistake  has  been,  that  governments  have 
proposed  ends  of  their  own,  and  in  securing  these 
nave  been  utterly  reckless  of  both  the  rights  and 
the  ends  of  the  individual.  When  this  is  done  in 
the  least  degree,  it  matters  not  what  the  form  of 
government  may  be,  —  it  is  a  perversion  and 
tyranny. 


266 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


We  next  inquire  when,  m  the  profiress  The  origin 

^     ,  .  ^     ^  of  govern- 

or the  race,  civil  government  becomes  ment. 

necessary. 

If  we  make,  as  we  must,  a  distinction  betwecE 
government  and  society,  society  being  the  principal, 
and  government  the  agent,  then  government  can- 
not be  needed,  or  possible,  till  there  is  society.  But 
as  demanding  civil  government,  a  single  family  can- 
not constitutp  society.  The  family  has  a  govern- 
ment of  its  own,  and  suffices  for  itself.  Before 
there  can  be  civil  government,  there  must  be  an 
aggregation  of  families.  Hence  it  is  that  the  family, 
and  not  the  individual,  is  the  unit  of  civil  govern- 
ment. This,  in  the  patriarchal  form,  would  natu- 
rally grow  out  of  the  union  of  several  families  hav- 
ing a  common  origin  ;  and  this  again  would  naturally 
extend  and  consolidate  itself  in  monarchy.  This  is 
supposed  to  have  been  the  actual  origin  of  govern- 
ment. 

This  needs  to  be  fully  comprehended  ;  for  if  society 
ever  consisted  of  disinteo-rated  individuals,  standinor 
on  an  equality,  and  an  attempt  hsid  been  made  to 
construct  somethino;  unknown  before,  to  be  called  a 
government,  all  would  have  had  an  equal  right  to 
take  part  in  such  construction.  But  consisting  as 
society  did  of  flimilies,  and  needing  only  such  ex- 
tension and  modification  of  principles  of  government 
already  existing  as  should  secure  in  wider  relations 
the  conditions  of  well-being  previously  secured  in 
ihe  family,  there  would  be  not  only  a  natural  rights 


SOCIETY  AND  GOVERNMENT.  ETC. 


26t 


but  a  necessity,  that  in  the  formation  of  civil  govern* 
ment  fainihes  should  be  represented  by  their  heads. 
Such  a  work  could  not  have  been  done  by  the  body 
3f  those  whose  rights  were  to  be  secured,  and,  if 
Formally  done,  the  heads  of  families  would  be  the 
divinely  appointed  representatives  to  do  it.  If 
these  were  to  meet  and  adopt  such  a  form  of  gov- 
ernment as  should  seem  to  them  best  adapted  to 
secure  civil  liberty,  that  government  would  not 
stand  simply  as  the  product  of  human  wisdom  and 
will,  but,  as  growing  out  of  relations  divinely  consti- 
tuted, would  have  divine  authority. 

But  no  such  formal  meeting  was  originally  held. 
With  no  discussion  of  abstract  rights,  by  a  move- 
ment spontaneous,  gradual,  self-adjusting,  as  al] 
primitive  movements  for  the  attainment  of  ends  in- 
dicated by  nature  are,  government  would  naturally 
grow  out  of  the  union  of  several  families  having  a 
common  origin,  the  head  and  natural  representative 
of  each  family  caring  for  its  interests  as  occasion 
might  arise.  In  this  way,  but  for  usurpations  and 
abuses,  government  might  have  gone  on  indefinitely^ 
In  some  cases,  as  throughout  the  East,  these  usur 
pations  and  abuses  were  such  as  to  crush  out  liberty, 
and  produce  permanent  degradation  and  hopeless- 
ness among  the  people.  In  others  they  have 
resulted  in  agitation,  revolution,  discussion  of  rights, 
and  in  attempts  to  found  governments  on  such 
rights. 

So  instinctive,  however,  has  been  the  tendency 


268 


mohal  science. 


above  indicated  to  crystallize  into  governments  by 

an  inherent  force,  that  formal  declarations  ^^^^^ 
of  rio;hts  had  scarcely  been  thouo;ht  of  S™Jt«r^ 

o  J  o  ot  govern- 

till  our  OTvn  revolution,  and  then  their 
effect  was  less  than  has  generally  been  supposed. 
There  was  no  destruction  of  old  governments,  and 
construction  of  new  ones  on  the  basis  of  principles 
formally  laid  down.  The  colonial  governments 
were  continued.  The  laws  were  essentially  the 
same  under  the  Confederation  as  before,  though  the 
seat  of  sovereignty  was  changed;  and  when  the 
Constitution  was  formed  there  was  simply  a  new 
distribution  of  some  of  the  essential  powers  of  gov- 
ernment, and  a  new  mode  of  appointing  those  by 
whom  the  government  should  be  administered.  It 
was  not  the  object  to  find  a  new  basis  of  govern- 
ment, but  such  a  mode  of  appointing  its  officers  and 
such  a  distribution  of  its  functions  as  should  give 
the  best  guarantee  that  its  ends  should  be  secured. 
There  had  been  abuse,  and  the  object  was  to  guard 
against  that.  The  inquiry  then  was,  and  is  now, 
how  government  may  be  so  guarded  from  abuse 
as  to  secure  for  all  that  civil  liberty  which  is  its 
end. 


CHAPTER  VIIL 


QOTEBNMENT  KEPRESENTATIVE  AND  INSTRUMENTAL  t 
THE  RIGHT  OF  SUFFRAGE. 

If  we  suppose  government  to  have  originated  as 
above,  spontaneously,  formally,  or  in  whatever  way, 
it  is  plain  that  those  who  take  part  in  it,  whether  in 
its  original  formation,  or  by  voting  or  by  holding  of- 
fice, must  act  largely  in  a  representative  capacity. 
They  must  act  for  the  children,  the  sick,  the  infirm, 
the  insane,  the  criminal,  the  absent.  If  adult  women 
were  permitted  to  vote,  there  would  still  remain  a 
large  majority  who  could  take  no  part  in  the  gov- 
ernment, and  whose  rights  could  be  secured  only 
as  they  were  thus  represented.  Hence  all  con- 
cerned in  government  act  as  trustees  and  guardians. 
Government  is  not  an  end,  it  is  instrumental.  It  is 
as  a  bridge  over  which  all  must  pass,  and  what 
society  cares  for  is  to  have  a  bridge  that  will  carry 
all  safely  over.  It  is  in  that  that  essential  rights 
and  interests  are  involved,  and  society  has  a  right 
to  see  that  only  those  are  engaged  in  building  the 
bridge  who  know  how,  and  are  disposed  to  build  it 
^vell. 

But  if  government  be  thus  representative  and 


270 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


instiumental,  it  will  follow,  since  natural  rights  be- 
long to  all,  that  the  right  to  take  part  in  ^.^^^ 
it,  whether  by  voting  or  holding  office,  control 
cannot  be  a  natural  right ;  and  also  that  ^^^^^se. 
society  will  have  the  right  to  say  who  shall  exercise 
that  right,  and  on  what  conditions.    Hence  society 
may  rightfully  require  that  voters  and  office-holders 
shall  be  above  a  certain  age,  shall  have  a  certain 
degree  of  education,  shall  have  committed  no  infa- 
mous crime,  and  the  like. 

It  also  follows  from  the  representative  character 
of  voting,  that  the  exercise  of  the  right  suffrage  aa 
becomes  a  duty,  and  that  citizens  cannot 
treat  it,  as  they  frequently  would,  as  a  personal 
right  or  privilege  which  they  may  rightfully  at  their 
pleasure  forego  ;  but  it  imposes  a  solemn  obligation, 
requiring  in  the  voter  the  exercise  of  his  intelligence 
and  discretion,  if  not  for  himself,  at  least  for  the  sake 
of  others  who  cannot  take  part  in  the  government, 
and  even  for  the  sake  of  posterity,  who  will  one  day 
inherit  his  work,  and  be  affected  by  his  care  or  his 
neglect.  So  essential  is  this  that  society  might  com- 
pel the  exercise  (f  this  right,  and  insist  that  those 
to  whom  it  is  comn  utted  shall  not  lay  it  lightly  aside, 
nor  be  allowed  to  shield  themselves  under  the  idea 
that  it  is  a  personal  right  and  privilege,  and  thus 
stand  idly  by  while  others  inflict  an  injury  on  soci- 
ety ;  but  might  require  of  them,  as  of  more  forma] 
^ardians  and  trustees,  that  they  shall  act  for  the 
Oenefit  of  their  wards,  though  they  may  not  care 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  271 

sufficiently  for  their  own  rights,  as  members  of  soci- 
ety, to  protect  them. 

But  while  it  is  undeniable  that  the  right  of  suf- 
Right  of  frage  extends  to  interests  far  beyond  thoso 
sonferred.  of  tho  individual  who  may  claim  to  exer- 
cise it,  and  hence  that  no  individual  can  claim  to 
exercise  it  as  a  natural  right,  it  still  remains  a  duty 
for  society  to  confer  this  right  in  the  most  just  and 
secure  manner  that  human  wisdom  can  devise. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  said  that  there  has  doubtless 
been  from  the  first  the  spontaneous  and  unconscious 
operation  of  a  principle  which  should  be  a  control- 
ling one,  that  is,  that  those  should  vote  on  any  sub- 
ject on  v/hom  the  responsibility  with  reference  to 
it  falls.  It  has  seemed  right  that  those  \vho  are  to 
go  to  war  should  determine  the  question  of  war, 
and  that  those  who  are  liable  to  do  military  and 
police  duty,  and  sit  on  juries,  who  are  to  work  on 
the  highways  and  pay  the  taxes,  should  vote  on 
those  subjects  ;  that  those,  in  short,  whoever  they 
may  be,  who  do  the  fighting,  and  the  working,  and 
the  tax-paying,  should  also  do  the  voting.  It  would 
be  quite  as  unjust  that  war  should  be  declared 
through  the  votes  of  women  and  children  who  could 
take  no  part  in  it,  as  that  men  should  impose  taxes 
on  property  which  women  have  acquired.  If  it  be 
said  that  the  interests  of  women  are  as  much  opposed 
CO  war  as  those  of  men,  and  that  they  would  never 
urge  and  inaugurate  and  perpetuate  one  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  judgment  of  the  men,  this  is  refuted 


272 


MOKAL  SCTKNCB. 


by  what  occurred  at  the  South  during  our  late  civil 
war,  for  it  is  well  known  that  the  war  was  intensi- 
fied and  prolonged  by  the  spirit  of  the  women, 
though  they  had  no  power  to  vote.  If  women  and 
children  had  taken  an  active  part  in  the  great  duties 
and  responsibilities  of  society,  beyond  question  they 
would  have  been  allowed  to  vote. 

But  accounting  thus  for  what  has  been,  we  inquire 
what  ouo-ht  to  be.    On  what  principle  Basis  of  the 

1  •  ^        1        .   1        r>      1  •         right  of 

ought  society  to  confer  the  right  or  taking  suffrage, 
part  in  the  government  ? 

And  here  it  is  plain  that  no  one  ought  to  be  ex- 
cluded arbitrarily,  that  is,  unless  such  exclusion  is 
required  by  the  ends  of  government.  In  this  view 
all  agree  on  two  grounds  of  exclusion.  One  is  in- 
competence, the  other  presumed  hostility  to  the 
government.  On  these  grounds  minors,  foreigners 
not  naturalized,  criminals,  and  those  who  have 
shown  hostihty  to  the  government,  are  excluded. 
This  being  conceded,  and  putting  aside  for  the 
moment  the  question  in  regard  to  women,  the  one 
great  principle  which  must  be  observed  by  society 
in  conferring  the  right  of  suffrage,  and  which  is 
practically  found  to  be  the  foundation  and  safeguard 
of  civil  liberty,  is  that  that  right  should  be  attainable 
oy  all.  It  is  to  be  something  attainable  by  all,  not 
possessed.  Thus  society  may  require  that  all  voters 
shall  have  attained  a  uniform  and  discreet  age,  but 
aistinctions  may  not  be  drawn  between  the  rich  and 
the  poor,  the  white  and  the  black,  the  learned  ana 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


273 


the  unlearned.    To  the  youth  of  each  of  thesa 

classes  society  may  rightly  say  that  when  they  reach 
such  age,  and  not  till  then,  they  shall  come  equally 
into  possession  of  this  right. 

Nor  may  society  impose  any  condition  upon  the 
right  of  suffrage  which  the  mass  of  the  people  can- 
not comply  w^ith.  Thus  society  may  not  require 
that  voters  shall  be  free  from  sin,  but  may  require 
that  they  shall  be  free  from  crime,  for  a  moral  life 
is  a  condition  w^ith  which  all  can  comply.  Thus 
society  may  not  limit  the  right  of  suffrage  to  pro- 
found mathematicians,  nor  to  men  learned  in  the 
ancient  languages,  for  these  would  necessitate  talent 
and  education  not  practically  within  the  reach  of 
every  youth  ;  but  it  may  require  that  every  voter 
shall  be  able  to  read  the  Eno-Ush  lano-uao-e,  for  that 
is  attainable  by  every  American  youtli,  and  neces- 
sary, in  the  present  age,  to  secure  an  ordinary  intel- 
ligence. 

Such  is  the  basis  on  which  the  v'mht  of  suffrage 
should  be  conferred.  Forbiddino;  that  the  rio;ht 
should  be  withheld  from  any  race  or  class  as  such, 
and  that  any  part  of  society  should  have  or  exercise 
the  right  of  excluding  any  other  part,  it  secures  to 
every  person  the  right  to  rise. 

But  besides  the  rio-lit  of  suffrao:e,  w^hich  is  the 
Bight  of      right  to  take  a  part  in  the  affairs  of  the 

representa- 

lion.  government,  there  is  a  totally  distinct  right. 

%  right  of  representation.    These  two  are  often 
corfounded,  but  are  distinct,  for  those  who  do  not 
18 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


vote  are  Still  entitled  to  be  represented.  In  prac- 
tical effect,  as  in  theory,  the  child  is  represented  by 
the  father,  and  the  wife  by  the  husband.  All  indi- 
viduals have  an  interest  in  government,  and  where 
the  individual  possesses  an  interest,  that  interest 
necessitates  and  confers  a  right,  for  wherever  there 
is  a  rio;ht  to  o-overn  there  must  also  be  a  rio:ht  to  be 
governed  rightly.  The  representative  in  the  legis- 
lature represents  far  more  than  the  minority  of  men 
who  voted  for  him.  He  represents  their  opponents 
who  voted  against  him,  their  wives  and  children 
who  did  not  vote,  and  he  represents,  and  is  bound 
to  provide  for  the  well-beino;  of  even  criminals  who 
have  forfeited  the  right  to  vote.  This  generality 
of  representation  is  sought  to  be  secured  by  what  is 
termed  "  manhood  suffrage,"  and  it  is  this  which 
must  prevent  one  class  from  dominating  over  or  ex- 
cluding another  from  the  substantial  right  of  repre- 
sentation, and  w^hich  must  secure  to  all  that  equal 
protection  and  care  without  which  civil  liberty  can 
but  imperfectly  exist. 

There  is  also  a  right  of  representation  which  in 
this  country  has  received  but  little  favor  Representa- 
or  attention  as  yet,  but  which  may  m  time  property, 
be  found  essential  to  the  existence  of  popular  gov- 
ernment, and  that  is  the  representation  of  property 
as  distinct  from  the  representation  of  persons.  Mer 
owe  certain  common  duties  to  society,  and  society 
owes  a  certain  common  protection  to  them,  but 
there  are  also  expenses  of  government  which  are  noi 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


275 


drawn  equally  from  all  men,  but  which  are  contrib- 
uted in  different  proportions  by  individuals.  This 
principle  is  very  old,  and  has  borne  an  important 
part  in  the  history  qf  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  it  hav- 
ing been  enunciated  as  early  as  Magna  Charta  in 
the  declaration  that  taxes  should  be  laid  only  with 
the  consent  of  the  taxed  given  through  the  Com- 
mons "in  Parliament;  and  again  in  the  Bill  of 
Rights ;  and  again  in  the  revolution  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies,  where  the  principle  in  question  was 
the  power  to  tax  without  the  consent  of  the  taxed, 
or  without  representation.  There  exists  now  the 
case  of  unmarried  women  holding  property  on  which 
the  government  imposes  taxes  without  affording  a 
correlative  right  of  representation  ;  and  there  is  also 
the  case  of  resident  aliens  whose  property  is  taxed 
in  the  same  way.  This  withholding  of  representa- 
tion from  tax-paying  women,  and  at  the  same  time 
requiring  them  to  contribute  equally  with  men  to 
rhe  ordinary  expenses  of  government,  already  strikes 
the  common  mind  as  injustice  ;  and  it  may  be  that 
the  growing  interests  of  civilization  will  one  day  re- 
quire that  these  two  bases  of  representation  shall  be 
separated,  and  that  one  branch  of  the  legislature 
shall  represent  property,  and  be  chosen  by  those 
who  contribute  towards  the  expense  of  maintaining 
government,  and  that  all  such  shall  be  allowed  to 
cake  part  in  the  government  to  that  extent,  what- 
ever may  be  their  nationality,  race,  or  sex.  Of  the 
equity  of  such  representation  there  can  be  no  quea* 


276 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


Hon.   Government  is  supported  wholly  by  property ; 

the  Larger  portion  of  legislation  respects  property, 
and  it  may  readily  happen  in  communities  like  the 
city  of  New  York,  where  irresponsible  and  destitute 
foreigners  are  constantly  made  voters,  that  great  in- 
security and  oppression  should  result  from  subject- 
ing property  to  the  control  of  mere  numbers. 

We  have  thus  the  family  as  the  unit  of  society. 
We  have  wvernment  as  necessarily  rep-  Has  woman 

^  .         .  a  right  to 

resentative.  We  have  a  right  in  all  the  vote, 
members  of  society  to  representation;  to  protection 
in  all  their  rights ;  to  be  governed  rightly.  We  have 
also  the  two  grounds  on  which  persons  have  been 
called  on  to  take  part  in  the  government :  responsi- 
bility for  personal  service,  and  the  support  of  the 
government  by  their  property.  With  these  ele- 
ments we  inquire  whether  the  right  of  suffrage 
should  be  extended  to  woman.  The  question  is 
not  whether  she  has  a  natural  right  to  vote,  for 
none  have  that,  but  whether  her  own  elevation  and 
best  influence,  and  the  ends  of  society  require  that 
that  right  should  be  bestowed  upon  her. 

This  question  has  been  discussed  as  if  the  sexes 
constituted  different  classes,  and  as  if  there  were, 
or  could  be,  in  their  real  interests,  a  conflict  be- 
tween them.  That  is  a  great  mistake.  A  man  and 
his  wife  are  not  of  a  different  class  ;  and  their  in- 
terests, together  with  those  of  their  family,  are 
identical.  The  very  existence  of  society,  indeed, 
iepends  on  men  and  women  as  entering  into  a  special 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


277 


relation  which  not  only  unites  their  interests,  as  in 
a  partnership,  but  identifies  them,  and  makes  each 
sex  reciprocally  the  guardian  of  the  other.  The 
cases  where  this  relation  does  not  exist  are  strictly 
exceptional,  and  society  is  not  organized,  and  does 
not  exist  for  exceptional  cases. 

This  question,  therefore,  should  not  come  in  the 
form  of  a  partisan  discussion,  but  of  a  mutual  in 
quiry  what  the  rights  of  woman  are,  and  how  she 
may  be  elevated  to  the  highest  point  in  culture  and 
legitimate  influence.  And  upon  such  an  inquiry 
man  should  enter  with  no  less  alacrity  and  candor 
than  woman,  for  if  there  be  anything  which  mus' 
react  with  swift  retribution  upon  society,  it  is  any 
needless  ignorance  or  degradation  of  its  wives  and 
mothers. 

The  family,  as  has  been  said,  is  the  unit  of  society. 
This  character  of  it  should  be,  and  unconsciously  is, 
one  of  the  most  cherished  objects  of  Christian  civil- 
ization, and  unhappy  will  be  the  nation  whose  legis- 
lative mind  shall  regard  society  simply  as  a  mass  of 
individuals,  and  not  as  a  combination  cf  families. 
The  family  being  regarded  thus,  as  a  divine  institu- 
tion sufficing  for  itself,  and  society  being  regarded  as 
a  combination  of  families,  society  will  have  a  double 
life,  or  rather,  its  one  life  will  be  within  two  spheres. 
There  will  be  the  domestic  life  of  the  family,  and 
the  public  life  of  society.  Of  these  the  family  is 
the  more  important  and  sacred,  and  over  this  in  ita 
domestic  life,  it  is  the  duty  and  dignity  and  happi- 


278 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ness  of  woman  to  preside.  This  is  her  sphere,  not 
inferior  to  that  of  man,  but  different  from  it.  Here 
Bhe  has  not  only  a  right  to  vote,  but  to  rule.  If,  as 
is  to  be  supposed,  she  is  fitted  for  her  place,  nothing 
will  be  added  to  the  dignity  of  the  husband  or  to 
the  happiness  of  the  family  by  any  interference  with 
her  where  the  responsibility  properly  falls  upon  her. 
The  sphere  of  society  on  the  other  hand  belongs  to 
man,  at  least  it  has  been  hitherto  regarded  as  belong- 
ing to  him.  For  the  support  of  its  institutions  and 
for  those  duties  more  immediately  required  for  its 
welfare  he  is  responsible.  Here  man  has  the  right 
to  vote,  and  nothing  will  be  added  to  the  dignity  of 
the  w^ife  or  to  the  happiness  of  society  by  any  inter- 
ference of  the  wife  wdiere  the  responsibility  properly 
falls  upon  the  husband.  By  a  natural  relation,  and 
so  by  the  appointment  of  God,  the  wife  is  the  centre 
of  the  domestic  circle,  the  chief  source  of  its  happi- 
ness, and  guardian  of  her  husband's  interests  and 
rights  in  all  that  pertains  to  it.  By  a  natural  rela- 
tion the  husband  is  the  house-land.,  the  provider  for 
its  wants,  its  defender,  and  the  guardian  of  the 
rights  of  the  wife  as  of  the  children  in  their  relations 
to  society.  He  is  the  natural  representative  of  both. 
The  wife  is  not  a  child,  but  according  to  the  Chris- 
lian  conception  is  nearer  than  that,  is  one  with  her 
husband,  and  their  interests  are  one.  If  we  suppose 
society  composed  of  families  alone,  and  if  the  rights 
wives  and  children  would  not  be  secured  by  giv- 
ing to  every  husband  and  father  a  share  in  the  gov 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  279 

^rnment,  the  fault  woulrl  not  be  in  the  system,  but 

in  iirdividual  corruption  that  would  work  itself  out 
whatever  system  might  be  adopted.  Women  have 
had  wrongs,  and  so  have  children.  These  must  be 
'  dressed,  but  this  will  not  be  done  by  disregard- 
ing any  relation  established  by  God.  If  parents 
and  children,  and  husbands  and  wives,  will  act  in 
the  spirit  of  those  relations,  society  will  be  perfected. 
If  they  will  not  do  that,  no  political  relations  will 
avail.  The  same  spirit  on  the  part  of  men  that 
would  concede  the  right  of  voting,  would  concede 
and  secure  in  a  representative  capacity  every  right 
without  that. 

For  each  of  the  spheres  above  spoken  of,  men 
and  women  are  fitted  respectively  by  their  physical 
organization  and  by  their  mental  instincts  and  ten- 
dencies, and  their  relations  to  the  children  require 
that  the  spheres  should  be  kept  separate,  it  is  not 
that  man  is  not  competent  to  set  the  table  and  rock 
the  cradle,  or  that  woman  is  not  competent  to  vote. 
It  is  because  the  one  life  of  society  will  work  itself 
mi  in  more  perfect  results,  if  these  two  great  but 
kiiterdependent  spheres  be  left  to  those  who  natu- 
rally have  charge  of  them. 

But  while  the  above  is  said,  society  is  to  hold  it- 
self ready  to  make  any  changes  which  its  changing 
modifications  may  require.  In  the  primitive  stages 
of  society,  when  the  chief  business  of  governments 
was  to  carry  on  offensive  or  defensive  war,  women 
Viad  no  desire  to  take  part  in  government,  and  theii 


280  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

m 

presence  would  have  been  an  inconvenience  and 
injury.  But  society  has  now  greatly  advanceS,  so 
that  tliere  are  many  fields,  especially  that  of  educa- 
tion, in  which  woman  may  properly  act,  and  in 
which  her  aid  will  be  an  advantage  to  society ;  and 
it  is  possible  that  in  a  future  and  higher  stage  of 
progress  these  fields  will  be  increased,  and  woman 
be  assigned  to  perform  her  definite  part  in  the  gov- 
ernment. Yet  so  long  as  the  sexes  remain  fused  in 
one  common  mass,  as  has  always  been  the  case  with 
society,  so  long  the  indiscriminate  mingling  of  the 
sexes,  either  in  the  domestic  sphere  or  in  the  gen- 
eral management  of  government,  will  be  found  an 
inconvenience,  a  source  of  embarrassment  and  weak- 
ness. If,  however,  it  should  be  found  advantageous 
to  society  and  to  woman  herself  that  the  number  of 
her  employments  should  be  increased,  and  her  re- 
sponsibility to  society  enlarged,  there  would  probably 
be  no  opposition  to  a  corresponding  enlargement  of 
the  riorht  of  suffrao-e. 

If  we  adopt  this  view  of  the  family  as  the  unit 
of  society,  and  of  the  natural  right  of  representa- 
tion, the  principle  which  it  contains  will  harmonize 
and  protect  all  interests.  Let  the  family  be  regarded 
as  the  unit  of  society,  and  the  principle  adhered  to 
of  giving  to  each  unit  a  single  and  equal  represen- 
tation, and  society  may  provide  for  exceptional  cases 
Dy  general  laws.  Such  cases  arise  when  the  chil- 
dren of  a  family  reach  maturity  and  do  not  marry 
ind  in  the  case  of  widows  who  are  the  heads  of 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


281 


families.  For  the  case  of  widows  no  remedy  is  pro- 
vided, but  in  equity  there  should  be.  When  the 
sons  of  a  family  reach  the  age  of  manliood  they  go 
forth  and  become,  in  theory  as  in  fact,  the  stocks  of 
new  families,  which  sooner  or  later  they  support, 
maintain,  and  represent,  and  hence  they  are  made 
responsible  for  the  duties  and  burdens  of  society. 
They  may  not,  indeed,  instantly  marry  and  become 
the  heads  of  new  families,  but  they  are  preparing 
for  that,  and  are  essentially  doing  the  work  of  main- 
taining the  future  family  by  the  work  of  preparation. 
The  daughters,  on  the  contrary,  remain  at  home, 
and  are  identified  in  its  interests  with  the  old  family 
until  they  are  taken  forth  to  form  parts  of  new  fam- 
ilies. They  do  not  go  forth  by  themselves,  nor  un- 
dertake the  work  of  preparation,  but  stay  protected, 
maintained,  and  represented  in  and  by  the  original 
stock.  .  Perhaps,  exceptionally,  they  may  acquire 
property,  and  in  the  contemplation  of  law,  establish 
for  themselves  new  homes.  Society  will  never  fos- 
ter such  a  system,  for  it  would  be  prejudicial  to  its 
own  ends  ;  but  nevertheless  it  might  protect  the  in- 
dividual by  allowing  her  to  exercise  the  suffrage  of 
property  representation.  The  right  of  personal 
suffrage  she  could  hardly  ask,  and  society  would 
hardly  allow,  except  as  she  should  be  willing  and 
fitted  to  do  the  work  of  the  juror,  the  policeman, 
the  sheriff,  the  soldier,  —  except  as  she  should  be- 
come subject  to  all  the  duties  and  responsibilities  or 
which  the  great  interests  of  society  depend. 


282 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


In  Speaking  on  this  subject  nothing  has  been  said 
Jiitherto  of  sentiment  and  a  sense  of  propriety  as 
distinguished  from  rights,  and  nothing  need  be,  ex* 
cept  as  those  indicate,  as  natural  sentiment  always 
does,  what  is  right.  But  sentiment  depends  so  much 
upon  custom,  and  custom  is  so  varied  and  capri- 
cious that  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  natural  sen- 
timent is.  Throughout  the  East  it  shocks  the  sense 
Df  propri'fety  for  a  woman  to  appear  in  public  un- 
veiled, or  to  \valk  the  streets  arm-in-arm  with  her 
husband,  probably  even  more  than  it  w^ould  here  for 
aer  to  vote  and  take  part  in  the  stormy  debates  of  a 
town  meeting.  Still,  sentiment  has  a  real  basis.  In 
reading  the  account  lately  given  by  a  missionary  of 
his  findino;  a  man  in  the  house  knittino;  and  his  wife 
at  work  in  the  field,  we  cannot  help  feeling  that  the 
sense  of  ludicrous  impropriety  as  well  as  of  indigna- 
tion is  well  founded.  That  there  is  in  the  minds  of 
large  portions  of  the  people  of  this  country  —  perhaps 
strono-er  amono;  the  well  educated  and  refined,  and 
stronger  among  women  than  men  —  a  feehng  of  pro- 
priety that  would  be  offended  by  the  promiscuous 
mingling  of  women  with  men  in  the  conduct  of  pub- 
lic affairs,  cannot  be  questioned.  It  is  the  sentiment 
which  makes  woman  strong  through  her  weakness. 
It  lay  at  the  foundation  of  all  that  w^as  good  in 
.hivahy.  It  has  been  a  strong  auxiliary  to  Chris- 
tian principle  in  elevating  woman.  It  sets  her  apart 
m  many  hearts  as  something  sacred,  and  adds  to  life 
otherwise  hard  and  prosaic,  much  of  its  beauty 


GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


283 


f^'or  this  sentiment  Americans  are  distinguished.  It 
should  be  cherished  rather  tlian  weakened,  and  if,  as 
many  think,  it  would  be  destroyed,  or  essentially 
impaired  by  extending  the  suffrage  to  woman,  those 
who  wish  her  elevation  will  hesitate  long  before  tak- 
ing such  a  step. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


POKMS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  DUTIES  OF  MAOISTS  AXES 

AND  CITIZENS. 

After  considering  elementary  points  so  fully,  it 
will  not  be  necessary  to  spend  much  time  on  the  more 
beaten  grounds  of  forms  of  government,  and  of  the 
riMits  and  duties  of  citizens  and  of  mamstrates. 

Governments  have  always  been  classed  as  Mon- 
archies, Aristocracies,  and  Democracies,  Fo^mg^j^ 
but  substantially  they  are  now,  and  indeed  fs^en^u^^y  * 
always  liave  been,  either  monarchical  or 
republican.  There  are  indeed  privileged  classes,  as 
in  England,  who  have  an  hereditary  share  in  the 
government,  but  there  is  no  government  that  is  in 
fact  or  in  form  aristocratic. 

Monarchies  are  either  absolute  or  limited,  as  the 
power  rests  with  one  man  alone  or  is  divided  w^ith 
others.  The  monarch  may  be  elective,  or  heredi- 
tary, though  of  an  elective  monarchy  there  is  now 
no  example.  That  the  monarchy  should  be  hered- 
itary conduces  to  the  stability  of  the  government, 
%nd  to  peace. 

Democracies,  that  is  governments  by  the  people 
themselves,  instead  of  by  representation,  are  impos- 


FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT,  ETC. 


285 


Bible  except  for  very  sriiall  communities.  Repub- 
lican government  is  representative  and  elective. 
There  may  be  a  simple  independent  republic,  such 
as  the  several  States  were  before  the  formation 
of  the  Federal  Union,  or  there  may  be  a  federal 
republic,  with  powers  divided  between  the  central 
government  and  the  several  states. 

The  object  of  government,  that  is,  security  in  the 
enjoyment  of  every  right,  may  be  attained  under 
any  form.  A  monarch  may  concede  every  right, 
and  his  character  may  give  security,  but  practically 
it  is  found  that  rio;hts  are  best  secured  where  a  laro-e 
amount  of  power  is  retained  in  the  hands  of  the 
people,  and  where  the  government  itself  is  one  of 
checks  and  balances. 

The  essential  condition  of  freedom  and  security 
„,  is  that  the  three  p-reat  functions  of  o-overn- 

Tne  neces-  o  o 

separating  Hicut,  tlic  Legislative,  the  Judicial,  and  the 
fSnctiorsof  Executive,  should  be  kept  distinct,  and 
government,  gi^^^^jj  different  haucls.    Let  the 

laws  be  made  by  one  set  of  men,  with  penalties  fixed 
before  transgression  ;  let  the  question  of  an  infrac- 
tion of  law  and  the  declaration  of  the  penalty  be  in 
the  hands  of  another  set  of  men,  and  the  execution 
of  the  sentence  in  still  other  hands,  and  a  good  de- 
gree of  security  and  freedom  can  hardly  fail  to  be 
enjoyed.  Still,  much  will  depend  on  the  method  in 
which  the  legislative  body  and  the  judiciary  are 
appointed  and  constituted.  The  object  is  the  bes 
laws  and  their  perfect  administration.    Society  I 


286 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


therefore  bound  to  elect  men  of  wisdom  and  integ- 
rity, and  laws  passed  by  such  men  after  due  deliber- 
ation will  be  all  that  can  be  reached  in  the  present 
imperfect  state. 

To  secure  due  deliberation  and  a  view  of  each 
subject  upon  all  its  sides,  the  legislature  Twoieg- 
should  consist,  and  commonly  does,  of  two  bodies, 
bodies.  In  some  cases  these  are  elected  in  different 
methods  and  serve  for  different  periods,  and  this 
would  seem  best  adapted  to  secure  the  end.  It 
gives  opportunity  also  for  the  representation  of  every 
interest. 

It  has  been  thought  in  this  country  that  the  office 
of  legislation  was  a  right  and  a  privilege  Rotation 
to  be  enjoyed  in  rotation,  with  little  refer- 
ence  to  integrity  and  wisdom,  especially  with  little 
reference  to  any  special  knowledge  of  the  science  of 
legislation.  If  the  legislative  body  be  numerous, 
such  a  theory  will  be  comparatively  harmless  if  a 
fair  proportion  of  competent  legislators  be  elected. 
In  such  bodies  the  business  is  really  done  by  a  few, 
and  if  the  numbers  that  serve  simply  as  ballast  do  no 
positive  mischief,  there  is  little  objection  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  rotation  for  them.  Crude  legislation  how- 
ever is  too  great  an  evil  to  be  lightly  incurred,  and 
koo  many  men  may  not  be  set  aside  just  as  experience 
vould  render  their  services  valuable.  Society  owes 
it  to  itself  to  sec  that  its  legislation  moves  on  in  the 
fall  light  of  the  experience  of  the  past,  and  of  the 
best  talent  and  wisdom  of  the  presemti 


FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT,  ETC, 


287 


Laws  having  been  made,  and  penalties  annexed, 
rhe  judi-  cases  will  arise  under  them,  respecting  both 
:iarj»  property  and  crime,  that  will  require  a  ju- 
diciary department.  The  sure  and  speedy  and 
inexpensive  administration  of  justice  is  an  essential 
condition  of  the  well-being  of  a  people.  The  speed- 
iest and  least  expensive  method  of  reaching  this  k 
by  a  single  judge  deciding  cases  on  the  spot,  or,  in 
cases  of  importance  and  difficulty,  two  others  might 
be  added.  The  objection  to  this  is  the  danger  of 
passion,  prejudice,  and  corruption.  Hence  juries 
and  courts  of  appeal  have  been  introduced.  These 
have  guarded  against  corruption,  but  have  in  many 
cases  so  been  the  means  of  delay  and  expense  that 
the  rich  could  baffle  and  w^orry  out  the  poor,  and 
that  it  is  often  better  pecuniarily  to  lose  a  just  claim 
than  to  contest  it  in  law.  Such  a  state  of  things 
is  disgraceful  to  civilization  and  to  Christianity,  and 
should  be  remedied  by  an  enlightened  people.  What 
is  needed  is  an  impartial  and  competent  judiciary, 
through  which  speedy  and  inexpensive  justice  may 
be  reached.  This  end  has  been  sought  not  merely 
through  the  constitution  of  the  judiciary,  but  also 
through  the  mode  of  its  appointment,  and  the  ten- 
ure of  office.  Obviously  these  should  be  such  as  to 
Becure  the  appointment  of  the  best  men,  and  that 
the  judge  himself  shall  be  unaffected  in  his  prospects 
And  private  interests  by  his  decisions.  That  these 
conditions  should  be  secured  by  an  elective  judi- 
ciary, holding  ofSce  for  a  limited  and  comparative!; 


288 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


brief  time,  would  not  seem  possible  in  the  present 

estate  of  public  morals. 

It  is  the  business  of  the  executive  to  see  that* the 
laws  are  enforced,  and  that  all  sentences  T^eex- 
of  the  judiciary  are  carried  out.  The 
executive  also  represents  the  majesty  of  the  na- 
-tion  before  other  nations,  and  in  all  international 
transactions  is  the  medium  of  communication  with 
them.  The  character  of  these  duties  demands  that 
they  be  performed  by  a  single  person.  If  the  ex- 
ecutive have,  as  he  should  have,  to  guard  his  own 
prerogatives,  a  veto  power,  he  is  so  far  a  part  of  the 
legislature ;  but  beyond  that  his  sole  business  is  to 
execute  the  laws.  This  he  must  do,  certainly,  as  he 
understands  them.  He  must  execute  a  law  in  what 
he  supposes  to  be  its  true  intent  and  meaning,  seek- 
ing, if  there  be  doubt,  the  best  aid  from  legal  ad- 
visers. But  when  a  law  has  been  passed,  having 
fully  the  forms  of  law,  he  must  accept  it  as  such, 
and  may  not  delay  or  refuse  its  execution  on  the 
ground  of  its  alleged  unconstitutionality,  though,  if 
there  be  doubt,  he  may  take  immediate  measures  to 
have  the  constitutionahty  of  the  law  tested. 

To  secure  always  a  suitable  executive  has  been  a 
great  problem.  In  most  nations  the  executive  of- 
fice has  been  hereditary.  This  has  many  advan- 
tages. It  tends  to  stability  and  a  uniform  policy, 
^nd  prevents  the  excitement  and  corruption  incident 
to  an  election.  Besides,  in  many  countries  an  intel- 
ligent and  patriotic  election  would  be  im2)ossible. 
In  this  country  the  executive  is  elective,  virtually 


FOHMS  OF  GOVERNMENT,  ETC.  289 


by  the  whole  people,  and  hitherto  the  strain  has  not 
been  found  too  great.  Whether  this  will  continue 
to  be  the  case  when  wealth  shall  be  indefinitely  in- 
creased, and  interests  shall  be  extended  and  compli- 
cated, is  a  problem.  It  can  only  be  as  there  shall 
be  a  virtue  and  an  mtelligence  among  the  people 
hitherto  unknown.  Probably  the  danger  would  be 
diminished,  if  the  tenure  of  office  were  for  six  years, 
with  no  possibility  of  a  reelection. 

The  duties  of  the  citizen  are,  1st.  To  obey  the 
First  duty  ^^^^'^  ^^^^  ^^^^  conscicncc  will  allow  him 
cftizen  •  possible  for  men  to  cherish 

obedience.  willfulncss  and  fanaticism  under  the  pre 
tense  jof  conscience,  and  the  presumption  is  in  favor 
of  the  law  as  right,  and  of  the  obligation  of  the  citi- 
zen to  obey.  Still  there  have  been,  and  are  liable  to 
be,  under  all  forms  of  government,  wicked  laws,  and 
if,  with  the  best  light  a  man  can  gain,  he  shall  deem 
it  wrong  to  obey  a  law,  he  is  bound  to  disobey  it,  and 
take  the  consequences  whatever  they  may  be.  He  is 
bound  to  obey  God  rather  than  men. 

2.  The  citizen  is  bound  to  bear  cheerfully  his 
Becondduty;  sliarc  of  tlic  burdcus  of  p;overnment,  and 

lubmispion        ^         .  iT  t  r> 

to  taxation,  ot  socicty.  Wliether  Called  upou  lor  pcr- 
sonal  service,  or  for  property  in  the  way  of  taxation, 
he  is  to  stand  in  his  place  and  do  his  part  without 
Bubterfuge  or  evasion. 

3.  So  far  as  his  influence  goes  he  is  bound  to  see 
rhirdduty;  that  tlic  bcst  men'  are  selected  as  candi- 
•uffrage.  dates  for  office,  and  so  to  cast  his  vot« 
ts  will  most  benefit  the  country. 

19 


290 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


4.  The  citizen  is  bound  to  give  his  aid  in  all  at- 
tempts to  secure  the  rights  of  others,  and  Fo^^thduty 
to  enforce  law  and  order.  He  may  not  ^Hrgovem 
stand  supinely  by  and  see  the  right  of 
property  violated.  If,  through  general  supineness, 
the  property  of  individuals  be  destroyed  by  a  mob, 
society  is  bound  to  make  it  good.  Against  the  ten- 
dency of  liberty  to  license,  and  of  license  again  to 
despotism,  every  citizen  is  to  guard. 

If  we  look  at  history,  or  at  the  state  of  most 
countries  now,  we  cannot  value  civil  lib-  vaiueof 
erty  too  highly.  Hitherto  it  has  existed  ^'"^^  ^'^'"^^ 
but  imperfectly,  and  has  reached  its  present  posi- 
tion only  through  great  sacrifices  and  struggles. 
Tlie  end  of  government,  as  for  the  individual,  the 
ground  of  human  rights,  and  the  rights  themselves, 
have  not  been  well  understood.  These  are  now 
understood  by  some,  and  it  has  become  possible  to 
instruct  a  whole  people  in  them.  Let  this  be  done, 
and  if,  in  connection  with  such  instruction  and  the 
advancing  light  of  science  the  community  may  but 
be  so  pervaded  by  the  spirit  of  Christianity  that  a 
permanent  and  constantly  advancing  civilization 
may  be  possible,  there  will  be  nothing  to  prevent  the 
attainment  by  man  of  all  the  perfection  and  happi- 
ness of  which  the  present  state  will  admit.  The 
highest  earthly  conception  is  that  of  a  vast  Christian 
?ommonwealth,  instinct  with  order,  and  with  such 
triumplis  and  dominion  over  nature  as  moden) 
science  is  achieving,  and  promises  to  acliieve. 


CLASS  m. 

DUTIES  TO  GOD. 


CHAPTER  L 

DUTIES  TO  GOD  DEFINED. 

Duties  to  God  are  distinguished  from  others  by 
Beiationto  having  God  for  their  object.  It  is  one 
the^ont"*'^'''  thJ^g  subject  to  disregard  the  sov- 

great  duty,  ercign  iudlrcctlj  by  breaking  his  laws  in 
injuring  a  fellow  subject,  it  is  another  for  him  to 
meet  that  sovereign  personally  and  show  towards 
him  disregard  or  contempt.  There  are  accordingly 
both  duties  and  sins  of  which  God  is  the  immediate 
object,  and  which  have  reference  to  Him  alone. 
Such  are  worship,  and  blasphemy.  It  is  this  capacity 
of  coming  directly  to  God  that  makes  man  a  child, 
or  rather  it  is  the  necessary  result  of  his  being  a 
child. 

So  far  as  we  can  separate  religion  from  morality 
Mgion  religion  consists  in  those  duties  of  which 
guished  God  is  the  object.  That  these  cannot  be 
rauty.  performed  acceptably  except  on  condition 
of  performing  our  duties  to  our  fellow  men  has  al» 


292 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ready  been  shown.    In  this  sense  our  duties  to  our 

fellow  men  are  conditional  for  those  to  God,  and  so 
lower.  Whether  they  are  also  conditional  as  prior 
in  time  is  less  clear.  Many  suppose  that  the  moral 
nature  is  first  called  into  action  towards  man,  and 
observation  favors  this.  But  the  relation  of  God  to 
the  soul  as  Creator  and  as  all-pervading  in  his 
presence,  and  the  necessary  idea  which,  according 
to  some,  is  formed  of  Him  from  the  first,  has  led 
others  to  the  belief  that  the  moral  nature  is  first 
stirred  towards  God,  and  that  there  can  be  no  form 
of  duty  without  some  reference  to  Him. 

But  be  this  as  it  may,  while  all  must  allow  that 
there  can  be  no  p-enuine  relio-ion  without  „  ,.  , 
morality,  it  is  generally  supposed  there  can  to^^jferSt 
be  morality  without  religion.  This  may  ^^^^i^^^- 
be  differently  viewed  as  we  suppose  morality  to  con- 
sist in  outward  conduct,  or  in  a  state  of  the  heart. 
There  are  many  reasons  why  outward  conduct  should 
be  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  morality,  though 
it  may  not  proceed  from  love.  Doubtless,  also,  the 
moral  nature,  in  common  with  the  other  parts  of  our 
nature,  and  taking  its  turn  with  them,  is  constantly 
brought  into  activity  towards  men  with  no  conscious 
reference  to  God.  But  if  we  mean  by  morality  the 
love  of  our  neighbor  as  a  paramomit  and  controlling 
principle,  and  by  perfect  morality  the  love  of  our 
neiglibor  as  ourselves,  then  there  is  no  reason  to 
6uppose  tliat  it  can  exist  witliout  religion.  The 
Drinciple  in  each  is  identical,  and  supposing  God  tc 


DUTIES  TO  GOD  DEFINED. 


293 


be  known,  th^y  reciprocally  imply  each  other.  Cer* 
tainly  this  is  the  only  morality  that  has  an  adequate 
basis,  or  that  can  be  relied  on  as  consistent. 

With  this  view  of  the  relation  to  each  other  of 
these  two  branches  of  duty,  we  inquire  what  those 
duties  are  of  which  God  is  the  object. 

And  here  the  first  and  great  duty  of  every  one  is, 
Man's  great  9^'^^  Mmself  to  God,  This  is  the  great- 
est  and  most  solemn  of  all  acts.  It  in- 
volves the  highest  possible  prerogatives  of  a  creature, 
and  is  the  highest  possible  privilege  as  well  as  duty. 
The  whole  wisdom  of  man  lies  in  his  confiding  him- 
self imphcitly  to  the  guidance  of  the  divine  wisdom, 
and  to  the  protection  of  the  divine  power.  It  was 
by  withdrawing  himself  from  this  guidance  and  pro- 
tection that  man  sinned  originally ;  he  can  be 
restored  only  by  accepting  them  anew. 

As  Creator,  God  is  the  absolute  owner  of  all 
things.  As  omnipotent.  He  can  do  with  them  as 
He  pleases.  But  if  He  would  be  a  Father  and 
Moral  Governor  He  must  have  children  and  subjects 
in  his  own  image,  and  with  the  prerogative  of 
choosing  or  rejecting  Him  as  their  supreme  good. 
Control  by  force,  order  by  an  impulse  from  without, 
is  the  opposite  of  control  by  love,  and  of  order  from 
a  rational  choice,  and  the  highest  duty  of  man  is  to 
give  himself  in  the  spirit  of  a  child,  that  is  by  faith, 
to  God. 

The  above  will  include  everything.  W^ioever 
holds  himself  fiiUy  and  constantly  in  the  aK,i1ude  tc 


294 


MORAL  SCIENCfi. 


God  of  a  child,  does  all  that  he  can.  This  will  in- 
clude love  and  obedience.  Still  we  need  to  specify 
in  three  particulars  — 

1.  The  cultivation  of  a  devotional  spirit  5 

2.  Prayer ;  and 

3.  The  keeping  of  the  Sabbath. 


CHAPTER  n. 


CULTIVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT. 

A  DEVOTIONAL  spirit  may  be  cultivated  — 

1.  By  the  exercise  of  devotion.  This  is  on  the 
principle  that  all  our  active  powers  are  strengthened 
by  exercise.  There  is  no  active  power  that  does  not 
gain  facility  and  scope  by  repeated  acts  under  the 
direction  of  will. 

2.  A  devotional  spirit  may  be  cultivated  by  a 
right  use  of  Nature. 

The  physical  universe  is  but  a  visible  expression 
of  the  power  and  the  thought  of  God. 

This  power  and  thought  are  seen  in  the  very  con- 
stitution of  matter.  It  was  not  any  matter,  but 
such  matter,  and  in  such  proportions,  that  was 
needed  for  the  forms  that  we  see,  and  for  vital  pro- 
cesses. The  varieties  and  affinities  and  relative 
quantities  of  matter  as  much  show  that  it  was  created, 
and  for  a  purpose,  as  its  forms  and  movements  show 
that  it  is  used  for  a  purpose.  It  is  therefore  the 
voice  of  Science  as  well  as  of  Revelation  that  He 

hath  measured  the  waters  in  the  hollow  of  his 
hand,  and  meted  out  heaven  "  —  that  is  the  extent  of 


296 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


the  atmosphere  —  "  with  the  span,  and  comprehended 
the  dust  of  the  earth  in  a  measure,  and  weighed  the 
mountains  in  scales,  and  the  hills  in  a  balance." 

But  the  more  obvious  manifestations  of  thought 
and  power  are  in  form  and  movement.  It  is  in  the 
forms  that  we  see,  so  diversified  —  some  changing, 
some  permanent,  each  adapted  to  an  end  —  together 
with  those  uniform  and  recurring  movements  w^hich 
reveal  unlimited  force  and  skill,  that  what  we  call 
Kature  consists.  Through  this  we  gain  our  concep- 
tions of  beauty,  and  of  the  most  perfect  adaptation 
of  means  to  ends.  Physical  science  is  but  the 
thought  of  God  expressed  through  this.  Upon  this, 
suspended  as  it  is  in  immensity,  so  vast  in  its  magni- 
tudes, so  mighty  in  its  forces,  so  perfect  in  its  organi- 
zations even  the  most  minute,  so  extended  yet  pre- 
cise in  its  periods,  no  one  can  look  without  wonder, 
unless  it  be  from  ignorance  or  criminal  stupidity. 

But  all  this  may  be  regarded  with  two  habits  of 
mind  utterly  different. 

Through  the  element  of  uniformity  in  nature  it  is 
possible  to  regard  it  as  having  no  relation  to  a  per 
Bonal  God.  Through  that  element  God  so  hides 
■limself  behind  his  works  that  very  many  are  prac- 
tically, and  some  theoretically,  pantheistic  or  athe- 
istic. They  see  nothing  in  Nature  but  impersonal 
forces  and  fixed  relations. 

A  devotional  spirit  is  the  opposite  of  this 
Through  Nature  it  sees  God.  It  sees,  and  culti- 
vates the  habit  of  seeing  Him  in  everything.  Tc 


CULTIVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT,  297 


3uch  a  spilit  the  earth  and  the  heavens  are  a  temple, 
the  only  temple  worthy  of  God.  To  it  the  succes- 
sion of  day  and  night  and  the  march  of  the  seasons 
are  constant  hymns.  To  it,  not  the  heavens  alone, 
l)ut  the  whole  frame-work  and  structure  of  Nature 
with  its  ongoings  "  declare  the  glory  of  God.' ' 

This  is  the  spirit  which  it  is  the  duty  and  happi- 
ness of  man  to  cultivate.  The  highest  use  of 
Nature  is  not  the  support  of  man,  but  to  lead  him 
up  to  God. 

3.  A  devotional  spirit  may  also  be  cultivated  by 
observing  the  Providence  of  God  as  it  respects 
Nations,  individuals,  and  particularly  ourselves. 

The  warp  of  our  earthly  life  is  those  uniformities, 
called  laws,  w^ithout  w^hicli  there  could  be  no  educa- 
tion of  the  race,  and  no  rational  conduct.  But  these 
laws  mtersect  and  modify  each  other.  They  are  so 
related  to  the  results  of  human  will,  and  the  results 
of  different  wills  apparently  unrelated  so  combine  and 
converge  to  unexpected  ends,  as  to  have  produced 
an  impression  almost  universal  that  the  filling  in  of 
those  seeming  contingencies  which  go  to  make  up 
the  completed  pattern  of  our  lives  is  controlled  by 
wise  design.  In  this  is  Providence.  This  it  is  that 
in  every  age  takes  Joseph  from  the  pit  and  makes 
him  ruler  of  Egypt.  Through  this  it  is  that  the 
m'ow  shot  at  a  venture  finds  the  joints  of  the  har- 
ness. Here,  as  in  Nature,  it  is  possible  for  men  to 
Bubstitute  something  else,  as  chance,  or  fate,  for 
God;  but  those  who  believe  in  Him  w^ill  nc where 


298 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


find  more  striking  evidence  of  a  divine  hand,  and 
"  he  who  will  observe  the  Providence  of  God  will 
have  providences  to  observe." 

4.  But  the  main  nutriment  of  a  devotional  spirit 
must  be  found  in  the  Scriptures. 

In  the  Scriptures  we  have  an  unequivocal  revela- 
tion of  God  as  personal,  and  so  of  his  attributes  as 
moral.  It  is  only  in  view  of  personality  and  moral 
attributes  that  devotion  can  spring  up.  Sentiment 
and  sentimentalism  there  may  be  in  view  of  force 
regarded  as  impersonal,  but  not  devotion,  not  wor- 
ship. These  require  a  Father  in  Heaven,  an  infinite 
God,  universal  in  his  government  and  perfect  in  his 
moral  character.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the 
truth  of  the  Scriptures,  it  is  demonstrable  that  the 
God  whom  they  reveal  must  call  forth  the  highest 
possible  adoration,  and  hence  that  the  knowdedge  of 
God  as  revealed  in  them  must,  more  than  anything 
else  can,  quicken  intelligent  devotion.  The  attri- 
butes and  character  of  God  as  made  known  in  the 
Scriptures  hold  the  same  relation  to  devotion  that 
the  infinity  of  space,  and  the  awful  force  that  sus- 
tains and  moves  in  it  the  array  of  suns  and  planets, 
holds  to  the  emotion  of  sublimity ;  and  as  nothing 
can  supersede  infinite  space  in  that  relation,  so  noth- 
ing can  supersede  the  God  of  the  Bible  as  the 
ground  and  stimulus  of  the  highest  possible  devo- 
tion. 

Thus  recognizing  God  in  the  three  great  modes 
ill  which  He  is  revealed,  in  Nature,  in  Pi'ovidence, 


CULTIVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT.  299 


ind  m  Revelation,  we  shall  cultivate  a  devotional 
spirit. 

In  contrast  with  a  devotional  spirit  is 

Profaneness.  i       •  o 

one  that  is  profane. 
This  may  manifest  itself  in  action  or  in  speech. 
The  true  conception  of  this  world  is  that  of  a  temple 
involving  both  the  ownership  and  the  indwelling  of 
God.  As  there  is  nothing  that  God  does  not  own, 
any  reckless  or  vicious  use  of  what  is  his  is  a  form 
of  profaneness.  It  is  a  profanation  to  convert  what 
God  gave  for  food  into  a  means  of  gluttony  or 
drunkenness.  If  travellers  were  to  stop  in  a  cara- 
vansera,  and  in  the  presence  of  him  who  built  and 
furnished  it  were  to  destroy  the  food  and  injure  the 
furniture  he  had  provided  for  all,  he  would  be 
grieved  and  justly  incensed.  It  would  be  an  -un- 
grateful disregard  of  his  wishes,  and  an  abuse  of  his 
goodness.  But  this  is  what  men  do  who  pervert  the 
works  of  God  from  the  end  designed  by  Him,  and 
such  conduct  toward  Him  is  profaneness. 

But  while  this  is  really  profaneness,  and  in  an 
aggravated  form,  it  is  not  generally  so  regarded 
The  term  is  commonly  applied  to  some  form  of 
speech  implying  disregard  or  contempt  of  God,  or 
of  the  sanctions  of  his  mo^al  government ;  and  more 
particularly  to  an  irreverent  use  of  his  name.  This 
is  an  offense  that  would  excite  astonishment  if  it 
were  not  so  common. .  It  differs  from  others  in  be- 
mg  wholly  gratuitous,  and  is  thus,  perhaps,  the  most 
striking  evidence  of  the  depravity  of  the  race.  The 


300 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


ttiiet,  the  sensualist,  the  ambitious  man  has  a  temp- 
tation that  appeals  to  a  natural  desire;  but  that  a 
creature  and  child  of  God,  supported  wholly  by  his 
goodness  and  responsible  to  Him,  should  wantonly 
profane  his  name,  could  not  beforehand  be  credited. 
That  there  should  be  in  Christian  lands  communities 
in  which  such  profaneness  is  thought  an  accomphsh- 
ment,  and  so  an  evidence  of  manhood  that  boys  are 
tempted  to  it  on  that  ground,  shows  a  standard  of 
manhood  that  has  depravity  for  its  essence. 

Profaneness  can  be  of  no  possible  use  to  him  who 
indulges  in  it,  or  to  any  one  else.  If  it  were  not 
wicked  it  would  be  simply  superfluous  and  ridicu- 
lous. As  it  is,  it  is,  as  Robert  Hall  said,  in  allusion 
to  feudal  times,  merely  "  a  peppercorn  rent  to  show 
that  a  man  belongs  to  the  devil."  So  far  from  giv- 
ing, as  some  suppose,  assurance  of  the  truth  of  what 
is  spoken  in  connection  with  it,  it  is  the  reverse. 
All  observation  shows,  mine  certainly  does,  what 
might  have  been  inferred  without  it,  that  he  who 
will  swear,  will  lie.  Why  not?  The  practice  is 
'icarcely  less  offensive  to  a  just  taste  than  to  a  sen- 
sitive conscience,  and  whoever  may  be  guilty  of  it, 
deserves  to  be  not  only  condemned  and  abhorred, 
but  despised. 


CHAPTER  m. 


PRAYER. 

The  second  great  duty  which  we  owe  exclusively 
to  God  is  Prayer. 

Literally,  prayer  is  supplication,  it  is  asking ;  but 
Prayer  commouly  uscd  it  includes  all  that  we 

worship.  mean  by  worship.  It  includes  in  addition 
to  supplication,  adoration,  confession,  and  thanksgiv- 
ing. To  a  being  like  man  each  of  these  would  seem 
to  be  the  dictate  of  nature.  What  more  reasonable 
than  adoration  in  view  of  an  Infinite  Majesty  ? 
What  more  suitable  than  confession  in  view  of  guilt, 
or  than  thanksgiving  in  view,  not  simply  of  good- 
ness, but  of  mercy,  and  of  a  love  unutterable? 
What  more  natural  than  that  the  creature  and 
child,  in  view  of  his  wants,  should  ask  the  Creator 
and  Owner  of  all,  and  his  Father,  to  supply  those 
wants  ?  That  each  of  these,  excepting  the  last,  is 
not  only  suitable  but  a  duty  is  generally  conceded^ 
Dut  that  man  should  ask  and  that  God  should  give 
because  of  his  asking,  has  seemed  to  many  incom 
patible  with  the  fixed  order  of  nature,  and  with  his 
mfinite  attributes. 

By  asking  is  here  meant,  not  simply  desire  ex* 


302 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


pressed,  but  paramount  desire.     There  must  be 

a  desire  for  the  thing  asked  greater  than  Prayer  is 
for  anything  else  that  would  be  incom-  desfrT.^^^* 
patible  with  it.  This  is  prayer,  and  nothing  else  is. 
If  a  man  may  have  either  an  estate  or  so  much 
money  for  the  asking,  but  cannot  have  both,  how- 
ever much  he  may  desire  the  estate  he  cannot 
really  ask  for  it,  unless  he  desires  it  more  than  the 
money.  And  so,  whatever  desire  a  man  may  have 
of  heaven,  or  of  the  presence  with  him  of  the  Spirit 
of  God,  yet  if  he  have  a  stronger  desire  for  any  form 
of  worldly  good,  any  form  of  expression  that  he 
might  use  in  the  guise  of  prayer  would  not  be  ask- 
ing. It  would  be  hypocrisy  to  the  omniscient  eye. 
It  is  only  a  paramount  desire  presented  to  God  with 
the  submission  becoming  a  creature,  that  is  prayer, 
and  the  question  is  whether,  in  consequence  of  such 
prayer,  man  will  receive  what  he  would  not  with- 
out it. 

On  this  point  the  Bible  expresses  no  doubt. 
There  is  in  that  no  recognition  of  the  dif-  Testimony 
ficulties  raised  by  philosophy.  It  teaches 
us  how  to  pray ;  it  commands  and  exhorts  us  to 
pray ;  it  gives  us  examples  in  great  number  and 
variety  of  direct  answers  to  prayer  ;  it  makes  prayer 
an  essential  element  of  a  Christian  life ;  it  says  ex- 
pHcitly,  "  Ask  and  ye  shall  receive."  It  would  be 
impossible  that  the  duty  and  efficacy  of  prayer 
should  be  taught  more  clearly  than  they  are  in  the 
Bible. 


PKAYEB. 


803 


These  teachings  of  the  Bible  are  confirmed  by 
the  analogy  of  our  earthly  life,  and  by  the  instinct 
of  the  race. 

From  his  infancy  the  child  asks  and  receives. 
Askinp'  is  one  of  the  two  lemtimate  ap- 
pointed  ways  in  which  ms  wants  are  to  be 
supphed.  For  some  things,  and  at  some  times,  it  is 
the  only  way.  It  is  just  an  expression  of  that  de- 
sire and  dependence  which  are  appropriate  to  the 
relation  of  parent  and  child.  Without  recognized 
dependence  in  the  way  of  expressed  desire  on  the 
one  hand,  and  an  ability  and  willingness  to  supply 
wants  thus  indicated  on  the  other,  the  chief  beauty 
and  significance  of  the  parental  relation  would  be 
gone.  Can  it  be  then  that  we  have  a  Father  in 
heaven,  and  yet  that  the  very  feature  which  gives 
warmth  and  beauty  and  value  to  the  earthly  relation 
should  be  wanting  ?  Without  this  the  name  would 
lose,  in  its  transference  to  God,  its  chief  significance, 
and  Christ  would  not  be  the  benefactor  He  is  sup- 
posed to  have  been  in  teaching  the  race  to  say, 
"  Our  Father." 

On  this  point  too  the  instinct  of  the  race  has  been 
Foiceof  manifested  unequivocally.  Universally,  or 
instinct.  nearly  so,  when,  as  the  Psalmist  says,  men 
'draw  near  unto  the  gates  of  death,"  when  "  they 
that  go  down  to  the  sea  in  ships  "  "  mount  up  to  the 
heaven,"  and  "  go  down  again  to  the  depths,"  "  anc' 
are  at  their  wits'  end,"  "  then  they  cry  unto  the 
Lord  in  their  trouble."    Not  only  speculative  ques- 


m 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


doners  of  the  efficacy  of  prayer,  but  professed  athe- 
ists have  often  been  brought  to  extremities  in  which 
this  instinct  has  so  asserted  itself  that  they  have 
cried  unto  God. 

It  may  also  be  doubted  whether  the  highest  bless- 
ings can  be  received  except  on  the  condition  of 
asking.  Health,  rain,  a  prosperous  journey,  may 
come  to  men  whether  they  ask  or  not.  But  the 
hio-liest  blessinsis  are  from  the  direct  communion  of 
man  witli  God.  This  is  the  great  distinction  of  man, 
that  God  himself  may  be  his  portion  and  good.  To 
be  enjoyed,  this  blessing  must  be  desired  and  sought 
for,  and  it  can  be  sought  for  only  by  asking.  To 
obtain  the  larger  number  of  blessings  we  need,  we 
must  not  only  ask,  but  put  forth  active  exertion  ;  but 
here  the  only  active  exertion  possible  is  the  asking. 
Nor  would  it  seem  fit  that  God  should  bestow  this 
blessing  on  any  other  condition.  Other  things  may 
come  alike  to  all,  but  it  might  have  been  anticipated, 
even  if  He  could  do  it  otherwise,  that  God  would 
give  his  Holy  Spirit,  as  a  sanctifier  and  comforter, 
only  to  those  who  should  ask  Him. 

Not  only  from  the  Bible,  then,  but  from  the  anal- 
ogy of  our  earthly  life,  from  our  whole  nature  as 
practical,  and  from  its  necessary  relation  to  our 
highest  wants,  should  we  infer  the  efficacy  of  asking. 

The  question  then  recurs  whether,  in  objection 
the  light  of  a  philosophy  that  apprehends  {^mutebu- 
immutable  law  and  the  infinite  attributes  ^^y^*^^^^- 

God,  all  this  be  not  a  mere  seeming  and  delusion 


PRAYER. 


305 


To  the  efficacy  of  asking  for  the  Holy  Spirit,  oi 
for  any  direct  agency  of  God  upon  our  minds,  there 
can  be  no  objection  from  the  immutabihty  of  phys- 
ical law,  since  that  can  have  no  relation  to  what  is 
done  immediately  by  a  personal  being.    From  this 
highest  region  and  sphere  of  prayer,  therefore,  no 
cavil  about  fixed  law  can  debar  us.    Nor,  on  the 
view  of  the  immutability  of  law  (the  only  correct 
one),  taken  by  the  Duke  of  Argyle  in  his  "  Reign 
of  Law,"  can  any  valid  objection  lie  against  the  effi- 
cacy of  asking,  for  example,  for  rain.      There  are," 
says  he,  "no  phenomena  visible  to  man  of  which 
it  is  true  to  say  that  they  are  governed  by  any  inva- 
riable force.     That  which  does  govern  them  is 
always   some  variable  combination  of  invariable 
forces.    But  this  makes  all  the  difference  in  reason- 
ing on  the  relation  of  will  to  law  —  this  is  the  one 
essential  distinction  to  be  admitted  and  observed. 
.    .    .    .    In  the  only  sense  in  which  laws  are 
immutable,  this  immutability  is  the  very  charac- 
teristic which  makes   them  subject  to  guidance 
through  endless  cycles  of  design.     It  is  the  very 
certainty  and  invariableness  of  the  laws  of  Nature," 
—  that  is,  of  each  individual  law  taken  separately  — 
"  which  alone  enables  us  to  use  them,  and  yoke  them 
to  our  service."    If,  as  some  suppose,  man  can  cause 
/ain  by  the  firing  of  cannon,  then  it  may  be  obtained 
by  asking  it  even  of  him.    In  such  a  case  there 
would  be  simply  a  different  adjustment  of  invariable 
laws ;  and  if  results  may  be  thus  produced  to  some 

20 


806  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

extent  by  the  intervention  of  human  will  without  a 
miracle,  it  cannot  be  irrational  to  suppose  they  may 
be  thus  produced  to  any  extent  by  the  divine  will. 
The  arrow  shot  at  a  venture  that  finds  the  joints  of 
the  harness,  is  governed  by  ordinary  laws.  Nothing 
but  their  nice  adjustment  is  needed  to  carry  it  pre- 
cisely there.  The  intervention  of  will  is  supposed, 
but  in  no  other  relation  to  fixed  law  than  that  of  the 
human  will  when  it  causes  ice  by  a  freezing  mix- 
ture. This  removes  a  difficulty  which  has  weighed 
heavily  on  many  minds. 

There  remains  the  objection  from  the  oi^jection 
infinite  attributes  of  God.  fntSite 

As  infinite  in  knowledge,  God  knows  ^-^^^^^^s. 
what  we  need  before  we  ask  Him.  We  can  tell  Him 
nothing  new.  He  also  knows  what  events  are  to 
be,  therefore  they  cannot  be  changed.  As  infinite 
in  goodness.  He  will  do  for  us  what  is  best  whether 
we  ask  Him  or  not. 

In  obviating  these  difficulties,  we  may  say  — 

1.  That  no  one  can  read  the  speculations  of  such 
men  as  Spinoza,  Kant,  Cousin,  and  Hamilton,  upon 
the  Infinite,  without  feeling  that  they  are  dealing 
with  a  subject  which  they  do  not  fully  grasp ;  and 
that  it  can  never  be  wise  to  set  the  results  of  such 
speculations  in  opposition  to  the  practical  principles 
of  our  nature.  The  apparent  contradictions  result- 
ing from  these  speculations  were  such  that  Kant 
felt  obliired  to  recognize  or  invent  what  he  called  a 
Practical  Reason,  as  the  only  basis  of  rationa 
-onduct. 


PRAYER. 


807 


2.  The  objection  so  makes  God  infinite  as  really 
to  limit  Him,  and  virtually  to  deny  his  personality. 
It  makes  it  impossible  for  Him  to  be  a  Father,  or 
moral  Governor.  Prayer  is  an  act  of  choice  and 
free  will.  So  is  murder.  And  if,  because  God  is 
infinite,  and  knows  what  is  to  be,  and  will  do  w^hat 
is  best,  it  can  make  no  difference  with  a  man 
whether  he  prays  or  not,  for  the  same  reason  it  can 
make  no  difference  whether  he  murders  or  not.  It 
will  follow  that  God  will  do  what  He  will  do,  with- 
out reference  to  human  conduct,  which  is  subversive 
of  moral  government,  and  a  practical  absurdity.  If 
we  regard  God  as  a  person,  and  man  also,  the  pos- 
sibility of  such  direct  intercourse  as  prayer  involves 
must  be  allowed ;  nor  can  we  conceive  of  a  being, 
especially  of  an  Infinite  Being,'  having  fully  the 
attributes  of  personality,  that  is,  being  really  God, 
to  whom  it  would  be  impossible  to  answer  prayer. 
Why  not  say  that  the  immutable  God  immutably, 
that  is  always,  answers  prayer  ?  The  difficulty  lies 
in  connecting  personality  with  infinite  attributes, 
and  those  who  deny  that  prayer  may  be  efficacious, 
really  deny  the  personality  and  fatherhood  of  God. 

It  is  to  the  fatherhood  of  God  that  we  cling.  To 
that  we  turn  with  infinite  relief,  from  those  limitless 
and  dreary  abstractions,  which  philosophy  calls  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute.  Without  that,  we  are 
orphans  :  virtually,  all  is  Fate.  With  that,  nothing 
can  rationally  prevent  the  cliild  from  coming  to  the 
Father,  or  even  the  sinner,  when  he  sees  evidence 


808 


MOKAL  SCIENCE. 


of  placability,  from  coming  "  boldly  unto  the  throne 
of  grace,  that  he  may  obtain  mercy,  and  find  grace 
to  help  in  time  of  need." 

With  this  view  of  the  nature  and  reasonableness 
of  prayer,  it  only  remains  to  say  that  its  ^^^^ 
form  is  of  little  consequence.  Prayer  is  ®^  i^^J^^- 
more  than  desire  —  more  than  sincere  desire.  It 
is  paramount  desire  offered  to  God  with  a  filial 
spirit.  Of  necessity  this  will  be  both  reverent  and 
miportunate.  Such  prayer,  whether  repeated  from 
memory,  or  read  from  a  book,  or,  as  would  seeir 
most  natural,  uttered  directly  from  the  promptings 
of  the  heart,  is  always  heard. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  SABBATH. 

The  last  duty  to  be  considered  is  the  keeping  of 
the  Sabbath. 

To  man,  originally,  the  Sabbath  must  have  come 
as  a  positive  institution,  since  he  could  have  seen 
no  reason  for  it,  aside  from  the  divine  command. 
It  has  since  been  commonly  regarded  as  partly  pos« 
itive  and  partly  moral.  Now,  however,  as  a  reason 
can  be  assigned  for  it,  and  even  for  the  proportion 
of  time  designated,  it  may  be  regarded  as  wholly 
moral. 

In  considering  the  Sabbath,  we  shall  first  treat  of 
the  Rehgious,  and  then  of  the  Civil  Sabbath. 

By  the  Religious  Sabbath,  we  mean  a  day  set 
apart  by  God  himself  for  his  own  worship,  and  to 
secure,  in  connection  with  that,  the  religious  cul- 
ture and  final  salvation  of  men. 

By  the  Civil  Sabbath,  we  mean  a  day  made 
"  non-legal,"  in  which  public  business  shall  be  sus- 
pended, and  in  which  all  labor  and  recreation  shall 
be  so  far  restrained,  that  the  ends  of  a  religious  Sab- 
bath may  be  secured  by  those  who  wish  it. 


810 


-  MORAL  SCIENCE. 


In  treating  of  the  religious  Sabbath,  we  naturally 
consider,  first,  its  origin  and  history. 

Concerning  these,  the  points  which  the  friends  of 
the  Sabbath  accept  and  regard  as  established  are 
the  following :  — 

1.  That  the  Sabbath  was  given  to  our  first  par- 
ents in  Eden,  according  to  the  account  in  Genesis 
ii.  2,  3  ;  and  that  it  was  intended  for  the  race. 

2.  That  we  find  unmistakable  indications  of  the 
Sabbath,  both  in  the  Scriptui'es  and  in  heathen  liter- 
ature, between  the  original  command  and  the  giving 
of  the  Law. 

3.  That  when  the  Law  was  given,  the  command 
to  hallow  the  Sabbath  .was  made  conspicuous,  as 
one  of  t'ne  ten  commandments.  That  it  has  the 
same  rank  as  the  other  commandments,  all  of  which 
are  moral  in  their  character,  and  universally  binding. 

4.  That  during  the  subsequent  history  of  the 
Jews  the  Sabbath  is  referred  to  by  the  prophets  in 
a  way  to  show  that  they  classed  it  w^ith  the  other 
commandments,  and  that  they  regarded  its  obser- 
vance as  intimately  connected  wdth  the  prosperity  of 
the  nation. 

5.  That  at  the  time  of  our  Saviour  the  Sabbath 
was  observed  with  great  strictness ;  that  the  people 
assembled  regularly  for  public  worship,  and  that 
Moses  and  the  prophets  were  read  in  the  syna- 
gogues every  Sabbath-day.  Also,  that  this  worship 
was  attended  by  our  Saviour,  and  that  while  He  re- 
proved the   superstitious   observances  and  over- 


THE  SABBATH. 


811 


gcnipulousness  that  had  crept  in,  He  yet  recognized 
the  Sabbath  as  a  divine  institution,  and  as  "  made 
tor  man." 

6.  That  after  the  resurrection  of  Christ  the  day 
was  changed,  and  that  the  Christian  Sabbath,  with 
substantially  the  same  ends,  has  been  perpetuated 
till  the  present  time. 

These  points  have  been  amply  discussed  by  many 
writers,  and  as  they  belong  to  history  rather  than 
to  philosophy,  they  will  not  be  further  noticed  here. 
We  proceed  to  inquire  what  may  be  known  of  the 
origin  of  the  Sabbath,  from  the  character  and  condi- 
tion of  man. 

And  here  we  observe  that  the  religious  Sabbath 
authenticates  itself  as  from  God.  This  it  does  m 
various  ways. 

1.  Regarding  man  as  sinful,  taking  him  as  we 
now  find  him  in  every  country  where  the  Sabbath 
is  unknown,  the  very  conception  of  a  holy  Sabbath 
would  have  been  impossible.  There  could  have  been 
nothing  within  him  or  without  him  to  suggest  it. 

2.  ReggTL'ding  men  as  selfish,  the  rich  and  the 
j)Owerful  would  never  have  originated  an  institution, 
or  consented  to  it,  which  would  not  only  free  laborers 
and  dependents  and  slaves  from  labor  one  seventh 
of  the  time,  but  would  require  that  time  for  the 
service  of  another. 

3.  As  the  Sabbath  corresponds  with  no  cycle  or 
natural  division  of  time,  it  must  have  been  impos- 
lible  for  any  man,  or  number  of  men,  to  single  oul 


312 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


one  day,  and  set  it  apart  authoritatively.  Man  could 
Qeither  have  decided  rightly  the  proportion  of  time 
to  be  set  apart,  nor  have  guarded  the  sanctity  of 
the  day  by  penalties.  If  the  division  of  time  into 
weeks  were  wholly  unknown,  it  would  be  impossible 
that  it  should  be  introduced  by  man. 
*  4.  Man  could  not  have  so  associated  the  Sabbath 
with  the  grandest  ideas  made  known  by  revelation, 
or  possible  to  thought,  as  the  creation  of  the  world, 
the  resurrection  of  Christ,  the  outpouring  of  the 
Spirit,  and  the  rest  of  a  holy  heaven.  He  could 
not  have  made  it  span  the  arch  from  the  beginning 
till  the  consummation  of  all  things. 

6.  The  Sabbath  authenticates  its  divine  origin 
not  only  as  it  thus'  blends  with  the  highest  ideas  and 
interests  of  man,  as  connected  with  the  past  and  the 
futm*e,  but  by  its  analogy  with  the  works  of  God  as 
simple,  and  at  the  same  time  touching  the  interests 
of  the  present  life  at  so  many  points.  In  this  it  is 
like  the  air  and  the  water,  which  seem  so  simple, 
yet  subserve  so  many  uses. 

As  thus  impossible  to  have  been  originated  by 
man,  as  connected  with  the  creation  of  the  world, 
with  the  resurrection  of  Christ,  with  the  outpouring 
if  the  Spirit,  and  with  the  rest  of  heaven ;  being 
analogous  to  nature,  and  promoting  every  interest 
of  time,  we  say  that  the  religious  Sabbath  comes  tc 
man  bearing  its  own  credentials  as  from  God. 

From  the  origin  of  the  Sabbath  we  TheSabbaU 

necessary 

turn  to  its  necessity  for  man.  for  man. 

t.  Of  its  necessity  for  man  as  an  individual. 


THE  SABBATH. 


818 


Of  this  the  first  ground  is  the  necessity  man  is  la 
For  religions      religious  instruction.    The  rehgion  of 

through  with  mechanically,  or  a  superstition  that 
can  be  inherited,  or  imposed  upon  ignorance.  It  is 
a  religion  of  light.  This  is  its  glory.  But  rational 
ideas  of  God  and  of  his  worship,  and  of  the  duty 
and  destiny  of  man  as  a  religious  being,  can  no  more 
be  reached  without  instruction  than  similar  ideas  of 
civil  society.  Upon  such  instruction  the  Bible  in- 
sists, both  in  the  Old  Testament  and  in  the  New, 
and  for  this,  if  it  is  to  be  made  general,  the  Sabbath 
is  indispensable. 

But  it  is  not  simply  instruction  that  man  needs. 
Forpersua-  uccds  pcrsuasiou.  Indifference  and 
aversion  are  to  be  overcome.  Men  are 
tempted  to  forget  God,  to  neglect  prayer,  and  make 
light  of  accountabihty.  They  are  tempted  to  live, 
and  most  men  do  live,  for  this  world  alone.  Here 
is  the  great  need  of  a  Sabbath.  There  is  need  of 
time  and  opportunity  to  persuade  men  ;  to  go,  if  need 
be,  into  the  highways  and  the  hedges,  and  compel 
them  to  come  in." 

But  again,  if  we  suppose  an  individual  intelh- 
For  culture  S^^^^Y  ^^eligious,  the  Sabbath  would  be 
Mid  growth,  needed  for  his  culture  and  growth.  Were 
men  open  every  day  to  the  calls  of  society,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  pressure  of  competition  in  business,  the 
tide  of  worldliness  would  become  resistless.  The 
Sabbath  brings  the  world  to  a  solemn  pause,  as 


314 


MORAL  SCIEiTCi. 


under  the  eye  of  God.  It  enables  man  to  subordi- 
»iate  sense  to  faith,  and  hfts  him  up  to  the  power  of 
living  for  the  unseen  and  the  future. 

Again,  man  cannot  reach  his  end  as  isolated. 
He  is  social,  and  needs  public  and  social  For  social 
worship,  as  well  as  instruction,  and  for 
these  the  Sabbath  is  indispensable.  The  Sabbath, 
the  pulpit,  the  Sabbath-school,  and  the  social  meet- 
mgs  appointed  on  the  Sabbath  and  revolving  about 
*t,  are  inseparable.  Withdraw  these,  and  it  is 
doubtful  whether  the  Church  itself  would  survive. 
The  pulpit,  in  connection  with  the  Sabbath,  is  the 
only  institution  ever  established  on  earth  for  the 
general  diffusion  of  religious  instruction,  and  for 
securing  a  form  of  social  worship  that  should  bring 
all  men  together  in  equality  and  brotherhood  before 
God. 

II.  The  Sabbath  is  needed  not  only  for  the  indi- 
vidual, but  for  the  family. 

The  Sabbath  and  the  family  were  instituted  in 
Paradise  —  these   only,  and  they  natu-  j,^^  ^j^^ 
rally  support  each  other.    Where  there  is  ofTh2°^ 
no  Sabbath,  the  domestic  relations  are  not  ^"^^^^^y- 
held  sacred,  and  where  the  domestic  relations  are 
not  held  sacred,  there  is  no  Sabbath.     Let  but 
these  two  institutions,  the  family  and  the  religious 
Sabbath,  be  sustained  in  their  integrity,  and  every 
interest  of  the  individual  and  of  the  family  will  ht 
iocured. 

III.  The  Sabbath  is  essential  to  the  state,  if  free 
government  is  to  be  maintained. 


tHE  SABBATH. 


No  people  ever  have  been,  or  ever  can  be,  raised  - 

.^o  a  point  of  knowledge  and  virtue  that  would  en- 
able them  to  maintain  permanently  a  free  govern- 
ment, that  is,  self-government,  without  that  circle  of 
agencies  of  which  the  Sabbath  is  an  essential  part. 

Without  the  Sabbath  and  the  Bible  there  has 
The  Sabbath  bccu  uo  such  diffusiou  of  kuowlcdge 
government,  amoug  a  wholc  pcopIc  as  would  qualify 
them  for  liberty.  It  was  among  those  who  most 
highly  esteemed  the  religious  Sabbath,  and  were 
persecuted  for  maintaining  it,  that  the  idea  of  edu- 
cating the  whole  people  first  arose  and  was  made 
efficient.  The  idea  had  its  germ  in  that  estimate  of 
man  as  man,  which  underlies  the  whole  system  of  re- 
ligion of  which  the  Bible  and  the  Sabbath  are  a  part. 

But  knowledge  is  not  sufficient  for  freedom. 
There  must  also  be  virtue,  principle,  and  a  right 
social  state.  Outward  forms  and  amenities  must 
spring  fi'om  good  will,  and  love  as  a  law  must  be 
applied  in  the  relations  of  life  as  it  never  has  been, 
or  can  be  without  the  Sabbath  and  its  teachings.^ 

IV.  We  next  observe,  that  man  needs  the  Sab- 

1  As  the  capacity  of  man  for  free  government  is  now  on  trial,  and 
especially  in  this  country,  this  point  is  of  special  interest  to  the  patriot 
as  well  as  to  the  Christian,  and  has  attracted  no  little  attention.  Two 
years  since,  at  the  request  of  the  New  York  Sabbath  Committee,  a 
paper  was  read  by  me  before  the  National  Sabbath  Convention,  held  at 
Saratoga,  in  which  it  was  maintained :  — 

1.  That  a  religious  observance  of  the  Sabbath  would  secure  the 
permanence  of  free  institutions.'* 

2.  *'  That  without  the  Sabbath  religiously  observed  the  permanend 
if  free  institutions  cannot  be  secured; "  and  — 


316 


MORAL  SClElTCi:. 


bath  as  a  physical  being,  and  not  he  alone,  but  the 

animals  that  are  subjected  to  labor  by  him.  It  is 
worthy  of  notice  that  cattle  are  especially  mentioned 
in  the  fourth  commandment. 

If  this  be  so,  it  is  a  fact  of  high  import,  not  only  as 
sliowing  the  wide  relations  of  the  Sabbath,  but  the 
subordination  of  physical  to  moral  ideas  in  the  whole 
structure  of  the  present  system. 

The  question  is,  Will  man  and  animals  do  more 
work,  do  it  better,  have  better  health,  and  pi^ygicai 
live  longer  by  laboring  six  days  and  rest-  thi*^ 
ing  the  seventh,  than  by  laboring  seven  s^^^^-*^- 
days  in  the  week  ?    This  question  can  be  decided 
only  by  facts,  and  by  a  wide  and  careful  induction. 

On  this  point  extensive  observations  have  been 
made  by  cautious  men,  and  facts  like  the  following 
are  stated:  "The  experiment  was  tried  on  a  hun- 
dred and  twenty  horses.  They  were  employed  for 
years  seven  days  in  a  week.  But  they  became  un- 
healthy, and  finally  died  so  fast  that  the  owner 
thought  it  too  expensive,  and  put  them  on  a  six 
days'  arrangement.  After  this  he  was  not  obliged 
to  replenish  them  one  fourth  as  often  as  before. 
Instead  of  sinking  continually,  his  horses  came  up 
again,  and  lived  years  longer  than  they  could  have 

3.  "  That  the  civil  as  based  on  the  reh'gious  Sabbath  is  an  institutioc 
*o  which  society  has  a  natural  right,  precisely  as  it  has  to  property." 

These  propositions,  it  is  believed,  can  be  established,  and  if  so  the 
Babbath  must  be  from  God. 

The  paper  referred  to  having  been  published  by  the  Sabbath  Com< 
jnitte<?  jind  extensively  circulated,  it  is,  perhaps,  sufficient  to  refer  to  i! 
here. 


THE  SABBATH. 


817 


ione  on  the  other  plan."  Numerous  cases  of  this 
kind  are  stated  by  Dr.  Justin  Edwards  in  his  "  Sab- 
bath Manual." 

A  friend  writes  me  that  when  the  extensive  stable 
of  the  3d  Avenue  Railroad,  in  New  York,  was  com- 
pleted, he  was  invited  to  inspect  it ;  and  noticing  that 
the  stables  were  arranged  in  groups  of  seven,  he 
found  on  inquiry  "  that  the  object  was  to  have  a 
gang  or  team  of  horses  together ;  that  each  car  re- 
quired three  pair  of  horses  per  day,  each  pair  going 
about  twenty-four  miles  ;  but  that  this  was  not 
enough,  for  that  a  horse,  no  matter  how  well  fed 
and  cared  for,  required  rest,  and  that  the  only  way 
to  give  it  to  him  and  still  keep  the  car  running  was 
to  have  an  odd  horse  which  should  come  in  and  take 
his  turn  at  the  work."  This  gave  each  horse  a 
seventh  part  of  the  time  for  rest.  "  It  had  been 
tried,  the  superintendent  said,  with  less,  and  with 
more,  but  that  it  took  just  about  seven  horses  to  run 
the  car  all  the  time."  My  friend  adds  :  "This  re- 
sult had  apparently  been  reached  through  pure 
experience,  but  however  reached,  it  had  not  been 
founded  upon  any  Scriptural  reason  ;  and  I  have  no 
doubt  but  that  the  superintendent  and  directors  were 
entirely  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  they  were  fol- 
lowing a  divine  precept." 

In  view  of  facts  like  the  above.  Dr.  Edwards  felt 
authorized  to  say  of  laboring  animals  that  when 
employed  but  six  days  in  a  week,  and  allowed  to* 
rest  one,  they  are  more  healthy  than  they  can  he 


818 


MORAL  SCIENCE* 


when  employed  during  the  whole  seven.  They  do 
more  work,  and  live  longer." 

And  what  is  true  of  animals  is  true  of  man. 
From  extensive  inquiries,  from  reports  made  by 
government  commissioners,  and  from  the  opinion  of 
many  scientific  physicians,  Dr.  Edwards  concludes 
that  "men  who  labor  six  days  in  a  week,  and  rest 
one,  can  do  more  work  in  all  kinds  of  business,  in 
all  parts  of  the  world,  and  do  it  in  a  better  manner 
than  those  who  labor  seven."  Also,  "  that  it  is 
now  settled  by  facts  that  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  is  required  by  a  natural  law^  and  that  were 
man  nothing  more  than  an  animal  it  would  be  for 
his  interest  to  observe  the  Sabbath."  ^ 

The  above  refers  to  physical  labor ;  but  as  the 
power  of  vigorous  and  persistent  mental  The  mental 

Til  1  1  r»    1       1     1      •     powers  need 

labor  depends  on  the  state  ot  the  body,  it  a  sabbath. 
will  follow  that  more  such  labor  can  be  done,  and 
better  done  by  those  who  keep  the  Sabbath,  than  by 
those  who  do  not.  This  is  confirmed  by  facts, 
beginning  with  the  testimony  of  Sir  Matthew  Hale, 
which  seems  to  have  first  called  attention  to  the 
subject.  He  said :  "  If  I  had  at  any  time  bor- 
rowed from  this  day  any  time  for  my  secular  em- 
ployment I  found  that  it  did  further  me  less  than  if 
I  had  let  it  alone,  and  therefore,  when  some  years' 
experience,  upon  a  most  attentive  and  vigilant 
observation,  had  given  me  this  instruction,  I  gre^w 
peremptorily  resolved  never  in  this  kind  to  make  a 
1  See  Sab.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  41. 


THE  SABBATfl. 


819 


breach  upon  the  Lord's  day,  which  I  have  now 

strictly  observed  for  more  than  thirty  years."  On 
this  point  more  recent  testimony  is  abundant,  but 
need  not  be  added. 

The  views  above  presented  rest  on  their  own 
basis,  though  they  could  never  have  been  reached 
without  revelation,  and  they  justify  us  in  calling 
special  attention  to  the  saying  of  our  Saviour,  that 
"  the  Sabbath  was  made  for  man."  Viewing  him 
in  whatever  aspect,  whether  as  a  physical,  an  in- 
tellectual, or  a  moral  and  religious  being ;  whether 
in  his  domestic,  his  social,  or  his  civil  relations,  we 
see  that  the  Sabbath  is  an  integral  and  essential 
part  of  the  divine  arrangement  for  his  training  and 
well-being. 

If  the  preceding  views  are  correct,  and  also  the 
Man's  right   doctriue  of  risihts  already  considered,  it 

to  the  civil  mi    p  n  i 

Babbath.  will  follow  that  man  has  a  right  to  the 
civil  Sabbath,  on  the  same  ground  that  he  has  a 
right  to  property,  or  to  anything  else  ;  and  that  it 
belongs  to  legislation  to  secure  him  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  that  right. 

Rights  are  from  the  necessity  of  those  things  to 
which  man  has  a  right,  to  secure  the  various  ends 
indicated  by  the  active  principles  of  his  constitution, 
and  they  vary  in  importance  and  sacredness  accord- 
ing to  the  importance  and  sacredness  of  the  end. 
But  the  highest  end  of  man  is  a  religiously  socia! 
3nd.  His  most  sacred  right  must  therefore  be  to 
the  requisites  and  conditions  for  attaining  that  end; 


520 


MORAL  SCiENCfi. 


and  he  will  have  a  right  to  demand  of  society  what- 
ever legislation  may  be  required  for  that.  The 
civil  society  wliich  does  not  afford  to  every  man  the 
most  favorable  conditions  for  the  attainment  of  the 
ends  for  which  God  made  him,  needs  modification, 
and  if  it  would  render  such  attainment  impossible, 
it  needs  reconstruction. 

In  saying  the  above  we  disclaim  any  purpose  to 
make  men  moral  or  religious  by  legislation,  or  to 
interfere  with  any  liberty  that  w^ould  not  trench 
upon  rights.  Give  us  our  rights,  give  us  the  still- 
ness and  quiet  needed  for  the  religious  impression 
of  the  Sabbath,  for  the  instruction  of  families,  and 
for  public  worship,  and  we  are  content.  To  these, 
as  needed  for  the  attainment  of  our  highest  ends,  we 
have  a  right. 

It  may  also  be  said  that  society,  as  being  from 
God,  has  a  natural  right  to  anything  necessary  to 
secure  its  own  ends.  If,  therefore,  it  can  be  shown, 
as  it  can  be,  and  has  been,  that  those  ends  cannot 
be  secured  without  the  Sabbath,  then  society  has, 
on  this  ground  also,  a  right  to  legislate  in  favor  of 
the  civil  Sabbath."  ^ 

It  only  remains  to  speak  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  Sabbath  should  be  kept. 

How  the  Sabbath  must  be  kept  must  ^Tanner  of 
be  determined  in  part  from  its  origin,  but  SetiTmined 
rhiefly  from  its  end. 

As  associated  with  great  and  joyful  events  in  the 

1  See  Sabbath  and  Free  Institutions y  p.  17. 


THE  SABBATH. 


321 


past,  the  Sabbath  is  of  the  nature  of  a  festival,  and 
should  be  a  day  of  joy.  As  calling  us  to  cease  from 
the  toil  imposed  by  the  primeval  curse,  and  to  lay 
aside  its  soiled  garments,  the  Sabbath  is  a  day  of 
release  and  of  refreshment.  As  pointing  to  a  rest 
of  holy  activity,  in  which  the  curse  of  toil  shall  be 
wholly  lifted  from  us,  the  Sabbath  is  a  day  of  de- 
lightful anticipation,  and  of  earnest  preparation. 
To  one  acquainted  with  its  origin,  and  sympathizing 
with  its  end,  the  whole  tone  and  aspect  of  the  day 
must  be  bright,  and  its  spirit  free  ;  but,  as  has  been 
said,  the  manner  of  keeping  the  day,  its  duties  and 
employments,  must  be  mainly  determined  by  its 
end. 

Is  the  end  of  the  Sabbath  physical  ?  Then  it  is 
to  be  spent  in  physical  culture.  Is  it  intellectual  ? 
Then  the  schools,  and  lyceums,  and  libraries  should 
be  opened  and  thronged.  Is  the  end  aesthetic  ? 
Then  we  are  to  listen  to  fine  music,  and  view  works 
of  art.  Is  it  social  ?  Then  we  are  to  make  calls, 
and  attend  dinner  parties.  Is  the  end  communion 
with  nature,  or  with  the  God  of  nature,  distinc- 
tively ?  Then  we  are  to  walk  in  the  fields  and 
woods,  and  go  on  excursions.  Is  the  end  of  the 
Sabbath  religious?  Then  it  is  to  be  kept  holy. 
Then  are  we  to  bring  ourselves  by  every  method  of 
his  appointment,  into  immediate  and  conscious  re- 
ation  to  God  as  a  holy  God,  and  our  end  will  be 
\he  promotion  of  holiness  in  ourselves  and  others. 
This  is  the  end  designated  by  God,  the  only  worthy 


322 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


end,  the  only  end,  even,  in  connection  with  which 

any  other  can  be  fully  secured. 

But  while  the  above  is  the  end,  it  does  not  follow 
that  it  is  the  only  end  ;  for  here,  as  else-  Higher  and 
where,  we  find  higher  and  lower  ends, 
and  here,  too,  the  law  of  limitation  holds.  Every 
lower  good  may  be  promoted,  and  should  be,  but 
only  so  far  as  it  is  a  condition  for  one  that  is  higher. 
Holiness  is  the  supreme  end.  So  far  as  that  will  be 
promoted  by  physical  rest  and  "  bodily  exercise," 
by  study,  or  art,  or  social  intercourse,  or  commun- 
ion with  nature,  these  will  be  in  place,  hut  no  further. 

The  Sabbath  was  made  for  man,"  and  whatever 
labor  or  service  his  good  may  require  us  to  perform 
on  that  day,  we  are  to  do  —  all  works  of  necessity  and 
mercy.  But  we  are  to  remember  that  it  was  made 
for  man  especially  as  a  religious  being,  and  as  his 
great  need  is  conformity  to  God,  if  the  Sabbath  be 
not  so  kept  as  to  promote  that,  it  fails  of  its  chief 
end.  It  fails  to  be  properly  a  Sabbath.  But  let  it 
be  kept  so  as  to  promote  this  end,  and  every  inferior 
good  will  follow.  There  will  be  physical  rest.  There 
will  be  that  study  of  the  Word  of  God  and  that 
meditation  which  give  light  and  depth  to  the  intel- 
lect. There  will  be  sacred  song,  with  so  much  of 
art  as  higher  ends  may  demand  or  permit.  There 
will  be  that  family  worship  which  hallows  the  home, 
and  that  public  and  social  worship  which  at  once 
humbles  and  exalts  meiiv  and  brino;s  them  too-ether 
as  one  family  before  God.    Man  will  have  syrapathv 


THE  SABBATH. 


323 


mth  nature,  not  merely  as  expressing  the  natura 
attributes  of  G  od,  but  as  the  basis  and  frame- work, 
and  in  some  of  its  aspects,  the  silent  prophecy  of  a 
higher  moral  and  Christian  system.  All  this  he 
will  have  under  the  law  of  limitation,  and  in  addi- 
tion, the  limitless  good  that  comes  from  conformity 
to  God,  and  direct  communication  with  Him. 

Such  a  law  of  the  Sabbath  is  as  precise  as  can  be 
given  and  not  keep  men  children,  or  make  them 
machines.  It  avoids  all  precisionism,  allowing  each 
one  to  decide  for  himself,  whether  or  not  he  may 
pluck  the  ears  of  corn  as  he  passes  through  the  field, 
and  rub  them  with  his  hands. 

The  requirement  to  keep  the  Sabbath  holy  places 
Holiness  ^  peculiar  position,  as  making  holi- 

SrighTob-^  ness  necessary  to  the  right  keeping  of  it. 
lerrance.  j^.  self-cvideut  that  the  religious  Sabbath 
must  be  kept  religiously,  and  that  only  a  relig- 
ious man  can  do  that.  Here  is  the  great  difficulty 
with  the  Sabbath ;  but  it  is  only  the  same  as  with 
the  service  of  God  in  any  form.  "  Ye  cannot,"  said 
Joshua  to  the  Israelites  of  old,  "  serve  the  Lord,  for 
He  is  a  holy  God."  The  very  reason  why  they 
should  do  it  was  the  reason  why  they  could  not. 
The  faculties  can  act  with  alacrity  only  with  ref- 
erence to  a  congenial  end.  Let  a  man  hungei 
and  thirst  after  righteousness,"  and  all  opportunities 
and  means  of  attaining  it  will  be  welcomed  and  im- 
proved. This  alone  can  free  the  Sabbath  from  that 
impression  of  negation  and  vacuity  and  rest^ainl 


324 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


c^liich  they  must  feel  who  are  brought  up  to  keep 
it  strictly,  but  have  no  sympathy  with  its  ends  as 
rehgious.  Restramed  by  conscience  or  by  custom 
from  employments  and  pleasures  that  are  congenial, 
and  with  no  taste  for  the  proper  business  and  enjoy- 
ments of  the  day,  it  will  be  "  a  weariness,"  and  they 
will  say,  as  was  said  by  men  similarly  situated  three 
thousand  years  ago,  and  has  been  ever  since,  "  When 
will  the  Sabbath  be  gone,  that  we  may  set  forth 
wlieat  ?  "  For  this  irksomeness  of  the  Sabbath 
there  are  but  three  possible  remedies.  One  is  that 
God  should  change  his  law  ;  one  that  men  should 
obey  it ;  and  the  third,  that  they  should  disregard 
and  pervert  it  by  spending  the  day  in  business  or 
pleasure. 

The  observance  of  the  Sabbath  has  been  supposed 
to  be  peculiarly  a  guard  against  crime.  ^^^^ 
It  is  so  because  it  is  more  purely  than  any-  safeguard 

»y  J  against 

thing  else  a  test  of  regard  to  the  authority 
of  God.  As  no  time  is  intrinsically  holy,  and 
nothing  but  the  command  of  God  can  make  it  so, 
the  observance  of  a  specified  time  on  that  ground  is 
almost  sure  to  be  connected  with  the  fear  of  God  in 
other  things.  Hence,  of  1232  convicts  in  Auburn 
State  prison,  only  26  had  conscientiously  kept  the 
Sabbath  ;  and  of  203  who  were  committed  in  one 
year,  only  two  had  conscientiously  done  so.  For 
the  same  reason,  desecration  of  the  Sabbath  is  often 
the  beginning  of  a  course  of  vice  and  crime.  As  of 
Old  with  tiie  Israelites,  the  Sabbath  seems  to  be  set 


THE  SABBATH. 


825 


as  a  sign  between  God  and  men,  and  when  they  dis- 
regard that,  all  fear  of  Him  departs.  It  is,  there- 
fore, ominous  of  every  form  of  evil  when  a  young 
person  begins  to  disregard  the  Sabbath.  Tell  me 
how  the  Sabbath  is  spent,  and  I  will  give  you  a 
moral  history  of  the  rest  of  the  week. 

It  has  also  been  supposed  that  something  of  dis- 
Providence  Crimination,  enough  to  show  which  side 
Babbath.  God  is  ou,  may  be  discerned  in  special 
evils  which  follow  Sabbath  desecration.  It  is  said 
by  careful  observers,  and  confirmed  by  striking 
facts,  that  those  who  seek-  to  obtain  their  own  ends, 
whether  of  business  or  pleasure,  by  appropriating 
God's  time  for  them,  often  find  themselves  strangely 
thwarted,  sometimes  by  seeming  accidents  and  sud- 
den events,  and  sometimes  in  the  long  lines  of  God's 
providence.  This  may  well  be,  for  if  the  law  of 
the  Sabbath  be  the  law  of  God,  we  may  be  sure 
that  there  is  no  such  inflexibility  of  natural  forces 
that  they  cannot  be  brought  to  conspire  with  it,  and 
that  in  some  way  it  will  ultimately  vindicate  itself. 
"  Who  hath  hardened  himself  against  Him,  and 
prospered  ?  " 

The  religious  Sabbath  has  been  dwelt  upon  thus 
at  length,  from  the  conviction  that  it  is 
vital  to  individual  piety,  to  the  family,  and 
to  our  free  institutions  ;  and  also  that  it  can  be  sus- 
tained only  by  a  clear  apprehension  of  its  grounds, 
und  by  vigilance  and  struggle.  To  a  pervertea 
Sabbath,  a  day  of  amusement,  spectacles,  idleness, 


326 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 


find  consequent  vice  and  degradation;  despotism,  in- 
fidelity, and  formalism  have  no  objection.  Such  a 
day  is  their  surest  means  of  undermining  everything 
opposed  to  them.  It  is  the  temple  of  God  become 
a  den  of  thieves.  It  is  a  holy  Sabbath  that  is  the 
point  of  their  common  attack,  and  this  it  is  that  the 
friends  of  an  enlightened  Christianity,  and  of  free 
institutions,  are  called  upon  to  sustain. 

The  fourth  and  the  fifth  commandments  stand 
together  in  the  centre  of  the  Decalogue  ;  and  as  it 
is  through  these  that  there  is  a  connection  between 
the  two  tables  of  the  divine  Law,  so  it  is  through 
the  Sabbath  that  a  divine  influence  passes  into  the 
family,  and  through  that  into  society.  This  is  the 
divine  order  —  the  Sabbath  and  the  family  mutu- 
ally supporting  each  other ;  and  God,  through 
them,  working  out  a  perfect  society.  It  remains 
to  the  Christian  and  the  patriot  to  accept  this  order, 
and  work  together  with  Him. 


APPENDIX. 


HOPKINS'S  "LAW  OF  LOYE  ANT>  LOVE  ASA  LAW." 
BY  THE  KEY.  JAMES  MoCOSH,  LL.  D.,  D.  D. 

In  the  summer  of  1866  I  found  myself  wandering 
among  the  limbs  of  the  Green  Mountains,  and  it  oc- 
curred to  me  that  I  ought  to  find  my  way  to  Williams- 
town  and  its  college.  One  end  I  had  in  view  was  to 
see  more  of  the  grand  scenery  —  tlie' lovely  forests  and 
towering  mountains,  by  which  the  region  is  character- 
ized. I  was  certainly  not  disappointed  in  the  situation 
of  the  town.  It  is  placed  on  a  knoll  in  the  heart  of  a 
capacious  hollow,  surrounded  with  imposing  mountains. 
It  struck  me  as  a  spot  at  which  the  Last  Judgment 
might  be  held,  with  the  universe  assembled  on  the 
slopes  of  the  encircling  hills.  But  I  had  another  object 
on  which  I  had  set  my  heart  still  more  earnestly,  and 
this  was  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  the  President  of 
the  college,  whose  works  I  had  read  in  my  own  country, 
and  whose  character  I  had  been  led  to  revere  by  the 
accounts  given  me  by  those  who  knew  him  intimately. 
And  if  I  was  not  disappointed  with  the  scenery,  I  was 
still  less  so  with  Dr.  Hopkins,  whom  I  found  a  man 
stalwart  and  elevated  like  the  mountains  among  which 
he  lives  and  muses,  and  yet  adorned  withal  with  graces 
as  lovely  as  the  foliage  of  the  spruce  hemlock  which 
there  clothes  the  scenery.  Since  that  time  I  ever  place 
him  before  me,  in  imagination,  seated  under  a  tree  in 
the  heart  of  the  mountains,  pondering  some  deep  theme, 
seeking  light  for  himself,  and  wishing  to  impart  it  to 
others. 


328 


APPENDIX. 


In  the  book  before  us  he  has  given  us  the  result  of 
his  thoughts  on  no  lower  a  subject  than  Law  and  Love 
and  the  rehition  between  them.  And  surely  these  two 
must  be  intimately  connected,  and  this  whether  we  are 
able  to  express  it  in  categorical  form  or  not.  There 
can  be  no  moral  excellence  without  love  ;  but  just  as 
little  can  there  be  without  a  rule,  without  obligation. 
The  two  seem  to  be  inseparably  joined  in  the  nature  of 
things,  as  they  certainly  are  in  the  revelation  which 
God  has  given  of  duty  in  the  Word,  —  "  For  this  is  the 
sum  of  the  Ten  Commandments,  to  love  the  Lord  thy 
God  with  all  thy  heart,  with  all  thy  soul,  with  all  thy 
strength,  and  with  all  thy  mind,  and  thy  neighbor  as 
thyself." 

Jonathan  Edwards  used  to  ponder  this  profound  sub- 
lect.  Francis  Hutcheson,  the  founder  of  the  Scottish 
•School  of  Philosophy,  had  labored  to  prove  that  virtue 
consists  in  benevolence.  Edwards  saw  the  defect  of  this 
theory,  as  omitting  love  to  God  and  justice,  which  are 
virtues  quite  as  much  as  benevolence.  So  amending  the 
theory  of  Hutcheson,  Edwards  makes  the  bold  attempt 
to  resolve  all  virtue  into  love,  in  love  to  being  as  being, 
and  distributed  to  beings  as  they  have  claims  upon  us. 
But,  with  all  his  acuteness,  he  failed  to  see  that  in  this 
resolution  he  had  unwittingly  introduced  another  idea 
besides  love  —  that  of  claim  or  obligation  —  the  claim 
of  being  as  being,  the  separate  claims  of  different  beings, 
say  of  God,  of  father  and  mother,  of  husband  and  wife, 
of  brothers  and  sisters,  of  rulers  and  subjects,  of  friends 
and  foes.  That  being  has  claims  upon  us  —  that  dif- 
ferent beings,  such  as  God  and  our  neighbors,  have 
separate  claims  upon  us,  —  this  tui  ns  out  to  be  an  ulti 
mate  truth,  which  cannot  be  resolved  into  anything 
hiferior  to  itself.  Why  ought  I  to  love  my  fellow-men  ? 
Why  ought  I  to  love  God,  aud  to  love  liim  more  than 


APPENDIX, 


329 


I  love  even  my  fellow-men?  To  its,  whatever  there 
may  be  to  higher  intelligences,  there  can  be  no  answer 
but  one,  and  that  is,  that  I  ought  to  do  so.  And  if 
any  one  puts  the  other  question.  How  do  I  come  to 
know  this  ?  there  is  but  one  answer,  and  this  is,  that 
it  is  self-evident.  And  this  leads  me  to  remark  that 
there  is  a  great  defect  in  the  pievailing  doctrine  of  our 
day  among  metaphysicians  —  a  doctrine  introduced  by 
Kant  into  Germany  and  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  among 
English-speaking  nations  —  as  to  what  are  the  proper 
tests  of  first  truths  :  these  are  represented  as  necessity 
and  universaliiy.  The  primary  mark  of  first  truths  was 
seized  by  Locke  with  his  usual  sagacity  :  it  is  self-evi- 
dence. We  regard  God  as  having  a  claim  upon  our 
love,  not  because  we  are  necessitated  to  love  him,  or 
because  all  men  love  him,  but  because  it  is  right,  and 
men  see  it  to  be  so  at  once ;  and  it  is  because  they 
see  it  to  be  so  that  the  necessity  and  universality  arise. 
Edwards  has  succeeded  in  showing  that  love  is  an  essen- 
tial element  in  virtue ;  but  he  has  not  succeeded  in 
proving  that  to  us  there  is  no  other  element.  In  par- 
ticular, there  is  a  binding  obligation  to  love  God  and 
man,  and  not  only  so,  but  to  discountenance  and  punish 
sin  and  to  countenance  and  encourage  moral  excellence. 

And  now  we  find  a  thinker  of  this  century,  and  liv- 
ing in  much  the  same  parts,  trying  to  solve  the  same 
problem  of  the  relation  of  law  to  love,  and  love  to  law, 
and  thinking  he  has  solved  it.  The  following  is  his 
noble  language  :  — 

"  Law  and  love !  These  are  the  two  mightiest  forces 
in  the  universe,  and  thus  do  we  marry  them.  The 
place  of  the  nuptials  is  in  the  innermost  sanctuary  of 
the  soul.  As  in  all  right  marriage,  there  is  both  con- 
trariety and  deep  harmony.  Law  is  stern,  majestic,  and 
the  fountain  of  all  order.    Love  is  mild,  winning,  the 


330 


APPENDIX. 


fountain  of  all  rational  spontaneity  —  that  is,  of  the 
Bpontaneity  that  follows  rational  choice.  Love  witliout 
law  is  capricious,  weak,  mischievous  :  opposed  to  law  it 
is  wicked.  Law  without  love  is  unlovely.  The  highest 
harmony  of  the  universe  is  in  the  love  of  a  rational 
being  that  is  coincident  with  the  law  of  that  being- 
rationally  affirmed  ;  and  the  deepest  possible  jar  and 
discord  is  from  the  love,  persistent  and  utter,  of  such  a 
being  in  opposition  to  his  law.  It  is  because  there  is  in 
the  Divine  Being  this  harmony  of  law  with  love  that - 
He  is  perfect.'' 

It  is  a  curious  circumstance  that  Dr.  Hopkins  does 
not  examine,  or  even  refer  to  the  attempt  made  by  Ed- 
wards. Indeed  it  is  one  of  the  peculiarities  of  our 
author — under  one  aspect  an  excellence,  under  another 
a  defect  —  that,  like  Edwards,  he  is  largely  a  "  self-con- 
tained" thinker.  The  reading  of  the  one,  as  of  the 
other,  seems  confined,  and  confined  to  rather  common  - 
place works.  This  circumstance  imparts  a  freshness  and 
an  independence  to  their  thinking,  but  at  times  it  keeps 
them  from  seeing  certain  aspects  of  their  theme  which 
others  have  noticed  and  brought  out  to  view. 

Dr.  Hopkins,  as  every  one  who  knows  his  spirit 
would  expect,  has  a  great  aversion  to  ancient  Epicure- 
anism and  modern  Utilitarianism.  He  speaks  with 
great  contempt  of  "  the  sty  of  Epicurus,"  "  the  dirt  phi- 
losophy "  and  "  the  bread  and  butter  philosophy."  On 
the  other  hand,  he  is  not  prepared  to  give  his  adherence 
to  the  counter  doctrine  of  intuitive  morals.  Avoiding, 
as  he  reckons,  the  errors  of  both  extremes,  he  is  striving 
to  construct  a  theory  of  his  own,  and  he  defends  it  with 
able  arguments  and  acute  distinctions.  I  am  not  sure 
whether  he  has  been  successfid  any  more  than  Edwards 
was  in  a  like  attempt.  While  evidently  and  strongly 
aiming  at  something  higher,  I  fear  that,  without  meaning 


APPENDIX. 


331 


it,  he  has  landed  himself  logically  in  Eudai monism,  or  in 
making  enjoyment  the  supreme  end  of  man  and  of 
virtue. 

He  admits  fully  that  there  is  in  the  mind  of  man 
original  and  fundamental  ideas :  "  I  am  oiie  of  those 
who  believe  that  there  are  simple  and  ultimate  ideas.'' 
He  gives  existence  as  an  example  :  "  That  of  existence, 
or  being,  is  one.  All  men  have,  and  must  have,  an 
idea  of  something,  of  themselves  as  existing."  But 
then  he  will  not  allow  that  an  idea,  w^hich  seems  to 
me  to  be  as  much  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  simple 
and  original  as  any  other  we  could  name,  is  of  that 
description.  I  refer  to  our  idea  of  Right.  He  insists 
that  there  is,  that  there  must  be,  an  ultimate  end  to 
which  everything  else  is  subordinate.  But  he  denies 
that  doing  right,  as  right,  can  be  that  end.  What,  then, 
is  the  ultimate  end,  according  to  Dr.  Hopkins  ?  It 
comes,  in  the  end,  to  be  a  "  form  of  enjoyment  or  satis- 
faction.'* He  says  it  is  "  the  good."  But  what  is  the 
good  ?  The  following  is  his  answer ;  "  An  objective 
good  is  anything  so  correlated  to  a  conscious  being  as  to 
produce  subjective  good.  Subjective  good  is  some  form 
of  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  in  the  consciousness."  He 
tells  us  that  "  strictly  there  is  no  good  that  is  not  sub- 
jective." This  is  explicit  enough.  Commonly  he  speaks 
of  the  ultimate  end  in  virtuous  conduct  as  being  "  the 
good  "  or  "  well  being."  But  then  the  phrases  "  good  " 
and  "  well  being "  are  ambiguous  ;  they  may  mean 
pleasure,  or  they  may  mean  moral  good  and  moral 
well  being.  I  am  not  sure  whether  Dr.  Hopkins  is 
not  kept  at  times,  by  the  amphiboly  of  these  phrases, 
from  seeing  the  full  consequences  of  his  theory.  Let 
him,  or  let  his  readers,  substitute  "  some  form  of  enjoy- 
ment or  satisfaction  in  the  consciousness  "  for  "  good" 
and  "  well  being,"  and  what  the  precise  doctrine  is,  and 


332 


APPENDIX. 


mu8t  be,  will  at  once  become  patent.  He  tells  us 
again  and  again  :  '*  It  is  an  affirmation,  through  the 
moral  reason,  of  obligation  to  choose  the  supreme  end 
for  which  God  made  ns  —  that  is,  to  choose  the  good 
of  all  beings  capable  of  good,  our  own  included,  and  put 
forth  all  those  volitions  which  may  be  required  to  attain 
or  secure  that  good."  This  sounds  well,  and  is  in  eutire 
accordance  with  the  impression  which  Dr.  Hopkins  means 
to  leave.  But  substitute  for  "  good "  some  form  of 
enjoyment  or  satisfaction  in  the  consciousness,"  and  it 
comes  to  this,  logically  —  that  the  supreme  end  of  man 
is  to  choose  the  enjoyment  of  all,  including,  so  far  as  I 
see,  the  enjoyment  of  the  Supreme  Being. 

He  is  careful  to  explain,  in  thus  speaking  of  good  as 
"  some  form  of  enjoyment  or  satisfaction,"  that  he  does 
not  mean  our  own  good,  but  that  of  all  conscious 
beings."  But  whether  he  means  it  or  no,  whether  he 
wishes  it  or  no,  whether  he  sees  it  or  no,  this  is  in  the 
end  the  utilitarian  or  "greatest  happiness  principle." 
This  is  the  logical  consequence,  and  if  not  drawn  by 
himself  it  will  be  drawn  by  others ;  and  the  history  of 
philosophy  and  theology  shows  that  what  follows  log- 
ically will,  in  fact,  follow  chronologically,  when  the  sys- 
tem has  had  time  to  work  and  show  its  effects. 

And,  after  all,  Dr.  Hopkins  cannot  get  rid  of  an  ulti- 
mate principle  of  right.  For  why  am  I  or  any  other 
man  required  to  look  after  the  good  ?  —  meaning  the  en- 
joyment of  all  conscious  beings  —  is  the  question  that 
ever  comes  up.  Why  am  I  bound  to  look  after  any 
one's  enjoyment  but  my  own  ?  The  answer  to  this 
question  by  such  a  man  as  Dr.  Hopkins  must  be,  Because 
it  is  right,  which  right  is  discovered  by  the  moral  reason, 
and  is  an  ultimate  idea  and  an  ultimate  end.  Right 
thus  comes,  like  love,  to  be  an  end  in  itself,  inferior  to 
no  other,  subordinated  to  no  other. 


APPENDIX, 


833 


He  cannot  avoid  this  conclusion  by  the  distinctions 
tvhich  he  draws.  He  tells  us  that  hoiiness  is  not  a 
means  of  happiness  but  the  cause,"  and  "  that  a  cause 
we  always  conceive  of  as  higher  than  its  effects,"  and 
gives,  as  an  illustration,  "  God  as  a  cause  is  higher  than 
the  universe."  Ti'ue,  God  as  a  cause  is  higher  than 
any  creature  effect,  or,  we  may  add,  any  creature  cause. 
But  as  to  creature  causes  and  effects,  1  am  not  sure 
that  the  cause  is  always  higher  than  its  eflPects.  These 
late  discussions  as  to  the  nature  of  causation  have 
shown  that  all  physical  causes  are  composed  of  more 
than  one  agent,  and  that  all  effects  are  capable  of  be- 
coming causes  which  may  or  may  not  be  greater  than 
the  effects.  I  am  not  sure  that  the  causes  which  led  to 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  United  States  were  higher 
than  the  effect  —  the  abolition  of  slavery.  But  grant- 
ing his  doctrine  to  be  true,  that  holiness  is  greater  than 
happiness  because  it  is  the  cause  of  happiness  (it  is 
sometimes,  also,  in  our  world  the  cause  of  suffering), 
then  it  surely  follows  that  holiness,  which  is  the  higher, 
and  not  happiness,  ought  to  be  the  ultimate  end. 

The  following  is  evidently  the  difficulty  which  Dr. 
Hopkins  feels  in  making  right  the  end  of  moral  action . 
"  It  is  plain  that  the  quality  of  an  action  can  never  be 
the  ground  of  an  obligation  to  do  that  action."  "  Think 
of  a  man's  doing  good  to  another,  not  from  good  will, 
but  for  the  sake  of  the  rightness  of  his  own  act.  Think 
of  his  loving  God  for  the  same  reason.  Certainly,  if 
we  regard  right  as  the  quality  of  an  action,  no  man  can 
be  under  an  obligation  to  do  an  act  morally  right  for 
which  there  is  not  a  reason  besides  its  being  right, 
and  on  the  ground  of  which  it  is  right."  This  is 
pointedly  put.  But  it  is  possible  to  meet  it.  The 
difficulty  arises  from  a  confusion  of  idea  into  which  we 
•*re  apt  to  fall  when  we  think  or  speak  of  ultimate 


834 


APPENDIX, 


ideas  or  ends.  We  talk  of  them  as  having  a  reason, 
but  then  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  this  reason  is  not  out 
of  themselves  but  in  themselves.  It  lies  in  the  objects 
contemplated,  and  is  seen  to  be  so  by  the  bare  contem- 
plation of  the  objects,  that  is  by  self-evidence,  which  is 
the  primary  mark  of  intuitive  trutli.  All  that  passes 
under  the  name  of  love  is  not  virtuous.  Certainly  our 
love  is  not  always  virtuous  when  we  contemplate  some 
form  of  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  to  ourselves  or  others. 
But  when  we  love  God  and  our  fellow-men  in  a  truly 
virtuous  manner,  we  feel  that  love,  that  tliis  love,  is  due 
to  them.  In  this,  as  in  all  cases  of  moral  excellence, 
the  ought^  the  due,  the  ohligation,  comes  in  along  with 
love,  and  is  an  ultimate  end  inferior  to  no  other. 

Dr.  Hopkins  sees  that  utilitarianism  has  a  truth  in  it. 
The  truth  lies  in  this,  that  we  are  bound  by  ultimate 
moral  principle  to  promote  the  happiness  of  mankind. 
Or,  to  give  a  deeper  and  juster  account,  we  are  bound 
not  only  to  do  good  to  all  conscious  beings,  we  are 
bound  to  love  them.  Viewed  under  this  aspect,  the 
principle  of  virtue  is  not  beneficence,  but  love.  Had 
Dr.  Hopkins,  with  his  clinching  power  and  high  moral 
aims,  brought  out  these  two  truths  more  fully  than  intui- 
tive moralists  have  done,  he  would  have  done  essential 
service  to  ethical  science,  which  has  sometimes  given 
morality  a  repulsive  aspect,  by  exhibiting  law  as  sepa- 
rated from  love.  But  this  is  not  the  way  in  which  Dr. 
Hopkins  "marries"  the  parties.  He  thinks  he  has  done 
great  service  to  ethics  by  showing  how  sensibility,  pleas- 
ure, enjoyment,  or  satisfaction  is  a  condition  of  moial 
(rood.  "A  sensibility  is  the  condition  precedent  of  all 
moral  ideas."  I  am  not  sure  that  he  is  absolutely  right 
here.  We  may  put  the  case  that  God  creates  an  angelic 
being  with  high  intellectual  endowments,  but  without 
sensibility.    Is  not  that  angel  bound  to  be  grateful  tC 


APPENDIX. 


835 


God,  from  the  very  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  hia 
Creator,  and  apart  altogether  from  sensibility  on  his 
part  or  the  part  of  God  ?  In  following  out  this  princi- 
ple, I  hold  that  man  is  bound  to  love  God,  apart  alto- 
gether from  this  love  producing  any  enjoyment  on  God's 
part  or  on  man's  part.  Dr.  Hopkins  is  obliged,  in 
effecting  his  reconciliation,  to  give  a  very  inadequate 
view  of  law.  "  The  object  of  law  is  the  control  of  force 
by  direction  and  regulation  with  reference  to  an  end." 
Surely,  the  deepest  idea  of  a  moral  law  is  here  lost 
sight  of,  which  is  obligation  to  cherish  the  affection  or 
do  the  deed  as  being  right. 

But  while  I  take  objection  to  the  very  peculiar  theory 
advocated  as  to  the  ground  of  morality,  I  am  bound  to 
speak  in  highest  terms  of  the  ability  and  high  moral 
purpose  displayed  throughout  the  volume.  Except  in 
regard  to  the  special  theory  in  the  first  part,  I  have 
nothing  to  say  against  the  work,  and  much  to  say  in  its 
favor.  Of  the  second,  or  practical  part,  I  have  to  speak 
only  in  highest  commendation.  Take  the  following  as 
a  specimen,  selected  at  random,  of  the  clear  discrimina- 
tion and  admirable  judgment  everywhere  displayed. 

"  Property  may  be  permanently  and  rightfully  alien- 
ated by  gift,  by  exchange,  and  by  sale.  It  is  also  per- 
manently alienated  by  gambling ;  this  has  different  forms 
In  some  cases,  as  in  dice  and  in  lotteries,  it  is  simply  an 
appeal  to  chance.  In  others,  as  in  cards,  there  is  a 
mixture  of  chance  and  skill.  In  others,  as  in  betting, 
of  chance  and  judgment.  In  all  cases,  the  object  is 
gain  without  an  equivalent,  and  while  there  is  such  gain 
on  one  side,  there  is,  on  the  other,  loss  without  compen- 
sation. In  legitimate  trade  both  parties  are  benefited  ; 
in  gambling,  but  one.  Legitimate  trade  requires  and 
promotes  habits  of  industry  and  skill ;  gambling  gener- 
ates indolence  and  vice,  and  stimulates  a  most  infatuatino 
and  often  uncontrollable  passion.    It  is  wholly  fselfish. 


836 


APPENDIX. 


aud  wholly  injurious  in  its  effects  upon  the  commumty. 
That  a  practice  thus  inherently  vicious,  should  be  re- 
sorted to  for  charitable  purposes,  does  not  change  its 
character,  but  only  tends  to  confound  moral  instructions. 
But  are  all  appeals  to  chance  in  the  distribution  of  prop- 
erty gambling  ?  Not  necessarily,  if  we  define  it  by  its 
motives  and  results.  A  picture  is  given  to  a  fair.  No 
individual  will  give  for  it  its  value ;  that  value  is  con- 
tributed by  a  number  and  the  picture  disposed  of  by  lot ; 
this  differs  from  an  ordinary  lottery :  1st,  Because 
there  are  no  expenses,  and  all  that  is  given  goes  for  an 
object  which  the  parties  are  gathered  to  promote.  2d, 
The  prize  is  given,  so  that  nothing  is  taken  for  the  prizes 
from  the  amount  paid  in,  but  the  whole  goes  for  the 
proposed  object.  3d,  This  may  be  done  from  a  sim- 
ple desire  that  the  fair  should  realize  the  worth  of  its 
property,  and  so,  benevolently.  And  all  appeals  to 
chance  under  these  conditions  are  not  likely  to  be  so 
frequent  or  general  as  to  endanger  the  habits  of  the 
community.  All  this  may,  and  should,  in  fairness,  be 
said.  It  should  also  be  said,  1st,  that  no  form  of 
charity  should  be  tolerated  for  a  moment  that  in  the 
actual  state  of  a  community  will  foster  a  spirit  of  gam- 
bling. It  should  be  said,  2d,  that  any  attempt  to 
promote  a  benevolent  object  by  an  appeal  to  selfish  mo- 
tives is  wrong.  Benevolent  giving  is  a  means  of  Chris- 
tian culture,  but  selfish  giving  in  the  form  of  benevo* 
lence  is  a  deception  and  a  snare.  If  the  cause  of 
benevolence  cannot  be  supported  benevolently,  it  had 
better  not  be  supported  at  all." 

I  commend  all  intelligent  readers  to  buy  this  book 
and  read  it  with  care,  and  they  will  find  themselves 
travelling  in  the  company  of  a  man  of  high  and  inde- 
pendent soul,  who  expresses  his  thoughts  in  brief  and 
weighty  sentences,  and  imparts  much  moral  instructioD 
'>£  a  lofty  order. 


APPENDIX, 
ANSWER  TO  REV.  DR.  McCOSH. 

BY  REV.  MARK  HOPKINS,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

In  reviewing  "  The  Law  of  Love,"  in  the  *^  Observer  " 
of  April  15th,  Dr.  McCosh  speaks  of  his  visit  to  Wil- 
liamstown  and  to  myself.  That  visit  is  among  my 
most  pleasing  recollections.  It  was  dm^ing  the  summer 
vacation ;  the  weather  was  fine,  and  we  were  quite  at 
leisure  to  stroll  about  the  grounds  and  ride  over  the 
hills. 

Riding  thus,  we  reached,  I  remember,  a  point  which 
he  said  reminded  him  of  Scotland.  There  we  alighted. 
At  once  he  bounded  into  the  field  like  r,  young  man, 
passed  up  the  hillside,  and,  casting  himself  at  full  length 
under  a  shade,  gave  himself  up  for  a  time  to  the  asso- 
ciations and  inspiration  of  the  scene.  I  seem  to  see 
him  now,  a  man  of  world-wide  reputation,  lying  thus 
solitary  among  these  hills.  They  were  draped  in  a 
dreamy  haze  suggestive  of  poetic  inspirations,  and  from 
his  quiet  but  evidently  intense  enjoyment,  he  might 
well,  if  he  had  not  been  a  great  metaphysician,  have 
been  taken  for  a  great  poet.  And  indeed,  though  he 
had  revealed  himself  chiefly  on  the  metaphysical  side, 
it  was  evident  that  he  shared  largely  in  that  happy 
temperament  of  which  Shakespeare  and  Tennyson  are 
the  best  examples,  in  which  metaphysics  and  poetry 
seem  to  be  fused  into  one  and  become  identical. 

As  befitted  the  season,  our  conversation  was  in  the 
light  and  aroma  of  those  great  truths  in  which  we  were 
agreed,  without  any  attempt  to  go  down  to  their  roots. 
As,  however,  I  was  meditating  my  book,  I  went  so  far 
as  to  ascertain  from  him  more  fully  what  I  knew  be- 
fore from  his  writings,  that  he  .held  to  an  ultimate  right 
and  would  not  agree  with  me.  My  ground  on  that 
22 


APPENDDt, 


point  was  therefore  not  hastily  taken,  and  while  I  ac- 
knowledge fully  the  want  of  reading  referred  to  by  Dr, 
McCosh,  and  regret  it,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say  that 
on  this  subject  he  has  presented  no  point  that  I  had 
not  seen,  and  has  raised  no  objection  that  I  had  not 
considered. 

That  the  foundation  of  obligation  should  be  gener- 
ally understood  is  most  desirable,  and  as  the  subject  so 
appeals  to  the  common  consciousness  that  every  intel- 
ligent man  can  understand  it,  I  cannot  but  think  that 
Dr.  McCosh  has  done  a  public  service  in  bringing  it 
thus  prominently  before  the  wide  circle  reached  by  the 

Observer."  Thanking  him,  therefore,  for  this,  as  well 
as  for  his  courtesy  and  kind  words  to  myself,  I  will  en- 
deavor to  do  something  to  aid  the  object  he  thus  evi- 
dently had  in  view. 

In  doing  this,  I  propose,  since  the  book  reviewed 
has  probably  not  been  seen  by  one  in  fifty  of  the  read- 
ers of  the  "  Observer,"  1st,  to  make  a  condensed  statement 
of  the  system  it  contains  ;  2d,  to  inquire  whether  that 
system  is  one  of  utilitarianism  or  eudaimonism,  which 
is  the  thing  objected  against  it ;  and  3d,  to  inquire 
whether  Dr.  McCosh  can  hold  his  system  in  consistency 
with  the  Scriptures,  or  with  himself. 

"  Morality  regards  man  as  active."  It  asks,  "  What 
ought  to  be  done  ? "    "  Why  ought  it  to  be  done  ?  " 

How  ought  it  to  be  done  ?  "  How  shall  we  answer 
these  questions  ?  The  method  adopted  in  my  books 
is  so  simple  and  obvious  that  nobody  but  a  philosopher 
could  ever  have  missed  it.  It  assumes  that  all  moral 
action  is  rational  action,  and  that  all  rational  action 
must  not  only  have  an  end,  but  must  find  its  occasion 
and  reason  in  that  end. 

This  being  assumed,  the  next  step  is,  and  must  be^ 
to  inquire  what  the  end  of  man  is.    This  is  the  uu 


APPENDIX. 


S89 


derlying  question  of  all  philosophy  of  action  for  man. 
This  we  may  know,  or  snppose  we  do,  because  we  are 
told  it;  or  we  may  know  it  by  investigating  the  struc- 
ture of  man  in  connection  with  his  position,  just  as  we 
do  that  of  a  locomotive  standing  on  a  railway  track. 
In  the  first  case,  we  should  know  the  end  by  faith; 
in  the  second,  by  philosophy.  The  faith  may  be  ra- 
tional, wholly  so.  That  will  depend  on  the  ground  of 
our  confidence  in  him  who  tells  us.  But  it  will  not 
be  philosophical.  Both  methods  are  legitimate,  but 
must  ultimately  coincide.  It  would  not  do  for  any- 
thing claiming  to  be  a  revelation  to  say  that  the  chief 
end  of  a  locomotive  was  to  -stand  still  and  scream 
through  the  steam  whistle,  and  no  teaching  could  stand 
that  should  go  clearly  against  the  end  as  revealed  in 
the  structure. 

Of  the  above  methods,  the  Westminster  divines, 
whose  earnest  minds  were  instinctively  led  to  the  ques- 
tion of  an  end,  adopted  the  first.  But,  adopting  a 
right  method,  they  regarded  man  solely  as  under  a 
remedial  system,  of  which  philosophy  can  know  noth- 
ing, except,  indeed,  as  it  may  become  a  test  of  anything 
claiming  to  be  such  a  system.  Tlie  end,  however,  as 
stated  by  them,  I  adopt  fully,  while  Dr.  McCosh,  as  I 
understand  him,  adopts  it  only  in  part.  According  to 
him,  "  man  is  bound  to  love  God  apart  altogether  from 
this  love  producing  any  enjoyment  on  God's  part,  or 
on  man's  part."  This  must  mean  that  enjoyment  ought 
to  be  no  part  of  the  end  in  any  moral  action.  That  is 
the  principle  of  it.  Would  Dr.  McCosh  say  so? 
Would  he  say  that  virtuous  love  to  God,  which  must 
consist  in  good-will,  or  the  willing  of  good,  would  be 
possible  if  God  were  as  incapable  of  enjoyment  as  a 
rock?  To  me,  the  conception  even  of  such  love  is 
impossible,  and  yet  the  statement  of  Dr.  McCosh  would 


340 


APPENDIX. 


seem  to  require  it.  But,  however  this  may  be,  what 
we  ueed  is  no  mere  statement  based  on  faith,  but  a 
philosophy  of  action,  and  for  me  this  is  possible  only 
from  a  knowledge  of  the  end  of  man  as  revealed  in  his 
structure. 

Let  us  then  take  man  as  we  would  a  locomotive, 
and  see  if  we  can,  as  we  could  in  that,  find  his  end 
from  his  structure.  This  is  no  question  of  words  and 
subtle  distinctions  that  two  hair-splitting  philosophers 
may  fall  to  loggerheads  about.  It  is  a  great  problem 
which  I  have  hoped  by  my  books,  and  hope  by  this 
paper,  to  set  many  at  working  out.  This  we  are  to  do 
independently  of  revelation.  I  would  do  it  cautiously 
and  reverently,  but  I  would  do  it.  We  are,  indeed, 
bound  to  do  it  for  ourselves,  and  not  to  leave  it  to  be 
done  by  infidels,  and  then  weakly  quarrel  with  the 
results. 

In  doing  this  we  shall  find  aid  in  observing  all  lower 
forces  that  work  towards  ends.  These  we  find  ar- 
ranged in  a  beautiful  gradation  as  conditioning  and  con- 
ditioned, and  so  higher  and  lower ;  thus  giving,  as  I 
have  shown,  a  law  of  limitation  for  the  regulation  of 
all  forces  and  faculties  except  the  highest.  In  observ- 
ing these  forces  the  point  to  be  noticed  is,  that  in  pass- 
ing upward  nature  reaches  points  where  she  does  not 
proceed  by  gradations  that  pass  into  each  other,  but 
by  leaps.  This  she  does  when  she  passes  from  inor- 
ganic to  organic  being ;  when  she  passes  from  vegetable 
to  animal  life;  and  again,  when  she  passes  from  animal 
to  rational  and  spiritual  life.  In  eacli  case  we  get  some- 
thing different,  not  in  degree  merely,  but  in  kind  ;  and 
in  stepping  across  these  gulfs  we  are  to  notice  that 
while  we  carry  with  us  everything  on  the  side  we  leave, 
it  yet  falls  into  subordination  to  the  new  force,  which 
will  work  by  its  own  laws,  and  cannot  be  safely  rea- 


APPENDIX, 


841 


soned  about  from  the  old  analogies.  A  tree  is  the 
product  of  a  force  that  acts  in  opposition  to  gravitation 
and  to  all  the  cohesions  and  chemical  affinities  of  inor- 
ganic matter,  and  he  would  be  seeking  the  living  among 
the  dead  who  should  carry  the  laws  of  inorganic  being 
over  to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  vegetable  life. 

In  each  case,  in  passing  over,  we  need  a  test  of  the 
presence  of  the  new  power.  The  test  of  the  presence 
of  vegetable  life  is  organization  ;  jof  animal  life  it  is 
sensation,  and  of  rational  life  it  is  the  power  to  choose 
its  own  end  with  an  alternative  in  kind.  Reacliing  this 
point  we  pass  out  of  the  domain  of  mechanical  forces 
acting  from  without,  and  of  instinctive  and  impulsive 
forces  acting  from  within,  into  a  region  higher  and  en- 
tirely new,  of  comprehension  and  of  freedom.  "  Up  to 
man,"  as  I  have  said  elsewhere,  "  everything  is  driven 
to  its  end  by  a  force  working  from  without  and  from 
behind,  but  for  him  the  pillar  of  cloud  and  of  fire  puts 
itself  in  front,  and  he  follows  or  not  as  he  chooses." 

As  I  view  it,  it  is  only  after  passing  this  gulf  that 
we  find  moral  phenomena.  But  at  this  point  there  is 
a  difference  about  the  very  nature  of  those  phenomena ; 
and  if  we  could  always  tell  which  side  of  the  gulf  men 
are  on,  if  they  would  not  sometimes  be  on  one  side, 
and  sometimes  on  the  other,  and  sometimes  astride  it, 
often  not  seeming  to  know  where  they  are,  it  would 
prevent  immense  confusion.  "  Holiness,"  says  Dr. 
Thornwell,  "  is  a  nature."  Then,  it  may  be  created, 
but  cannot  be  commanded.  Where  he  was  when  he 
said  this  we  cannot  doubt.  The  same  I  suppose  would 
be  said,  —  it  ought  to  be,  —  by  the  writer  of  a  recent 
article  on  morals  in  the  Princeton  Review."  By  this 
olass  of  thinkers  God  is  conceived  of  as  an  essence  in 
which  love  and  wrath  inhere  as  qualities,  and  mani- 
fest themselves  independently  and  necessarily ;  whereas 


342 


APPENDljt. 


others  conceive  of  him  as  a  person,  rational  and  free, 
and  as  a  consuming  fire  only  because  he  is  love.  Of 
these,  Dr.  McCosh  is  among  the  latter.  He  has  passed 
this  gulf.  For  him  "  moral  good "  (goodness  ?)  "  is  a 
quality  of  certain  actions  proceeding  from  the  will." 
Saying  thus,  he  must,  with  us,  develop  moral  phenom- 
ena from  the  point  of  freedom  as  manifested  in  choice. 

What,  then,  are  moral  phenomena?  They  are  those 
revealed  from  a  moral  nature,  and  are  immediately 
known  as  moral,  as  intellectual  phenomena  are  revealed 
from  an  intellectual  nature,  and  are  immediately  known 
as  intellectual.  A  man  and  a  brute  are  moved  equally 
by  appetite  to  eat ;  but  the  man  can,  and  the  brute  can- 
not be  induced  to  eat  that  which  is  distasteful  out  of 
regard  to  a  higher  good.  Here  is  an  alternative  in 
kind,  possible  for  man,  impossible  for  the  brute;  and 
when  this  is  presented  the  moral  reason  comes  at  once 
into  action,  and  affirms  obligation  to  choose  the  higher 
good,  just  as  natural  reason  affirms  personal  identity 
when  the  occasion  arises  for  that.  This  will  be  re- 
peated, as  alternatives  of  higher  and  lower  good  are 
presented,  till  we  reach  the  supreme  good,  and  then  we 
shall  have  moral  law,  and  a  basis  for  conscience  both 
as  an  impulse  and  as  a  law.  Whoever  will  ask  him- 
self what  he  means  by  an  enlightened  conscience  will 
find  the  meaning  and  necessity  of  a  supreme  end  and 
good. 

In  a  being  willing  to  come  to  the  light  the  affirma- 
tion of  obligation  will  be  made  impartially,  whether  the 
good  be  our  own  or  that  of  another.  It  will  be  made 
in  view  of  good  as  such,  and  valuable  in  itself,  whether 
it  be  our  own,  or  that  of  our  fellow  creatures,  or  of  God, 

'What  then  have  we  here  ?  We  have,  1st,  good. 
This  is  wholly  from  the  sensibility,  and  is  the  condition 
for  any  affirmation  of  obligation,  and  of  any  moral  idea 


APPENDIX. 


343 


We  have,  2d,  the  affirmation  of  obligation  to  choose 
the  good.  In  this  we  find  moral  law.  Here  we  find 
the  "  claim  "  spoken  of  by  Dr.  McCosh,  what  he  calls 
the  ought,''  the  "  due,''  the  "  obligation"  which  it 
might  be  inferred  from  bis  review  that  I  ignore.  It  is 
indeed  strange  that  in  reviewing  a  book,  one  third  of 
which  is  occupied  in  showing  the  precise  origin  and 
nature  of  obligation,  it  should  be  quietly  taken  for 
granted  that  it  is  ignored.  I  do  not  ignore  it,  but 
affirm  it  as  strongly  as  he  does  ;  but  I  do  not  say,  as 
he  does,  that  this  affirmation  of  obligation  to  choose  an 
end  "  is  itself  an  ultimate  end  inferior  to  no  other.*' 
"  The  ought,  the  due,  the  obligation,''  he  says,  "  comes  in 
along  with  the  love,  and  is  an  ultimate  end  inferior  to 
no  other."  This  I  do  not  say,  because  obligation  must 
be  obligation  to  choose  some  ultimate  end,  and  how  a 
man  can  choose  as  an  ultimate  end  his  obligation  to 
choose  some  other  ultimate  end,  I  do  not  well  under- 
stand. But  be  this  as  it  may,  this  affirmation  of  obliga- 
tion is  no  part  of  virtue.  It  is  not  only  not  an  ulti- 
mate end,  but  it  cannot  be  an  end  of  any  kind.  It  is 
necessitated.  If  it  were  not,  we  should  not  have  a 
moral  nature.  Without  it  man  would  be  incapable 
of  either  virtue  or  vice,  but  it  is  no  part  of  either. 
Through  it  we  simply  have  law,  that  by  which  a  man 
"  is  a  law  unto  himself,"  but  the  question  of  obedience 
and  disobedience,  in  which  virtue  and  vice  consist,  re- 
mains. 

Having  now  the  idea  of  good  from  the  sensibility 
^nd  of  obligation  from  the  moral  reason,  we  come  to 
the  action  of  the  will,  the  man,  the  voluntary  agent, 
the  CAUSE,  higher  than  any  effect  he  can  produce.  It 
is  in  his  power  as  a  cause,  as  well  as  in  his  nature  as 
rational  and  moral,  that  man  is  in  the  image  of  God  ; 
and  only  as  he  is  a  cause  is  he  either  responsible  oi 


B44 


APPENDIX. 


respectable.  As  a  cause  it  is  obvious  that  man  may 
assume  one  of  three  positions  in  regard  to  good.  He 
may  choose  it  unselfishly  and  impartially  for  himself 
and  all  who  are  capable  of  it  —  that  is,  he  may  love 
God  with  all  his  heart,  and  his  neighbor  as  himself ;  or 
he  may  choose  his  own  good  selfishly,  regardless  of 
that  of  others ;  or  he  may  be  malignant,  and  wish  to 
destroy  good,  and  to  cause  positive  misery. 

Taking  the  first  of  the  above  positions,  the  man  ac- 
cepts the  Law  of  Love  as  the  law  of  his  being.  It  is 
law  because  obligation  is  affirmed.  It  is  the  Law  of 
Love  because  love  is  the  thing,  and  the  only  thing  com 
manded.  "  And  thus  do  we  marry  them,"  —  "  Law  and 
Love,  the  two  mightiest  forces  in  the  universe."  The 
command  comes  with  immediate  and  "  self-evidence  "  of 
its  authority,  on  the  apprehension  of  good  as  valuable 
in  itself  to  God,  to  our  fellow-creatures,  and  to  our- 
selves. Choosing  thus,  the  man  has  done  no  outward 
act,  and  yet  he  has  virtually  done  all  good  acts.  Noth- 
ing remains  but  to  carry  out  this  choice  in  executive 
volitions,  according  to  the  circumstances  and  relations 
of  life.  In  making  this  choice,  and  thus  carrying  it 
out,  the  man  will  fulfill  obligation,  will  be  virtuous  ; 
and  in  so  doing  there  will  be  developed  a  sensibility 
of  the  moral  nature  giving  a  satisfaction  higher  than 
any  other.  This  form  of  voluntary  action  would  be 
moral  goodness,  and  the  enjoyment  from  it  would  be 
moral  good.  This  is  holy  happiness,  or  happiness  from 
holiness,  or  blessedness.  It  can  come  only  from  holiness, 
and  is  as  much  higher  than  animal  enjoyment  as  an  an- 
gel is  higher  than  an  animal.  Becoming  conscious  of 
this,  the  man  is  fully  in  possession  of  himself,  with  all  his 
possible  forms  of  activity  and  their  results.  He  knows 
himself  now  through  and  through,  as  he  might  know 
1  locomotive.    And  now,  retaining  his  generic  choice 


APPENDIX. 


345 


to  cause  good,  his  action  must  take  one  of  two  forms. 
He  must  either  seek  to  cause  good  directly,  or  to  lead 
othei-s  to  cause  it.  He  mu-t  seek  to  cause  a  change 
either  in  the  condition  or  the  character  of  men.  In 
thus  laboring  to  cause  well  being  directly,  and  to  cause 
it  indirectly  by  laboring  for  holiness,  man  finds  his  true 
3nd.  Thus  does  he  glorify  God  ;  thus  does  he  do  the 
greatest  possible  good  to  his  fellow-creatures  ;  thus 
does  he  find  his  own  highest  enjoyment ;  thus  does  lie 
reveal  the  highest  beauty,  and  so  become  an  object  of 
complacency.  What  more  can  we  ask  for  man  as  ac- 
tive ?  Let  him  become  thoroughly  subject  to  the  Law 
of  Love,  and  we  ask  nothing  more. 

But  what  of  right,  and  righteousness,  and  justice  ? 
Nothing  has  been  said  of  these.  We  have  now  reached 
the  point  at  which  moral  philosophies  generally  begin. 
They  generally  begin  by  inquiring  about  right,  and 
obligation  as  from  that.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  fore- 
going statements  what  I  would  say  of  them.  Let  a 
man  adopt  the  Law  of  Love,  and  then  seek  to  apply  love 
as  a  law  in  practical  life,  and  he  will  need  to  ask  con- 
stantly what  is  right ;  he  will  always  be  under  obliga- 
tion to  do  it ;  and  the  doing  of  it  will  be  righteousness. 
Then  also  will  the  idea  and  sense  of  justice  be  revealed ; 
but  there  is  no  more  an  eternal  right,  or  an  eternal 
justice,  independent  of  good  and  of  love  as  possible 
through  that,  than  there  is  an  eternal  tree  independent 
of  existence.  Existence  is  the  conditioning  idea  with 
out  which  that  of  a  tree  could  not  be,  and  good  and 
love  are  conditioning  ideas  without  which  those  of  right 
und  justice  could  not  be.  A  justice  that  should  have 
no  reference  to  the  good  of  any  being  would  not  be 
justice,  but  a  blind  instinct.  But,  having  its  basis  and 
conditioning  idea  in  love,  it  justifies  itself  to  itself  even 
in  becoming  "  indignation  and  wrath."    These  must  be 


346 


APPENDIX, 


developed  from  love,  which  thus  becomes  holiness,  when 
gelfishness  and  malignity  would  defeat  its  ends.  Some- 
thing analogous  to  this  is  seen  even  in  instinctive  love. 
Tlie  fury  of  the  eagle  is  never  so  great  as  when  it  re- 
veals itself  as  an  expression  of  love  for  its  young.  And 
nothing  can  be  so  dreadful  as  the  wrath  of  Infinite 
Goodness,  not  as  a  blind  fury,  but  because  it  is  Infinite 
Goodness.  That  there  are  what  may  be  called  ra- 
tional instincts  and  impulses  connected  with  our  moral 
nature,  and  which  some  have  mistaken  for  conscience 
and  so  have  become  fanatics,  I  believe  ;  but  I  also  be- 
lieve that  there  can  be  no  law  of  the  conscience  except 
in  the  presence  of  the  supreme  good. 

Of  this  system  it  may  be  said,  1st,  that  it  is  in 
harmony  with  the  Scriptures.  It  was  a  great  satisfac- 
tion to  find  that  the  law  of  the  Constitution  was  the 
law  of  the  Bible.  Let  that  be  shown  and  we  shall 
have  an  argument  for  the  divine  origin  of  the  Bible 
that  cannot  be  gainsaid.  2d,  By  making  the  idea  of 
good  the  condition  of  obligation,  or  goodness,  or  virtue, 
the  system  shows  just  how  that  absolute  assurance" 
comes,  "  that  happiness  must  be  the  accompaniment  or 
end  of  holiness,"  which  the  Princeton  Review"  says  is 
graven  on  man's  soul."  How  this  comes  the  advo- 
cates of  an  ultimate  right  have  never  attempted  to 
show.  Let  them  attempt  it,  and  they  will  find  the 
need  of  changing  their  system.  3d,  It  connects  man 
with  all  that  is  below  him,  and  all  that  is  subordinate 
in  him  with  that  which  is  higher,  thus  bringing  him 
into  unity  with  his  surroundings  and  with  himself,  and 
making  the  same  law  of  limitation  that  we  find  in  na- 
ture a  law  to  him.  4th,  It  gives  a  basis  out  of  which 
Ihe  practical  part  grows,  so  that  it  is  not  mere  precept 
Such  is  the  system.  We  now  inquire,  as  was  pro- 
posed, is  not  this  utilitarianism  ?    Of  this  there  seems 


APPENDIX. 


347 


to  be  a  superstitious  horror  in  some  quarters,  and  the 
idea  is  hardly  better  defined  than  that  of  a  ghost.  Dr. 
McCosh  says  there  is  a  truth  in  it,  but  what  that 
truth  is,  as  he  states  it,  if  it  be  not  precisely  my  doc- 
trine, I  am  unable  to  make  out.  It  is  the  only  part 
of  his  review  that  puzzled  me.  I  have  supposed  that 
utility  involved  a  tendency  to  some  good,  and  that  the 
choosing  of  a  thing  because  of  its  tendency  to  a  good, 
or  as  a  means  of  good,  was  a  different  thing  from  the 
choice  of  a  good  that  is  good  in  itself  and  that  has 
nothing  to  do  with  tendency.  I  must  think  these  are 
wholly  different.  But  as  some  do  not  see  this,  I  will 
simply  say,  leaving  out  definitions,  that  as  objectionable, 
nothing  can  be  utilitarianism  that  does  not  either  op- 
pose self  to  love^  or  happiness  to  duty.  To  this  all  will 
agree. 

But  so  far  from  opposing  self  to  love,  the  system  is 
one  of  disinterested  and  impartial  love  —  the  "  love  of 
God  with  all  the  heart  and  of  our  neighbor  as  our- 
itelves."  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  means  or  utilities, 
but  chooses  an  end  for  its  own  sake,  that  is,  not  good 
in  the  abstract,  but  the  good  of  beings  capable  of  good  ; 
and  this  choice  is  love.  It  fixes  on  good  as  that,  and 
that  alone,  which  renders  virtuous  love  possible.  We 
have,  then,  no  possible  taint  of  utilitarianism  here. 

J^or,  again,  does  this  system  oppose  happiness  to 
duty.  It  affirms,  with  Dr.  McCosh,  the  "  self-evidence  " 
of  obligation,  and  that  duty  is  to  be  done  at  all  hazards. 
Speaking  of  conscience  in  its  relation  to  moral  law,  I 
Bay  "From  that  is  its  power  to  originate  the  word 
ought^  and  whenever  the  mandate  and  imjDulse  involved 
41  that  word  are  truly  derived  from  the  law  (hey  are 
to  be  obeyed  at  all  hazards.  It  would  be  absurd  tc 
say  that  anything  could  excuse  a  man  from  doing  what 
he  ought  to  do.    Moral  law  must  be  supreme."  Nothing 


348 


APPENDIX. 


\ 


surely,  can  be  stronger  than  this.    There  is  no  taint  of 

utilitarianism  here. 

But  though  the  book  so  proclaims  love  and  law  sep- 
arately as  to  preclude  utilitarianism,  is  it  not  inconsis- 
tent with  itself,  and  does  it  not,  in  marrying  the  two, 
give  an  opportunity  for  this  subtle  and  terrible  enemy 
to  slip  in  ?  Again,  No.  If  utilitarianism  cannot  be 
compatible  with  either  separately,  much  less  can  it  be 
with  the  two  united.  As  I  understood  the  contract,  it 
was  that  law  was  so  to  remain  law  and  love  love,  as  to 
exclude  utilitarianism.  The  two  must  be  united  in 
some  way.  They  belong  to  each  other  by  a  preor- 
dained affinity,  and  the  deepest  laws  of  thought,  and 
the  necessities  of  moral  government;  and  if  they  can- 
not be  united  by  making  good  from  a  sensibility  the 
condition  of  obligation,  then  how  ?  This  does,  indeed, 
and  that  is  one  advantage  of  it,  retain  the  truth  which 
Dr.  McCosh  admits  is  in  utilitarianism — just  that,  and 
nothing  more.  The  question  here  is  not  at  all  about  un- 
compromising obedience  or  duty,  when  that  is  made 
known,  but  whether  the  very  idea  of  duty  is  possible 
except  through  that  of  a  good  from  the  sensihility,  and 
so  of  a  possible  love.  The  truth  is,  that  the  advocates 
of  an  ultimate  right  are  so  afraid  of  soiling  virtue  by 
some  contact  with  happiness  as  to  exclude  the  possibil- 
ity of  it  altogether.  This  Dr.  McCosh  seems  to  me  to 
do  when  he  speaks  of  obligation  to  love  a  being  with- 
out regard  to  his  happiness.  If  there  may  be  the  love 
of  complacency  without  regard  to  liai)piness,  there  can 
DO  more  be  virtuous  love  than  there  can  be  pity  with- 
out regard  to  distress. 

The  system,  then,  is  not  one  of  utilitarianism.  It  has 
no  tendency  towards  it,  and  nothing  could  be  more  uii- 
Founded  than  such  a  supposition.  If,  indeed,  there  be 
any  two  things  more  opposed  to  utilitarianism  than  law 


APPENDIX. 


849 


and  love,  of  which,  in  their  true  nature  and  relations  to 
each  other,  this  system  is  simply  an  exposition,  I  do 
not  know  what  they  are. 

But  if  the  system  be  not  utilitarianism,  is  it  not  "  eu- 
daimonism,  or  the  making  of  enjoyment  the  supreme 
end  of  man  and  of  virtue  ? "  If  we  would  clear  this 
subject  up  fully,  we  must  understand  each  other  here. 
We  must  understand  what  is  meant  when  it  is  said 
that  there  is  some  other  good  besides  happiness. 

Looking  at  man  in  his  complex  nature,  —  as  physical, 
intellectual,  moral,  spiritual,  —  we  see  that  he  is  capa- 
ble of  various  forms  of  activity  from  without  and 
within,  and  that  these  are  accompanied  with  certain 
forms  of  feeling.  This  capacity  of  feeling  is  called  the 
sensibility  ;  and  the  feeling  may  be  one  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  of  joy  or  of  sorrow.  Now  we  need  a  word  which 
shall  express  unequivocally  the  whole  range  of  feeling 
as  it  gives  satisfaction,  pleasure,  joy,  happiness,  blessed- 
ness. Unfortunately  we  have  no  such  word.  Happi- 
ness is  often  used,  but  in  many  minds  its  associations 
are  with  the  lower  forms  of  enjoyment.  Blessedness, 
which  is  from  the  moral  and  spiritual  powers,  and  can 
be  only  as  they  act  normally,  will  not  do,  because  it 
excludes  the  lower  forms  of  enjoyment.  Hence  the 
difficulty  of  finding  any  one  word  that  will  express  the 
whole  end  of  man  ;  but  that  that  end  is  in  the  sensibil- 
ity, and  so  in  it  that  without  that  the  very  conception 
of  an  end  would  be  impossible,  I  have  no  doubt.  To 
avoid  ambiguity  and  put  it  in  the  broadest  way,  my 
statement  is,  that  a  sensibility  is  the  condition  prece- 
dent of  all  moral  ideas."  Of  course  it  must  be  the  con- 
dition of  all  moral  action.  Is  this  denied  ?  To  deny 
t  would  be  to  deny  the  universally  received  doctrine 
of  which  my  position  is  but  an  instance,  that  there  is 
ao  action  of  the  will  except  fiom  the  sensibility.  Dr 


850 


APPENDIX, 


McCosh  does,  indeed,  attempt  to  deny  it,  but  in  doing 
BO  he  makes  a  supposition  that  I  marvel  at;  one  indeed 
that  looks  so  much  Jike  an  absurdity,  that  if  it  had  been 
made  by  any  one  else,  I  am  not  quite  sure  but  I  might 
have  taken  it  for  one.  He  puts  "  the  case  that  God 
creates  an  ans^elic  beino^  with  hioh  intellectual  endow- 
ments,  but  without  sensibility,"  and  then  affirms,  and 
founds  a  principle  on  it,  that  such  a  being  would  be 
under  obligation  to  be  grateful  to  God,  while  yet  grati- 
tude is  a  form  of  the  sensibility,  and  obligation  itself 
cannot  be  conceived  of  without  it.  "  Si  naturam  furca 
expeUas^'  etc.  Let  the  advocates  of  an  ultimate  right 
be  explicit  on  this  point.  If  they  say  there  is  any  good 
not  from  sensibility,  let  them  tell  us  what  it  is.  If  not, 
let  them  say  so,  and  accept  the  consequences.  So  far 
as  I  can  see,  no  one  can  any  more,  except  by  a  juggle 
of  words,  deny  that  all  good  is  from  a  sensibility  than 
he  can  deny  his  personal  identity. 

The  view  presented  above  is  said  by  Dr.  McCosh  to 
be  a  "  very  peculiar  theory."  By  others  it  is  said  to 
be  the  view  long  held  by  a  large  class  of  writers.  This 
is  of  little  consequence.  In  the  materials  of  the  system 
there  is  nothing  new.  They  are  the  same  old  ideas. 
So  the  needle  and  thread  were  the  same  old  materi- 
als. But  as  a  simple  change  in  the  manner  of  thread- 
ing the  needle  led  to  a  wide  range  of  new  C(mibinations 
and  revolutionized  a  whole  branch  of  industry,  so  a 
simple  adjustment  or  two  here,  with  very  little  that  is 
new,  may  disentangle  thought  at  this  knotty  point,  and 
change  our  whole  mode  of  conceiving  of  this  subject. 

It  remains  to  say  something  of  the  system  held  by 
Dr.  McCosh.  Dr.  McCosh  agrees  with  me  in  acce[)ting 
the  law  of  love  as  given  in  the  Scriptures  ;  and  also 
obligation  as  "  self-affirmed."  What  I  venture  to  doubt 
IS,  whether,  in  holding  the  system  he  does,  he  is  consis- 
tent with  the  Scriptures,  or  with  himself. 


APPENDIX. 


351 


And  here,  as  v^e  are  to  speak  of  love,  I  must  call 
attention  to  two  different  meanings,  an  amphiboly  "  of 
that  word.  It  may  be  a  love  of  benevolence,  as  a  man 
may  love  his  enemy,  including  good-will,  or  the  willing 
of  good ;  or  it  may  be  a  love  of  congruity,  as  a  man 
may  love  art  or  poetry,  in  which  there  is  no  good- will. 
The  first  is  virtuous  love,  the  second  is  not.  There 
is  no  virtuous  love  that  is  not  either  the  willing  of  good 
to  some  being  capable  of  good,  or  that  does  not,  like 
the  love  of  complacency,  proceed  directly  or  indirectly 
from  that. 

With  this  in  mind,  and  remembering  that  we  are 
seeking  for  the  ultimate  thing  on  which  the  mind  rests 
when  obligation  is  affirmed,  let  us  take  the  Law  of  Love 
as  given  in  the  Scriptures  :  "  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord 
thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thy- 
self." Here  God  is  presented  to  be  loved  for  his  own 
^ake,  and  there  is  nothing  more  ultimate,  the  idea  of 
good  coming  in  simply  as  rendering  love  possible.  The 
love  is  to  be  a  simple  primitive  act  in  view  of  the  object 
as  worthy  of  love.  But  Dr.  McCosh  is  not  satisfied 
with  this.  He  says,  "We  regard  God  as  having  a 
claim  upon  our  love  because  it  is  right,  and  men  see  it 
to  be  so  at  once."  I  venture  to  say  that  men  do  not 
see  it  to  be  so  at  all.  It  may  be  true  that  men  see  at 
once  that  they  are  under  obligation  to  love  God;  it  is 
right  that  they  should  love  him ;  but  it  is  not  true  that 
they  are  under  obligation  to  love  him  because  it  is 
right,  and  of  course  they  do  not  see  that  they  are.  I 
have  said  that  ''No  man  is  under  obligation  to  do  an 
act  morally  right  for  which  there  is  not  a  reason  be- 
ijides  it3  being  right,  and  on  the  ground  of  which  it  is 
right."  In  accordance  with  this,  the  reason  of  our  love 
to  God,  its  ultimate  ground,  is  the  worth  and  worthi- 
ness of  God,  so  that  we  do  not  love  him  because  it  is 


352 


APPENDIX, 


right,  tbe  Tightness  being  as  Dr.  McCosh  allows,  a 
mere  quality  of  our  love,  but  because  he  is  worthy  of 
our  love.  In  the  one  case  the  last  thing  seen  as  the 
ground  of  obligation  is  God  in  his  worth  as  capable  of 
good,  and  in  his  worthiness  as  seeking  to  promote  it ; 
in  the  other  it  is  —  right.  This  is  an  "  ultimate  idea," 
absolutely  ultimate,  observe,  with  nothing  beyond  it ; 
"  an  end  in  itself,  inferior  to  no  other,  subordinate  to 
no  other."  This  puts  right  above  God.  We  are  to 
love  God,  not  for  his  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  the 
right ;  or,  as  was  said  to  me  recently,  we  are  to  love 
God  because  we  love  virtue,  as  if  the  love  of  God  were 
not  virtue.  In  the  same  way  we  are  to  love  our  fel- 
low-men, not  for  their  sakes,  but  for  the  sake  of  the 
right.  We  are  to  love  the  right  supremely,  and  to 
lo\^e  God  because  we  love  the  right.  Nor  can  it  be 
said  that  the  love  of  God  and  of  right  are  the  same,  for 
good-will  towards  an  "ultimate  idea"  is  impossible.  1 
have  seen  quite  enough  of  this  abstract,  hard,  godless, 
loveless  love  of  right  and  virtue,  instead  of  the  love  of 
God  and  of  men.  It  is  nearly  as  bad  on  the  one  side 
as  utilitarianism  is  on  the  other;  and  "whether"  Dr 
McCosh  "  means  it  or  no,  whether  he  sees  it  or  no,  this 
is,  in  the  end,  the  "  ultimate  right  "  principle."  "  This 
is  the  logical  consequence,  and  if  not  drawn  by  him  it 
will  be  drawn  by  others ;  and  the  history  of  philosophy 
and  theology  shows  that  what  follows  logically "  (ex- 
cept when  men  receive  a  system,  as  most  men  do  this, 
in  words  only)  "  will  follow  chronologically  when  the 
system  has  had  time  to  work  and  show  its  effects." 
Accordingly,  we  find  that  wlierever  this  system  has 
been  fully  received  it  has  tended  to  fanaticism.  No 
man  can  adopt  right  as  an  ultimate  end  with  no  regard 
to  good  —  and  if  it  be  ultimate  it  must  be  so  ado{)ted 
without  thi*'  tendency  ;  nor  can  any  man  adopt  as 


APPENDIX* 


853 


ultimate  and  supreme  the  Scriptural  Law  of  Love,  the 
very  nature  of  love  making  the  good  of  being  its  end, 
and  at  the  same  time  consistently  adopt  riglit  as  "an 
ultimate  end,"  "  an  end  in  itself,  superior  to  no  other, 
subordinate  to  no  other." 

It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  the  Scriptures  nowhere 
command  men  to  do  right  because  it  is  right,  but  that 
their  whole  tenor  is  opposed  to  this  form  of  teaching. 

But  if  the  theory  held  by  Dr.  McCosh  be  not  con- 
sistent with  the  Scriptures,  can  he  hold  it,  and  be  con- 
sistent with  himself?  1  am  not  sure,  indeed,  whether 
Dr.  McCosh  has  not  been  led  to  adopt  and  retain  the 
system  by  the  "  amphiboly "  of  the  cardinal  words 
which  we  are  obliged  to  use  on  this  subject,  such  as 
"end,"  and  "right,"  and  "love,"  and  "good."  He 
speaks  of  right,  and  love,  and  obligation,  and  holiness, 
as  being  ultimate  ends.  So  far  as  appears,  there  may 
be  any  number  of  these  in  his  system  ;  nor  does  he 
seem  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  a  supreme  end,  or 
the  distinction  insisted  on  by  me,  between  ends  as  ulti- 
mate and  supreme. 

But  what  does  Dr.  McCosh  mean  when  he  speaks 
of  these  —  of  love,  for  example  —  as  an  end  ?  Love 
is  an  act ;  and  we  do  not  commonly  speak  of  an  act 
as  an  end,  but  as  done  for  some  end.  Anything  purely 
spontaneous,  as  an  emotion,  that  may  be  called  love, 
would  have  no  moral  character ;  but  if  love  be  a  ra- 
tional and  moral  act,  as  most  people  suppose,  then  it 
must  have  some  object  or  end  beyond  itself,  for  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  a  rational  action,  involving  the 
choice  of  an  end,  can  be  its  own  end. 

What,  again,  does  he  mean  when  he  speaks  of  right 
as  an  end  ?  What  is  right  ?  Is  it,  as  some  say,  some- 
thing out  of  the  mind,  having  an  independent  exist- 
ence, like  space  ?  That  Dr.  McCosh  denies.  Is  it  the 
23 


S54 


APPENDIX, 


quality  of  an  action  ?  Most  men  think  so.  But  the 
moral  quality  of  an  action  can  exist  only  in  view  of 
the  end  to  be  chosen,  and  therefore  cannot  be  that  end. 
Is  right,  as  I  suppose  it  is,  equivalent  to  the  "  recti- 
tude "  of  the  "  Princeton  Keview  "  ?  Then  it  is  "  a 
simple  quality" — "  undefinable,"  "absolute,"  "eternal," 
"unchangeable"  —  having  itself  for  its  own  standard  ; 
as  high  as  God,  for  there  can  be  "nothing  higher," 
as  pure  as  God,  for  there  can  be  "  nothing  purer," 
as  authoritative  as  God,  for  there  can  be  "  nothing'- 
more  authoritative."  "  It  is  underived,"  ultimate," 
"  supreme,"  "  elementary,"  "  uncompounded."  Yes  ;  a 
"  simple  quality "  is  elementary  and  uncompounded ! 
and  yet  it  is  not  simple,  for  "  it  carries  in  itself  the 
idea  of  obligation."  This  same  "simple  quality"  is, 
moreover,  "  moral  goodness,"  and  "  is  the  original 
supreme  excellence  of  God  and  all  moral  creatures." 
Whether  this  "  simple  quality "  originally  inhered  in 
God's  essence  or  in  his  acts,  we  are  not  told,  though  we 
should  be  glad  to  know.  Probably  in  both,  for  we  are 
told  that  it  is  both  "in  man's  soul,  and  in  its  acts."  Is 
it  this  "  simple  quality,"  thus  simplified  and  made  per- 
fectly intelligible,  the  doctrine  of  which  "  may  be  called 
the  catholic  Christian  doctrine  of  the  ultimate  moral 
idea,"  that  Dr.  McCosh  would  make  an  end  ?  If  so,  I 
have  nothing  to  say ;  for  a  simple  quality  capable  of  all 
that  is  thus  attributed  to  this,  may  doubtless  become  an 
and,  or,  at  least,  I  should  be  unwilling  to  say  what  it 
may  not  become,  whether  an  end  or  an  elephant.  Prob- 
ably this  is  the  very  quality  spoken  of  by  the  Teutonic 
theosopher,  quoted  by  Campbell,  when  he  aimoupcea 
that  "  all  the  voices  of  the  celestial  joyfulness  qualify, 
commix,  and  harmonize  in  the  fire  that  was  from  eternity 
in  the  good  quality." 

Take  again  obligation,  to  which  I  have  already  re 


APPENDIX. 


355 


ferred.  There  may  be  obligation  to  choose  an  end,  but 
as  I  understand  it,  obligation  itself  cannot  be  an  end. 
And  yet  Dr.  McCosh  says  that  it  is  an  "  ultimate  end, 
inferior  to  no  other."  Obligation  an  ultimate  end!  And 
one,  too,  not  inferior  to  the  good  of  God  and  bis  uni- 
verse !  There  must  lurk  here  somewhere  —  and  the 
public  must  judge  where  —  that  "  confusion  of  idea  into 
which,"  as  Dr.  McCosh  says,  "  we  are  apt  to  fall  when 
we  speak  or  think  of  ultimate  ideas  or  ends." 

But  again  :  take  love  in  the  two  meanings  explained 
above,  and  the  confusions  from  it  are  endless.  What 
do  the  advocates  of  the  ultimate  right  theory  mean  by 
the  love  of  right,  and  of  the  right  ?  A  virtuous  love  ? 
I  suppose  so.  If  a  man  is  to  do  right  because  it  is  right, 
which  is  what  Dr.  McCosh  would  call  virtue,  it  must  be  be- 
cause he  loves  the  right,  else  there  is  a  virtue  without  love, 
which  neither  Dr.  McCosh  nor  the  Bible  allow.  But  is 
the  love  of  right,  or  of  the  right,  or  of  virtue,  virtuous 
love  ?  No  ;  because  neither  ris^ht  nor  virtue  can  be  ob- 
jects  of  good-will.  There  is  no  willing  of  good  to  them, 
and  so  no  more  virtue  in  loving  them  than  in  loving 
poetry,  except  as  such  love  may  imply  a  previous  love 
that  did  involve  good-will. 

But  perhaps  the  most  misleading  ambiguity  of  all,  is 
that  of  good  "  as  derived  —  sometimes  from  the  sensi- 
bility and  meaning  enjoyment,  and  sometimes  from  the 
will  and  meaning  goodness.  Of  this,  however,  I  have 
spoken  so  fully  in  the  work  reviewed,  that  I  will  not 
dwell  on  it  here. 

On  other  points  I  should  be  glad  to  touch,  particularly 
those  of  cause  and  law.  But  enough  has  been  said.  For 
the  first  time  in  my  life  I  have  noticed  what  has  been 
said  of  my  writings.  If  I  have  spoken  plainly,  it  is  not 
in  a  spirit  of  controversy,  for  I  have  no  little  fort  to  de- 
fend, but  with  a  desire  to  aid  Dr.  McCosh  in  his  evident 


856 


APPENDIX, 


purpose  of  awakening  a  more  general  interest  in  this 
great  subject,  and  to  add  my  mite  toward  the  displace- 
ment, sure  to  come,  of  a  traditional  philosophy  based  on 
the  inadequate  and  radically  false  method  of  construct- 
ing a  system  of  conduct  on  a  purely  abstract  idea. 
Wh-iLIAms  College,  May  1, 1869. 


ANSWER  TO  REV.  DR.  HOPKINS. 

BY  JAMES  McCOSH,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

Dr.  Hopkins's  letter  is  worthy  of  the  man,  in  respect 
both  of  the  ability  and  the  kindly  spirit  displayed  in  it. 
No  evil  can  arise  from  a  controversy  so  conducted.  On 
the  contrary,  I  expect  good  to  spring  from  it.  It  bears 
on  a  question  second  to  no  other  in  philosophy,  and  it 
admits  of  applications  to  the  justice  of  God,  the  punish- 
ment of  sinners,  and  the  atonement  for  sin. 

But  we,  the  controversialists,  must,  for  our  own  sake 
and  that  of  our  hearers,  take  care  that  we  keep  the  point 
at  issue  clearly  before  us.  It  is  a  very  simple  one  : 
What  is  the  chief  end  of  man?  Is  it  or  is  it  not  some 
form  of  pleasure,  happiness  or  enjoyment  ? 

With  much  that  Dr.  Hopkins  has  said  I  concur.  I 
agree  with  what  he  says  as  to  the  importance  of  looking 

ends  in  determining  what  "  good  "  is.  This  has  been 
done  more  or  less  by  moralists  since  the  days  of  Aristotle, 
who  begins  his  Nicomachean  Ethics  with  an  inquiry 
into  ends,  and  has  been  followed  by  the  Stoics,  and  by 
Cicero  in  his  treatise  De  Finihus,  The  question  is,  W^hat 
is  the  end  and  the  supreme  end  of  man  ?  Again  Dr. 
Hopkins  and  I  are  agreed  as  to  the  manner  in  which  this 
question  is  to  be  settled  ;  that  is,  by  an  inquiry  into  oui 
moral  nature  —  in  the  manner  of  Bishop  Butler.  The 


APPENDIX. 


367 


question  here  is,  What  saith  our  moral  nature  as  to  the 
final  aim  of  man?  Dr.  Hopkins's  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion is  stated  clearly  in  a  passage  which  I  have  quoted 
before,  and  which  I  must  quote  again.  What  then  is 
the  ultimate  end  according  to  our  author?  He  says  it 
is  "  the  good."  But  what  is  the  good  ?  He  answers, 
—  An  objective  good  is  anything  so  correlated  to  a 
conscious  being  as  to  produce  subjective  good.  Subjec- 
tive good  is  some  form  of  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  in 
the  consciousness He  tells  us  that  strictly  there  is 
no  good  that  is  not  subjective."  In  his  review  in  the 
"  Observer  "  he  says  there  is  "  a  difficulty  of  finding  any 
one  word  that  will  express  the  whole  end  of  man  ;  but 
that  end  is  in  the  sensibility."  "  The  capacity  of  feeling 
is  called  the  sensibility,  and  the  feeling  may  be  one  of 
pleasure  or  pain,  of  joy  or  of  sorrow."  This  is  the 
point  at  which  we  come  into  collision.  My  remarks 
will  be  confined  to  it. 

We  are  agreed  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  point  is  to 
be  settled.  It  is  by  an  appeal  to  our  moral  nature.  To 
that  moral  nature  I  appeal  with  confidence,  as  deciding 
in  my  behalf.  An  intelligent  being  receives  favors  from 
God;  say  lofty  reason,  fine  fancy,  rich  emotions,  and  a 
capacity  of  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong. 
What  is  the  affection  which  he  should  cherish  toward 
this  his  benefactor?  Our  moral  nature  replies  on  the 
instant,  —  gratitude  and  love.  And  we  do  not  require 
to  consider  whether  this  gratitude  adds  to  the  enjoyment 
of  God  or  the  enjoyment  of  him  who  cherishes  it.  It 
is  the  same  with  moral  evil  as  with  moral  good.  Ten 
lepers  are  healed  by  our  Lord.  Nine  of  them  give  him 
no  thanks.  In  condemning  their  conduct  we  do  not  stop 
to  inquire  whether  it  is  fitted  to  give  pain  to  the  sensi- 
bility of  the  Saviour  or  their  own.  On  the  bare  con- 
templation ot  he  act  we  declare  it  to  be  evil.    The  £ict 


868 


APPENDIX. 


IS  not  wicked  because  it  grates  on  the  sensibility  of  the 
Saviour,  or  is  fitted  to  inflict  sorrow  on  those  guilty  of 
it.  On  the  contrary,  it  offends  our  Lord  and  is  fitted  to 
bring  down  judgments  on  the  offending  parties  because 
it  is  evil. 

Dr.  Hopkins  is  shut  up  to  this  conclusion  by  his  own 
statements.  Enjoyment  is  represented  by  him  as  the 
end  of  moral  action.  But  what  enjoyment?  P^njoy- 
ment  as  enjoyment?  Every  kind  of  enjoyment?  En- 
joyment of  passion,  of  sensual  pleasure  ?  No,  says  Dr. 
Hopkins ;  only  enjoyment  of  a  certain  kind.  He  says 
expressly  that  good  does  not  consist  in  happiness  but  "  a 
holy  happiness,"  "  happiness  from  holiness,"  "  it  can 
come  only  from  holiness."  Does  not  this  show  clearly 
that  in  the  moral  end  holiness  requires  to  be  looked  at 
with  the  happiness  ?  Does  it  not  prove  that  there  is  a 
higher  end  than  enjoyment,  and  to  which  enjoyment 
must  give  way  because  enjoyment  is  the  inferior  ?  With- 
out contradiction,  it  is  the  less  that  yields  to  the  greater, 
and  happiness,  as  the  lower,  must  give  place  when  holi- 
ness requires  it.  Holiness,  then,  and  not  mere  happiness, 
thus  comes  to  be  the  higher,  the  supreme  end. 

It  cannot  be  proven  by  an  appeal  to  our  moral  na- 
ture that  sensibility  is  a  necessary  condition  of  virtue. 
I  acknowledge  that  it  is  presupposed  in  the  exercise  of 
certain  virtues.  It  is  our  duty^  so  far  as  within  us  lies, 
to  promote  the  general  happiness  —  this  is  the  truth  in 
utilitarianism ;  but  it  is  a  truth  which  embraces  more 
than  mere  sensibility  — it  embraces  "  duty  "  as  well  as 
hap[)iness.  Again,  it  is  true  that  one  ground  of  our  re- 
garding God  as  good  is,  that  he  delights  in  the  happiness 
of  his  creatures ;  another  reason  always  being  that  he 
delights  in  their  holiness.  All  this  shows  that  while 
man  should  look  to  pleasure  and  pain,  he  should  also 
looK  to  something  higher.    The  brutes  have  no  oihei 


APPENDIX. 


859 


end  than  enjoyment.  But  as  nature  rises  —  as  Dr. 
Hopkins  shows  in  one  of  the  fine  passages  of  his  paper 
—  from  lower  to  higher,  froai  inorganic  to  organic, 
from  plant  to  animal,  and  from  irresponsible  animal  to 
responsible,  so  the  end  of  each  being  rises  in  the  same 
way ;  the  end  of  the  organic  is  higher  than  that  of  the 
inorganic  ;  the  end  of  man  is  higher  than  that  of  the 
brute.  Moral  and  accountable  man  is  bound,  while  he 
does  not  overlook  enjoyment,  to  look  beyond  to  the  law- 
fulness or  unlawfuhiess  of  the  enjoyment  as  determined 
by  moral  law.  Moral  good  does  not  consist  in  any  case 
in  the  promotion  of  mere  enjoyment,  such  as  may  be 
accomplished  by  a  fine  piece  of  furniture,  a  fine  flower, 
or  a  fine  animal,  but  by  something  different  and  higher, 
by  the  love  which  knowingly  contemplates  and  promotes 
the  enjoyment.  Nor  does  it  consist  in  every  sort  of  love, 
but  in  love  that  is  due  and  right.  As  we  mount  up  in 
this  way,  we  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  a  love,  and  a 
holiness,  and  a  justice  above  all  gratification  of  the  sen- 
Bibility.  We  clothe  the  Divine  Being  with  these  per- 
fections, and  we  believe  that  in  the  exercise  of  them  he 
will  regard  the  happiness  of  his  creatures  ;  but  that  he 
will  also,  and  for  a  higher  end,  promote  their  love  and 
their  holiness. 

Dr.  Hopkins  is  still  perplexed  with  the  difficulty,  — 
"  The  moral  quality  of  an  action  can  exist  only  in  view  of 
the  end  to  be  chosen,  and,  therefore,  cannot  be  that  end." 
I  endeavored  to  remove  that  difficulty  in  my  review,  and 
1  must  try  to  do  it  again  in  a  few  words.  The  difficulty 
arises  entirely  from  a  misapprehension  of  the  nature 
of  the  first  truths  of  the  intellect,  and  of  the  ultimate 
ends  of  our  moral  constitution.  The  reason  of  first  truths 
18  to  be  found,  not  in  anything  out  of  themselves,  but 
in  themselves  and  the  objects  contemplated.  We  are  sure 
that  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a  space,  not  because 


360 


APPENDIX, 


we  can  give  any  reason  for  it  out  of  the  things  and  out 
of  ourselves,  but  because  in  contemplating  two  straight 
lines,  we  see  that  they  are  such  in  their  nature  that  they 
cannot  inclose  a  space.  So  it  is  with  final  moral  ends  — 
ends  in  themselves.  When  we  love  God  in  such  a  way  as 
to  constitute  this  a  moral  act,  we  see  that  there  is  an  ob- 
ligation in  the  very  act ;  and  this  not  our  own  enjoyment, 
,  or  that  of  God,  but  because  the  act  is  right  in  itself. 
He  says,  "  If  love  be  a  rational  and  moral  act,  as  most 
people  suppose,  then  it  must  have  some  object  or  end  be- 
yond itself,  for  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  rationkl  action, 
involving  the  choice  of  an  end,  can  be  its  own  end." 
But  does  not  Dr.  Hopkins  see  that  in  affirming  our  own 
existence  and  identity,  which  is  a  rational  act,  we  have 
reason  not  "  beyond,"  but  in  the  thing  ?  In  like  man- 
ner, when  we  love  God,  we  are  made  to  feel  that  this  is 
due  to  God.  Dr.  Hopkins  acknowledges  everywhere  — 
which  the  Utilitarians  do  not  —  the  existence  of  moral 
reason,  deciding  what  ought  to  be  done.  His  confusion 
arises  from  his  not  giving  that  moral  reason  the  right 
place.  He  makes  it,  as  I  understand  him,  come  after 
the  end,  after  the  end  has  been  chosen.  The  correct 
statement  is  that  the  moral  reason  is  implied  in  the  very 
choice  of  the  virtuous  end.  He  says,  The  affirmation 
of  obligation  is  no  part  of  virtue."  The  abstract  affir- 
mation may  not,  but  the  intuitive  concrete  conviction 
is.  We  love  God,  not  as  being  a  mere  sensitive  en- 
joyment to  ourselves,  or  as  adding  to  the  enjoyment  of 
God,  but  as  fit,  proper,  and  due.  Dr.  Hopkins  has 
hit  tlie  truth  for  once,  when  he  says,  "The  love  is 
to  be  a  simple  primitive  act  in  view  of  the  object  as 
worthy  of  love."  This  seems  to  me  to  be  the  correct 
expression.  "  The  love  is  a  primitive  act  in  view  of  the 
object ;  "  he  adds,  '*as  worthy  of  love  ;"  and  I  say,  the 
worthiness  is  proclaimed  by  the  moral  reason  "  in  view 


APPEiJDIX. 


061 


of  the  object,'*  and  has  a  place  in  the  motive  leading 
as  to  perform  the  act.  This  is  the  element  wliich  dis- 
tinguishes a  virtuous  love  from  other  love  which  may 
not  be  virtuous,  which  may  be  positively  sinful. 

I  am  surprised  to  find  Dr.  Hopkins  saying  that  "  the 
Scriptures  nowhere  command  men  to  do  right  because  it 
is  right,  but  that  their  whole  tenor  is  opposed  to  this 
form  of  teaching."  Does  not  Paul  say  (Eph.  vi.  1), 
"  Children  obey  your  parents  in  the  Lord,  for  this  is 
right —  just,  due  ?  And  is  not  the  whole  tenor  of 
Scripture  on  this  wise :  "  Love  God,  obey  his  command- 
ments, for  this  is  right  ?  " 

The  question  at  issue  has  many  applications.  John 
Foster,  in  a  well-known  letter,  proceeding  on  the  doc- 
trine that  it  is  the  highest  end  of  God  and  man  to  pro- 
mote happiness,  argues  with  immense  power  that  there 
cannot  be  eternal  punishment  under  the  government  of 
God.  I  am  obliged  to  say  that  if  I  grant  his  premises, 
1  cannot  avoid  his  conclusion.  I  can  stand  up  for  etei'nal 
Beparatiou  of  the  wicked  from  God  only  on  the  principle 
that  ingratitude,  that  ungodliness,  are  sins  in  themselves, 
and  ought  to  be  punished. 

I  have  not  before  me  the  means  of  ascertaining  Dr. 
Hopkins's  view  of  the  nature  of  the  atonement.  I  hold 
that  in  the  Divine  nature  there  is  an  essential  justice 
which  leads  Him  not  only  to  promote  enjoyment,  but 
punish  sin.  I  hold  that  the  atonement  has  a  reference 
not  merely  to  the  general  happiness  of  mankind,  but  the 
holy  perfections  of  God,  and  that  Christ's  sufferings  were 
a  real  substitution  and  a  satisfaction  to  Divine  justice. 
It  is  only  thus  I  can  understand  the  strong  language 
employed  everywhere  in  Scripture  about  Jesus  snffering 
and  dying  in  our  room  and  stead.  I  mention  these  things 
merely  to  show  that  this  discussion  has  extensive  bear- 
ings, but  I  believe  it  would  weary  the  readers  of  a  popu- 
lar newspaper  to  dwell  on  it. 


862 


Appendix. 


And  so  I  must  conclude  by  saying  that  1  do  not 
lieve  that  Dr.  Hopkins  has  been  able  to  build  a  half 
way  house,  likely  to  stand,  between  the  two  contending 
armies.  Our  author  has  evidently  a  great  aversion  to 
utilitarianism.  But  if  the  end  of  virtue  be  enjoyment, 
everything  must  be  subordinate  to  it,  and  we  are  landed 
logically,  whether  we  see  it  or  no,  in  the  greatest  hap- 
piness theory.  We  can  avoid  this  only  by  falling  back 
on  that  moral  reason  which  Dr.  Hopkins  acknowledges, 
and  by  giving  it,  which  Dr.  Hopkins  does  not,  a  place  in 
determining  the  supreme  end,  which  we  will  then  see, 
not  to  be  mere  happiness,  but  holiness. 
Pbincbton,  June  14, 1869. 


DR.  HOPKINS'S  REJOINDER  TO  DR.  McCOSH. 

The  subject  of  discussion  between  Dr.  McCosh  and 
myself  not  being  of  transient  interest,  I  have  not  been 
in  haste  to  reply  to  his  second  paper.  I  do  it  now,  not 
as  thinking  my  positions  endangered,  but  in  the  interest 
of  a  subject  too  much  neglected.  Literally  and  figura- 
tively, deep  ploughing  is  good  husbandry.  Only  as  the 
community  shall  be  pervaded  by  a  deeper  knowledge  of 
nature,  and  especially  of  man,  can  the  best  fruits  of  liv- 
ing be  expected. 

"  The  point  at  issue,"  says  Dr.  McCosh,  "  is  a  very 
simple  one  —  What  is  the  chief  end  of  man  ?  "  I  had 
supposed  it  to  be.  What  is  the  foundation  of  obliga- 
tion? but  accept  this,  since  he  prefers  it.  I  am  indeed 
pleased  that  he  is  so  far  a  convert  to  the  doctrine  of 
ends  as  to  be  willing  to  substitute  an  end  to  be  chosen 
for  the  abstract  idea  of  right.  Regarding  man  only  as 
active,  the  science  of  morals  requires  this ;  but  it  wiL 
be  fatal  to  his  system. 


APPENDIX. 


■363 


But,  simple  or  not  in  the  point  it  makes,  the  above 
question  underlies  practical  philosophy.  Tliis  is  coming 
to  be  more  and  more  recognized.  The  difficulty  with 
the  French  was  said  by  JoufFroy  to  be  that  they  did  not 
know  what  the  end  of  man  is ;  and  in  the  last  number 
of  the  "  North  British  Review  "  there  is  an  article  hav- 
mg  this  for  its  title  and  subject,  in  which  it  is  said  that 
The  theoretical  solution  of  this  question  would  be  the 
answer  to  a  fundamental  problem  in  ethics  ;  its  practi- 
cal realization  would  be  the  ideal  of  a  perfect  life." 

What  the  end  of  man  is,  Dr.  McCosh  says,  is  to  be 
settled  "  by  an  inquiry  into  our  moral  nature,  in  the 
manner  of  Bishop  Butler.  The  question  here  is.  What 
3aith  our  moral  nature  as  to  the  final  aim  of  man  ?  "  In 
this  I  regret  not  to  agree  with  Dr.  McCosh,  especially 
as  he  says  I  do.  As  rational,  we  have  the  power  to 
overlook  and  comprehend  our  whole  being,  as  we  would 
a  locomotive,  and  1  suppose  the  question  must  be  de- 
cided by  our  doing  this.  It  must,  if  it  is  to  be  decided 
by  philosophy  at  all.  This  is  not  to  be  done  by  the 
moral  nature  alone.  On  the  contrary,  that  nature  is  to 
be  compared  with  the  other  parts  of  our  complex  being, 
the  proper  functions  and  relations  of  each  are  to  be  de- 
termined, and  thus  the  end  of  the  whole.  This  was  the 
manner  of  Bishop  Butler."  Making  this  comparison, 
he  says,  as  quoted  in  ^'  The  Law  of  Love,"  "  It  may 
be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the  cause  of  virtue 
and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happiness  and  misery 
are,  of  all  our  ideas,  the  nearest  and  most  important 
^0  us  ;  that  they  will,  nay,  if  you  please,  that  they  ought 
to  prevail  over  those  of  order,  and  beauty,  and  harmony, 
and  proportion,  if  there  should  ever  be,  as  it  is  impossi- 
ble there  ever  should  be,  any  inconsistence  between 
them,"  Here  we  have  the  highest  English  authority  in 
morals  not  only  making  the  comparison  I  advocate,  but 


364 


APPEHDIl* 


affirming  that  our  ideas  of  happiness  and  misery  are 
nearer  and  more  important  to  us  than  any  others^  and  so 
than  that  of  holiness  itself,  which  Dr.  McCosh  makes 
supreme.  Butler,  however,  and  I  agree  with  him,  does 
not,  like  Dr.  McCosh,  —  who  says  that  ^'  happiness  must 
give  place  where  holiness  requires  it,"  —  allow  that  there 
can  be  an  "  inconsistence  "  between  holiness  and  happi- 
ness. He  believed  in  a  deep  harmony  of  the  constitu- 
tion, insuring  the  harmony  of  the  two ;  and  that  harmony 
is  in  the  fact  that  a  sensibility,"  and  so  the  possible  en- 
joyment and  suffering  of  some  being,  is  the  condition 
precedent  of  all  moral  ideas." 

Nor,  I  may  remark  here,  is  Butler  alone  among  thoso 
of  the  intuitional  school  in  his  estimate  of  happiness  in 
its  relation  to  virtue.  Whewell,  who  has  stood  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  Dr.  McCosh  in  opposing  Mill,  says, 
"  Happiness  is  the  object  of  human  action  in  its  most 
general  form  as  including  all  other  objects,  and  approved 
by  reason."  Edwards  says,^  Agreeable  to  this  the  good 
of  men  is  spoken  of  as  an  ultimate  end  of  the  virtue  of 
the  moral  world  and  quotes  Scripture  to  prove  it. 
And  Robert  Hall  himself,  in  opposing  Edwards,  says, 
"  Let  it  be  remembered  we  have  no  dispute  respecting 
what  is  the  ultimate  end  of  virtue,  which  is  allowed 
on  both  sides  to  be  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  in  the 
universe." 

But,  authority  aside,  if  we  compare  the  different  con- 
stituents of  our  being,  we  find  that  the  end  of  the  intel- 
lect is  to  know  ;  of  the  sensibility,  to  feel ;  and  of  the 
will,  to  choose  and  act.  As  rational,  we  can  feel  onlj 
as  we  know,  and  can  choose  and  act  only  as  ends  are 
presented  through  the  sensibility.  If  we  suppose  the 
sensibility  excluded,  the  concei)tion  even  of  an  end  h 
Impossible.  Aside  from  the  products  of  this,  nothing 
oan  be  a  good,  or  have  value.    Excej)t  as  we  and  others 

1  See  5th  page  of  God*t  Chitf  End, 


APPENDIX. 


365 


are  possessed  of  this,  neither  love,  nor  hatred,  nor  obliga- 
tion, nor  right,  nor  wrong,  nor  viriiie,  nor  vice,  is  possi- 
ble. Finding  thus  the  end  in  tlie  sensibility,  so  fai-  at 
least  that  without  that  there  can  be  no  end,  1  ac('ej)t  the 
statement  of  the  Westminster  divines  that  "  The  chief 
end  of  man  is  to  glorify  God  and  enjoy  him  forever."  If 
any  inquire  how  this  's  to  be  done,  I  reply  that*  it  is  to 
be  done  by  knowing,  ioving,  and  obeying  God.  This  is 
the  whole  of  religion,  and  the  whole  duty  of  man.  It 
may  all  be  comprised  in  loving  God,  since  to  be  loved, 
he  must  be  known  ;  and  if  loved,  he  will  be  obeyed. 
This  brings  into  requisition  the  intellect,  the  sensibility, 
and  the  will;  and  from  the  right  action  of  these,  wiib 
God  for  their  object,  there  must  be  an  enjoyment  of 
him  forever.  Anything  involving  this  1  accept,  and 
nothinoj  short  of  it.  1  cannot,  I  do  not  wish  to  exclude 
from  my  conception  of  the  end  of  man  that  fullness  of 
joy  "  which  is  in  the  presence  of  God,  and  those  [)loas- 
ures  which  are  at  his  right  hand  forevermore."  ]>ut 
while  I  accept  the  above  statement,  pei-haps  a  plainer 
one  may  be,  that  the  chief  end  of  man  is  "  to  jiromote 
blessedness  impartially  and  in  the  highest  degi'ee." 
Blessedness,  then,  is  the  supreme  end  —  the  blessedness 
of  God  and  of  his  rational  universe ;  and  that  form  of 
activity  by  which  this  is  chosen  and  voluntarily  caused, 
is  holiness. 

Having  thus  stated  my  views  positively,  and  I  hope 
clearly,  in  this  aspect  of  the  subject,  I  proceed  to  some 
positions  of  Dr.  McCosh  in  his  second  letter  to  which  I 
do  not  assent. 

The  first  in  logical  order  is,  that  there  may  be  vir- 
tue without  sensibility.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  Dr. 
McCosh  reaflSrms  this  position.  It  cannot,"  he  says,  be 
proven  by  an  appeal  to  our  moral  nature "  —  and  of 
course  he  means  that  it  cannot  be  proved  at  all  —  "  that 


866 


APPENDIX, 


sensibility  is  a  necessary  condition  of  virtue.*'  1  ac- 
knowledge," he  continue?,  "  that  it  is  presupposed  in  the 
exercise  of  certain  virtues."  Indeed  !  Then  have  we 
need  of  a  new  division  of  the  virtues  into  those  that  can, 
and  those  that  cannot  exist  without  sensibility.  And 
this  is  said  by  Dr.  McCosh  while  he  allows  that  all  vir- 
tue may  be  included  in  love !  It  would  be  interesting 
to  hear  him  give  the  constituents  of  a  love  that  has  no 
sensibility.  It  would  be  interesting  to  hear  him  enu- 
merate those  virtues  that  presuppose  no  feeling,  or- 
power  of  feeling,  either  in  those  who  exercise  them,  or 
those  toward  whom  they  are  exercised.  I  would  not 
be  too  positive  here ;  but  through  what  medium,  or  from 
what  angle,  Dr.  McCosh  can  be  looking  when  he  speaks 
of  such  virtues,  I  cannot  conjecture.  For  myself,  I  am 
free  to  say  that  I  have  no  conception  of  any  such  virtue, 
and  must  venture  humbly  to  question  whether  any  one 
else  either  has  or  can  have. 

The  second  position  of  Dr.  McCosh  that  I  would  call 
in  question  is,  that  "  holiness  is  the  supreme  end."  As 
stated  above,  holiness  is  that  form  of  voluntary  activity 
by  which  blessedness  is  chosen  and  intentionally  caused. 
The  objection  to  making  this  the  supreme  end  is,  that  it 
makes  the  activity  its  own  end.  If  holiness  be  the  su- 
preme end,  and  holiness  or  virtue  consists  in  choosing 
the  supreme  end,  then  holiness  must  consist  in  choosing 
holiness.  This  difficulty  mnst  always  arise  when  any 
form  of  activity  of  the  will,  and  so  of  virtue,  is  made  the 
ultimate  end.  Rational  activity  can  never  be  for  the 
sake  of  the  activity  itself,  but  must  always  be  for  the 
sake  of  some  result  of  the  activity  ;  for  some  good,  satis- 
faction, enjoyment,  blessedness,  —  either  of  the  being 
acting,  or  of  some  other  being.  The  activity  is  virtue, 
the  result  is  blessedness.  The  virtue  is  from  the  will 
the  blessedness  from  the  sensibility. 


APPENDIX. 


Another  position  from  which  I  dissent,  if  indeed  it  be 
another,  is,  that  the  moral  quality  of  an  action  can  be  its 
end ;  or  that  the  quality  of  an  action  may  be  the  ground 
of  obligation  to  do  that  action.  It  is  said  in  the  ^'  Law 
of  Love  "  to  be  plain  that  this  cannot  be.  Dr.  McCosh 
and  others  say  it  is  plain  it  can  be ;  and  it  is  in  conceiv- 
ing how  it  can  be,  that  the  difficulty  arises  with  which 
"  Dr.  Hopkins  is  still  perplexed,"  and  I  fear  always 
will  be. 

But  how  is  this  in  other  cases  ?  Can  the  bravery  or 
the  generosity  of  an  act  be  the  reason  for  doing  it  ? 
Yes,  if  it  be  done  ostentatiously  ;  but  no  true  man  ever 
did  a  brave  act  because  it  was  brave,  or  a  generous  act 
because  it  was  generous.  But  for  an  underlying  sensi- 
bility, the  idea  of  bravery  would  be  impossible  ;  and  if 
the  exposure  to  danger,  in  which  the  bravery  consists, 
were  not  for  an  end  beyond  the  exposure  itself,  it  would 
be  mere  ostentation  and  fool-hardiness.  It  is  the  same 
with  generosity.  Both  are  praiseworthy  and  pleasing, 
and  men  may  be  so  exhorted  to  cultivate  them  for  their 
own  sakes  as  to  think  them  ultimate  ;  but  the  qualities 
themselves  are  possible  only  on  the  ground  of  interests 
lying  beyond  themselves,  and  can  never  be  the  chief 
legitimate  motive  for  those  actions  in  which  they  inhere. 
But  if  right  and  holiness  be  allowed  to  be  the  qualities 
of  actions,  no  reason  is  seen  why  the  same  is  not  true 
of  them.  A  man  loves  his  enemy.  This  he  does,  not 
from  any  worthiness  in  him,  but  because  of  his  worth  as 
having  capacity  for  good.  In  view  of  this  he  subdues 
his  resentment,  and  makes  sacrifices  for  the  good  of  his 
enemy  as  he  would  for  his  own.  This  is  a  right  and 
holy  act.  Is  it  done  because  it  is  so,  or  does  it  become 
BO  from  the  end  for  which  it  is  done  ?  The  questions 
answer  themselves. 

Dr.  McCosh  says  my  difficulty  "  arises  entirely  from 


368 


APPENDIX. 


a  misapprehension  of  the  nature  of  the  first  truths  of  the 
intellect,  and  of  the  ultimate  ends  of  the  moral  constitu- 
tion.'* The  reason  of  first  truths,'*  he  adds,  "  is  to  be 
found,  not  in  anj^thing  out  of  themselves,  but  in  them- 
selves and  the  objects  contemplated."  "  Does  not  Dr. 
Hopkins,"  he  asks  triumphantly,  "  see  that  in  affirming 
our  own  existence  and  identity,  which  is  a  rational  act, 
we  have  the  reason,  not  beyond,  but  in  the  thing?" 
Yes  ;  and  admitting  the  parallelism  here  assumed,  does 
not  Dr.  McCosh  see  that  it  makes  against  him?  The 
reason  for  affirming  the  truth  is  not  in  the  act  affirm- 
ing it,  or  in  any  quality  of  the  act,  but  "  in  the  objects 
contemplated ; "  it  should  follow,  therefore,  that  the  rea- 
son for  choosing  an  end  is  found,  not  in  the  act  of  choos- 
ing, or  in  any  quality  of  the  act,  but  in  the  end  ;  and 
that  is  just  what  I  say.  But  I  do  not  admit  the  paral- 
lelism. It  seems  to  me  that  the  processes  of  the  mind, 
in  dealing  with  first  truths  where  there  is  no  choice,  and 
with  ends  where  there  is,  are  wholly  different.  With 
what  he  says  of  first  truths  I  agree ;  but  the  moment 
he  pp.sses  to  ends,  I  seem  to  find  confusion  both  in 
the  thought  and  in  the  language.  "  So,"  he  says,  "  it  is 
with  tinal  moral  ends  —  ends  in  themselves.  When  we 
love  God  in  such  a  way  as  to  constitute  this  a  moral  act, 
we  see  that  there  is  an  obligation  in  the  very  act ;  and 
that  not  our  own  enjoyment,  or  that  of  God,  but  because 
it  is  right  in  itself."  Concerning  this  extraordinary 
passage,  which  contains  the  gist  of  what  he  says,  1  in- 
quire, 1st.  Whether  any  "final"  end  be  not  an  end  in 
itself,  whether  nv)ral  or  not?  2d.  Whether  a  "moral" 
end  means  anyiliing  more  than  an  end  that  we  are 
under  obligation  to  ch()ose?  3d.  Whether  it  be  pos- 
tiible  to  love  God  so  that  it  sliall  not  be  a  moral  act  r 
And  4th.  Whether  Dr.  INIcCosh  means  to  say  that  we 
do  not  see  that  there  is  an  obligation  to  love  God  before 


APPENDIX. 


869 


we  love  him  ?     His  language  implies  this.    He  says, 

"  WTien  we  love  him,  we  see  that  there  is  an  obligation 
171  the  very  act'*  If  it  be  "  in  the  very  act,"  it  could  not 
exist  before  that,  and  so  a  man  who  had  never  loved 
God  could  be  under  no  obligation  to  love  him.  This 
consequence  must  follow  every  attempt  to  make,  as  Dr. 
McCosh  does,  obligation,  or  the  sense  of  it,  a  part  of 
virtue.  The  obligation  is  "  not  our  own  enjoyment,  or 
that  of  God  ; "  but  it  may  be  affirmed  in  view  of  the 
capacity  of  God  and  of  other  beings  for  enjoyment,  and 
not  because  "  it  is  right  in  itself,"  aside  from  all  relation 
to  enjoyment ;  and  this  I  suppose  to  be  the  truth.  I 
suppose  the  moral  reason  affirms  obligation  to  choose, 
not  goodness,  but  good  as  good  in  itself.  This,  I  sup- 
pose, is  ultimate,  and  that  a  reason  for  every  right  act 
may  be  found  in  its  relation  to  this  ultimate  good. 

And  here  I  must  notice  a  i^j^isapprehension  of  Dr. 
McCosh  respecting  the  place  assigned  b}^  me  to  the 
moral  reason.  He  says  my  "confusion  arises  from 
making  the  moral  reason  come  after  the  end,  after  the 
end  has  been  chosen."  I  not  only  do  not  do  this,  but  ii 
never  occurred  to  me  as  possible  that  any  one  should 
As  I  understand  it,  the  moral  reason  has  a  place  Id 
determining  the  supreme  end  by  affirming  obligation  to 
choose  it,  but  it  is  no  part  of  the  end  ;  nor  is  the  ob- 
ligation a  part  of  the  act  or  choice.  The  choice,  the 
love,  I  make  "  to  be  a  simple  primitive  act  in  view  of 
the  object  as  worthy  of  love."  In  this.  Dr.  McCosh  is 
80  obliging  as  to  say  that  I  have  "  hit  the  truth  for 
Dnce  ; "  and  yet  he  says  that  "  the  intuitive,  concrete 
conviction  of  obligation  "  is  a  part  of  the  love,  thus  mak- 
ing it  complex.  Certainly  I  recognize  the  love  as  "  fit, 
proper,  and  due;"  but  I  also  say  that  the  love  itself  is 
impossible,  except  through  a  capacity  for  enjoyment. 
'1  bis  makes  "  a  sensibility  the  condition  precedent  of  all 
24 


370 


APPENDIX. 


moral  ideas,"  and  is  fatal  to  the  theory  of  an  eternal 

right,  or  that  anything  is  right  in  itself  apart  from  all 
relation  to  enjoyment. 

On  the  Scriptural  question,  I  have  only  to  repeat 
what  I  have  already  said.  The  passage  quoted  by  Dr. 
McCosh  is  the  only  one  in  the  Bible  that  seems  to  say 
that  we  are  "to  do  right  because  it  is  right  but  that 
does  not  say  it,  and  scarcely  seems  to.  If  it  said  that^ 
no  further  question  could  be  asked.  The  theory  of 
morals  would  be  settled.  What  it  does  say  is,  that 
children  should  ohey  their  parents  because  it  is  right, 
and  that  leaves  the  question,  Why  is  it  right  to  obey 
parents?  where  it  was  before.  I  "  am  surprised"  that  Dr. 
McCosli  should  think  this  a  text  in  point.  It  is,  indeed, 
worthy  of  notice  how  little  is  said  of  "  right  "  in  the 
New  Testament.  The  word  is  used  but  thirteen  times 
ill  all,  and  only  ten  time^  as  an  adjective.  Of  these,  the 
word  hUaiov^  translated  right  in  the  passage  quoted, 
is  used  but  five  times  ;  the  proper  meaning  of  it  is  not 
right,  as  that  term  is  used  in  this  discussion,  but  jusl ; 
and  in  no  other  case  can  it  be  tortured  into  a  support  of 
the  theory  of  Dr.  McCosh. 

Of  "  the  whole  tenor  of  the  Scripture  "  on  this  point, 
[  am  content  that  any  one  should  judge,  as  between  Dr. 
McCosh  and  myself,  who  has  not  a  theory  to  support. 
Our  Saviour  opened  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  and 
every  beatitude,  by  speaking  of  blessedness.  In  the 
!5ame  connection,  he  spoke  of  the  "  great  reward  in 
heaven."  The  general  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures  is, 
that  men  shall  be  rewarded  according  to  their  works. 
The  "  good  and  faithful  servant  "  is  to  enter  into  the 
joy  of  his  Lord.  The  righteous  are  to  inherit  eternal 
life,  and  the  wicked  to  go  into  "everlasting  punishment" 
It  was  for  the  "joy  that  was  set  before  Him  that  ibe 
Saviour  himself  endured  the  cross,  despising  the  shame,' 


APPENDIX, 


371 


Dr.  McCosh  refers  to  the  theological  bearings  of  the 
point  in  question.  Those  I  might  discuss  if  there  were 
apace  and  a  call  for  it ;  but  there  is  neither.  Let  the 
question  be  decided  on  its  merits.  That  is  the  only  fair 
way ;  and  to  aid  our  readers  in  doing  that  has  been  my 
endeavor  in  the  preceding  discussion. 

Mark  Hopkins. 

WiULiAMS  College,  July  24,  1869. 


DR.  McCOSH'S  SUMMATION 

OP  THE   CONTROVERSY   BETWEEN   HIM   AND   DR.  HOPKINS. 

The  discussion  between  Dr.  Hopkins  and  myself 
must  sooner  or  later  come  to  an  end,  and  I  do  not  see 
why  it  should  not  now  close.  I  fear  the  readers  of  the 
"  Observer  "  will  complain  if  we  protract  it  much  longer. 
We  have  both  had  an  opportunity  of  stating  our  views, 
and  the  public  must  judge  for  themselves.  Intelligent 
readers  have  already  before  tliem  the  means  of  coming 
to  a  decision,  and  will  not  thank  us  for  falling,  as  we 
might  be  tempted  to  do,  into  miserable  wrangling.  I 
am  in  this  paper  to  take  up  no  new  topic.  I  am  simply 
to  sum  up  what  I  believe  to  be  the  substance  of  the  dis- 
pute. 

(1.)  Dr.  Hopkins  tells  us,  in  language  which  cannot 
be  too  often  quoted,  that  the  final  end  of  man  is  "  some 
form  of  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  in  the  consciousness." 
"That  end,"  he  says,  is  in  the  sensibility,"  and the 
capacity  of  feeling  is  called  the  sensibility,  and  the  feel- 
ing may  be  one  of  pleasure  or  pain,  of  joy  or  of  sorrow," 
He  says  in  his  last  paper,  "  If  we  suppose  the  sensibility 
excluded,  the  conception  even  of  an  end  is  impossible." 
Now  this  is  the  point  which  1  controvert.  I  maintain  that 


872 


APPENDIX. 


we  ought  to  look  to  something  higher,  and  that  all  truly 

good  action  has  a  higher  refei  ence.  I  have  to  complaiu 
that  in  explaining  and  defending  his  peculiar  theory 
Dr.  Hopkins  changes  "form  of  enjoyment"  and  "sen- 
sibility" into  "good  "  and  "blessedness."  In  this  way 
I  believe  he  deceives  himself,  and  would  hide  from 
others  the  sensational  character  of  his  system.  If  by 
"  good  "  is  meant  "  moral  good,"  I  agree  with  him  ;  but 
then  it  is  a  departure  from  his  fundamental  principle,  — 
that  man's  end  is  some  form  of  enjoyment.  He  is  able 
to  give  his  theory  a  plausible  appearance  and  a  lofty 
moral  tone  only  by  passing  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
If  we  substitute  for  "  the  good,"  wherever  it  occurs,  "  the 
feeling  of  plea-^ure  and  pain,"  we  see  how  bare  and 
earrhly  the  system  is.  In  his  last  paper,  he  tells  us  that 
"  blessedness  is  the  supreme  end."  This  sounds  well, 
and  if  it  be  properly  explained,  the  view  is  correct.  But 
the  "blessedness"  which  has  thus  come  in  surrepti- 
tiously in  the  defense  of  his  theory  is  not  the  same  as 
"  the  enjoyment "  of  his  primary  principle.  There  may 
be  an  "  enjoyment  in  consciousness  "  which  is  not  blessed- 
ness ;  and  there  is  a  blessedness  which  is  not  enjoyment, 
as  when  a  man  suffers  pain  and  reproach  in  a  good 
cause.  He  speaks  of  the  supreme  end  being  "  blessed- 
ness, the  blessedness  of  God  and  of  his  rational  uni- 
verse." Substitute  for  "  bles-edness  ""  sensitive  enjoy- 
ment," the  sensitive  enjoyment  of  God,  and  the  doctrine 
jars  upon  us  offensively.  Surely  the  supreme  end  of 
man  is  not  to  promote  the  enjoyment  of  God.  1  insist, 
*hen,  that  he  stick  to  the  one  or  other,  ei:her  the  enjoy- 
ment or  the  blessedness.  If  he  adhere  to  the  enjoy- 
ment, his  theory  becomes  the  utilitarianism  whicii  he 
pei>udiates.  If  he  insist  on  bringing  in  blessedness,  he 
has  introduced,  whether  he  sees  it  or  no,  a  new  and  far- 
ther clement,  and  is  diiven,  logically,  to  a  very  different 


APPENDIX. 


373 


theory.  Whichever  horn  he  takes,  he  is  in  difficulties 
in  this  middle  position  which  he  has  cho-en  to  occupy. 
When  our  Lord  says,  "  Blessed  are  they  who  mourn," 
he  includes  vastlj'-  more  than  mere  sensitive  enjoyment. 
If  Dr.  Hopkins  means  by  "  blessedness  "  a  "  holy  enjoy- 
ment,^' 1  believe  that  this  is  a  supreme  end  ;  but  it  is  so 
because  holiness  is  a  constituent. 

(2.)  I  am  sorry  to  find  that  he  and  I  do  not  agree,  as 
I  thought  at  one  time  that  we  did,  as  to  the  way  of  set- 
tling the  question  between  us.  As  a  question  of  mental 
philosophy,  I  presumed  that  it  was  to  be  determined  by 
an  inquiry  into  our  mental  and  moral  nature.  It  turns 
out  that  Dr.  Hopkins  does  not  admit  this.  I  am  not 
sure  what  is  the  way  in  which  he  would  settle  it.  He 
Bays,  "  As  rational,  we  have  the  power  to  overlook  and 
comprehend  our  whole  being  as  we  would  a  locomotive, 
and  I  suppose  the  question  must  be  decided  by  our  do- 
ing this."  I  accept  his  illustration.  We  determine  the 
end  of  a  locomotive  by  looking  at  its  structure  and  its 
relation  to  other  things  in  the  uses  to  which  it  is  turned. 
It  is  thus  we  are  to  determine  the  end  of  man's  existence, 
as  a  question  in  philosophy.  We  look  at  man's  nature, 
especially  his  higher  nature,  his  moral  nature,  his  moral 
reason,  or  conscience ;  and  we  find  it  to  declare  that 
there  is  something  higher  than  mere  enjoyment,  and  to 
which  enjoyment  should  be  subordinated,  if  the  two 
come  in  collision.  I  am  sorry  to  find  him,  in  his  last 
paper,  falling  into  the  omission  of  Professor  Bain,  and  of 
the  sensational  and  utilitarian  school  generally,  and  rep 
resenting  the  original  constituents  of  man's  end  to  be 
*  intellect  to  know,  sensibility  to  feel,  and  will  to  choose 
and  act."  In  doing  so,  he  has  left  out  as  an  independ- 
ent element  the  Moral  Power  Moral  Reason,  or  Con- 
science, which,  looking  to  an  action,  declares  it  to  be 
good  or  evil,  to  be  chosen  and  done  as  being  good,  or  to 


874 


APPENDIX. 


be  avoided  as  being  evil.  This  moral  power  in  man 
declares,  if  we  listen  to  it,  that  there  is  a  higher  eud 
than  the  mere  securing  or  promoting  of  enjoyment,  and 
that  this  is  an  end  which  man  should  set  before  him.  I 
am  amazed  to  find  hini  dechuing  that,  apart  from  sensi- 
bility, "  the  conception  of  an  end  is  impossible."  The 
]\Ioral  Faculty  points  to  a  higher  end,  and  it  is  easy  to 
form  a  conception  of  it.  I  hold,  tlien,  tliat  our  moral 
nature  settles  the  question  in  my  favor,  and  I  do  not  al 
low  a  loose  appeal  to  any  supposed  "  rational "  or  "  over- 
looking "  or  ''comprehending"  power  capable  of  deter- 
mining the  question  without  looking  at  the  decisions  of 
conscience. 

(3.)  He  gives  a  place  to  the  Moral  Reason,  but  it  is 
not,  1  thiidi,  the  pioper  place  —  it  is  a  confused  place. 
He  tells  us  that  Moral  Reason  has  a  place  in  deter- 
mining the  supreme  end  by  affirming  the  obligation  to 
choose  it,  but  is  no  part  in  the  end."  In  discussing  this 
subject,  he  puts  a  number  of  questions  to  me  which  I 
could  easily  answer,  but  the  questions  and  the  answers 
would  only  conduct  us  into  a  miserable  chop-logic  no 
way  fitted  to  lead  to  a  solution.  Whenever  the  Moral 
Reason  looks  at  a  moral  act,  —  say  justice,  or  love  to 
God,  or  love  to  man,  —  it  declares  it  to  be  binding.  It 
declares  it  to  be  so  beforehand  and  behindhand,  as  Dr. 
Hopkins  seems  to  admit.  But  I  go  a  step  further,  and 
affirm  that  the  moi  al  power  declares  the  act  to  be  good 
at  the  very  time  we  do  it ;  that  is,  cherish  the  afTection, 
or  do  the  deed  that  is  viituous.  I  hold  that  not  only  be- 
fore we  love  God  and  afier  we  love  God,  but  when  we 
love  God,  we  see  that  there  is  obligation  in  the  act. 
Tliis  makes  the  sense  of  duty  to  enter  into  the  virtuous 
act  and  to  become  part  of  the  end.  Tiiis  does  not  make 
the  act  com[)lex,  any  more  than  water  is  com[)lex,  as 
containing  two  elements  —  oxygen  and  hydrogen ;  any 


APPENDIX, 


375 


more  than  any  other  actual  state  of  the  mind  is  com- 
plex —  all  operations  of  the  mind  being  concrete.  Upon 
my  statement  that  when  we  love  God,  we  see  that  there 
is  an  obligation  in  the  very  act,  he  comments  in  a  way 
scarcely  worthy  of  liim  :  "  If  it  be  in  the  very  act,  it 
could  not  exist  before  that,  and  so  a  man  who  had  never 
loved  God,  could  be  under  no  obligation  to  love  liim." 
Surely  a  thing  may  be  in  the  act,  and  yet  exist  before 
the  act.  The  truth  is,  that  if  the  obligation  did  not 
already  exist,  man  could  not  see  it  by  the  Moral  Reason. 
As  the  obligation  exists,  the  Moral  Reason  may  per- 
ceive it  beforehand  and  behindhand,  but  also  in  the  very 
act. 

(4.)  On  another  important  point  we  differ.  He  de- 
nies, and  I  affirm,  that  the  quality  of  an  action  may  be 
tlie  ground  of  an  obligation  to  do  that  action.  When  I 
affirm  this,  I  do  not  mean  that  an  abstraction  is  the 
ground  of  obligation,  but  that  the  concrete  action  is  good 
as  possessing  that  quality  —  that  is,  is  done  because  it 
is  right.  This,  I  think,  can  easily  be  decided.  I  am 
tempted,  let  me  suppose,  to  tell  a  lie,  to  say  that  I  did 
not  commit  an  act  which  I  did  commit.  But  in  looking 
at  and  considering  the  act  thus  suggested,  I  see  that  it  is 
evil  in  itself,  and  I  decline  doing  it.  It  is  clear  to  me 
that  in  such  a  case  we  are  led  to  refuse  to  do  the  deed 
because  of  the  sinful  quality  of  the  act,  and  not  because 
we  look  to  some  form  of  enjoyment.  It  is  the  same 
with  injustice,  with  ingratitude,  and  other  sins.  I  avoid 
them,  or  should  avoid  them,  not  simply  because  they 
may  deprive  me  or  others  of  enjoyment,  but  because  they 
are  inherently  evil.  It  is  in  the  same  way  that  we  are 
led,  or  should  be  led,  to  do  a  good  act,  say  to  cherish 
gratitude  or  godliness :  we  see  the  essential  excellence 
of  the  affections.  Even  in  love  the  same  element  enters 
when  the  feeling  rises  to  the  rank  of  a  virtue ;  for  alJ 


876 


APPENDIX. 


love  is  not  virtuous.  We  have  to  distinguish  between 
a  holy  love  and  an  unholy ;  and  a  holy  love,  say  love 
to  God  or  love  to  man,  is  cherished  as  being  right 
proper,  due,  and  not  from  any  enjoyment  to  be  thus  de- 
rived by  God  or  by  ourselves. 

(5.)  I  allow  that  in  many  virtues,  pleasure  and  pain 
enter  into  our  view.  We  are  i30und  as  much  as  within 
us  lies  to  promote  the  happiness  of  all  beings  capable  of 
joy  or  of  sorrow.  But  even  here,  let  it  be  observed,  a 
moral  element  enters  :  we  are  hound  to  do  this.  All  • 
our  higher  moralists  maintain  that  justice,  which  looks  to 
what  is  right  in  itself,  is  a  virtue  quite  as  much  as  be- 
nevolence is.  Dr.  HojDkins  argues  that  in  loving  God 
we  do  so  "  in  the  view  of  the  capacity  of  God  and  other 
beings  for  enjoyment.''  I  am  not  prepared  to  uphold 
uuch  a  statement;  for  my  moral  nature,  as  interpreted  by 
my  consciousness,  does  not  seem  to  me  to  sanction  it. 
We  love  God  as  being  our  Creator  and  Benefactor,  and 
as  possessed  of  all  perfection. 

I  am  not  to  enter  on  new  subjects,  and  so  will  not 
review  the  statement  which  he  gives  of  the  doctrines 
of  certain  philosophers.  It  could  easily  be  shown  that 
neither  Butler  nor  Edwards  lend  any  sanction  to  the 
very  peculiar  ethical  theory  of  Dr.  Hopkins.  I  need  to 
touch  only  on  one  other  point. 

(6.)  The  Bible  happily  is  not  a  metaphysical  work, 
and  I  am  not  very  willing  to  use  its  simple  statements 
to  settle  philosophic  questions.  But  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  Word  of  God,  in  its  spirit  and  its  letter,  opposes  that 
theory  which  makes  man's  highest  end  to  be  enjoyment. 
Everywhere  God  is  represented  as  a  Being  of  whoso 
character  holiness  is  as  essential  an  attri))ute  as  even 
benevolence.  Sin  is  spoken  of  as  an  evil  in  itself,  and 
requiring  atonement  to  be  made  for  it.  We  are  taught 
to  do  this,  and  avoid  that,  not  merely  that  we  may 


APPENDED, 


377 


avoid  sensitive  pahi,  and  gain  sensitive  enjoyment,  but 

because  God  has  commanded  it,  and  because  we  are 
bound  to  obey  God.  Our  chief  end  is  to  glorify  God, 
and  in  this,  and  under  this,  enjoy  Him  forever. 

I  began  this  di??cussion  with  a  profound  veneration 
for  the  character  and  abilities  of  Dr.  Hopkins,  and  I 
close  it  with  the  same  sentiment. 
Pbihceton,  N.  J.,  Sept.  13, 1869. 


REY.  DR.  HOPKINS'S  CONCLUSION. 

Dr.  McCosh  thinks  it  time  the  discussion  between 
him  and  myself  should  close.  I  agree  with  him.  He 
says,  We  have  both  bad  an  opportunity  of  stating  our 
views,"  and  that  "intelligent  readers  have  already  be- 
fore them  the  means  of  coming  to  a  decision."  So  I 
thought,  and  was  content.  Hence  anything  further, 
and  especially  a  rediscussion  of  the  whole  matter  in 
the  form  of  a  summing  up,  was  unexpected  by  me. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  with  reluctance  that 
I  say  a  word  more  ;  but  from  his  fame  and  position 
the  words  of  Dr.  McCosh  fall  with  weight,  and  I  am 
unwilling  that  some  statements  and  representations  in 
his  last  paper  should  pass  without  notice. 

On  the  first  point  taken  up  by  Dr.  McCosh,  I  am 
happy  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  we  are  more  nearly 
agreed  than  he  seems  to  suppose.  I  cannot  but  think 
that  much  of  our  seeming  difference  arises  from  the 
different  meaning  we  give  to  the  word  "  sensibility," 
and  hence  to  "  blessedness."  By  the  sensibility,  I 
mean,  in  common,  as  I  suppose,  with  philosophers  gen- 
erally, the  capacity  of  feeling  in  its  whole  range,  as  re- 
vealed, not  only  through  the  activity  of  the  senses,  bnt 


378 


APPENDIX, 


of  every  mental  and  moral  power ;  and  did  not  suspecfc 

the  possibility  of  my -being  supposed  to  mean  anything 
else.  According  to  this,  blessedness  would  be  a  form 
of  enjoyment,  and,  except  in  and  through  the  sensibil- 
ity, would  be  impossible.  But  Dr.  McCosh  cannot 
mean  this,  for  he  says  there  is  a  blessedness  which 
is  not  enjoyment,''  and  calls  oh  me  to  "  stick  to  the  one 
or  the  other."  He  says  that  if  I  adhere  to  enjoyment, 
my  theory  becomes  utilitarianism  ;  if  1  insist  on  bring- 
ing in  blessedness,  I  introduce  a  new  element,  whether 
I  see  it  or  not :  and  so  he  makes  two  horns  of  a  dilem- 
ma where  I  see  no  horn  at  all.  He  says  that  the  end 
of  man  is  not  in  the  sensibility,  and  yet  says  that 
"blessedness,"  ^'properly  explained,"  "is  the  supreme 
end."  He  says  that  "holy  enjoyment  is  a  supreme 
end,"  —  that  is,  the  supreme  end,  for  there  can  be  but 
one.  But  this  is  precisely  what  I  have  said  from  the 
beginning,^  and  whoever  says  this,  explain  it  as  he 
may,  must  agree  with  me  substantially  in  my  whole 
theory,  "  whether  he  sees  it  or  not."  I  congratulate 
Dr.  McCosh,  or  rather  myself,  on  his  coming  to  this 
lesult ;  but  what  meaning  he  can  attach  to  the  word 
"  sensibility  "  in  his  process  of  doing  so,  is  inscrutable 
to  me.  With  the  above  meaning,  I  still  say  that  "  if 
we  suppose  the  sensibility  excluded,  the  conception  even, 
of  an  end  is  impossible  ; "  and  I  cannot  but  think  that 
my  readers,  and  even  Dr.  McCosh  will  agree  with  me. 
As  I  have  said  from  the  first,  a  being  with  no  capac- 
ity of  feeling  of  any  kind  not  only  could  form  no  con- 
ception of  an  end,  but  would  lack  the  very  condition 
that  would  enable  him  to  form  moral  ideas  or  to  Ibrm- 
uiate  a  moral  law. 

Under  liis  second  head,  again,  I  think  we  should  be 
Bubstantially  agreed  but  for  the  same  didiculty.  Dr 
McCosh  accepts  my  illustraiion  of  the  mode  in  which 
1  See  Moral  Science,  lect.  viii. 


APPENDIX. 


379 


ie  question  between  m  is  to  be  settled.    He  says. 

We  determine  the  end  of  a  locomotive  by  looking  at 
its  structure  and  its  relation  to  other  things  in  the  uses 
to  which  it  is  put.  It  is  thus  that  we  are  to  determine 
the  end  of  man's  existence  as  a  question  of  philosophy." 
This  is  just  what  1  say ;  and  also  that  it  follows  that 
as  we  do  not  determine  the  end  of  a  locomotive  by 
inquiring  "  what  saith  our  moral  nature,"  so  neither  do 
we  determine  thus  the  end  of  man ;  whereas  Dr.  Mc- 
Cosh  says,  after  saying  what  I  have  quoted  above,  that 
the  end  of  man  is  to  be  determined  by  his  conscience. 
As  I  think,  we  judge  that  the  end  of  man  is  to  be 
gained  by  obeying  his  conscience  by  comparing  that 
faculty  with  others,  but  that  judgment  and  comparison 
are  not  the  work  of  the  faculty  itself.  In  this  there 
is  a  slight  difference  on  another  ground ;  but  now  comes 
that  again  from  our  not  understanding  alike  sensi- 
bility" and  its  cognates.  Dr.  McCosh  is  ''sorry  to 
find  me  falling  into  the  omission  of  Professor  Bain,  and 
of  the  sensational  and  utilitarian  school  generally,"  —  an 
omission,  by  the  way,  fallen  into  by  Kant  and  Ilamil- 
von  and  every  distinguished  intuitional  pliilosopher  who 
has  written  since,  —  "  and  representing  the  original 
constituents  of  man's  end  [being  ?]  to  be  intellect  to 
know,  sensibility  to  feel,  and  will  to  choose  and  act." 
In  so  doing,  he  says  I  have  left  out,  as  an  independent 
element,  the  Moral  Power,  Moral  Reason,  or  Con- 
science." He  is  "  amazed  to  find  me  declaring  that 
without  a  sensibility  the  conception  of  an  end  is  impos- 
sible." He  holds  that  "the  moral  power  in  man  de- 
clares that  there  is  a  higher  end  than  the  mere  securing 
or  procuring  of  enjoyment,"  and  that  "it  is  easy  to 
form  a  conception  of  it."  Here  it  is,  in  all  this,  that 
we  feel  the  need  of  that  insci'utable  meaning  of  the 
word  "  sensibility  "  of  which  I  have  spoken.    For  wit]^» 


380 


APPENDIX. 


out  it  what  have  we  ?  We  have  a  part  of  man's  na- 
ture, and  that  the  highest,  which  neither  consists,  not 
is  employed,  in  knowing,  or  feeling,  or  willing !  What 
else  is  possible  ?  We  have  an  end  without  a  sensibility, 
easy  to  be  conceived  of,  higher  than  any  other,  and  yet 
the  pursuit  of  which  would  neither  secure  nor  promote, 
at  least  intentionally,  the  enjoyment  of  anybody.  I 
am  curious  to  know  what  such  an  end  may  be,  espe- 
cially in  the  view  of  one  who  holds  that  "  the  supreme 
end  is  blessedness  (properly  explained)  or  holy  enjoy- 
ment." 

Under  his  third  head  Dr.  McCosb  says  that  I  "give 
to  Moral  Reason  a  place,  but  a  confused  place."  What 
I  say  is,  that  moral  reason  recognizes  moral  quality, 
and  affirms  obligation  to  choose  ends.  He,  as  I  sup- 
pose, says  the  same,  and  also  makes  this  affirmation  of 
obligation,  or  sense  of  duty,  a  part  of  the  end.  He 
says,  "  This  makes  the  sense  of  duty  to  enter  into  the 
virtuous  act  and  to  become  part  of  the  end."  I  say 
it  enters  into  the  act  to  give  it  quality,  but  not  as  a 
part  of  the  end.  The  end,  I  suppose,  must  be  known 
before  the  sense  of  duty  can  be  oiiginated.  Whether 
this  more  complex  view  gives  moral  reason  a  less  "con- 
fused place,"  I  leave  others  to  judge.  That  a  moral 
act  may  be  binding,  both  beforehand  and  at  the  time 
when  it  is  done,  I  agree  fully  with  Dr.  McCosh  ;  but 
am  not  sure  that  I  understand  what  is  meant  by  its 
beinfj  bindinfj  "  behindhand." 

On  the  question  under  liis  fourth  head,  we  seem  to 
be  in  direct  opposition.  Dr.  McCosli  affirms,  and  I 
deny,  that  the  quality  of  an  act  can  be  the  ground  of 
obligation  to  do  that  act ;  and  yet  I  am  not  sure  that 
we  are  looking  at  precisely  the  same  point  when  we 
thus  affirm  and  deny.  I  agree  that  the  quality  of  ac 
^t  may  be  assigned  as  the  reason  for  doiug  it.    A  mau 


APPENDIX* 


381 


aiay  be  exhorted  to  do  a  just  act  because  it  is  just,  or 

he  may  say  he  did  it  because  it  was  so.  This  is  con- 
venient, and  often  sufficient,  and  hmguage  has  accommo- 
dated itself  to  it  as  it  has  to  the  apparent  motion  of 
the  heavens  ;  but  it  would  be  mere  trifling  to  assign 
the  fact  of  the  justice  of  an  act  —  that  is  the  quality  of 
justice  in  it  —  as  the  ground  of  the  obligation  to  do 
justice.  We  here  seek  what  is  ultimate,  the  real  na- 
ture of  things ;  and  what  I  say,  and  have  said,  is  that 
without  an  underlying  sensibility  and  its  products  in 
the  consciousness,  the  quality  itself  of  justice  could  not 
exist  —  that  nothing  could  be  either  just  or  right.  He 
and  his  school  say  that  an  action  is  right  because  it  is 
right,  and  that  is  the  end  of  it.  I  say  that  a  reason 
can  always  be  given  why  an  action  is  right,  and  that 
without  a  sensibility,  the  quality  of  right  in  an  action, 
regarded  as  moral,  could  not  exist. 

Under  his  fifth  head  Dr.  McCosh  allows  that  "in 
many  virtues  pleasure  and  pain  enter  into  our  view." 
"  We  are  bound,"  he  says,  "  as  much  as  in  us  lies,  to 
promote  the  happiness  of  all  beings  capable  of  joy  or 
of  sorrow.  But  even  here,  let  it  be  observed,  a  moral 
element  enters  :  we  are  bound  to  do  this."  Of  course 
we  are.  Who  ever  thought  otherwise  ?  I  agree  with 
Dr.  McCosh  perfectly,  that  when  beings  capable  of  joy 
or  of  sorrow  are  in  question,  we  are  as  much,  or  at 
least  nearly  as  much,  bound  to  exert  ourselves  for  them 
as  if  they  were  capable  of  no  such  thing.  I  agree 
with  him  that  justice  is  quite  as  much  a  virtue  as  be- 
nevolence, only  I  do  not  think  that  "justice  looks  to 
what  is  right  in  itself"  independently  of  benevolence,  or 
that  it  could  exist  without  it.  I  think  benevolence  ita 
condition,  but  no  more  think  the  idea  of  justice  a  part 
of  that  of  benevolence  than  I  do  the  idea  of  identity 
a  part  of  that  of  being.    I  think  also  that  if  God  were 


882 


APPENDIX. 


as  incapable  of  sensibility  as  a  rock,  and  so  incapable 

of  enjoyment,  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  love 
Him  with  the  love  of  benevolence,  the  only  love  com- 
manded. 

Respecting  the  Bible,  Dr.  McCosh  says,  under  his 
sixth  head,  that  he  is  "  not  very  willing  to  use  its  sim- 
ple statements  to  settle  philosophic  questions."  I  am. 
Let  the  Bible  state  anything  simply  and  explicitly,  and 
I  have  no  philosophy  to  oppose  to  it.  I  said  that  the 
Bible  nowhere  commands  us  to  do  right  because  it  is 
right.  Dr.  McCosh  was  surprised,  and  undertook  to 
show  that  it  did,  by  quoting  the  only  passage  he  could 
find  that  seemed  to  say  so,  though  it  did  not.  He  now 
simply  says  that  it  seems  to  him  "  that  the  Word  of 
God  in  its  spirit  and  letter  opposes  that  theory  which 
makes  man's  highest  end  to  be  enjoyment/*  quoting  no 
text,  and  implying,  in  the  form  of  his  statement,  that 
•I  hold  that  the  end  of  man  is  his  own  enjoyment.  I 
have  nowhere  said  that.  What  I  say  is,  that  the  high- 
est end  of  man  is  to  cause  blessedness  "  properly  ex- 
plained." In  immediate  connection,  Dr.  McCosh  speaks 
of  sensitive  pain  and  sensitive  enjoyment  as  if  they  were 
the  basis  of  my  system.  I  trust  I  have  said  nothing 
to  justify  this.  I  am  no  sensationalist,  but  a  believer 
in  the  highest  form  of  intuitional  and  spiritual  philoso- 
phy. I  am  no  utilitarian.  I  believe  in  a  good  that 
is  good  in  itself,  and  to  be  sought  for  its  own  sake ; 
and  in  disinterested  love  of  beings  who  are  capable  of 
happiness,  quite  as  much,  too,  as  if  they  were  not.  In 
my  two  books,  1  have  examined  the  constitution  of 
man  in  its  relation  both  to  nature  and  to  the  Bible.  I 
have  found  from  that,  that  the  law  of  the  constitution 
18  the  law  of  the  Bible.  That  law  —  tJie  Law  of  Love 
—  I  accept  and  endeavor  to  enforce  —  sim[)ly  that.  I 
build  no  "  lialf-way  house."    I  bring  in  nothing  "  sur 


APPENDIX. 


3^3 


reptHiously."  T  steal  no  element.  I  do  not  subordi- 
Date  virtue  to  happiness,  but  find  a  harmony  between 
them.  I  do  not  say  as  Dr.  Lord,  in  his  letter  to  the 
graduates  of  Dartmouth,  taking  the  representation  of 
Dr.  McCosh,  represents  me  as  saying,  that  I  am  bound 
to  glorify  God  "  because  my  ^ faculties  are  adapted  to 
that  duty,  and  in  performing  it  my  faculties  will  be  in 
harmony,  and  I  shall  be  happy."  I  simply  find  the 
moral  law  —  the  one  law  for  myself  and  for  all  others 
—  impersonal  and  impartial,  and  have  as  little  to  do 
with  this  terrible  enjoyment  as  is  possible  under  a  law 
that  requires  me  to  promote  it  in  its  purest  form  and 
in  the  highest  degree. 

But  enough.  All  metaphysical  points  lie  within  a 
narrow  compass,  and  it  is  both  amusing  and  annoying 
to  me  to  see  what  a  fog  of  discussion,  and  often  nimbus^ 
will  gather  around  them.  Those  involved  in  this  dis- 
cussion seem  to  me  simple  and  luminous.  Most  of  the 
difficulty  in  making  them  appear  so  to  others  arises 
from  the  imperfection  of  language.  This  has  seemed 
to  me  so  great,  that  for  years  I  was  deterred  from 
attempting  anything.  I  saw  so  much  on  these  subjects 
of  mere  logomachy.  This  has  been  a  difficulty  between 
Dr.  McCosh  and  myself.  We  evidently  do  not  always 
attach  the  same  shade  of  meaning  to  the  same  word. 
If  we  could  do  that,  I  am  confident  it  would  bring  us 
nearer  together  than  we  have  seemed,  for  not  only  are 
the  intuitions  of  all  men  on  these  subjects  alike,  but  he 
and  I  belong  to  the  same  general  school  of  thought, 
and  are  substantially  working  together. 

I  close  by  reciprocating  the  kind  expressions  of  re- 
gard by  Dr.  McCosh.  It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  me 
to  welcome  him  in  this  country.  I  rejoiced  in  the 
eclat  with  which  he  was  received  at  Princeton,  and  in 
the  favor  and  endowment  which  his  coming  brought 


884 


APPENDIX. 


to  that  College.    I  trust  the  favor  will  contmue,  and 

the  endowment  increase ;  and  can  only  say  that  if 
another  such  man  could  be  found  who  would  come  to 
this  College  and  bring  equal  favor  and  endowment,  es- 
pecially, just  now,  the  endowment,  I  would  resign 
to-day. 

Williams  College,  Sept.  2Sthf  1869. 


